recognizing that if the medical profession were allowed to set its own standard of conduct by establishing its own custom of practice, then no matter how unreasonable such standard may be by ordinary standards, all members of profession would be insulated from liability so long as they conform to the norm
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that if the medical profession were allowed to set its own standard of conduct by establishing its own custom of practice, then no matter how unreasonable such standard may be by ordinary standards, all members of profession would be insulated from liability so long as they conform to the norm
- interpreting inadequate warnings under Restatement Sec. 402A; "[o]n th[e] basis [of evidence] the trial court instructed the jury that if it found that Parke, Davis was on notice that the drug was being used indiscriminately, and yet failed to try to restrict its use to proper situations, then the company could be found negligent. We think the charge was proper. When a required warning is retained unchanged in the face of being widely disregarded, and the supplier knows or has reason to know of such wide disregard, a jury may be permitted to find the warning insufficient."
- interpreting inadequate warnings under Restatement § 402A; “[o]n th[e] basis [of evidence] the trial court instructed the jury that if it found that Parke, Davis was on notice that the drug was being used indiscriminately, and yet failed to try to restrict its use to proper situations, then the company could be found negligent. We think the charge was proper. When a required warning is retained unchanged in the face of being widely disregarded, and the supplier knows or has reason to know of such wide disregard, a jury may be permitted to find the warning insufficient.”
- stating strict liability was not applicable to a case involving a prescription drag manufacturer’s alleged failure to properly warn physicians of the dangers involved with taking the drug
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 491 Pa. 561 (1980)
282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971), abrogated on other grounds by Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d 1027
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
I dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Spencer, 442 Pa. 328, 338 , 275 A. 2d 299, 305 (1971), believing that this wholly prospective overruling is inappropriate and that the newly announced measure of damages should be applied at least to the instant case.
*312 It will be remembered, for example, that in Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 417 Pa. 486 , 208 A. 2d 193 (1965), where this Court repudiated the charitable immunity doctrine, relief was afforded the particular litigant in that case. A further list of cases where we rejected prospective overruling is contained in Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372 , 282 A. 2d 351 (1971). Therefore, I would likewise here remand solely for the awarding of damages.