what is actually decided and controlling is the law which is applicable to the specific facts of that particular case, and although “great consideration” is due other statements and conclusions contained in the opinion, they are not controlling
How later courts described this case
- what is actually decided and controlling is the law which is applicable to the specific facts of that particular case, and although “great consideration” is due other statements and conclusions contained in the opinion, they are not controlling
- what is actually decided and controlling is the law applicable to the particular facts of that particular case and while all other statements and conclusions therein are entitled to great consideration, they are not controlling
- overruled on other grounds Estate of Tyler, 474 Pa. 148, 377 A.2d 157 (1977)
- the court must consider, inter alia, “the condition of his family, the natural objects of his bounty and the amount and character of his property.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Estate of Tyler, 474 Pa. 148 (1977)
John Paxson's brief at 11 (citing In re Pew's Trust Estate, 411 Pa. 96, 191 A.2d 399 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Estate of Tyler, 474 Pa. 148, 377 A.2d 157 (1977)); In re Hirsh's Estate 334 Pa. 172 5 A.2d 160 (1939); In re Blish Trust, 350 Pa. 311, 38 A.2d 9 (1944).
Overruled in part by Tyler Trusts, 447 Pa. 40 (1972)
See In Re Steele’s Estate, 377 Pa. 250, 103 A.2d 409 (1954), overruled in part by In re Trust of Catherwood, 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961), overruled in part by In re Trust Estate of Pew, 411 Pa. 96, 191 A.2d 399 (1963); overruled in part by Estate of Tyler, 447 Pa. 40, 289 A.2d 441 (1972) and overruled in part by Estate of Tyler, 474 Pa. 148, 377 A.2d 157 (1977); see also In Re Pincus’ Estate, 378 Pa. 102, 105 A.2d…
The opinion
Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen:
I. agree with Justice Jones and Judge Taxis of the court below, that the settlor did not “direct” the apportionment between principal and income so as to bring this trust within the proviso clause of section 2 of the Principal and Income Act.
I likewise-agree that our decision in Catherwood with respect to the retroactive application of the Act to ordinary stock dividends is entitled to as much weight as our decision with regard to extraordinary stock dividends—a determination which the majority apparently accepts. Moreover, no reason is advanced by the majority why our decision in Catherwood that ordinary stock dividends are subject to the Principal and Income Act should now be overruled.
I would go further, however, and hold that the retroactive application of the Act to ordinary stock dividends does not violate due process or constitute an impairment- of the obligation of contracts, as contended by appellant. . As we held in Catherwood, “[t]here is ho vested property right in a court-made rule of apportionment.” [405 Pa. at 77]. Instead of undermining the Act of 1947 and our decision, in Catherwood, as the majority does, I would give appellant the opportunity to question the constitutionality of Catherwood before the United States Supreme Court—the obvious purpose of this litigation.
Accordingly, I dissent.