Opinion

Zoltek Corp. v. United States

  • 672 F.3d 1309
  • 87 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 559
  • 102 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1001
  • 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5361
  • 2012 WL 833892
Court
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Filed
Mar 14, 2012
Status
Published
On the bench
Rader, Plager, Gajarsa, Newman, Lourie, Bryson, Linn, Prost, Moore, O'Malley, Reyna, Wallach, Dyk, I-B
Cited by
94 cases
Authority
More cited than 20.1%

explaining that because “direct infringement under § 1498(a) comes within the scope of the right to exclude granted in 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)____ the Government has waived its sovereign immunity”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining that because “direct infringement under § 1498(a) comes within the scope of the right to exclude granted in 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)____ the Government has waived its sovereign immunity”
  • observing that § 1498(a) waives ' sovereign immunity when “the United States ... would be liable for direct infringement of the patent right for such use or manufacture if the United States was a private party”
  • granting permanent injunction where plaintiff set forth evidence that future infringement "might" take place
  • “It is fundamental that ‘[t]he starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the language itself.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472, 97 S.Ct. 1292, 51 L.Ed.2d 480 (1977))

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

__________________________

ZOLTEK CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant,

v.

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

2009-5135

__________________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal

Claims in case no. 96-CV-166, Judge Edward J. Damich.

___________________________

Decided: March 14, 2012

___________________________

JOE D. JACOBSON, Green Jacobson, P.C., of Clayton,

Missouri, argued for plaintiff-appellee. Of counsel were

DEAN A. MONCO and JOHN S. MORTIMER, Wood, Phillips,

Katz, Clark & Mortimer, of Chicago, Illinois.

DONALD R. DUNNER, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow,

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for

defendant-appellant. With him on the brief were RICHARD

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 2

T. RUZICH, Duane Morris LLP, of Chicago, Illinois,

MATTHEW C. MOUSLEY, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,

and KERRY B. MCTIGUE, of Washington, DC, and SCOTT J.

POPMA, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, Garrett & Dun-

ner, LLP, of Washington, DC.

ANISHA DASGUPTA, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Civil

Division, United States Department of Justice, of Wash-

ington, DC, argued for amicus curiae United States. With

her on the brief were TONY WEST, Assistant Attorney

General, and SCOTT R. MCINTOSH, Attorney.

JERRY STOUCK, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, of Washing-

ton, DC, for amicus curiae Federal Circuit Bar Associa-

tion.

WILLIAM C. BERGMANN, Baker & Hostetler LLP, of

Washington, DC, for amicus curiae Aerospace Industries

Association of America, Inc.

__________________________

Before RADER, Chief Judge, PLAGER and GAJARSA, ∗ Circuit

Judges.

RADER, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, LOURIE, BRYSON, LINN,

PROST, MOORE, O’MALLEY, REYNA, and WALLACH, Circuit

Judges, join Part I-B of this opinion. DYK, Circuit Judge,

dissents from Part I-B.

GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.

This appeal represents the continuing saga of the

Zoltek Corporation (“Zoltek”) in its effort to obtain com-

pensation for the alleged infringement of its patent. The

∗

Circuit Judge Gajarsa assumed senior status on

July 31, 2011.

3 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

specific issue in this appeal is whether the Court of Fed-

eral Claims properly allowed Zoltek to amend its com-

plaint and transfer its claim for infringement under 35

U.S.C. § 271(g) against Lockheed Martin Corporation

(“Lockheed”) to the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Georgia. The trial court allowed the

amendment and transfer because it concluded that the

requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1631, the transfer statute,

were satisfied. On the facts of this case, however,

amendment and transfer were legal error. Moreover,

because the error in this case was precipitated in part by

this court’s earlier decision in Zoltek Corp. v. United

States (“Zoltek III”), 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per

curiam; Gajarsa, J. concurring; Dyk, J. concurring;

Plager, J. dissenting) we revisit the basis for that deci-

sion. Thus, in light of our revisiting of our earlier deci-

sion, we (1) reverse the trial court’s decision here allowing

amendment of Zoltek’s complaint and transferring the

amended complaint to the district court; and (2) we re-

mand the case to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

BACKGROUND

Zoltek is the assignee of United States Reissue Patent

No. 34,162 (the “RE ’162 Patent”), entitled “Controlled

Surface Electrical Resistance Carbon Fiber Sheet Prod-

uct.” Claims 1-22 and 33-38 relate to methods of manu-

facturing carbon fiber sheets with controlled surface

electrical resistivity; claims 23-32 and 39-40 are product-

by-process claims for the partially carbonized fiber sheets.

Zoltek is presently asserting only the method claims,

which generally contain two steps: partially carbonizing

the fiber starting material and then processing those

fibers into sheet products. The carbon fiber products at

issue were used in the F-22, a fighter jet, which Lockheed

designed and built pursuant to a contract with the Gov-

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 4

ernment. The F-22 contains two types of carbon fiber

products: silicon carbide fiber mats (“Tyranno fibers”),

which are fibrous reinforcing material, and prepregs

(“Nicalon fibers”), which are pre-impregnated material

typically used in the manufacture of high performance

composites. Zoltek Corp. v. United States (“Zoltek I”), 51

Fed. Cl. 829, 831 & nn.1-2 (2002).

In its original complaint filed in 1996, Zoltek sued the

United States under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), alleging that,

without a license from Zoltek or other lawful right, the

claimed invention covered by the RE ’162 Patent was

infringed because the resulting product was used or

manufactured by or for the United States. At that time,

Zoltek did not assert any claims against Lockheed. Under

§ 1498(a),

Whenever an invention described in and covered

by a patent of the United States is used or manu-

factured by or for the United States without li-

cense of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or

manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall

be by action against the United States in the

United States Court of Federal Claims for the re-

covery of his reasonable and entire compensation

for such use and manufacture.

Section 1498(a) “is more than a waiver of immunity and

effects an assumption of liability by the government.”

Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fed. Res. Bank, 583

F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Richmond

Screw Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 U.S. 331, 344

(1928)).

The United States (“Government”) moved for partial

summary judgment arguing that 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c)

precluded Zoltek’s recovery for the Government’s use of

the method claims. Zoltek I, 51 Fed. Cl. at 830. Section

5 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

1498(c) states that “[t]he provisions of this section shall

not apply to any claim arising in a foreign country.” The

manufacturing of the Tyranno and Nicalon fibers begins

in Japan, where the fibers are “partially carboniz[ed].”

Zoltek Corp. v. United States (“Zoltek II”), 58 Fed. Cl. 688,

690 (2003). The fibers are then imported into the United

States, where they are processed into sheets. 1 Id. The

Government argued Zoltek’s claim arose in a foreign

country and, therefore, its sovereign immunity was not

waived.

The trial court held in Zoltek I that § 1498 “does not

[waive the Government’s sovereign immunity as] to all

forms of direct infringement as currently defined in 35

U.S.C. § 271.” 51 Fed. Cl. at 837. The trial court, how-

ever, did not rule on the Government’s summary judg-

ment motion, but stayed the motion pending additional

briefing concerning Zoltek’s ability to assert a claim for a

taking of its patent rights under the Fifth Amendment.

See id. at 839. It subsequently denied the Government’s

motion, holding that Zoltek could assert a takings claim.

Zoltek II, 58 Fed. Cl. at 707. Both parties appealed.

In our per curiam opinion, the panel majority re-

versed the trial court’s ruling that Zoltek could allege

patent infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking under

the Tucker Act. Zoltek III, 442 F.3d at 1353 (per curiam).

In the same opinion, the panel majority affirmed the trial

court’s conclusion that Zoltek’s infringement allegations

were precluded by § 1498, but—unlike the trial court and

the dissent—the majority cited § 1498(a) as the basis for

1 In Zoltek III, this court stated that the Nicalon fi-

bers were manufactured and formed into sheet products

in Japan. 442 F.3d at 1349. This statement was contrary

to the facts as found by the trial court, see Zoltek Corp. v.

United States (“Zoltek IV”), 85 Fed. Cl. 409, 411 n.1

(2009), and we correct it here.

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 6

the holding, without reaching the issue of § 1498(c). Id.

In doing so, the panel majority relied on NTP, Inc. v.

Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir.

2005), for the proposition that “direct infringement under

section 271(a) is a necessary predicate for government

liability under section 1498.” Id. at 1350. Because “a

process cannot be used ‘within’ the United States as

required by section 271(a) unless each of the steps is

performed within this country,” we held that a § 1498

remedy is foreclosed “where, as here, not all steps of a

patented process have been performed in the United

States.” Id. (citing NTP, 418 F.3d at 1318). We then

remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. at 1353.

On remand, Zoltek sought leave to amend its com-

plaint to add a claim against Lockheed for infringement of

the RE ’162 Patent’s method claims under 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(g) and to transfer that claim to the Northern Dis-

trict of Georgia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. The trial

court explained that it lacked jurisdiction over Zoltek’s

claims against the Government based on this court’s

holding in Zoltek III and that the Northern District of

Georgia would have jurisdiction over Zoltek’s claim for

infringement against Lockheed. Zoltek IV, 85 Fed. Cl. at

413, 418.

The trial court rejected the Government’s argument

that on the basis of the grant of immunity for contractors

provided in § 1498(a), there is no jurisdiction in the

Northern District of Georgia. The second paragraph of

§ 1498(a) states that “the use or manufacture of an inven-

tion described in and covered by a patent of the United

States by a contractor . . . for the Government and with

the authorization or consent of the Government, shall be

construed as use or manufacture for the United States.”

According to the trial court, “§ 1498(a) only insulates

government contractors from suit when the Government

7 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

can be found liable,” and even if § 1498(a) insulated

government contractors from liability, transfer was still

proper because § 1498(a) is an affirmative defense and not

a jurisdictional bar. Id. at 418-19.

The trial court also found that it was in the interest of

justice to transfer the claim because (1) it was plausible

that without transfer at least part of Zoltek’s claim for

infringement against Lockheed would be time-barred; (2)

Lockheed had participated in the suit through discovery

beginning in 1997 and was aware that its product was the

subject of this litigation; and (3) Zoltek was the first

plaintiff to discover “a legislative gap between the defini-

tion of infringement under § 1498 and the definition of

infringement under § 271.” Id. at 420-21. The trial court

thus granted Zoltek leave to amend its complaint. Based

upon the trial court’s determination, Zoltek amended its

complaint.

Subsequently, the Court of Federal Claims certified

the following controlling question of law to this court for

interlocutory appeal: “whether 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c) must

be construed to nullify any government contractor immu-

nity provided in § 1498(a) when a patent infringement

claim aris[es] in a foreign country.” Zoltek Corp. v. United

States, No. 96-cv-166, Dkt. No. 385 (May 14, 2009) (“Certi-

fied Order”). This court accepted the appeal explaining

that the issues before the court are “whether the trial

court should have transferred the case and whether the

court should have allowed the complaint to be amended to

add Lockheed as a defendant.” Zoltek Corp. v. United

States, Misc. No. 903, 2009 WL 3169301, *1 (Fed. Cir.

Sept. 30, 2009). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2).

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 8

DISCUSSION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1631, transfer is appropriate if (1)

the transferor court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the action could

have been brought in the transferee court at the time it

was filed; and (3) transfer is in the interest of justice.

This court reviews the trial court’s grant of a motion to

transfer a claim for an abuse of discretion, but issues of

law are reviewed de novo. See Rick’s Mushroom Serv.,

Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir.

2008). As we stated in Zoltek III, the issues before the

court in this case are purely questions of law. 442 F.3d at

1349. And as we shall explain, the trial court inadver-

tently erred as a matter of law in authorizing the

amendment and the transfer of Zoltek’s claim against

Lockheed.

I.

In confronting the question of whether a contractor

acting under Government authority could be held liable

for patent infringement, in a situation in which we had

previously held the Government not liable for the alleg-

edly infringing actions of its contractor, we realized that

one of two consequences would result. Either we had to

conclude that a patentee’s well-pleaded complaint of

infringement in the United States of a United States

patent in these circumstances fails to state a cause of

action against both the Government and the Govern-

ment’s contractor, or we would have to override the long-

standing understanding of the statutory framework that a

contractor working for the Government is immune from

individual liability for patent infringement occurring in

the course of conducting the Government’s contract.

This caused us to re-examine the premises on which

our earlier opinion in Zoltek III was based, and to recon-

sider the consequences of that opinion. As we shall ex-

9 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

plain, we have concluded that the change in law effected

by this court’s decision in Zoltek III, which limited the

scope of § 1498(a) to direct infringement under § 271(a), is

in error, and must be corrected. We note that, before

arriving at this conclusion, we reviewed the briefs and

arguments before the court in the earlier appeal that

resulted in the Zoltek III opinion, as well as the trial

court’s several opinions and, of course, the briefs and

arguments in this phase of the case. Since our re-

examination of the case in effect reinstates the Govern-

ment’s potential liability under §1498(a) for the infringe-

ment alleged in this case, we particularly note that the

Government has been an active participant in all phases

of the trial and appeals in this case, including oral argu-

ment in the present appeal even though the case was

nominally between Zoltek and Lockheed Martin.

A.

As explained below, the Zoltek III panel’s limitation of

§ 1498(a) to infringement under § 271(a) is inconsistent

with the plain language of the statute, and in deciding to

limit § 1498(a), the panel misapplied its own case law.

That error significantly limits the protection that

§ 1498(a) provides to government contractors, which, in

this case, results in Lockheed having liability for conduct

otherwise immunized by § 1498(a). It creates the possibil-

ity that the United States’ procurement of important

military matériel could be interrupted via infringement

actions against government contractors—the exact result

§ 1498 was meant to avoid. And finally, it vitiates the

Congressional scheme, spread across three Titles in the

United States Code, see 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271(g), 19

U.S.C. § 1337, and 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which is meant to

give relief to process patent holders when the resulting

products of their patented process are used within the

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 10

United States—regardless of where the process is prac-

ticed.

Before analyzing Zoltek III’s interpretation of § 1498,

we review the history of the adoption of that section. In

Schillinger v. United States, the Supreme Court held that

patent infringement was a tort for which the Government

had not waived sovereign immunity. 155 U.S. 163, 167-69

(1894). Thus, absent conduct by the United States from

which a contract to license the patent could be inferred, a

patent holder lacked a remedy for infringement by the

United States. Id. at 169-71.

In response to the perceived injustice of the Schillin-

ger rule, Congress enacted the precursor to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1498, which provided:

That whenever an invention described in and cov-

ered by a patent of the United States shall hereaf-

ter be used by the United States without license of

the owner thereof or lawful right to use the same,

such owner may recover reasonable compensation

for such use by suit in the Court of Claims.

Act of June 25, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61-305, 36 Stat. 851

(1910) (“1910 Act”); see also Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Akti-

engesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290, 304 (1912) (describing the

history of the 1910 Act).

In 1918, the Supreme Court applied the 1910 Act to

the issue of patent infringement by government contrac-

tors in the course of producing warships during World

War I. William Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co.

v. Int’l Curtis Marine Turbine Co., 246 U.S. 28 (1918).

Despite the contractor’s construction of warships pursu-

ant to “comprehensively detailed” specifications provided

by the Navy, the Court found that the 1910 Act did not

shield the contractor from infringement. Id. at 42-43.

11 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

Reaction to the Court’s March 4, 1918 decision was

swift. On April 20, Acting Secretary of the Navy Franklin

D. Roosevelt wrote a letter to the chairman of the Senate

Committee of Naval Affairs, stating that the Navy was

confronted with a difficult situation as the result

of [the] decision by the Supreme Court affecting

the government’s rights as to the manufacture

and use of patented inventions, and it seems nec-

essary that amendment be made of the Act of

June 25, 1910 . . . . [T]he decision is, in effect, . . .

that a contractor for the manufacture of a pat-

ented article for the government is not exempt . . .

from injunction and other interference through

litigation by the patentee.

A prior decision of the Supreme Court, that in the

case of Crozier v. Krupp [224 U.S. 290] had been

interpreted as having the opposite meaning, and

the department was able up to the time of the

later decision, on March 4 last, to proceed satis-

factorily with the procuring of such patented arti-

cles as it needed, leaving the matter of

compensation to patentees for adjustment by di-

rect agreement, or, if necessary, by resort to the

Court of Claims under the above-mentioned act of

1910. Now, however, manufacturers are exposed

to expensive litigation, involving the possibilities

of prohibitive injunction payment of royalties,

rendering of accounts, and payment of punitive

damages, and they are reluctant to take contracts

that may bring such severe consequences. The

situation promised serious disadvantage to the

public interests, and in order that vital activities

of this department may not be restricted unduly

at this time, and also with a view of enabling dis-

satisfied patentees to obtain just and adequate

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 12

compensation in all cases conformably to the de-

clared purpose of said act, I have the honor to re-

quest that the act be amended by the insertion of

a proper provision therefore in the pending naval

appropriation bill.

Wood v. Atl. Gulf & Pac. Co., 296 F. 718, 720-21 (D. Ala.

1924) (quoting letter). In response to this letter, the 1910

Act was amended to provide

That whenever an invention described in and cov-

ered by a patent of the United States shall hereaf-

ter be used or manufactured by or for the United

States without license of the owner thereof or law-

ful right to use or manufacture the same, such

owner may recover owner’s remedy shall be by suit

against the United States in the Court of Claims

for the recovery of his reasonable and entire com-

pensation for such use and manufacture by suit in

the Court of Claims.

Act of July 1, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-182, 40 Stat. 704, 705

(1918) (additions in italics; deletions struck through).

As a result of the amendment, the Government not

only waived sovereign immunity for its own unlawful use

or manufacture of a patented invention, but, in most

cases, assumed liability when its contractors did so. See

Richmond Screw, 275 U.S. at 343-44. Moreover, when

applicable, the amendment made the specified remedy

exclusive. Id. at 344. Indeed, the Supreme Court said:

The purpose of the amendment was to relieve the

contractor entirely from liability of every kind for

the infringement of patents in manufacturing

anything for the government, and to limit the

owner of the patent and his assigns . . . to suit

against the United States in the Court of Claims

13 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

for the recovery of his reasonable and entire com-

pensation for such use and manufacture. The

word ‘entire’ emphasizes the exclusive and com-

prehensive character of the remedy provided.

Id. at 343. See also Identification Devices v. United

States, 121 F.2d 895, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Pollen v. Ford

Instrument Co., 108 F.2d 762, 763 (2d Cir. 1940).

To the degree that any doubt existed, Congress fur-

ther clarified the scope of the 1918 amendment by enact-

ing what is now the second paragraph of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1498(a), which reads:

[T]he use or manufacture of an invention de-

scribed in and covered by a patent of the United

States by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any

person, firm, or corporation for the Government

and with the authorization or consent of the Gov-

ernment, shall be construed as use or manufac-

ture for the United States.

Act of Oct. 31, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-768, § 6, 56 Stat.

1013, 1014; see also S. Rep. No. 77-1640 (1942) at 1 (stat-

ing that the purpose of the second paragraph of § 1498 is

“[t]o clarify existing legislation . . . with respect to con-

tractors and subcontractors manufacturing and using

inventions for the Government”).

These provisions were codified in their modern form

in 1949:

Whenever an invention described in and covered

by a patent of the United States is used or manu-

factured by or for the United States without li-

cense of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or

manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall

be by action against the United States in the

United States Court of [Federal] Claims for the

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 14

recovery of his reasonable and entire compensa-

tion for such use and manufacture.

****

For the purposes of this section, the use or manu-

facture of an invention described in and covered

by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a

subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation

for the Government and with the authorization or

consent of the Government, shall be construed as

use or manufacture for the United States.

Act of May 24, 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-72, § 87, 63 Stat. 89,

102 (“1949 Act”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). 2

As enacted, this could be read to permit suit against

the United States for the unlawful use or manufacture of

patented inventions abroad, e.g., under foreign patent

law. See H.R. Rep. No. 86-624, at 6-7 (1959) (letter from

William Macomber, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State).

Indeed, at least one plaintiff brought suit in the Court of

Claims seeking compensation for such activities. See

Yassin v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 509, 511, 513-14 (Ct.

Cl. 1948). To clarify the scope of § 1498, Congress intro-

duced a geographic limitation, which is now codified at 28

U.S.C. § 1498(c): “The provisions of this section shall not

2 The statute was first codified as 35 U.S.C. § 68

(1926). The re-codification at 28 U.S.C. § 1498 substan-

tially altered the text. See Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L.

No. 80-773, 62 Stat. 869, 941 (1948) (enacting into posi-

tive law as 28 U.S.C. § 1498). The codified text was

revised shortly thereafter to “restate[] its first paragraph

to conform more closely with the original law.” H.R. Rep.

No. 81-352, at 11 (1949); see also 1949 Act § 87. The 1949

Act is identical to the current text of the first sentence of

28 U.S.C. § 1498(a), with the exception of the name of the

Court of Federal Claims.

15 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

apply to any claim arising in a foreign country.” Act of

Sept. 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-726, § 1, 74 Stat. 855, 855;

see also H.R. Rep. No. 86-624, at 1. Within that historical

framework, we turn to the terms of the statute and their

application to this case.

B.

In doing so we find that this court’s holding in Zoltek

III, which found liability under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) to be a

predicate to government liability under § 1498, must be

corrected because it 1) was contrary to the plain language

of § 1498; 2) relied on dicta and a fundamental misreading

of the statute; 3) impermissibly rendered subsection (c) of

§ 1498 inoperative; and 4) caused 19 U.S.C. § 1337(l) to

become ineffective while ignoring Congress’s clear intent.

Since a panel of this court cannot reverse a prior panel

decision, the court sua sponte voted to take Part I-B of

this opinion en banc for the limited purpose of vacating

the Zoltek III opinion. The active judges, consisting of

RADER, Chief Judge, NEWMAN, LOURIE, BRYSON,

LINN, PROST, MOORE, O’MALLEY, REYNA, and

WALLACH, Circuit Judges, voted to vacate the Zoltek III

opinion. DYK, Circuit Judge, dissents from the en banc

portion of the opinion. See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Kara-

van Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359 n.* (Fed. Cir.

1999) (reversing prior precedent through an en banc vote

on one part of an opinion), abrogated on other grounds by

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23,

28 (2001); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc.,

141 F.3d 1059, 1068 n.5 (Fed. Cir.1998) (same);

Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863

F.2d 867, 876 n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (same).

i.

It is fundamental that “[t]he starting point in every

case involving construction of a statute is the language

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 16

itself.” Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472

(1977) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 1498

waives the United States’ sovereign immunity from suit.

Thus, it must be strictly construed in favor of the United

States. Blueport Co. v. United States, 533 F.3d 1374,

1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187,

192 (1996)). Any ambiguity in the statute must be re-

solved in favor of immunity. See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192.

Section 1498(a) allows for suit against the Govern-

ment “[w]henever an invention described in and covered

by a patent of the United States is used or manufactured

by or for the United States without license of the owner

thereof or lawful right” and provides that government

contractors would be immune from suit for such use or

manufacture. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). The scope of the

Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity thus depends

on the meaning of (1) “an invention described in and

covered by a patent”; (2) “used or manufactured by or for

the United States”; and (3) “without license of the owner

[of the patent] or lawful right” to do so. Id. Moreover,

this language must be interpreted in accordance with its

ordinary meaning in 1910, when Congress enacted

§ 1498’s precursor. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S.

37, 42 (1979) (stating that “unless otherwise defined,

words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, con-

temporary, common meaning” at the time Congress

enacted the statute).

The language “described in and covered by a patent”

has been part of § 1498 since its precursor was enacted in

1910. See 1910 Act. Based on Supreme Court case law

and the Patent Act at the time of the 1910 Act, for an

invention to be “described in and covered by a patent,” the

invention must be claimed in the patent. See Lehigh

Valley R.R. Co v. Mellon, 104 U.S. 112, 119 (1881) (“[T]he

scope of letters-patent should be limited to the invention

17 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

covered by the claim . . . .”); see also Patent Act of 1870, 41

Cong. Ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870) (“Patent Act

of 1870”) (stating that the patent “shall particularly point

out and distinctly claim the part, improvement, or combi-

nation which he claims as his invention or discovery”). In

the intervening years, both the relevant case law and

subsequent amendments to the Patent Act are consistent

with this understanding of “described in and covered by a

patent.”

Moving next to the “used or manufactured” language,

we note that at the time the amendment to the 1910 Act

was adopted, the Patent Act gave the patentee “the exclu-

sive right to make, use, and vend the . . . invention or

discovery.” Patent Act of 1870 § 22. The Supreme Court

has explained that “make” and “use” were not “technical

terms.” Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913).

It stated that “make . . . embraces the construction of the

thing invented [and t]he right to use is a comprehensive

term and embraces within its meaning the right to put

into service any given invention.” Id. at 10-11. As ex-

plained above, the “invention” is what is claimed in the

patent. Thus, to “use” an invention, each limitation of the

claims must be present in the accused product or process.

See Sargent v. Hall Safe & Lock Co., 114 U.S. 63, 86

(1885) (holding the defendant did not infringe where its

product lacked an element of the asserted claim).

The last phrase we must interpret, “without license of

the owner thereof or lawful right,” has also been part of

§ 1498(a) since the 1910 Act. “Without license of the

owner” means simply that the owner has not given the

Government a license to use the patented invention.

Early variants of the bill that would ultimately become

the 1910 Act lacked the requirement that the use or

manufacture be “without . . . lawful right.” H.R. 7653,

60th Cong., 42 Cong. Rec. 6,164 (1908); S. 7676, 59th

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 18

Cong., 41 Cong. Rec. 1,344 (1907). Congress added the

requirement in order to make clear that the United States

would not be liable for manufacturing or using inventions

created by its employees in the course of their employ-

ment, a lawful shop right under then-existing law. See

H.R. Rep. No. 61-1288, at 3-4 (1910) (citing Solomons v.

United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 335 (1887), aff’d, 137 U.S. 342

(1890)); 45 Cong. Rec. 8,757 (1910). Of course, the words

of the limitation are not confined to the Government’s

shop rights. Instead, they carve out from the Govern-

ment’s assumption of liability all lawful uses, i.e. all uses

which are not covered by the scope of the patent grant.

See United States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262, 271-72 (1888)

(noting that a patent grants a monopoly against citizen

and Government alike, but questioning the availability of

a remedy for infringement by the United States); W.L.

Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1283

(Fed. Cir. 1988) (Rich, J.) (stating that a patent is a grant

of the right to exclude others from violating the patent

grant in Title 35, but § 1498 modifies the grant so the

Government may use what it needs), abrogated on other

grounds by eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S.

388, 391-94 (2006). In short, lawful right refers to the

United States’ right to use or manufacture an invention—

without liability under § 1498—in all cases where other

unlicensed parties can do so without directly infringing a

patent. See Garlock, 842 F.2d at 1283 (“The government

has graciously consented . . . to be sued . . . for what would

be infringement if by a private person.”).

Thus, § 1498(a) waives the Government’s sovereign

immunity from suit when (1) an invention claimed in a

United States patent; (2) is “used or manufactured by or

for the United States,” meaning each limitation is present

in the accused product or process; and (3) the United

States has no license or would be liable for direct in-

19 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

fringement of the patent right for such use or manufac-

ture if the United States was a private party. Section

1498 makes no reference to direct infringement as it is

defined in § 271(a). Indeed, so interpreting § 1498(a) is

contrary to its plain language, interpreted in light of the

meaning of that language in 1910.

ii.

Moreover, the panel majority’s per curiam interpreta-

tion of § 1498(a) in Zoltek III was rooted in a fundamental

misreading of the statute. The panel failed to rely on the

plain language of the statute, but premised its conclusion

on NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., which stated

that “direct infringement under section 271(a) is a neces-

sary predicate for government liability under section

1498.” 418 F.3d 1282, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing as

authority a footnote in Motorola, Inc. v. United States, 729

F.2d 765, 768 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). However, NTP did not

involve the United States as a party and was interpreting

35 U.S.C. § 271(a), not 28 U.S.C. §1498; the court referred

to § 1498(a) only to provide a framework for analyzing

§ 271(a). See id. at 1315-16 (interpreting “use within the

United States” under 271(a)). Therefore, this court’s

statement in NTP regarding the scope of § 1498 was not a

holding of the case and accordingly such dictum is not

binding.

NTP itself was relying on dictum from Motorola when

it referred to § 1498(a). In Motorola, this court cited to

Decca Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167 (Ct. Cl.

1980) and stated that “the Government can only be sued

for any direct infringement of a patent (35 U.S.C.

§ 271(a)), and not for inducing infringement by another

(section 271(b)) or for contributory infringement (section

271(c)).” 729 F.2d at 768 n.3. However, in 1984, § 271(g)

had not been enacted and § 154(a)(1) did not include the

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 20

right to exclude others from using products made by a

patented process—statutory provisions that were not

implemented until 1988. Process Patents Amendment

Act of 1988 (“PPAA”), P.L. 100-418, §§ 9002, 9003, 102

Stat. 1107, 1563-64 (1988). Therefore, at that time it was

logical to use those sections of Title 35 to illustrate the

idea that § 1498 requires direct infringement and does not

apply to indirect infringement. But using § 271(a) as

shorthand to define direct infringement under § 1498 was

not a holding of the case and did not reflect Motorola’s

holding, which was that § 1498 did not incorporate 35

U.S.C. § 287. Motorola, 729 F.2d at 769. Tellingly, that

statement appeared in a footnote listing some of the

several differences between a § 1498 action and one under

Title 35. Id. at 768 n.3.

In Decca, the Court of Claims, our predecessor court,

concluded that § 1498(a) did not waive the Government’s

sovereign immunity for indirect infringement under 35

U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and (c). 640 F.2d at 1169-70. Decca did

not hold, as Motorola assumed, that § 1498(a) is synony-

mous with infringement under § 271(a). Rather, the court

“h[e]ld that 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(b) and (c) are not incorpo-

rated by implication in [§] 1498.” Id. at 1170. The court

explained that inducement and contributory infringement

are outside § 1498(a) because they “do not involve the

Government’s making or using a patented invention . . . .”

Id. at 1170 & n.31 (emphasis added). In coming to this

conclusion, the court recognized the importance of the

language in § 1498(a), which is limited to inventions that

are “used or manufactured by or for the United States.”

The court stated simply:

Because section 1498 is an eminent domain stat-

ute, the Government has consented there under

only to be sued for its taking of a patent license.

Expressed differently, section 1498 is a waiver of

21 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

sovereign immunity only with respect to a direct

governmental infringement of a patent. Activities

of the Government which fall short of direct in-

fringement do not give rise to governmental liabil-

ity because the Government has not waived its

sovereign immunity with respect to such activi-

ties. Hence, the Government is not liable for its

inducing infringement by others, for its conduct

contributory to infringement of others, or for

what, but for section 1498, would be contributory

(rather than direct) infringement of its suppliers.

Although these activities have a tortious ring, the

Government has not agreed to assume liability for

them. In short, under section 1498, the Govern-

ment has agreed to be sued only for its direct in-

fringement of a patent.

Id. at 1167. Nothing in that statement can be read to

mean that § 1498 requires as a predicate liability under

§ 271(a). In fact, that statement indicates that any direct

infringement that would normally require a license by a

private party falls under § 1498. Therefore, we are not

mandated by NTP, Motorola, or Decca to conclude that

direct infringement under §1498 equates to direct in-

fringement under § 271(a).

iii.

Furthermore, Zoltek III’s limitation of § 1498(a) to

§ 271(a) renders § 1498(c) superfluous, violating the canon

of statutory construction that “a statute should be inter-

preted so as not to render one part inoperative.” CSX

Transp., Inc. v. Ala. Dep’t of Revenue, 131 S.Ct. 1101,

1111 (2011) (citation and internal quotation marks omit-

ted). Section 271(a) requires that the infringing activity

occur “within the United States.” (emphasis added). Yet

§ 1498(c) provides the exact same limitation by eliminat-

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 22

ing the Government’s liability “for a claim arising in a

foreign country.” By limiting § 1498(a) to activities within

the United States, the panel in Zoltek III rendered

§ 1498(c) superfluous. Section 1498(c), however, is not

superfluous. Congress specifically added this section to

28 U.S.C. § 1498 to ensure that the Government would

not be held liable for claims arising abroad. See H. Rep.

No. 86-624, at 5-6 (1959).

Thus, when the panel in Zoltek III concluded that the

Government’s liability under § 1498(a) is limited to in-

fringement under § 271(a), it was relying on dictum as

expressed by NTP, and not the tools of statutory construc-

tion. The plain language of § 1498(a) indicates that

§ 1498(a) operates independently from Title 35. Indeed,

this court so held in Motorola, where we said that

“[a]lthough a section 1498 action may be similar to a Title

35 action, it is nonetheless only parallel and not identi-

cal.” Motorola, 729 F.2d at 768. Instead of relying on any

infringement sections in § 271, § 1498(a) creates its own

independent cause of action.

iv.

Finally, Zoltek III’s interpretation of § 1498 elimi-

nated the effect of 19 U.S.C. § 1337(l) even though “[w]e

must read the statutes to give effect to each if we can do

so while preserving their sense and purpose.” Watt v.

Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (citing Morton v. Man-

cari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)). Zoltek III negated Con-

gress’s clear intent to protect products resulting from a

patented process, wherever practiced, when it rendered

§ 1337(l) ineffective, thereby limiting the remedies of

parties in situations similar to Zoltek’s.

23 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

Title 19 U.S.C. section 1337 allows process patent

holders to petition the International Trade Commission to

exclude the

importation into the United States, . . . or the sale

within the United States after importation by the

owner, importer, or consignee of articles that . . .

are made, produced, processed, or mined under, or

by means of, a process covered by the claims of a

valid and enforceable United States patent.

19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(1)(B)(ii). Therefore, subject to the

other requirements of § 1337, Zoltek could at least pre-

vent the importation of products made by its patented

process. However, under § 1337(l), entitled “Importation

by or for United States,”

[a]ny exclusion . . . in cases based on a proceeding

involving a patent, . . . under subsection (a)(1) of

this section, shall not apply to any articles im-

ported by and for the use of the United States, or

imported for, and to be used for, the United States

with the authorization or consent of the Govern-

ment.

Thus, when products resulting from a patented process

are imported for the United States, such as by a govern-

ment contractor, the process patent owner cannot exclude

the products from entering the United States. However,

in the same subsection, Congress gave process patent

owners in such a predicament a remedy:

Whenever any article would have been excluded

from entry . . . but for the operation of this subsec-

tion, an owner of the patent . . . adversely affected

shall be entitled to reasonable and entire compen-

sation in an action before the United States Court

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 24

of Federal Claims pursuant to the procedures of

section 1498 of Title 28.

19 U.S.C. § 1337(l). Based on the plain language of

§ 1337, Congress clearly intends that patent holders shall

have a remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 for the importation

of products made by a patented process if the products

could have been excluded under § 1337. By continuing to

require § 271(a) liability as a predicate for liability under

§ 1498(a), Zoltek III, relying on the perpetuation of the

dictum in NTP, disturbed Congress’s statutory scheme

and intent. See S. Rep. No. 93-1231, at 1999 (1974)

(commenting on the purpose of subsection (i), later redes-

ignated as subsection (l), and stating that “Any patent

owner adversely affected by this subsection would be

entitled to reasonable and entire compensation pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. 1498. [sic]” (emphasis added)).

Title 35 U.S.C. section 271(a) does not protect against

the importation of products made by a patented process,

but § 271(g) states that “[w]hoever without authority

imports into the United States or offers to sell, sells, or

uses within the United States a product which is made by

a process patented in the United States shall be liable as

an infringer.” Because § 1337 unambiguously asserts

Congress’s intent to give process patent owners a remedy

for importation of products made using their process, it

would be incorrect to maintain Zoltek III’s holding that

§ 271(a) infringement is a predicate to United States

liability under § 1498. If Zoltek III is correct, a process

patent holder who requests a § 1337 exclusion order from

the International Trade Commission to prevent the

importation of articles to be used by or for the United

States will be denied such relief by operation of § 1337(l).

But the patentee will be directed to obtain “reasonable

and entire compensation” from the United States, which

he “shall” be entitled to in the Court of Federal Claims

25 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

under § 1498. See § 1337(l). However, under Zoltek III,

the patentee will be denied relief because his claim cannot

be predicated on § 271(a). Zoltek III vitiated the effect of

19 U.S.C. § 1337(l), and as explained above, it relied on

dicta to refute the plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a)

and render superfluous 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c). Therefore,

that opinion is vacated by the court en banc. 3

II.

While this court in Zoltek III was incorrect when it

determined that infringement under § 271(a) is a predi-

cate for Government liability under § 1498(a), we must

now determine as a matter of law whether Lockheed’s

actions create Governmental liability under § 1498(a).

Under § 271(g), Lockheed allegedly infringed Zoltek’s

patents when it used in the United States, or imported

into the United States, the product made using the pat-

3 The dissent contends that this court lacks juris-

diction to address the question whether section 1498(a) is

limited to infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a), because

that question is not within the scope of the order on

appeal. In fact, however, the transfer order that is the

subject of this appeal was predicated in part on the trial

court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the claim

before it, see 28 U.S.C. § 1631, and that conclusion fol-

lowed from the trial court’s application of this court’s

earlier decision in Zoltek III. This court’s act of vacating

Zoltek III thus directly affects the transfer order that is on

appeal here. For that reason, this case is entirely differ-

ent from United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987), on

which the dissent relies, in which the court of appeals

improperly addressed an entirely different theory of

liability from the one at issue in the order on appeal.

With respect to the substantive objections raised by Judge

Dyk, he reiterates the same rationale he espoused in his

concurrence in Zoltek III, which is still not mandated by

the dicta of the cases upon which he relies.

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 26

ented process. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g). The issue is whether

that act falls under § 1498(a), thus giving Lockheed

immunity from suit and Zoltek the right to compensation

from the Government. To be within the parameters of

§ 1498(a), Lockheed must have used the invention with-

out a license and without lawful right. Lockheed clearly

was not licensed to practice Zoltek’s invention. Therefore,

the issue is whether they had the lawful right to do so. As

explained above, we have defined “without lawful right”

for purposes of § 1498(a) as use of an invention that, if

done by a private party, would directly infringe the pat-

ent. The liability of the United States under § 1498 is

thus linked to the scope of the patent holder’s rights as

granted by the patent grant in title 35 U.S.C. sec-

tion 154(a)(1). As the patent grant has expanded over the

years, so too has the coverage of § 1498(a). If a private

party had used Zoltek’s patented process to create the

resulting product, there would be liability for infringing

Zoltek’s patent right under § 154(a)(1) and § 271(g). We

hold that the Government is subject to the same liability

in this case, and that precedent and legislative intent

dictate that result.

A.

In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., the Su-

preme Court held that in the patent exhaustion context,

“methods . . . may be ‘embodied’ in a product.” 553 U.S

617, 628 (2008). The holding was necessary to avoid “an

end-run around exhaustion” where “[p]atentees seeking to

avoid patent exhaustion could simply draft their patent

claims to describe a method rather than an apparatus.”

Id. at 629-30. This concept was not applied to 35

U.S.C. § 271(f) in Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. St. Jude

Med., Inc., because method patents do not have physical

components that could be combined outside the United

States as prohibited by § 271(f). 576 F.3d 1348, 1364

27 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

(Fed. Cir. 2009) (en banc). That does not mean, however,

that the concept is not applicable under § 1498 because

§§ 154(a)(1), 271(g), and 1498(a) are applicable to process

patents. Although the process itself was partially prac-

ticed outside the United States in this case, the product

resulting from the practice, which embodies the patented

process, was imported into, or used in, the United States.

Therefore the process has been “used” without a license or

lawful right. A contrary result would similarly avoid

infringement by the United States. Additionally, contrac-

tors could practice the processes overseas whereby the

resulting product would be immunized from exclusion

from importation under § 1337.

To allow such a result is contrary to the PPAA’s legis-

lative history, which reflects the understanding that to

protect process patents is to protect the products resulting

from the process. Although “use” of the invention “with-

out lawful right” does not use the exact same terms as

§ 271(g), we can look to Judge Learned Hand for guid-

ance. He notes that, “Courts have not stood helpless in

such situations; the decisions are legion in which they

have refused to be bound by the letter, when it frustrates

the patent purpose of the whole statute.” Cabell v. Mark-

ham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945) (citing Justice

Holmes for the proposition that “it is not an adequate

discharge of duty for courts to say: We see what you are

driving at, but you have not said it, and therefore we shall

go on as before.” Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32

(1st Cir. 1908)). The Supreme Court approvingly quoted

Judge Learned Hand in Cabell and said:

Of course it is true that the words used, even in

their literal sense, are the primary, and ordinarily

the most reliable, source of interpreting the mean-

ing of any writing: be it a statute, a contract, or

anything else. But it is one of the surest indexes

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 28

of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to

make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to re-

member that statutes always have some purpose

or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic and

imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their

meaning.

Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 n.9 (1981) (quoting 148

F.2d at 739).

As explained above, the plain language of the statute

is clear. Additionally, the legislative purpose behind

§ 1498 is clear. The Supreme Court has stated that

§ 1498(a) was meant to “relieve the contractor entirely

from liability of every kind for the infringement of patents

in manufacturing anything for the government” in order

“to stimulate contractors to furnish what was needed for

the war, without fear of becoming liable themselves for

infringements . . . .” Richmond Screw, 275 U.S. at 343-45.

This purpose survives today.

In 1988, the patent grant under § 154(a)(1) was ex-

panded to state “if the invention is a process,” the patent

shall contain a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns,

“of the right to exclude others from using or selling

throughout the United States, or importing into the

United States, products made by that process.” PPAA

§ 9002. Section 271(g) was also added at that time to

clarify that violating this right is an act of infringement.

§ 9003. Section 154(a)(1) was modified, and section 271(g)

was adopted, by Congress because “[i]n order to make

patent protection of a process meaningful, it is . . . neces-

sary to consider the patented process and the resulting

product as a whole, with the consequence that process

protection is automatically extended to the resulting

product even if the said product has not been claimed.” S.

29 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

Rep. No. 100-83, at 31 (1987) (citations omitted and

emphasis added).

The purpose supporting the changes was to harmo-

nize United States law with that of the rest of the indus-

trialized world, in which “most countries’ patent laws are

structured so that the direct product of a patented process

is also included within the scope of the patent.” Id.;

accord H. Rep. No. 100-60, at 4 (1987). Congress noted

that previously, “[w]ith respect to process patents, courts

have reasoned that the only act of infringement is the act

of making through the use of a patented process; there-

fore, there can be no infringement if that act occurs out-

side the United States.” H. Rep. 100-60, at 5 (1987)

(citations omitted). Congress then noted that “this ra-

tionale is not adequate because it ignores the reality that

the offending act is the importation of a product made

through the use of a protected process patent or its subse-

quent sale within the United States.” Id. at 6 (emphasis

added).

Thus, because the scope of the Government’s “lawful

right” to “use” the invention under § 1498(a) is deter-

mined by the scope of § 154(a)(1), Congress’s expansion of

the patent grant makes § 1498(a) cover the use of a prod-

uct that incorporates the patented process by which it was

created. We agree with the argument made by the Fed-

eral Circuit Bar Association in its amicus brief that no

revision to § 1498(a) was necessary to reach this result; it

was accomplished by the expansion of the patent grant.

Amicus Brief of the Fed. Cir. Bar Ass’n at 14.

We recognize that this “court may not read an

amendment to one section of a statute as an amendment

to an entirely different section of the statute in the ab-

sence of any statutory justification.” Rotec Indus., Inc. v.

Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 30

Rotec, we analyzed an amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)

and determined that it did not apply to § 271(f). Id. at

1257-58. It would seem that Rotec’s rule would be espe-

cially applicable here since it may appear that we have

determined that the amendment of one statute is an

amendment to a completely different statute, rather than

simply different sections of the same statute. But, in this

case, as explained above, there is compelling statutory

justification for such an interpretation. However, such a

justification is not even necessary because “lawful right”

is linked to the scope of the patent grant; we are not

amending the meaning of lawful right—that was done by

Congress. We are simply stating the effect the amend-

ment to the patent grant had on § 1498(a), which is

defined by its terms and the patent grant.

Therefore, based on clear Congressional intent to pro-

tect contractors from infringement so that the Govern-

ment’s important business may not be disturbed, it would

be absurd to find that the importation or use of a product

created through the use of a patented process as prohib-

ited by 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1) and 271(g) fails to be the

equivalent of use of the invention without lawful right to

do so.

This is illustrated by a simple example. Had Lock-

heed practiced the process overseas without bringing the

resulting products back to the United States, there would

be no direct infringement of Zoltek’s patent rights under

§ 271(a) or (g). Additionally, Zoltek would have no rem-

edy against the Government under § 1498. As held in

NTP, there would be no infringement under § 271(a)

because all steps of the patented process were not carried

out “within the United States.” 418 F.3d 1282, 1318.

There would be no § 271(g) infringement because none of

the products made using the patented process were ever

present in the United States as required by the statute.

31 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

35 U.S.C. § 271(g). Additionally, as explained below, the

Government would not have waived its sovereign immu-

nity under § 1498 because § 1498(c) states that the section

does not apply to claims arising in a foreign jurisdiction,

and a claim arising from an act which has no connection

to the United States arises overseas. Essentially, as long

as the products made by the patented process overseas

are not imported into, or used within, the United States,

Lockheed has the lawful right to use the patented process

under § 1498(a) because the “within the United States”

requirements of §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a), and 271(g) are not

met, and § 1498(c) is implicated by the claim arising

outside the jurisdiction of the United States.

When it imported the resulting products into the

United States, or used them within the United States,

Lockheed used Zoltek’s patented invention “without

license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or

manufacture the same . . .” because it is the act of impor-

tation or use in the United States of the products made by

the patented process that constitutes improper use of a

patented invention. As explained, the products them-

selves embody the patented invention for the purposes of

§ 1498. It could be argued that importing the resulting

products is not the same as “use” of the invention under

the literal terms of § 1498 because the process itself is the

invention, not the resulting products. In light of the

modification, however, of the patent grant (§ 154(a)(1))

and adoption of 35 U.S.C. § 271(g), and considering the

effect of Congress’s mandate in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(l), in the

context of § 1498, the product of a patented process is not

only the product, but also the physical embodiment of the

invention. Therefore, Lockheed’s actions constitute use of

the invention without lawful right under the terms of

§ 1498(a).

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 32

B.

We must now determine whether 28 U.S.C. § 1498(c)

applies to this case. Section 1498(c) states that “[t]he

provisions of [§ 1498(a)] shall not apply to any claim

arising in a foreign country.” The partially carbonizing

step used to make the products alleged to infringe the RE

’162 Patent occurs in Japan, while the processing step

occurs in the United States. Thus, the question here is

whether a claim “aris[es] in a foreign country” when one

step of the claimed method is performed in a foreign

country and another step is performed in the United

States.

Congress amended § 1498 to add subsection (c) in

1960. Pub.L. 86-726, § 1, 74 Stat. 855, 856 (1960) (adding

copyrights to the scope of § 1498). Congress wanted “to

avoid liability for claims arising out of infringements of

patents or copyrights in a foreign country.” S. Rep. No.

86-1877, at 5 (1960). Indeed, the plain language of

§ 1498(c) eliminates Government liability for claims

“arising in a foreign country” not claims arising under

foreign law. Section 1498(c) was adopted “to remove the

possibility of [the bill] being interpreted as applying to

acts of infringement in foreign countries.” Id. at 7.

However, in this case, § 1498(c) does not exempt the

United States from liability because the infringing acts—

use or importation of the products resulting from the

process—occurred in the United States. Importation

occurs when the product crosses the United States’ bor-

der, and use occurs within the United States. Both of

those acts occur within the United States and any claim

regarding those acts similarly arises within the United

States. There is no infringement in a foreign country

because the patent grant and the infringement statutes

do not cover activities that occur outside the United

33 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

States. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a)(1), 271. Because the

resulting products were imported or used in the United

States, Zoltek’s claim for relief does not “arise” in a for-

eign country and § 1498(c) does not apply to this case.

This conclusion is supported by precedent; the legislative

histories of section 154(a)(1)’s modification and the en-

actment of section 271(g); and Congress’s intent to create

a comprehensive scheme meant to protect contractors,

inventors, and the United States.

Accordingly, we hold that for the purposes of section

1498, the use or importation “within the United States

[of] a product which is made by a process patented in the

United States” constitutes use of the invention without

lawful right because the products embody the invention

itself. We add that nothing in this opinion should be

construed to affect our Title 35 jurisprudence.

SUMMARY

In its original suit before the Court of Federal Claims,

Zoltek alleged infringement by the Government of its

patent, and a right to recover compensation therefore by

virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a). The trial court ruled for the

Government on the § 1498 issue on the basis of its under-

standing of § 1498(c) as applied to these facts, but permit-

ted Zoltek’s case to go forward on its theory of a taking of

its patent rights under the Fifth Amendment. We now

hold:

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) creates an independent cause

of action for direct infringement by the Government or its

contractors that is not dependent on 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).

Direct infringement under § 1498(a) comes within the

scope of the right to exclude granted in 35 U.S.C.

§154(a)(1). Thus, under § 1498(a) the Government has

waived its sovereign immunity for direct infringement,

which extends not only to acts previously recognized as

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 34

being defined by § 271(a) but also acts covered under

§ 271(g) due to unlawful use or manufacture. Therefore,

as in this case, when the product of a patented process is

used in, or imported into, the United States by or for the

United States, there is direct infringement for the pur-

poses of a § 1498 action. We do not decide the issue of

indirect infringement, under §§ 271(b), (c), and (f), which

is not before us. Zoltek has filed a complaint with well-

pleaded allegations against the Government for infringe-

ment under § 1498(a). The trial court’s holding to the

contrary is reversed, and the case is remanded for further

proceedings in accordance with this opinion;

2. Properly understood, § 1498(c) has no application

to the facts of this case in which a United States patent

was allegedly infringed by activities that took place

within the United States. Thus § 1498(c) does not bar

Zoltek’s suit against the Government. The trial court’s

holding to the contrary is reversed;

3. When the United States is subject to suit under

§ 1498(a) for alleged infringement of a patent by a con-

tractor acting by and for the United States, the contractor

by law is rendered immune from individual liability for

the alleged infringement. The trial court’s holding to the

contrary on appeal in this case is reversed; and

4. Since the Government’s potential liability under

§ 1498(a) is established, we need not and do not reach the

issue of the Government’s possible liability under the

Constitution for a taking. The trial court’s determina-

tions on that issue are vacated.

CONCLUSION

REVERSED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND

REMANDED

35 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

COSTS

No costs.

United States Court of Appeals

for the Federal Circuit

__________________________

ZOLTEK CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant,

v.

LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

2009-5135

__________________________

Appeal from the United States Court of Federal

Claims in case no. 96-CV-166, Judge Edward J. Damich.

__________________________

DYK, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

This court en banc overrules our precedent that 28

U.S.C. § 1498(a) is limited to infringement under 35

U.S.C. § 271(a), precedent which led to a holding in this

very case that the United States was not liable under

section 1498(a) for infringement of a method patent

outside the United States. Zoltek Corp. v. United States,

442 F.3d 1345, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court

denied certiorari. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 551 U.S.

1113 (2007).

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 2

The overturning of this earlier Zoltek decision here is

accomplished through the extraordinary approach of sua

sponte en banc action where the issue was not argued by

any of the parties, and where the government itself was

not a party to the appeal but participated only as amici

curiae. In my view the en banc decision is beyond our

jurisdiction and, in any event, is clearly incorrect on the

merits. I respectfully dissent.

I Jurisdiction

This case comes to us as an interlocutory appeal certi-

fied pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2), which provides

that an interlocutory appeal may be permitted if a judge

of the Claims Court, “in issuing an interlocutory order,

includes in the order a statement that a controlling ques-

tion of law is involved with respect to which there is a

substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an

immediate appeal from that order may materially ad-

vance the ultimate termination of the litigation.” The

legislative history of this exception indicates that it

“should only be used in exceptional cases where an inter-

mediate appeal may avoid protracted and expensive

litigation.” H.R. Rep. No. 85-1667, at 2 (1958).

After our 2006 holding in this case that the United

States was not liable for infringement under section

1498(a), the Claims Court allowed the complaint to be

amended to state an infringement claim against Lockheed

and granted Zoltek’s motion to transfer this claim to the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

Georgia. Zoltek v. United States, 85 Fed. Cl. 409, 422

(2009). In connection with the transfer order, the Claims

Court recognized that it could only transfer claims under

28 U.S.C. § 1631 if, inter alia, “the transferee court would

have had jurisdiction at the time the original case was

filed.” Id. at 413. On motion by Lockheed, the Claims

3 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

Court amended its transfer order and certified as a con-

trolling question of law for interlocutory appeal under 28

U.S.C. § 1292(d)(2) the issue of “whether 28 U.S.C.

§ 1498(c) must be construed to nullify any government

contractor immunity provided in § 1498(a) when a patent

infringement claim ‘aris[es] in a foreign country.’” Trans-

fer Order, Zoltek Corp. v. United States, No. 96-166 C

(Fed. Cl. May 14, 2009), ECF No. 385. The Claims

Court’s theory apparently was that, although the North-

ern District of Georgia would have jurisdiction over the

claims against Lockheed, it would be more efficient to

determine before transfer whether Zoltek’s claim was

viable.

It seems clear to me that the certified order does not

confer appellate jurisdiction over the earlier dismissal of

the claims against the United States. The Supreme Court

has stated that for interlocutory appeals under section

1292(d)(2), “appellate jurisdiction applies to the order

certified to the court of appeals, and is not tied to the

particular question formulated by the district court.”

Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199,

205 (1996). 1 However, “[t]he court of appeals may not

reach beyond the certified order to address other orders

made in the case,” and may only “address any issue fairly

included within the certified order.” Id.

Here, the certified order was limited to transferring

claims against Lockheed. The certified order does not

confer appellate jurisdiction over the earlier dismissal of

infringement claims against the United States. This

1 Yamaha was interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b),

which allows for certified interlocutory appeals from

district courts. Because the language of sections 1292(b)

and 1292(d)(2) are substantially similar, the Supreme

Court’s analysis is equally applicable here. See United

States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 884-85 (Fed. Cir. 1983).

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 4

attempt to reach beyond the certified order is nearly

identical to that rejected by the Supreme Court in United

States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).

In Stanley, a veteran filed suit against the govern-

ment in district court under the Federal Tort Claims Act

(“FTCA”), alleging negligence in the administration of a

drug testing program in which he participated while on

active duty. Id. at 672. The district court granted the

government’s motion for summary judgment, finding that

the veteran’s claims were precluded by Feres v. United

States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), because they arose out of

injuries related to his service. Stanley, 483 U.S. at 672.

On appeal, the court of appeals agreed that Feres barred

Stanley’s FTCA claims against the government, though

holding that the district court should have dismissed the

claim against the government for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction rather than disposing of the case on its mer-

its. Id.

Thereafter, the veteran filed an amended complaint,

naming as defendants certain government officers and

alleging constitutional claims against those individuals

under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,

403 U.S. 388 (1971). Stanley, 483 U.S. at 674. The dis-

trict court entered an order refusing to find these claims

barred, but it certified the order for interlocutory appeal

under section 1292(b). Id. at 675. On appeal again, the

court of appeals affirmed the district court’s conclusion

with respect to the individual defendants. Id. However,

the court of appeals also indicated that, due to interven-

ing precedent, the veteran “might have a viable FTCA

claim against the United States, and that law-of-the-case

principles therefore did not require adherence to the

[prior] holding that [the veteran’s] FTCA claim was

barred by Feres.” Id. at 675-76. The court of appeals

remanded the case to the district court with instructions

5 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

to allow the veteran the opportunity to again plead an

FTCA claim against the government for injuries related to

his service. Id. at 676.

On review, the Supreme Court vacated the court of

appeals decision with respect to claims against the United

States. The Court held that because the order appealed

from was an order only refusing to dismiss the claims

against the individual defendants, “[t]he Court of Appeals

. . . had no jurisdiction to enter orders relating to [the

veteran’s] long-dismissed FTCA claims” against the

United States, even though the issues involved with the

two types of claims were “closely parallel[].” Id. at 677.

The Court emphasized that the court of appeals decision

on appeal to allow the district court to reinstate a claim

against the government was “particularly astonishing in

light of the fact that the United States was not even a

party to the appeal.” Id.

Here, as in Stanley, the certified order itself in no way

addressed any claims against the government. This

court, in accepting this certified appeal, explained that

the issues before it were “whether the trial court should

have transferred the case and whether the court should

have allowed the complaint to be amended to add Lock-

heed as a defendant.” Zoltek Corp. v. United States, Misc.

No. 903, 2009 WL 3169301, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30,

2009). There was no mention in either the Claims Court

order or this court’s order of claims against the govern-

ment. As the Court found in Stanley, it is astonishing

that the majority’s opinion has the effect of reinstating a

cause of action against the government where the gov-

ernment was not even a party to the appeal. Under

Stanley, this court lacks jurisdiction to order reinstate-

ment of claims against the government when the certified

order addressed only the transfer of claims against a

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 6

different defendant. 2 The en banc court’s action is also

particularly striking insofar as it vacates the earlier

Zoltek decision that the United States is not liable on a

takings theory. This theory of liability is not even tan-

gentially related to Zoltek’s claims against Lockheed, and

has no relationship whatsoever to the transfer order.

II The Merits

The majority’s interpretation of section 1498 is also in

my view incorrect. Section 1498(a) currently provides, in

relevant part:

Whenever an invention described in and covered

by a patent of the United States is used or manu-

factured by or for the United States without li-

cense of the owner thereof or lawful right to use or

manufacture the same, the owner's remedy shall

be by action against the United States in the

United States Court of Federal Claims for the re-

covery of his reasonable and entire compensation

for such use and manufacture.

28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (emphasis added). This provision

does not specify where the “use[] or manufacture[] by or

for the United States” must occur. However, this provi-

sion, as with the patent laws generally, must be inter-

preted in light of the presumption against

extraterritoriality which, strikingly, the majority here

2 The majority urges that this case is different from

Stanley because this court’s decision as to the govern-

ment's liability “directly affects the transfer order that is

on appeal here.” Maj. Op. at 25 n.3. This is not correct.

The necessary basis for the order transferring the claims

against Lockheed pursuant to section 1631 was the

Claims Court's lack of jurisdiction over the Lockheed

claims, not a lack of jurisdiction over the claims against

the government.

7 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

does not even mention. In light of this presumption,

section 1498(a) was clearly intended to be limited to “use[]

or manufacture[]” of the invention only within the United

States. This necessarily excludes infringement under 35

U.S.C. § 271(g) that does not depend on use or manufac-

ture in the United States but instead on the importation

into the United States of a product created by a patented

process performed abroad. Nothing in the legislative

history of section 1498(a) indicates that it was designed to

have extraterritorial reach or that a later enacted statute,

such as section 271(g), could extend its extraterritorial

scope.

“It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that

legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears,

is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of

the United States.’” EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.

(“Aramco”), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1990) (quoting Foley Bros.,

Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). In applying this

presumption, courts “look to see whether language in the

[relevant Act] gives any indication of a congressional

purpose to extend its coverage” outside of the United

States. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation

mark omitted). Because we must “assume that Congress

legislates against the backdrop of the presumption

against extraterritoriality,” unless Congress’s affirmative

intention for a provision to govern extraterritorial activity

is “clearly expressed,” a statute is interpreted with the

narrower scope. Id. Thus, unless congressional intent

indicates to the contrary, the statutory language “applies

domestically, not extraterritorially.” Small v. United

States, 544 U.S. 385, 391 (2005). For example, in Foley

Brothers, a statute provided that “[e]very contract made

to which the United States . . . is a party” must have a

provision permitting no more than eight hours of work in

a single day. 336 U.S. at 282. Despite the broad lan-

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 8

guage of the act itself, the Supreme Court held that this

provision did not apply to a contract between the United

States and a private contractor for work to be done in Iraq

and Iran. Id. at 285. Applying the presumption against

extraterritoriality, the Court concluded that there was

nothing in the text of the statute itself or in the legislative

history “which would lead to the belief that Congress

entertained any intention other than the normal one in

this case.” Id. at 286-88.

The presumption against extraterritoriality is particu-

larly strong under the patent statutes, and is reinforced

by the requirement of narrow construction of a waiver of

sovereign immunity. See United States v. Nordic Village,

Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992). In interpreting some of the

earliest patent laws, the Supreme Court emphasized that

the Patent Clause of the Constitution itself “is domestic in

its character, and necessarily confined within the limits of

the United States.” Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 195

(1856). Thus, the laws enacted by Congress under the

Patent Clause “secure to the inventor a just remuneration

from those who derive a profit or advantage, within the

United States, from his genius and mental labors. . . .

[T]hese acts of Congress do not, and were not intended to,

operate beyond the limits of the United States . . . .” Id.

(emphasis added). This presumption against extraterrito-

rial interpretation and application of the patent laws has

remained strong since Brown. As the Supreme Court

noted recently in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., “[t]he

presumption that United States law governs domestically

but does not rule the world applies with particular force

in patent law.” 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007).

This presumption against extraterritoriality, articu-

lated in Brown, existed long before Congress enacted the

precursor to section 1498 in 1910. Act of June 25, 1910,

9 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

Pub. L. No. 61-305, 36 Stat. 851. 3 Indeed, just a few

years after the act of 1910 was passed, the Supreme Court

reemphasized that “[t]he right conferred by a patent

under our law is confined to the United States and its

territories and infringement of this right cannot be predi-

cated of acts wholly done in a foreign country.” Dowagiac

Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650

(1914) (citation omitted).

Section 1498(a) on its face does not indicate that it

was designed to have extraterritorial scope. Nor does the

legislative history of section 1498(a) suggest any intent to

have the section operate extraterritorially. Since its

original enactment in 1910, this provision has been trig-

gered whenever an invention is “used or manufactured by

or for the United States.” Under the presumption against

extraterritoriality, absent a contrary indication by Con-

gress, the general phrase “use[] or manufacture[]” in the

statute must refer only to use or manufacture within the

United States, and not to use or manufacture abroad.

This is even clearer in light of the enactment of sec-

tion 1498(c) in 1959, which provides that “[t]he provisions

of [section 1498] shall not apply to any claim arising in a

foreign country.” Section 1498(c) was added at the same

time that section 1498(b)—a parallel right of suit with

3 It should be noted that although section 1498 is

now codified under Title 28, the precursor to section 1498

was originally codified together with other substantive

patent law provisions. See, e.g., Compiled Statutes of the

United States 1913, tit. 60, ch. 1, § 9465. Indeed, from

the introduction of the United States Code in 1926 until

1948, this provision was codified in section 68 of Title 35.

See 35 U.S.C. § 68 (1946) (section titled “Suit for unli-

censed use of invention by the United States”). Thus, as a

provision of patent law itself, the presumption against

extraterritoriality should apply with “particular force” in

interpreting section 1498. See Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 455.

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 10

respect to infringements of copyrights committed by the

government—was added. See H.R. Rep. No. 86-624

(1959). The addition of subsection (c) was primarily to

“provide that the provisions of this bill shall have no effect

on any claim for copyright infringement against the U.S.

Government arising in a foreign country.” Id. at 1. But it

was also designed to reemphasize the fact that section

1498(a) requires use or manufacture within the United

States. See id. at 7.

In a closely analogous situation involving section

271(a) itself, the Supreme Court in Deepsouth Packing Co.

v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1971), reaffirmed this

principle of non-extraterritoriality. In Deepsouth, which

was decided before sections 271(f) and (g) were added to

Title 35, the Court recognized that section 271(a), adopted

as part of the Patent Act of 1952, did not change the law

with respect to infringement. Id. at 530 & n.10. Instead,

it merely codified the understanding of infringement

present at the time it was enacted. Id. Furthermore, the

Court held that direct infringement under section

271(a)—i.e., making, using or selling a patented inven-

tion—was limited to activity occurring within the United

States. Id. at 522-23. Thus, under the patent laws, “it

[was] not an infringement to make or use a patented

product outside of the United States.” Id. at 527. The

same follows for section 1498(a). At the time of its enact-

ment, it was “not an infringement to make or use a pat-

ented product outside of the United States.” Id. Because

infringement can only be premised on activity within the

United States, section 1498(a) applies only where the

“use[] or manufacture[] by or for the United States”

occurred within the United States. See also Morrison v.

Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884-85 (2010).

In a number of similar cases involving extraterritori-

ality, the Supreme Court has made clear that each trig-

11 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

gering event defined in the statute—here, use or manu-

facture—must occur in the United States even though

other events create a United States nexus. For example,

in Small, the issue was whether a statute which made it

“unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in

any court” to possess a firearm encompassed foreign as

well as domestic convictions. 544 U.S. at 387. Even

though the statute covered only domestic possession and

there was therefore some nexus to the United States, id.

at 389, the Court determined that it “should apply an

ordinary assumption about the reach of domestically

oriented statutes,” that is, it assumed that Congress

intended each part of the statute to apply domestically,

not extraterritorially, unless congressional intent was

explicitly otherwise. Id. at 390-91. Because the statute’s

language and legislative history did not suggest any

intent to reach extraterritorial convictions as a predicate

for domestic liability, it concluded that “convicted in any

court” referred only to domestic courts. Id. at 394.

Most recently, in Morrison, the Second Circuit, while

rejecting the claim in the particular case, reiterated that

section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934

permits a cause of action for domestic misconduct in

connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges. 4

130 S. Ct. at 2879. The Supreme Court disagreed and,

relying on the presumption against extraterritorial appli-

cation, held that the statute applied only to domestic sales

or purchases. Id. at 2881-83. It rejected the argument

that the “manipulative or deceptive” conduct occurred in

4 Section 10(b) provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful .

. . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or

sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive

device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and

regulations as the Commission may prescribe.” 15 U.S.C.

§ 78j(b).

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 12

the United States, and thus the statute was merely being

applied domestically. Id. at 2883-84. The Supreme Court

explained that “it is a rare case of prohibited extraterrito-

rial application that lacks all contact with the territory of

the United States” and that “the presumption against

extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog

indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever some domes-

tic activity is involved in the case.” Id. at 2884. Thus,

because “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the

place where the deception originated, but upon purchases

and sales of securities in the United States,” finding

jurisdiction over domestic misconduct related to securities

traded on foreign exchanges would nonetheless violate the

presumption against extraterritoriality. Id.

The majority here makes the same mistake as the

Second Circuit made in Morrison. The majority assumes

that section 1498(a) has no extraterritorial application

under its interpretation because there is a sufficient

nexus to the United States—that is, the statute applies

only if the product made abroad by the patented process is

ultimately used in the United States. This approach

ignores the plain language of section 1498(a). Section

1498(a) is clear that it applies “[w]henever an invention

. . . is used.” The invention here is a process. A process is

not “used” in the United States “unless each of the steps is

performed within this country.” NTP, Inc. v. Research in

Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (em-

phasis added). This process was not “used” in the United

States—it was used in a foreign country and then the

resulting product was imported into the United States.

The use of the invention is thus plainly extraterritorial.

The fact that section 1498(a) could have been written to

indicate that infringement liability was triggered upon a

domestic event, such as domestic use of the product, is

irrelevant. As it exists, the language of section 1498(a)

13 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

applies only to “use or manufacture” of an invention in the

United States. That did not occur here.

Significantly, in the past, Congress has been explicit

when it has expanded the extraterritorial reach of section

1498(a), as it did when it enacted 19 U.S.C. § 1337(l). In

1940, Congress amended the trade statutes to provide

that the importation of a product made abroad by a pat-

ented process constituted an unfair trade practice under

section 1337, and could therefore be excluded. Act of July

2, 1940, Pub. Law No. 76-710, 54 Stat. 724. Later, in the

Trade Act of 1974, Congress provided that exclusion

orders could not be issued for articles imported by or for

the use of the United States. Act of Jan. 3, 1975, Pub. L.

No. 93-618, § 341(A), 88 Stat. 1978. Instead, Congress

provided a remedy against the government under section

1498(a) in such situations, providing that whenever a

patent owner is denied exclusion for “any articles im-

ported by and for the use of the United States,” such

owner “shall be entitled to reasonable and entire compen-

sation in an action before the United States Court of

Federal Claims pursuant to the procedures of section

1498 of Title 28.” 19 U.S.C. § 1337(l).

Section 1337(l) did not create infringement liability for

products produced abroad by a patented process. This

occurred only in 1988 when section 271(g) was added. No

similar extension of section 1498(a) was adopted when

section 271(g) was enacted. Nothing could more clearly

demonstrate that if Congress intended section 1498(a) to

cover infringement under section 271(g), it would have

said so specifically as it did with excluded products in

section 1337(l). See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 256 (holding that

“[i]t is also reasonable to conclude that had Congress

intended Title VII to apply overseas, it would have ad-

dressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and

procedures,” as it had explicitly done when it amended

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 14

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 to

apply abroad). I note that the majority also urges that

section 1337(l) somehow has no effect unless section

1498(a) is read to include infringement under section

271(g). Maj. Op. at 22. The predecessor to section 1337(l)

was enacted in substantially its present form in 1974,

long before section 271(g) existed. Thus, for years before

section 271(g) existed, section 1337(l) provided a valid

remedy under section 1498(a) for the non-exclusion of

“articles imported by and for the use of the United

States.” There is no need to read section 1498(a) to incor-

porate section 271(g) to make sense out of section 1337(l).

Finally, the majority mistakenly urges that the gov-

ernment’s liability under section 1498(a) is otherwise

coextensive with potential government contractor liabil-

ity, and that section 1498(a) must therefore be interpreted

to incorporate section 271(g). There is no such principle

underlying section 1498(a). 5 Even under the majority’s

interpretation of section 1498(a) there are circumstances

in which a contractor, in the course of a government

contract, could potentially be held liable for patent in-

fringement while the government is protected from suit

by its sovereign immunity. The majority itself concedes

that section 1498 only waives “the Government’s sover-

eign immunity from suit when . . . the United States . . .

would be liable for direct infringement of the patent right

for such use or manufacture if the United States was a

private party.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added); see also Decca

Ltd. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1156, 1167 (Ct. Cl. 1980)

(“[S]ection 1498 is a waiver of sovereign immunity only

with respect to a direct governmental infringement of a

5 This argument, moreover, assumes that the con-

tractor would be liable when the government is not, an

issue presented in this case but not addressed by the

majority.

15 ZOLTEK CORP v. US

patent.” (footnote omitted)). Accordingly, the government

has not waived its sovereign immunity with respect to

indirect infringement by a contractor under sections

271(b), (c), and (f). 6 Thus, there is no anomaly in inter-

preting section 1498(a) as not incorporating section 271(g)

infringement.

To the extent this interpretation of section 1498(a)

might reveal a “loophole” in the patent laws excusing the

United States from infringement liability for use in the

United States of products produced abroad using a pat-

ented process, that “is properly left for Congress to con-

6 Section 271(f) was added in 1984 and provided li-

ability where someone within the United States supplied

the components of a patented invention to be assembled

outside of the United States. Patent Law Amendments

Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383. It is clear

that section 271(f) did not create liability for direct in-

fringement. The language of section 271(f) itself mimics

the language of the indirect infringement provisions of

sections 271(b) and (c). Compare 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (“. .

. actively induce the combination . . .”), with 35 U.S.C.

§ 271(b) (“. . . actively induces infringement . . .”); compare

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2) (“. . . component of a patented inven-

tion . . . not a staple article or commodity of commerce

suitable for substantial noninfringing use . . .”), with 35

U.S.C. § 271(c) (“. . . component of a patented [invention] .

. . not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable

for substantial noninfringing use . . .”). Furthermore,

section 271(f) was enacted in response to the Supreme

Court’s opinion in Deepsouth, which held that shipping

the constituent parts of a patented device overseas for

assembly was not an act of direct infringement. 406 U.S

at 528; see also Patent Law Amendments of 1984, S. Rep.

No. 98-663, at 6 (1984) (“This proposal responds to a

comment by the United States Supreme Court in [Deep-

south] calling for a legislative solution to close a loophole

in patent law.”).

ZOLTEK CORP v. US 16

sider, and to close if it finds such action warranted.”

Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 457. I respectfully dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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