D. Hill v. PA DOC

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Donna Hill, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections; :

Superintendent of SCI Benner and :

Smart Communications, : No. 684 M.D. 2018

Respondents : Submitted: July 9, 2021

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge1

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY FILED: February 17, 2022

Before this Court are Smart Communications’ (Smart) preliminary

objections (Preliminary Objections) to Donna Hill’s (Hill) pro se Second Amended

Petition for Review in the Nature of a Complaint (Second Amended Petition) filed in

this Court’s original jurisdiction. Therein, Hill, Inmate Dwayne Hill’s (Inmate Hill)

wife, challenges the Department of Corrections’ (Department) inmate mailing policy

(Mailing Policy), and seeks injunctive relief against Smart - the Department’s mail

handling contractor - and the Department enjoining them from “delaying, confiscating,

[and/or] recording her mail,” plus compensatory and punitive damages. Second

Amended Petition at 3. After review, this Court overrules Smart’s Preliminary

Objections.

1

This matter was assigned to the panel before January 3, 2022, when President Judge Emerita

Leavitt became a senior judge on the Court.

Background

The instant matter has a complicated procedural history. Inmate Hill is

currently incarcerated at State Correctional Institution (SCI)-Phoenix. On October 30,

2018, Inmate Hill, then incarcerated at SCI-Benner, and Hill (collectively, Petitioners),

filed a petition for review (Original Petition) with this Court seeking to enjoin the

Department from enforcing its Mailing Policy. Petitioners also challenged the Mailing

Policy’s validity, arguing that the Department improperly destroyed, delayed,

confiscated, and recorded all mail.2 The Department filed preliminary objections to the

Original Petition, asking this Court to dismiss the petition. The Department maintained

that this Court lacked jurisdiction over the matter. Additionally, the Department

averred that Hill had not stated a claim for relief because she did not have a cognizable

interest in original pieces of mail, and because she did not establish irreparable harm

resulting from the Mailing Policy. Lastly, the Department argued that its Mailing

Policy is constitutional because it reasonably relates to preventing drug entry into SCIs,

which is a legitimate penological interest. On September 12, 2019, this Court overruled

the Department’s preliminary objection to the Court’s jurisdiction, sustained its

demurrer without prejudice, and granted Hill leave to amend her Original Petition. See

Hill v. Commonwealth (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 684 M.D. 2018, filed Sept. 12, 2019) (Hill I).

On October 17, 2019, Hill filed an amended petition for review (First

Amended Petition) adding Smart as a defendant. On October 28, 2019, the Department

filed its answer and new matter. On November 27, 2019, Hill filed a new amended

petition (New Amended Petition). On December 10, 2019, the Department filed an

2

This Court initially granted Petitioners’ in forma pauperis (IFP) application in November

2018. However, the Court subsequently granted the Department’s motion to revoke Inmate Hill’s

IFP status under Section 6602(f) of what is commonly referred to as the Prison Litigation Reform

Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6602(f), based on his history as an abusive litigator. Because Inmate Hill failed to

pay the filing fee within the requisite time period, this Court dismissed Inmate Hill as a party in March

2019. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review of that Order.

2

application to strike the New Amended Petition. On December 23, 2019, Smart filed

preliminary objections to the First Amended Petition, alleging that the First Amended

Petition was insufficiently specific, and that it was legally insufficient, in that Smart is

not a state actor and, thus, cannot be liable to Hill for violating her constitutional rights.

On January 8, 2020, this Court granted the Department’s application to strike the New

Amended Petition.

On July 17, 2020, Hill filed a Motion to File Second Amended Petition,

which the Court granted on November 30, 2020. On January 21, 2021, Hill filed the

Second Amended Petition, which was substantially similar to her First Amended

Petition. On February 5, 2021, Smart filed the Preliminary Objections to Hill’s Second

Amended Petition, again alleging insufficient specificity in pleading and legal

insufficiency because Smart is not a state actor. On March 2, 2021, the Department

filed a motion seeking additional time to respond to the Second Amended Petition,

which the Court granted on March 4, 2021. On March 15, 2021, Hill filed her response

to the Preliminary Objections. On March 29, 2021, the Department filed its Answer

and New Matter to the Second Amended Petition (Answer and New Matter). On April

22, 2021, Hill filed her reply to the Department’s New Matter.

Second Amended Petition

In her Second Amended Petition, Hill avers that, pursuant to the

Department’s Mailing Policy, which was implemented to prevent the entry of drugs

into the SCIs, all non-legal inmate mail must be sent to Smart’s Florida facility for

processing, where the originals are destroyed and the inmate receives copies.3 Hill

3

Hill’s Second Amended Petition references “Exhibit A,” an undated, untitled document on

Department letterhead, which was attached to Hill’s Original Petition and First Amended Petition.

Exhibit A describes the Mailing Policy in relevant part, including frequently asked questions and

answers thereto, and attributes the new mail procedures to the need to “combat the introduction of

drugs into the facilities[.]” Ex. A at 1. In its Answer and New Matter, the Department references

3

further alleges that Smart maintains an incoming correspondence database. According

to Hill, she has sent mail to Inmate Hill at both the SCI and Smart’s mail processing

center and it disappeared. She contends that she used to write to Inmate Hill every

Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, until her mail started disappearing. She estimates

that approximately 38 pieces of mail are unaccounted for, including photos, children’s

drawings, and announcements of family achievements and occasions. She complains

that the Mailing Policy amounts to a constructive ban on all mail, for which she seeks

injunctive relief and monetary damages.

Discussion

Initially,

[i]n ruling on preliminary objections, we accept as true all

well-pleaded material allegations in the petition for review

and any reasonable inferences that we may draw from the

averments. The Court, however, is not bound by legal

conclusions, unwarranted inferences from facts,

argumentative allegations, or expressions of opinion

encompassed in the petition for review. We may sustain

preliminary objections only when the law makes clear that

the petitioner cannot succeed on his claim, and we must

resolve any doubt in favor of the petitioner.

Highley v. Dep’t of Transp., 195 A.3d 1078, 1082 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (citations

omitted).

Hill’s Exhibit A as a memorandum summarizing the inmate mail policy and acknowledges that “upon

the reopening of all Department facilities, the Department’s new inmate mail policy (DC-ADM 803)

went into effect.” Dep’t Answer and New Matter at 2. The Department attached a copy of Section 1

(Mail Processing Procedures) of the Inmate Mail and Incoming Publications Procedures Manual, DC-

ADM 803, to its Answer and New Matter.

4

I. First Preliminary Objection - Legal Insufficiency

Smart first objects that Hill’s Second Amended Petition is legally

insufficient in that Smart is not a state actor, but rather, is the Department’s arm’s

length independent contractor, and, thus, Smart cannot be liable for violating Hill’s

constitutional rights.

Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (Section 1983) provides:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any [s]tate . . . subjects, or

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or

other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation

of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The United States Supreme Court has held that “[t]o state a claim under

[Section] 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the

Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v.

Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (emphasis added); see also Owens v. Shannon, 808 A.2d

607 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). However, “a plaintiff is not required to set forth the statute

by stating a ‘Section 1983’ cause of action in his complaint[.]” Weaver v. Franklin

Cnty., 918 A.2d 194, 200 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (quoting Clark v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth.,

691 A.2d 988, 990 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997)).

Hill did not specifically assert a Section 1983 civil rights violation in her

Second Amended Petition, but this Court recognized in Hill I, that Hill “raises a

discernible constitutional challenge to the Mailing Policy predicated on her First

Amendment[, U.S. Const. amend. I,] right as a non-prisoner to communicate by mail

with Inmate [Hill].” Hill I, slip op. at 8.

5

“To be sure, the First Amendment to the United States Constitution

protects an inmate’s general right to communicate by mail.” Rivera v. Silbaugh, 240

A.3d 229, 238 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020). “Indeed, interference with an inmate’s mail can

rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Id. The United States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit4 has explained:

[T]he [United States] Supreme Court has generally treated

interference with the mail as implicating the First

Amendment right to free speech.

In Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 . . . (1974), the

Supreme Court invalidated California prison regulations

which provided for the routine censorship of inmates’

outgoing personal correspondence, on the grounds that the

regulations violated the free speech rights of the prisoners’

correspondents. [Id.] at 408 (“whatever the status of a

prisoner’s claim to uncensored correspondence with an

outsider, it is plain that the latter’s interest is grounded in the

First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech”). See

also Wolff [v. McDonnell], 418 U.S. [539,] 576-77 [(1974)].

In the years after Procunier and Wolff, however, the

[Supreme] Court abandoned the distinction between the free

speech rights of inmates and their correspondents on the

outside. [Thornburgh v. ]Abbott, 490 U.S. [401,] 411, n.9

[(1989)] (“any attempt to forge separate standards for cases

implicating the [First Amendment] rights of outsiders [and

inmates] is out of step with the intervening decisions”).

4

[W]e recognize that we are not bound to follow the decisions of federal

district and intermediate appellate courts on issues of federal law.

However, although decisions of the federal courts lower than the

U[nited] S[tates] Supreme Court are not binding on Pennsylvania

courts, they may be considered as persuasive authority with regard to

federal questions.

W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. A.M., 164 A.3d 620, 630 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (citations omitted).

6

Clearly, then, prisoners do not forfeit their First Amendment

rights to use of the mails.[5]

Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445, 1451-52 (3d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), overruled

on other grounds by Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).

Smart contends that, to the extent Hill’s Second Amended Petition is

construed as asserting a First Amendment claim, Smart is not a state actor and, thus,

cannot be liable for violating Hill’s rights. In support of its claim, Smart cites Hennessy

v. Santiago, 708 A.2d 1269, 1276 (Pa. Super. 1998), for the proposition that “[a]cts of

[] private contractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their

significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts.” Id. (quoting

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841(1982)). See also Marmolejos v. Global

Tel*Link Corp. (W.D. Pa., No. 1:17-CV-13, filed Jan. 9, 2019), 2019 WL 981882, at

*2-*3, Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation adopted by (W.D. Pa., No. C.A. 17-

13 Erie, filed Feb. 28, 2019), 2019 WL 977888 (dismissal of prisoner plaintiffs’ Section

1983 claims against a private corporate supplier of tablet devices sold in the prison

commissary that allegedly caused prisoners to receive different versions of downloaded

songs than they thought they were purchasing).6

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has also

described:

“Under color of law” and “state action” are interpreted

identically under the Fourteenth Amendment[, U.S. Const.

5

“Although it is well settled that inmates have a right to receive mail, that right may be limited

by prison regulations that are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Weiler v.

Purkett, 137 F.3d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir. 1998).

6

Hennessy and Marmolejos are inapposite. Hennessy did not involve prison operations.

Instead, it involved a lawsuit for an alleged civil rights deprivation arising from Hennessy’s alleged

wrongful dismissal from her position as a habilitative counselor where her employer, pursuant to

county contracts, provided community living arrangements for county residents. The Marmolejos

Court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege any facts from which the Court could infer that a private

corporation supplying the tablets to the Department was a state actor.

7

amend. XIV]. [Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337,] 339 [(3d Cir.

2005)]. . . .

Although there is no “simple line” between state and private

actors, Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic

Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288 . . . (2001), we have explained that “[t]he

principal question at stake is whether there is such a close

nexus between the [s]tate and the challenged action that

seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of

the State itself.” Leshko, 423 F.3d at 339 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted). To answer that question, we

have outlined three broad tests generated by [United States]

Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state

action exists: (1) “whether the private entity has exercised

powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the

state”; (2) “whether the private party has acted with the help

of or in concert with state officials”; and (3) whether “the

[s]tate has so far insinuated itself into a position of

interdependence with the acting party that it must be

recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity.”

Mark[ v. Borough of Hatboro,] 51 F.3d [1137,] 1142 [(3d

Cir. 1995)] (other alterations, internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Under any test, “[t]he inquiry is fact-

specific.”[7] Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638

(3d Cir. 1995)[.]

Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). However, “[i]t is clear that a private

entity that voluntarily assumes through contract with a state entity the obligation to

fulfill a traditional state function, such as providing medically prescribed diets to

inmates housed within the prison system, acts under color of state law for purposes of

[Section] 1983.” Nelson v. ARA Food Serv. (E.D. Pa., No. 94-4542, filed May 17,

1995), slip op. at ___, 1995 WL 303990, at *3 (emphasis added).

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania

clarified:

It has been well[ ]established that “the function of

incarcerating people, whether done publicly or privately, is

7

Notably, “state-hired private contractors are not automatically state actors under [Section]

1983, even if the state is their only patron.” Leshko, 423 F.3d at 342.

8

the exclusive prerogative of the state.” Giron v. Corr[.]

Corp. of Am., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1249 (D.N.M. 1998).

Largely, the courts have considered whether private entities

in prisons should be considered state actors in the context of

privately-run prisons, finding that the state actor requirement

was met for [Section] 1983 purposes. See Street v. Corr[.]

Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that

private prison company was a state actor when it incarcerated

inmates for the state); Kesler v. King, 29 F. Supp. 2d 356,

370-71 (S.D. Tex. 1998) (same); Giron . . . , 14 F. Supp.

2d . . . at 1247-51 [] (finding that a corrections officer

employed by a private prison company was a state actor for

[Section] 1983 purposes when he raped an inmate); Plain v.

Flicker, 645 F. Supp. 898, 907 (D.N.J. 1986) (“[I]f a state

contracted with a private corporation to run its prisons it

would no doubt subject the private prison authorities to

[Section] 1983 suits under the public function doctrine.”).

Furthermore, our colleagues in the Eastern District have

considered what individual functions of incarceration are

“public functions.” In McCullum v. City of Philadelphia,

the court found that a company which privately contracted

with a public prison to provide dining services could be

considered a state actor under the public function test

because “providing food service, like medical care, to

those incarcerated people is one part of the government

function of incarceration.” [(E.D. Pa., No. CIV. A. 98-

5858, filed July 13, 1999), slip op. at ___, 1999 WL 493696,

at *3]. In McCullum, the court held that, since the

government had an Eighth Amendment[, U.S. Const. amend

VIII,] duty to provide “humane conditions of confinement,”

providing adequate food could be considered acting under

the color of state law. Id. In addition, “[i]f a state

government must satisfy certain constitutional obligations

when carrying out its functions, it cannot avoid those

obligations and deprive individuals of their constitutionally

protected rights by delegating governmental functions to the

private sector.” Giron, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.

Amig v. Cnty. of Juniata, 432 F. Supp. 3d 481, 486-87 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (emphasis

added). In Amig, the court

similarly f[ou]nd that drug-testing in a prison may be

considered a traditional state function. Under the Eighth

9

Amendment, the state is required to provide “humane

conditions of confinement.” Such conditions must

necessarily include providing a safe environment in which

inmates may serve their periods of incarceration. An

inmate’s safety must, in part, include maintaining a drug-

free setting to the greatest extent possible. [The court] can

easily conceive of the safety concerns that could arise from

unchecked drug overdoses, inmates acting under the

influence of illicit drugs, or even, as is the case here, the

danger of a work-release inmate ingesting illicit drugs

outside of the prison and potentially causing harm to herself,

other inmates, or innocent bystanders. Because the [f]acility

has a duty to provide a safe environment to its inmates,

[it] also ha[s] a duty to monitor [its] prison population for

illicit drug use. Indeed, drug crimes account for a significant

number of incarcerations. The [f]acility cannot then

delegate the duty to monitor drug use [to] a private party

and absolve inmates of constitutional rights by doing so.

Id. at 487 (emphasis added). This Court finds Amig instructive and persuasive.

Here, the Department implemented the Mailing Policy to prevent drugs

from entering the facility through the SCI mailing system. In its Answer and New

Matter to the Second Amended Petition, the Department acknowledged that it “has a

constitutional duty under the Eighth Amendment to ensure the health and safety of all

inmates in its care and to prevent their exposure to opioids and synthetic cannabinoids.”

Dep’t Answer and New Matter at 9.

The safety concerns that the Department describes are substantially

similar to those referenced in Amig. Because the Department has a duty to provide a

safe prison environment for the inmates, it has a corresponding duty to prevent the

introduction of drugs into its facilities. Thus, this Court finds prison mail screening for

that purpose is a traditional state function. Smart voluntary assumed the obligation to

perform that traditional state function of prison mail screening and, as a result, it acts

under color of state law for purposes of Section 1983. Accordingly, this Court

overrules Smart’s first Preliminary Objection.

10

II. Second Preliminary Objection – Specificity of Pleading

Smart alleges in its second Preliminary Objection that Hill’s Second

Amended Petition should be dismissed for insufficient specificity.8 Smart argues in its

brief to this Court:

In her [Second Amended Petition], [] Hill still fails to allege

her claim with specificity. She vaguely alleges that some

mail she has sent to her spouse has gone missing. She does

not specify the date of any piece of mail she sent.

As the processor of all non-privileged inmate mail, Smart

handles thousands of mail items. The few mail pieces here

are a few needles in a massive haystack. For Smart to

investigate and respond to [] Hill’s allegations, it needs as

many details as possible. But [] Hill has not provided almost

any.

Smart Br. at 6 (citation omitted).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has declared:

Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state. “As a minimum, a

pleader must set forth concisely the facts upon which his

cause of action is based.” Line Lexington Lumber &

Millwork Co[.], Inc. v. P[a.] Publ[’g] Corp., . . . 301 A.2d

684, 688 ([Pa.] 1973). The complaint must not only apprise

the defendant of the claim being asserted, but it must also

summarize the essential facts to support the claim. Landau

v. W[.] P[a.] Nat[’l] Bank, . . . 282 A.2d 335, 339 ([Pa.] 1971)

(“The purpose of [Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure

(Rule) 1019, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1019,] is to require the pleader to

disclose the ‘material facts’ sufficient to enable the adverse

party to prepare his case.”) (citation omitted).

Rule 1019(a) requires that “[t]he material facts on which a

cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise

and summary form.” Pa.R.[Civ.]P. 1019(a). “Each cause of

action and any special damage related thereto shall be stated

8

On March 29, 2021, the Department filed its Answer and New Matter to the Second

Amended Petition without objecting to the Second Amended Petition’s alleged insufficient

specificity.

11

in a separate count containing a demand for relief.” Id.,

1020(a).

McShea v. City of Phila., 995 A.2d 334, 339-40 (Pa. 2010) (citation omitted).

This Court has explained:

[Rule] 1028(a)(3) permits a preliminary objection based on

insufficient specificity of a pleading. To determine if a

pleading is sufficiently specific, a court must ascertain

whether the facts alleged are sufficiently specific to enable a

defendant to prepare his defense. Preliminary objections in

the nature of a motion for a more specific pleading raise the

sole question of whether the pleading is sufficiently clear to

enable the defendant to prepare a defense. Further, in

pleading its case, the complaint need not cite evidence but

only those facts necessary for the defendant to prepare a

defense.

Unified Sportsmen of Pa. v. Pa. Game Comm’n, 950 A.2d 1120, 1134 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2008) (emphasis added; citation omitted).

Importantly, “[t]he allegations of a pro se [petitioner] are held to a less

stringent standard than that applied to pleadings filed by attorneys. If a fair reading of

the [petition for review] shows that the [petitioner] has pleaded facts that may entitle

[her] to relief, the preliminary objections will be overruled.” Danysh v. Dep’t of Corr.,

845 A.2d 260, 262-63 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), aff’d, 881 A.2d 1263 (Pa. 2005).

In Hill I, this Court stated:

To assert a constitutional violation of the First Amendment

right to correspond by mail, a petitioner must allege a

“pattern and practice” of mail interference or actual injury.

Jones v. Doe, 126 A.3d 406, 409 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015). The

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held

that a “single, isolated interference with [an inmate’s]

personal mail was insufficient to constitute a First

Amendment violation.” Nixon v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr.,

501 F. App’x 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2012). The Court declined

to establish a minimum number of mail interferences that

would rise to a constitutional violation, but rather found

12

actual injury is a factual inquiry to be determined on a case-

by-case basis. See Bieregu . . . .

Here, [Hill] claims she and Inmate [Hill] “correspond

regularly,” but Inmate [Hill] has not received mail from her

“since September 8, 2018.” [Original Petition], ¶10. [Hill]

alludes to a pattern and practice of mail interference, but does

not specify the dates of her mailed correspondence or the

number of alleged interferences in the petition. As a result,

her [Original Petition] lacks sufficient facts that, if true,

reflect a pattern and practice of mail interference, or show an

actual injury.

Hill I, slip op. at 7-8 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Hill filed her Original

Petition on October 30, 2018. Thus, it appears that the missing mail to which Hill

refers was allegedly lost between September 8 and October 30, 2018.

Hill’s Second Amended Petition contains the following additional

substantive factual allegations:

11. Since th[e] [O]riginal [Petition] was filed, there ha[ve]

been a number of changes. First, prisoners are now being

given the original, of all legal material, that falls neatly into

the Department’s new practices. Second, they created

different mailing addresses for books, legal mail and non-

legal mail.

12. [Hill] used to write to her husband every Monday,

Wednesday and Friday until her mail started disappearing.

[Inmate Hill] is missing around 38 pieces of mail.

13. There were photos, drawings by children in the family,

announcements of family achievements and occasions, and

none of these things can be replaced.

Second Amended Petition at 2-3.

Although sparse, Hill’s Second Amended Petition contains sufficient facts

necessary for Smart to prepare a defense. Hill alleges in her Second Amended Petition

that, following a system-wide lockdown on August 29, 2018, the Department

implemented the Mailing Policy and, as a result, since September 8, 2018, and until the

13

day she filed her Original Petition on October 30, 2018, approximately 38 pieces of

mail she sent to Inmate Hill, including photos, drawings and other family items, have

not been delivered to him. Hill, thus alleges a “pattern and practice” of mail

interference sufficient to assert a constitutional violation of her First Amendment right

to correspond by mail. Jones, 126 A.3d at 409 (quoting Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353,

358 (3d Cir. 2006)). Accordingly, this Court overrules Smart’s second Preliminary

Objection.

For all of the above reasons, this Court overrules Smart’s Preliminary

Objections.

_______________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

14

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Donna Hill, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections; :

Superintendent of SCI Benner and :

Smart Communications, : No. 684 M.D. 2018

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of February, 2022, Smart Communications’

Preliminary Objections to Donna Hill’s Second Amended Petition for Review are

OVERRULED. Smart Communications is directed to file its answer to the Second

Amended Petition for Review within 30 days from the date of this Order.

__________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge