finding the plaintiff’s “assertion that his signing of bond papers in order to obtain release was coerced and brought about under physical threat or force [to be] incredible” and noting “[a]ssuming the accuracy of this assertion, [the] plaintiff apparently preferred to remain incarcerated under circumstances that he believed were unlawful and unjust rather than to sign a paper voluntarily that would lead to his immediate release. Such fanciful allegations provide insufficient grounds for maintaining a lawsuit.”
How later courts described this case
- finding the plaintiff’s “assertion that his signing of bond papers in order to obtain release was coerced and brought about under physical threat or force [to be] incredible” and noting “[a]ssuming the accuracy of this assertion, [the] plaintiff apparently preferred to remain incarcerated under circumstances that he believed were unlawful and unjust rather than to sign a paper voluntarily that would lead to his immediate release. Such fanciful allegations provide insufficient grounds for maintaining a lawsuit.”
- holding that official capacity claims against “Daniel Richards [sic ] of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare’s Bureau of Child Support Enforcement” were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity in case where husband brought pro se § 1983 suit against multiple state defendants, among others, for violating his due process rights by prosecuting him and imprisoning him pursuant to child support and contempt orders
- holding that a county sheriff was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from plaintiff's civil rights claim based in carrying out facially valid court orders entered against plaintiff in child custody and contempt proceedings
- holding that court personnel are immune from suit when conducting acts that are an “integral part of the judicial process,” such as “carrying out facially valid court orders”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GLD-093 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 11-3915
____________
STEVEN ADDLESPURGER,
Appellant
v.
TOM CORBETT, Pennsylvania State Attorney General
in his official and individual capacities; STEPHEN
ZAPPALLA, Allegheny County District Attorney
in his official and individual capacities; DONNA JO
MCDANIELS, President Judge Allegheny County Fifth
Judicial District in her professional and individual
capacities; RAYMOND BILLOTTE, Administration
of Pennsylvania Courts Fifth Judicial District in his
official and individual capacities; KIM BERKELEY
CLARK, Administrative Judge in her professional and
individual capacities; PATRICK QUINN, Domestic
Relations Services in his official and individual
capacities; DAVID WECHT, Judge in his official and
individual capacities; WILLIAM MULLEN, Sheriff in
his official and individual capacities; DAN ONORATO,
Chief Executive of Allegheny County and in his official
and individual capacities; RAMON RUSTIN, Jail
Warden in his official and individual capacities;
DANIEL RICHARDS, Department of Public Welfare
in his official and individual capacities; MICHAEL H.
WOJCIK, County solicitors in his official and individual
capacities; KATE BARKMAN, Department of Court
records in her professional and individual capacities
__________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 2-09-cv-01064)
District Judge: David Stewart Cercone
__________________________________
Submitted on Motions for Summary Affirmance
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
January 20, 2012
Before: FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 9, 2012)
____________
OPINION
____________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Steven Addlespurger filed a pro se complaint in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, seeking injunctive relief against
the Family Division of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas. Addlespurger,
who was a defendant in a support action filed by his wife, Julie Addlespurger, sought to
enjoin an upcoming contempt proceeding, and complained that he had been subjected to
numerous contempt orders, and had been incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail. He
contended that the prior contempt orders were entered in violation of his due process
rights, and he sought an order enjoining the Family Division from holding the upcoming
contempt proceeding, and an order staying further proceedings in the Family Division.
Addlespurger consented to proceedings before a Magistrate Judge, 28 U.S.C. §
636(c)(1), who viewed the complaint as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. §
2254, and transferred it here for consideration of whether to grant leave to file a
successive petition. (Addlespurger had filed a prior habeas corpus petition, challenging
the Family Division’s contempt orders for non-payment of child support.) Upon its
2
transfer here, we concluded that Addlespurger’s pro se complaint should have been
viewed as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injunctive relief based on
alleged due process violations in the Family Division proceedings. Accordingly, we
transferred the matter back to the district court for further proceedings.
On remand, the case was reassigned to a district judge, and Addlespurger then
filed an amended complaint, alleging, in a rambling, unclear, and disorganized fashion,
that 13 defendants violated his constitutional rights, essentially by prosecuting and
imprisoning him pursuant to child support and contempt orders. The complaint contained
allegations of fraud, forgery, harassment, and conspiracy. Addlespurger sought money
damages, and named as defendants former Attorney General Tom Corbett and Daniel
Richards of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare’s Bureau of Child Support
Enforcement (the “State defendants”); several Family Division judges and administrators,
including President Judge Donna Jo McDaniels, Administrative Judge Kim Berkeley
Clark, Judge David Wecht, Court Administrator Raymond Billotte, and Family Division
Administrator Patrick Quinn (the “judicial defendants”); Allegheny County Executive
Dan Onorato, District Attorney Steven Zappala, Court Records Director Kate Barkman,
Warden Ramon Rustin, and Solicitor Michael Wojcik (the “County defendants”); and
Sheriff William Mullen.
The defendants moved in their respective groups to dismiss the amended
complaint, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6); each group and Sheriff Mullen raised numerous
bases for dismissing the amended complaint. In an order entered on August 1, 2011, the
District Court granted the motions and dismissed the amended complaint. The court
3
painstakingly worked through the counts in the complaint, and determined that there was
no basis for the action to proceed. In an order entered on September 20, 2011, the
District Court denied a timely filed motion for reconsideration. Addlespurger appeals.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The majority of the appellees have moved
in their respective groups for summary affirmance of the District Court’s orders
dismissing the amended complaint and motion for reconsideration. Addlespurger has
submitted a response in opposition to summary action, which we have considered.
We will summarily affirm. Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, we
may summarily dispose of an appeal when it clearly appears that no substantial question
is presented by the appeal. We exercise plenary review over a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal,
see Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 425 (3d Cir. 2001), and we “are free” to
affirm the judgment “on any basis which finds support in the record,” see Bernitsky v.
United States, 620 F.2d 948, 950 (3d Cir. 1980). A motion to dismiss should be granted
if the plaintiff is unable to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility
standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
As explained by the District Court, Addlespurger’s claims in the main flow from
defendant Judge David Wecht’s having issued orders with the intent of carrying out
Pennsylvania’s child support laws. Judges are absolutely immunized from a civil rights
suit for money damages arising from their judicial acts. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9
(1991) (per curiam); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978). The order of a
4
judge entered against Addlespurger in the Family Division proceedings may not serve as
a basis for a civil action for damages. See id. In addition, the defendant court
administrators are similarly absolutely immunized from a suit for damages under the
doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity, because their activities were an integral part of the
judicial process. A court administrator or deputy administrator, who is charged with the
duty of carrying out facially valid court orders, enjoys quasi-judicial immunity from
liability for damages in a suit challenging conduct prescribed by that order. See Gallas v.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 211 F.3d 760, 772-73 (3d Cir. 2000). See also Kincaid
v. Vail, 969 F.2d 594, 601 (7th Cir. 1992); Valdez v. City and County of Denver, 878
F.2d 1285, 1288-90 (10th Cir. 1989). Sheriff Mullin’s involvement in the alleged civil
rights violations was based on the actions of his deputies, who jailed Addlespurger
pursuant to Judge Wecht’s orders. He too is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity under
these circumstances. Accordingly, dismissal of the amended complaint against Judges
Wecht and Clark, Deputy Administrator Quinn, and Sheriff Mullins was proper.1
The action against President Judge McDaniels and Court Administrator Billotte
was properly dismissed because a civil rights claim cannot proceed exclusively on a
theory of respondeat superior. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir.
1
There appears to be a claim of “extortion” against defendant Quinn with respect
to the precise calculation of the monthly child support payments under Pennsylvania Rule
of Civil Procedure 1910.16-1, see Amended Complaint, at ¶¶ 10-12, 20-21, but, to state a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States, West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). An
allegation of a violation of the state child support rules will not suffice and thus this claim
properly was dismissed. The claim against State defendant Daniel Richards in his
individual capacity (he was alleged to have collaborated with defendant Quinn) fails for
the same reason.
5
1988). Liability under section 1983 cannot be imposed absent personal involvement in
the alleged actions, see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-77 (1976); Chincello v.
Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 133-34 (3d Cir. 1986). As to the County defendants,
Addlespurger’s claims are especially unclear, but, again, there do not appear to be any
allegations of personal involvement in the purported violation of his rights, and liability
cannot proceed on a theory of respondeat superior, see id. Accordingly, the amended
complaint was properly dismissed as to the County defendants as well. Addlespurger’s
motion for reconsideration did not cure these deficiencies.
As to the State defendants, to the extent they were sued in their official capacity,
the claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Any official capacity claim fails
because the Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General and Pennsylvania Department
of Public Welfare share in the immunity conferred to the States by the Eleventh
Amendment. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25-27 (1991); Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). The claims against former Attorney General Corbett in
his individual capacity fail because Addlespurger failed to allege any personal
involvement in the purported violation of his rights, Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 375-77;
Chincello, 805 F.2d at 133-34.
Last, Addlespurger alleged that he was routinely subjected to strip searches, upon
being jailed for contempt, pursuant to a policy established by County defendant Warden
Rustin. See Amended Complaint, at ¶ 65. These searches, he alleged, violate the Fourth
Amendment. The District Court properly held that this claim was foreclosed by our
decision in Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 621 F.3d 296, 311 (3d Cir. 2010),
6
petition for cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1816 (2011), in view of the fact that Addlespurger
does not allege that any of the searches were conducted in an unreasonable manner. In
addition, the allegations of a conspiracy among the defendants to violate Addlespurger’s
civil rights does not survive Rule 12(b)(6). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level....” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Furthermore,
there is no private cause of action for a violation of the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes, and we agree with the District Court’s disposition of Addlespurger’s excessive
force and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.
For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the appellees’ motions, and summarily
affirm the orders of the District Court dismissing the amended complaint and denying the
motion for reconsideration.2
2
We do so without regard to whether the appellees specifically moved for summary
affirmance.
7