In re Moawad

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DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 21-BG-778

IN RE EDWARD EMAD MOAWAD

2017 DDN 337

A Suspended Member of the Bar of the

District of Columbia Court of Appeals

Bar Registration No. 998755

BEFORE: Thompson* and Easterly, Associate Judges, and Ferren, Senior Judge.

ORDER

(FILED—February 3, 2022)

On consideration of the certified order from the state of Maryland disbarring

respondent from the practice of law in that state; the November 18, 2021, order

suspending respondent from the practice of law in this jurisdiction and directing him

to show cause why reciprocal discipline should not be imposed, respondent’s

response thereto wherein he states reciprocal discipline should not be imposed; the

statement of Disciplinary Counsel regarding reciprocal discipline; respondent’s

reply thereto; and it appearing that respondent filed his D.C. Bar R. XI, §14(g)

affidavit on December 15, 2021, it is

ORDERED that Edward Emad Moawad is hereby disbarred from the practice

of law in the District of Columbia nunc pro tunc to December 15, 2021. Although

respondent is correct that the state of Maryland presumptively disbars an attorney

for any intentional dishonesty, a presumption this court does not apply, we review

*

Judge Thompson’s term expired on September 4, 2021; however, she will continue to

serve as an Associate Judge until her successor is confirmed. See D.C. Code § 11-1502 (2012

Repl.). She was qualified and appointed on October 4, 2021, to perform judicial duties as a Senior

Judge and will begin her service as a Senior Judge on a date to be determined after her successor

is appointed and qualifies.

No. 21-BG-778

the findings of the originating state to determine, without consideration of the

Maryland presumption, the range of discipline this court would impose for the

misconduct if this were an original action. See D.C. Bar R. XI, §11(c)(4). In doing

so we accept the factual findings and aggravating circumstances of the state of

Maryland, as described in Attorney Grievance Commission v. Moawad, 257 A.3d

611 (Md. 2021), and apply our case law to that misconduct, see In re Guberman,

978 A.2d 200 (D.C. 2009).

Although we have limited the sanction of presumptive disbarment to cases

involving reckless or intentional misappropriation and the conviction of crimes

involving moral turpitude, we have also disbarred counsel in those cases where the

underlying facts and aggravating circumstances require such a sanction including

when we have determined that the attorney’s intentional dishonesty rises to the level

of flagrant dishonesty. See, e.g., In re Bleecker, 11 A.3d 1224 (D.C. 2011)

(disbarring an attorney as reciprocal discipline where the state of Maryland disbarred

respondent after it found that in filing a civil complaint he misrepresented the day of

the injury to hide his failure to file a complaint within the statute of limitations and

that his actions were detrimental to his client and wasted court time). Contrary to

respondent’s arguments, we have previously held that flagrant dishonesty does not

require an associated misappropriation or that the dishonest statement be made either

under oath or as part of a court proceeding. See, e.g., In re Bynum, 197 A.3d 1072,

1074 (D.C. 2018) (court accepted the Board’s findings and conclusion that

respondent’s multiple violations rose to flagrant dishonesty absent a lack of an

attempt to fraudulent obtain client or public funds, where the intentional dishonesty

is aggravated or prolonged, continues through the disciplinary process, and where

respondent demonstrates no remorse and attempts to shift blame for his misconduct

on others). While many prior cases have involved additional misconduct, we look

to the totality of the misconduct in determining whether the dishonesty was flagrant

and have considered whether the intentional dishonesty was an attempt to hide other

misconduct and blame others for his misconduct. See, e.g., In re Kanu, 5 A.3d 1

(D.C. 2010) (although other factors were present, the court found flagrant dishonesty

where counsel failed to return his fee to clients if their visa applications were not

successful, failed to communicate the outcome of the visa proceedings or respond to

clients’ request for the refund of their fees, and subsequently lied to both his clients

and Disciplinary Counsel about his efforts to return the fees, and where numerous

aggravating factors were present including the vulnerability of the clients, his failure

to return fees, and counsel’s failure to take any responsibility for his misconduct);

In re McClure, 144 A.3d 570 (D.C. 2016) (adopting Board recommendation of

No. 21-BG-778

disbarment for protracted dishonesty in a single probate case where he showed no

remorse and no mitigating circumstances were present). We have also considered

whether during the disciplinary proceedings respondent acknowledged his

misconduct, showed remorse, or showed any willingness to pay restitution or return

his client’s unearned fees. In this case the state of Maryland found that respondent

failed to competently represent three vulnerable clients in their immigration cases to

the clients’ detriment, failed to communicate with his clients to the point of

abandonment by failing to respond to their inquiries, and failed to return unearned

fees once his clients terminated his representation. Further, once disciplinary

proceedings began, respondent failed to cooperate and then submitted multiple false

statements and prepared false statements for another to sign. These false statements

denied any misconduct, argued that he did not represent the clients, falsely attributed

his failure to provide competent representation or effective communication to his

clients to another, and falsely claimed his fees were not excessive, he did not owe

them any fees and his clients owed him additional unpaid fees. Throughout the

Maryland proceedings respondent denied responsibility, showed no remorse, and

made no attempts at restitution. Reviewing the full scope of respondent’s

misconduct, as well as the long list of aggravating factors, irrespective of the

presumption applied by the state of Maryland, we conclude that respondent’s

misconduct constitutes flagrant dishonesty and disbarment is within the range of

discipline this court would impose if this were an original matter. Accordingly,

respondent has not shown why substantially different discipline would be imposed

by this court or why identical discipline should not be imposed.

PER CURIAM