Leggett v. Williams

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

May 8, 2008

No. 07-10581

Summary Calendar Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

JEFF LEGGETT

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

JANAY B WILLIAMS, Property Officer; RALEIGH BREEDEN, OIG, Texas

Department of Criminal Justice; DENNIS M HAWKINS, Sergeant; JEFFERY

L JONES, Sergeant; D BALCH; JUSTIN C HALIBURTON; CARY COOK;

KELLI WARD; RONALD P WILLIAMS, Captain

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:05-CV-110

Before WIENER, GARZA, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff-Appellant Jeff Leggett, Texas inmate # 590716, appeals the grant

of summary judgment for the defendants in his civil rights suit filed pursuant

to 42 U.S.C § 1983 against officials at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice

(TDCJ).. We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Freeman v. Texas

Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 369 F.3d 854, 859 (5th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

No. 07-10581

proper under FED. R. CIV. P. 56 “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show

that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party

is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 322 (1986).

Leggett contends that the magistrate judge erred when he applied the

Parratt/Hudson1 doctrine because the TDCJ delegated the authority to deprive

him of his property to prison authorities under Administrative Directive 3.72.

Leggett mischaracterizes the directive at issue, given that Leggett was given the

option of mailing his property or having the prison destroy it. Moreover,

Leggett‘s due process claim rests on his assertion that the defendants conspired

to confiscate and destroy his property as an act of retaliation for his status as a

writ writer and for his complaints against the Robertson Unit officers. Thus,

Leggett’s claim rests on the purported random and unauthorized acts of prison

officials, and his claim for § 1983 damages is barred by the Parratt/Hudson

doctrine. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535; Holloway v. Walker, 784 F.2d 1287, 1291

(5th Cir. 1986).

Leggett also asserts that the magistrate judge misapplied the

Parratt/Hudson doctrine because Leggett had no state-court remedy for his tort

claim. According to Leggett, his property was worth in excess of $10,000, and

under Texas law he can recover only $500. He also argues that state court

remedies were unavailable to him because the clerk of the state court refused to

accept his suit for filing.

Leggett’s arguments are unavailing. See Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541,

543-44 (5th Cir. 1984); see also TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. art. 501.007. That Leggett

might not be able to recover under Texas’s remedies the full amount that he

1

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.

527, 541 (1981), overruled in part on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474

U.S. 327 (1986).

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No. 07-10581

might receive in a § 1983 action is not determinative of the adequacy of that

state’s remedies. See Hudson, 468 U.S. at 535. Likewise, that Leggett was

unsuccessful in filing his state suit does not render Texas’s post deprivation

remedies unavailable. See Holloway, 784 F.2d at 1293. Thus, the magistrate

judge did not err when he granted summary judgment for the defendants on

Leggett’s procedural due process claim. We need not review Leggett’s

substantive due process claim because he did not raise it in the district court.

See Stewart Glass & Mirror, Inc. v. U.S. Auto Glass Disc. Ctrs., Inc., 200 F.3d

307, 316-17 (5th Cir. 2000).

Leggett insists that the magistrate judge abused his discretion when he

denied Leggett’s motions for injunctive relief. Given Texas’s post deprivation

remedies, Leggett was not entitled to injunctive relief on his due process claim.

See Women’s Med. Ctr. v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 419 n.15 (5th Cir. 2001).

Leggett’s contention that the magistrate judge erred when he granted

summary judgment for the defendants on Leggett’s retaliation claim is without

merit. The summary judgment evidence indicates that Leggett’s property was

confiscated because it was in excess of prison regulations and that it was

destroyed because he failed to complete the form addressing the disposition of

his property. Thus, Leggett has not advanced an issue of material fact regarding

retaliatory animus. See Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 684 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 127 S. Ct. 596 (2006); Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324-25 (5th Cir.

1999).

Leggett’s assertion that the magistrate judge erred in granting summary

judgment on Leggett’s equal protection claim is likewise unavailing. The

defendants’ summary judgment evidence shows that Leggett possessed more

property than was allowed and that he failed to fill out the requisite form

directing the way to deal with the property. See Freeman, 369 F.3d at 862.

Leggett advances that the magistrate judge erred when he granted the

defendants summary judgment on Leggett’s conspiracy claim. To establish a

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No. 07-10581

conspiracy claim under § 1983, Leggett had to show an actual violation of § 1983

and an agreement by the defendants to commit an illegal act. See Hale v.

Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995); Arsenaux v. Roberts, 726 F.2d 1022,

1024 (5th Cir. 1982). As the preceding discussion demonstrates, Leggett failed

to create an issue of material fact regarding a violation cognizable under § 1983.

Moreover, Leggett does not allege facts tending to show that the defendants

entered into an agreement to deprive him of his property. “Mere conclusory

allegations of conspiracy cannot, absent reference to material facts, state a

substantial claim of federal conspiracy under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.” Hale v.

Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Thus, the magistrate judge did not err when he granted the defendants

summary judgment on Leggett’s conspiracy claim. For the same reasons, the

magistrate judge did not err when, alternatively, he dismissed Leggett’s

conspiracy claim as frivolous for lacking an arguable basis in law or fact. See 28

U.S.C. § 1915A; Berry v. Brady, 192 F.3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999); Harper v.

Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 718 (5th Cir. 1999).

Leggett asserts that the magistrate judge abused his discretion when he

dismissed Leggett’s claims against Defendant Balch because Leggett alleged

that Balch was personally involved in the deprivation of Leggett’s constitutional

rights. The magistrate judge, however, did not dismiss Leggett’s claims against

Defendant Balch for lack of personal involvement. Rather, the magistrate judge

noted that Balch had not been served and had not answered the suit. The

magistrate judge sua sponte determined that Leggett’s claim that Balch

conspired with the other defendants was conclusional and therefore frivolous.

As set forth above, Leggett failed to show that the defendants, including Balch,

had agreed to conspire against him.

Leggett contends that the magistrate judge erred when he granted the

defendants qualified immunity. Public officials are entitled to qualified

immunity from suit under § 1983 unless the plaintiff makes specific allegations

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No. 07-10581

that the officials violated clearly established law. Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116,

120 (5th Cir. 1996). As Leggett has not created a genuine issue of material fact

on any of his constitutional claims, the defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity.

Leggett’s insistence that the defendants are not entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity because they were acting in violation of federal law is

unavailing because he sued them in their official capacities. See Aguilar v. Texas

Dep’t of Crim. Justice, 160 F.3d 1052, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998).

Finally, Leggett maintains that the magistrate judge erred when he failed

to rule on Leggett’s claim that the defendants denied him access to the courts

when they confiscated his legal property. The magistrate judge denied Leggett

Rule (60(b) relief on his denial-of-access-to-the-courts claim. As Leggett did not

appeal from the order denying Rule 60(b) relief, we are without jurisdiction to

review his claim that he was denied access to the courts. See Bowles v. Russell,

127 S. Ct. 2360, 2366 (2007).

AFFIRMED.

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