Opinion

Djadjou v. Holder

  • 662 F.3d 265
  • 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24080
  • 2011 WL 6016971
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Filed
Dec 5, 2011
Status
Published
On the bench
Wilkinson, Wynn, Floyd
Cited by
108 cases
Authority
More cited than 19.9%

recognizing that letters and affidavits from family and friends are not objective corroborating evidence and are therefore not required to be considered by Immigration Judges and the Board

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing that letters and affidavits from family and friends are not objective corroborating evidence and are therefore not required to be considered by Immigration Judges and the Board
  • stating that “the agency must provide specific, cogent reasons for making an adverse credibility determination”
  • affirming an adverse credibility finding when the applicant had testified she was in hiding, but an eviction notice indicated that she was in her store on the same day
  • describing the impact of the REAL ID Act on credibility determinations

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

PULCHERIE TEKEU DJADJOU, a/k/a 

Pulcherie Djadjou,

Petitioner,

v.  No. 10-1889

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney

General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of

the Board of Immigration Appeals.

Argued: September 22, 2011

Decided: December 5, 2011

Before WILKINSON, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Petition denied by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the

majority opinion, in which Judge Wilkinson concurred. Judge

Wynn wrote a dissenting opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Lawrence David Rosenberg, JONES DAY,

Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Keith Ian McManus,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washing-

ton, D.C., for Respondent. ON BRIEF: Danielle Beach-

2 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

Oswald, BEACH-OSWALD IMMIGRATION LAW ASSO-

CIATES, PC, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner. Tony West,

Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Joseph A.

O’Connell, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C.,

for Respondent.

OPINION

FLOYD, Circuit Judge:

Pulcherie Tekeu Djadjou, a native and citizen of Cameroon,

applied for asylum and withholding of removal under the

Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and protection under

the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). The

Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all forms of relief, and the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Djadjou now

petitions this court for review of the BIA’s decision. Her peti-

tion asserts that the agency erred in making an adverse credi-

bility determination and, even if it did not so err, independent

evidence exists to establish past persecution. We uphold the

adverse credibility determination as supported by substantial

evidence and agree with the agency that Djadjou failed to pro-

vide sufficient independent evidence establishing past perse-

cution. Accordingly, we deny the petition.

I.

A.

Djadjou obtained a nonimmigrant visa and was admitted

into the United States on March 12, 2002. Her authorization

to stay in the United States expired two days later on March

14, 2002. She overstayed her authorization without permis-

sion. Not quite a year later, on February 18, 2003, she applied

for asylum and withholding of removal under the INA and

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 3

protection under the CAT. After the Department of Homeland

Security served her with a Notice to Appear, Djadjou con-

ceded removability at her initial hearing, but again requested

asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the

CAT.

The IJ conducted a merits hearing that spanned the course

of two days in August and September 2008. At the hearing,

Djadjou testified and offered one witness to testify on her

behalf. At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ rendered an

oral decision denying all forms of relief and ordered her vol-

untary departure. The BIA affirmed the IJ. Before explaining

the bases for their decisions, we will recount the contents of

Djadjou’s testimony and her corroborating evidence.

B.

Djadjou testified that she fled Cameroon because her life

was in danger. This danger, she maintained, arose from the

persecution that she suffered at the hands of Cameroonian

officials. According to her testimony and application, Camer-

oonian officials arrested her four times and beat and raped her

during her detainments. Her persecution, she insisted, resulted

from her political activities with opposition organizations.

What follows is Djadjou’s version of events as reflected in her

application and testimony.

Djadjou became involved in politics in Cameroon in 1991.

At the time, she was a student at a university. While involved

with a campus opposition group called the "Group of Less,"

she rose to the rank of action coordinator, which entailed

organizing strikes and marches. In response to her political

activities, the Cameroonian government blacklisted her from

obtaining employment. This blacklisting ultimately caused

her to open her own store in the Mokolo market in Yaounde,

where she sold shoes, bags, jewelry, and clothes. She

employed one salesperson at her store.

4 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

As a businesswoman, Djadjou traveled to different coun-

tries to buy goods. She traveled to the Gabon Republic five

times between 1990 and 1998, and traveled to Syria on at

least two occasions. Her passport admitted into evidence,

which was issued in 1997, reflected that she went to the

Gabon Republic in 1999. Each time she returned to Camer-

oon.

On May 27, 1991, like many of her fellow members in the

Group of Less, she joined and became involved in the Social

Democratic Front (SDF), an opposition party in Cameroon.

She became secretary general of the young adults for the

Mokolo, Komkana, Madagascar, and Carriere wards of the

SDF in 1992. In that capacity, she was responsible for, among

other things, notifying members about meetings and writing

reports for the party. She remained a member of the SDF until

1996, when she changed political parties.

The SDF held its first meeting in Yaounde in May 1992.

Sellers in the Mokolo market played a role in organizing the

meeting. The SDF demanded that the government form a

"National Sovereign Conference" to address the social, politi-

cal, and cultural problems plaguing Cameroon. In response,

the local police broke all of the counters of the Mokolo mar-

ket sellers. When the SDF members resisted the local police

by throwing rocks and building barricades, the police arrested

them for public disturbance.

It was in this context that police officers first arrested Djad-

jou on May 18, 1992, during a protest march at the Mokolo

market. She had helped mobilize the march and distribute fly-

ers. After her arrest, the officers took her to the police station

where they beat her on her legs and feet while insulting and

threatening her. That night, an officer raped her in an interro-

gation room. Over the course of the next three days, she suf-

fered further beatings. On May 21, 1992, her uncle obtained

her release after speaking with the police commissioner.

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 5

Djadjou joined the Southern Cameroons National Council

(SCNC), another opposition organization, on January 1, 1997.

She rose in prominence within the organization and was

elected secretary general that same year. Her activities as sec-

retary general again involved providing information about

meetings, printing flyers, and writing reports.

Her second arrest occurred on June 1, 1997, as a result of

her position as secretary general of the SCNC. In April or

May 1997, the government proclaimed, falsely, that the

SCNC had attacked and vandalized government buildings. In

response, officers arrested Djadjou at her store in Yaounde

and detained her for a week. Because of her position in the

SCNC, they thought she or her associates might have been

responsible. Throughout the week, her detainers beat and

insulted her. Her uncle again intervened to secure her release,

showing the police commissioner invoices demonstrating that

she was elsewhere at the time of the alleged attacks and van-

dalism.

Officials arrested Djadjou a third time on July 10, 2000,

again because of her perceived role as a leader in the SCNC.

That previous December, a radio station incorrectly

announced that certain provinces had declared their indepen-

dence as the Federal Republic of Southern Cameroon,

prompting the government to investigate and round up the

leaders of the SCNC, including Djadjou. Pursuant to a police

summons, officials arrested Djadjou in Bassamba, where she

had fled after hearing that officers were arresting SCNC

members in Yaounde. The officers took her to Bangangte and

detained her for three days. During that time, her detainers

denied her food, beat her, and tortured her. The officers also

shut down her store while she was in detainment. Her uncle,

along with twenty other family members, convened on the

police station and demanded her release. The commandant of

the station relented and released her.

Djadjou’s fourth and final arrest came on December 15,

2001. This arrest occurred at the market in Yaounde. She was

6 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

conferring with a fellow SCNC sympathizer about organizing

a meeting when an official approached and began accusing

her of sanitation violations at her store. The official ordered

an officer to break down her counter and seize her merchan-

dise. When she resisted, they arrested her. On the way to the

police station, a car door was closed on her leg, cutting it

badly. At the police station, two officers held her down and

beat her. They placed her in a cell full of water and urine with

six other detainees. Her detention lasted for four days, during

which her detainers denied her health care, water, and food.

After she lost consciousness and collapsed on the fifth day,

they took her to the hospital. When the officer guarding her

room at the hospital went to get a drink, she, with the help of

her uncle, escaped through a back door.

Following Djadjou’s escape from the hospital, her uncle

drove her to Douala Bonaberi, where she hid at her older sis-

ter’s house until it was safe for her to depart Cameroon.

Because she was accustomed to traveling, she had her pass-

port with her. To help her escape Cameroon, she obtained a

visa from the United States Embassy under the guise of

attending the 49th World Congress Association of Women

Entrepreneurs, which was being held in Mexico from January

25, 2002, to January 31, 2002. Yet, when she went to the air-

port on January 25, she observed police officers looking for

her. Frightened, she abandoned her plans and returned to hid-

ing at her sister’s house.

Her sister made arrangements for her to leave Cameroon in

March 2002. This attempt was successful. She departed on

March 11, 2002, and arrived in the United States the follow-

ing day. Since her arrival in the United States, Cameroonian

officials have continued looking for her. In October 2007,

they destroyed her business in her absence.

C.

Djadjou offered testimonial and documentary evidence to

corroborate her testimony and application.

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 7

She admitted documentation from the SDF to support her

testimony as to the persecution she suffered from her activi-

ties in that organization. She offered an SDF membership

card. Also, she provided two letters from the SDF. One letter

indicated Djadjou was a member of the SDF from 1991 to

1996, stated that she was the ex-secretary of propaganda in

charge of youth affairs, and noted that government officials

were looking for her. The other letter stated that she has been

an active member of the SDF since 1991 and was the victim

of "great tortures."

Likewise, she submitted SCNC membership cards and an

affidavit from the Chairman of the Southern Cameroons

National Council in the United States of America (SCNC-

USA), Derrick Njoh, to corroborate her testimony about her

role in the SCNC in Cameroon and the persecution that she

suffered as a result. Njoh attested that SCNC records in Cam-

eroon confirmed Djadjou’s membership since 1997, her

instrumental role in handing out flyers, tracts, and similar

items, and her participation in demonstrations. As a result, he

stated, she was arrested and detained in 2000, and her hus-

band was arrested and tortured in 1997. He obtained this

information, he maintained, through telephone conversations

with an SCNC official in Cameroon.

One witness, Howard Njeck, the Vice Chairman of the

SCNC-USA, testified on her behalf. He stated that he has

known Djadjou since 2004 when he met her at SCNC-USA

meetings in the United States. He recounted that, at those

meetings, Djadjou discussed her prior arrests in Cameroon.

Njeck also described the efforts taken by Njoh in verifying the

information in his affidavit. He affirmed that Njoh called the

SCNC official in Cameroon and that the official, although not

having personal knowledge of Djadjou, checked the records

of the SCNC. Njeck reiterated that the Cameroonian official

told Njoh that Djadjou was arrested in 2000 and her husband

was arrested in 1997. Aside from explaining how Njoh

obtained the information, Njeck further asserted that he

8 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

undertook his own independent verification of the information

by calling his friend who is active in the SCNC in Yaounde.

According to Njeck, his friend checked the SCNC’s records

in Cameroon and confirmed that Djadjou was active in the

organization. Although Njeck knew that the SCNC kept a

leadership listing, he was unaware of her holding the position

of secretary general. Finally, Njeck affirmed that Djadjou was

an active member of the SCNC-USA and regularly attended

its meetings in the United States.

Djadjou also presented letters and affidavits from family

and friends to corroborate her claims. Her uncle submitted an

affidavit supporting her testimony regarding the four arrests,

her escape from the hospital, and the government officials

destroying her shop after she departed Cameroon. Her sister

provided an affidavit stating that Djadjou hid at her house

after her fourth arrest and that she arranged for Djadjou’s

departure from Cameroon. Finally, Djadjou submitted an affi-

davit from a friend who attested to her second and fourth

arrests.

Djadjou further provided police documents from Camer-

oon. One was a "convocation" issued on July 9, 2000, that

summoned her to appear at the police station in Bangangte on

July 10, 2000. The other was a telegram dated January 2,

2002, stating that Djadjou was fleeing to Bonaberi and

requesting that she be stopped for an illegal political meeting.

Djadjou submitted an eviction notice for her business dated

March 11, 2002. In the eviction notice, a Cameroonian clerk

of court ordered that Djadjou vacate the premises within

seventy-two hours. Notably, the eviction notice included the

following handwritten notation: "Mrs. DJADJOU Pulcherie

residing in Yaounde, and her residence or place of work

where she was and talking to: (her being present on the prem-

ises receives the copy and refuses to sign)." The clerk of court

served the eviction notice at Djadjou’s business.

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 9

Finally, Djadjou offered four other pieces of evidence. She

provided photographs of destroyed property. Presumably

these photographs depicted Djadjou’s destroyed store. She

also admitted reports from Amnesty International and the

United States Department of State, and an affidavit from Jus-

tice Aloysius, a leader in the Southern Cameroons National

Council North America (SCNC/NA). The reports and Justice

Aloysius discussed the persecution of SCNC leaders and

members in Cameroon. Justice Aloysius also added that Djad-

jou was a member of the SCNC/NA.

D.

The IJ determined that Djadjou failed to prove past perse-

cution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. In doing

so, she made an adverse credibility finding as to Djadjou, but

she found Njeck’s testimony credible insofar as he testified

consistently with Njoh’s SCNC-USA affidavit. She proceeded

to provide specific reasons for rejecting each piece of Djad-

jou’s corroborating evidence. She noted various inconsisten-

cies between, or omissions in, Djadjou’s testimony and

corroborating evidence, and explained why she found each

piece of evidence deficient:

• Djadjou testified to being secretary general of the

SCNC, yet none of her corroborating evidence

mentioned her holding that position, including

Njoh’s affidavit from the SCNC-USA, and Njeck

testified that he had no knowledge of her holding

the position. Also, Djadjou’s own application

statement did not mention her leadership posi-

tion.

• Djadjou testified she was arrested four times, but

Njeck and Njoh attested to her being arrested in

2000 and did not verify the other arrests.

Although the SCNC might have been unaware of

her 1992 arrest because she was associated with

10 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

the SDF at the time, they nevertheless did not

mention her other two arrests. The IJ determined

that Djadjou offered no satisfactory reason for the

omission.

• Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements were based on

what Cameroonian SCNC officials told them that

records in Cameroon reflected, but Djadjou did

not submit those records. The IJ determined this

to be a "significant omission" and noted no other

records corroborated their statements.

• One of Djadjou’s SCNC membership cards mis-

spelled the name of the organization by leaving

the "s" off "Cameroons." The IJ found her expla-

nation of a printing error unconvincing.

• One SDF letter stated she "is an active member,"

but Djadjou testified that she ended her member-

ship in 1996. The IJ did not accept Djadjou’s

explanation that the SDF letter embodied a gram-

matical error.

• One SDF letter stated she was a member and did

not mention her leadership position with the

SDF, but another SDF letter asserted that she was

an ex-secretary of propaganda in charge of youth

affairs. Also, one SDF letter referred to her gen-

erally being the victim of torture, but the other

did not. Neither letter mentioned the 1992 arrest

to which she testified. The IJ further noted there

was no source for the information in either letter.

• Djadjou testified that she was in hiding at her sis-

ter’s house from December 2001 until she

departed for the United States, but her eviction

notice indicated that she was personally served

with the notice by a government official in a pub-

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 11

lic location on March 11, 2002. (The BIA

observed she was at her store when served.) The

IJ refused to credit the explanation that the evic-

tion notice referred to her salesperson, not Djad-

jou.

• Djadjou left Cameroon after her 1992 and 1997

arrests, but voluntarily returned, as evidenced by

her passport and testimony. The IJ refused to

credit her explanation that she wanted to continue

the fight and found that her voluntary return

undermined her credibility about her arrests and

persecution.

• The government permitted Djadjou’s business to

continue to operate, even years after she departed

Cameroon, despite her being an opposition activ-

ist.

• The police convocation and police telegram were

not authenticated, and Djadjou did not establish

a chain of custody for them.

• The letters from family and friends were not

objective evidence.

• No objective corroborating evidence established

that the photographs actually depicted Djadjou’s

destroyed business.

As a result, the IJ did not credit that Djadjou was an SDF

member or arrested in 1992 as she claimed. She found that

Djadjou may have belonged to the SCNC, but she did not

credit that she was arrested in 1997, 2000, and 2001 because

of her activities with the SCNC. She found that no persuasive

objective evidence established that Djadjou was arrested

because of her political activities and determined that she did

not flee Cameroon in fear for her life. Thus, the IJ held that

12 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

Djadjou did not establish past persecution or a well-founded

fear of future persecution, and concluded that Djadjou did not

satisfy the requirements for asylum and withholding of

removal under the INA or protection under the CAT.

Following Djadjou’s appeal of the IJ’s order, the BIA

issued its decision on July 9, 2010. In discussing the IJ’s

adverse credibility determination, the BIA stated, "As noted

by the Immigration Judge, the respondent provided conflict-

ing statements and material omissions regarding the alleged

mistreatment in Cameroon," and cited to the IJ’s analysis. It

then stated, "For example," and reiterated some of the reasons

provided by the IJ for making an adverse credibility determi-

nation. The BIA also agreed with the IJ that Djadjou failed to

offer reasonably available objective evidence to support her

claim. It noted a few additional inconsistencies and deficien-

cies in Djadjou’s evidence:

• One SDF letter that Djadjou submitted stated she

was a member from 1991 until 1996, but the

other letter indicated she was still an active mem-

ber.

• Njeck had no firsthand knowledge of Djadjou’s

mistreatment.

• Djadjou failed to offer reliable evidence from the

SDF or SCNC to corroborate her claims.

The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision that Djadjou failed to

prove past persecution or a well-founded fear of future perse-

cution to qualify for asylum. It also agreed that she did not

establish eligibility for withholding of removal or protection

under the CAT. Thus, the BIA dismissed Djadjou’s appeal.

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 13

II.

A.

We begin with an overview of the relief that Djadjou seeks.

As noted, she asserts she is eligible for three forms of relief:

asylum and withholding of removal, both under the INA, and

protection under the CAT.

The INA vests in the Attorney General the discretionary

power "to grant asylum to aliens who qualify as ‘refugees.’"

Dankam v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 113, 115 (4th Cir. 2007). A

refugee is "someone ‘who is unable or unwilling to return to’

his native country ‘because of persecution or a well-founded

fear of persecution on account of . . . political opinion’ or

other protected grounds." Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(42)(A)). Asylum applicants carry the burden of

proving that they satisfy the definition of a refugee to qualify

for discretionary relief. Id. They may satisfy this burden by

"showing either that [they were] subjected to past persecution

or that [they have] a ‘well-founded’ fear of future persecution

‘on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.’" Marynenka v.

Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.13(b)(1)). A rebuttable presumption of a well-founded

fear of persecution arises when an applicant establishes past

persecution. Id.

Aliens face a heightened burden of proof "to qualify for

withholding of removal to a particular country under the

INA." Dankam, 495 F.3d at 115. They must show a "‘clear

probability of persecution’ on account of a protected ground."

Id. (quoting INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984)). If they

meet this heightened burden, withholding of removal is man-

datory. Id. But because the standard for withholding of

removal is higher than the standard for asylum, if applicants

cannot demonstrate asylum eligibility, their applications for

14 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

withholding of removal will necessarily fail as well.

Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 600.

Aliens may also seek protection from removal under the

CAT. Dankam, 495 F.3d at 115. The CAT requires aliens to

demonstrate "that it is more likely than not that [they] would

be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal."

Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)) (internal quotation

marks omitted). It is a mandatory form of relief as well. Id.

at 115-16. Unlike applicants for asylum and withholding of

removal under the INA, applicants for protection under the

CAT do not need to show that the likelihood of torture is con-

nected to a protected ground. Id. at 115.

B.

"When, as here, the BIA adopts the IJ’s decision and

includes its own reasons for affirming, we review both deci-

sions." Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 600. We are obliged to uphold

the BIA’s determinations unless they are "manifestly contrary

to the law and an abuse of discretion." Lizama v. Holder, 629

F.3d 440, 444 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Mirisawo v. Holder,

599 F.3d 391, 396 (4th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The agency abuses its discretion "if it fail[s] to offer

a reasoned explanation for its decision, or if it distort[s] or

disregard[s] important aspects of the applicant’s claim." Tassi

v. Holder, No. 10-2194, slip op. at 13 (4th Cir. Nov. 7, 2011).

Our standard of review of the agency’s findings is narrow

and deferential. Dankam, 495 F.3d at 119. We seek to ensure

that the agency’s factual findings are supported by substantial

evidence. Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 600. Substantial evidence

exists to support a finding "unless the evidence . . . was such

that any reasonable adjudicator would have been compelled to

conclude to the contrary." Id. (quoting Haoua v. Gonzales,

472 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Similarly, we cannot reverse the agency’s overall

decision that an applicant is ineligible for asylum unless we

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 15

determine that the applicant’s evidence "was such that a rea-

sonable factfinder would have to conclude that the requisite

fear of persecution existed." INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.

478, 481 (1992). Our review of legal issues, however, is de

novo. Marynenka, 592 F.3d at 600.

III.

We first address Djadjou’s contention that substantial evi-

dence does not support the agency’s adverse credibility deter-

mination. For the following reasons, we find that substantial

evidence exists to support the agency’s adverse credibility

determination.

A.

Applicants can satisfy their burden of proving eligibility for

asylum simply by testifying credibly. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a).

Corroborating evidence, though not always required, may be

necessary "when it is reasonable to expect such proof and

there is no reasonable explanation for its absence." Lin-Jian

v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 182, 191-92 (4th Cir. 2007).

Our review of an adverse credibility determination is lim-

ited to ensuring that substantial evidence exists to support it.

Dankam, 495 F.3d at 119. We accord broad deference to the

agency’s credibility determination. Id. This deference, how-

ever, is not absolute, for the agency must provide specific,

cogent reasons for making an adverse credibility determina-

tion. Anim v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 243, 252 (4th Cir. 2008).

We have recognized that omissions, inconsistent state-

ments, contradictory evidence, and inherently improbable tes-

timony are appropriate bases for making an adverse

credibility determination. Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d 234,

243 (4th Cir. 2009); Lin-Jian, 489 F.3d at 189. The existence

of only a few such inconsistencies, omissions, or contradic-

tions can be sufficient for the agency to make an adverse

16 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

credibility determination as to the applicant’s entire testimony

regarding past persecution. See Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d

361, 369 (4th Cir. 2004) (upholding an IJ’s adverse credibility

determination based on two inconsistencies). Minor omis-

sions, inconsistencies, and contradictions that do not go to the

heart of the applicant’s claims, however, do not necessarily

support an adverse credibility determination.1 Tassi, No. 10-

2194, slip op. at 7 n.6. Speculation, conjecture, and unsup-

ported personal opinion are insufficient reasons to discount an

applicant’s testimony or corroborating evidence. Lin-Jian,

489 F.3d at 189.

B.

We highlight two findings made by the agency that provide

substantial evidence for its adverse credibility determination:

1) the eviction notice served on Djadjou at her store when she

testified that she was in hiding elsewhere and 2) her failure to

mention her purported leadership role in her application state-

ment.

The IJ and BIA found that the eviction notice was inconsis-

tent with Djadjou’s testimony. They observed that, although

Djadjou testified she remained in hiding at her sister’s house

in Douala Bonaberi until she departed for the United States on

March 11, 2002, the eviction notice indicated that she was

present at her store in Yaounde and served with the notice the

same day. The IJ considered Djadjou’s explanation that the

eviction notice was referring to her salesperson,2 but rejected

1

The REAL ID Act of 2005 changed this rule and provides that an

inconsistency can serve as a basis for an adverse credibility determination

"without regard to whether [it] goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim."

8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). But because Djadjou filed her application

before the effective date of the Act, it is inapplicable. See Tassi, No. 10-

2194, slip op. at 7 n.6.

2

Djadjou also challenges the agency’s reliance on the eviction notice on

the ground that the notice is insufficiently clear to allow her to rebut its

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 17

it, determining that the plain language of the eviction notice

indicated that it was referring to Djadjou. This was a reason-

able interpretation of the eviction notice that is entitled to our

deference. See Dankam, 495 F.3d at 122.

The BIA and IJ were justified in finding that the eviction

notice was inconsistent with Djadjou’s testimony. That Djad-

jou was at her store and capable of government officials serv-

ing her with an eviction notice suggests she was not in hiding

at her sister’s house as she testified. As the IJ found, this is

a significant inconsistency. Djadjou’s testimony that she was

in hiding not only bolstered her allegation of her last arrest,

but also indicated that she was persecuted to the point of her

going into hiding. This is not a collateral matter, but goes to

the heart of her claims of past persecution. Accordingly, the

inconsistency between the eviction notice and Djadjou’s testi-

mony was an appropriate basis for an adverse credibility

determination.

The IJ also noted an inconsistency between Djadjou’s testi-

mony that she was elected secretary general of the SCNC and

her statement in support of her application, which omitted any

reference to her holding that position. As the IJ recognized,

Djadjou testified that she was elected secretary general of the

SCNC in 1997. Yet the statement in support of her application

omits any reference to her election to that post, noting only

contents. She asserts that the relevant part is a handwritten notation that

may have been mistranslated from French to English. To support this con-

tention, she relies on the following statement from our decision in Anim

v. Mukasey: "[D]ocumentary evidence—especially evidence that is partic-

ularly damning to an applicant’s case—should be sufficiently clear and

complete to give the applicant an opportunity to meaningfully rebut its

allegations." 535 F.3d at 257. Djadjou’s reliance on Anim is misplaced.

We note simply that our concerns in Anim to which she cites arose from

the introduction of a document by the government. Here, however, Djad-

jou, not the government, admitted the eviction notice in support of her

application. We, therefore, are not concerned with whether it was clear

enough for her to challenge its contents like we were in Anim.

18 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

her selection to a leadership role in the SDF in 1992. Further-

more, Njeck, her witness, admitted he had no knowledge that

she held such a post even though the SCNC maintains leader-

ship listings, and Njoh’s affidavit on behalf of the SCNC-

USA did not mention it.

Djadjou asserts that the omission or inconsistency regard-

ing her position as secretary general was immaterial. We dis-

agree. Djadjou testified that she was arrested the second time

because of her position as secretary general in the SCNC. She

also attested that her third arrest resulted from her perceived

leadership role. Thus, her purported leadership role lay at the

heart of her claims of past persecution. She asserted that Cam-

eroonian officials targeted her because of it. Her failure to

mention it in her application reasonably casts doubt not only

on whether she held the position, but also on whether officials

targeted her as she claimed. The agency appropriately relied

on this omission as a basis for its adverse credibility determi-

nation.

Based on the inconsistency arising from Djadjou’s eviction

notice suggesting she was not in hiding as she claimed and the

omission in her application of her leadership role in the

SCNC, we conclude that a reasonable adjudicator could find

Djadjou to lack credibility. The inconsistency and omission

reasonably cast doubt on aspects of Djadjou’s testimony that

went to the heart of her claims of past persecution, and their

cumulative effect could cause a reasonable adjudicator to

question the veracity of her overall testimony. Thus, we hold

that substantial evidence exists to support the agency’s

adverse credibility determination.

IV.

A.

Despite an adverse credibility determination, applicants for

asylum can establish past persecution through independent

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 19

evidence. See Camara, 378 F.3d at 369-70. Where indepen-

dent evidence apart from the applicant’s testimony and appli-

cation statement exists, the agency must consider whether it

is sufficient to establish a claim of past persecution. See id. at

370. The agency may not ignore such evidence and reject the

claim solely on the basis of the adverse credibility determina-

tion. See id.

Djadjou insists that independent evidence apart from her

testimony and application statement exists to establish past

persecution. According to Djadjou, the agency discredited

much of her corroborative evidence for legally erroneous rea-

sons. That evidence, she contends, independently establishes

her past persecution despite the adverse credibility determina-

tion. We disagree.

B.

In reviewing the agency’s decisions, our task is not to

decide whether we agree with the agency’s reasons or would

discredit the evidence if we stood in its shoes. Rather, we

ensure that substantial evidence supports its findings, which

means we simply determine whether any reasonable adjudica-

tor would be compelled to conclude to the contrary. Anim,

535 F.3d at 252. Unless any reasonable adjudicator would be

compelled to conclude differently, we defer to the agency. See

id. The agency, however, must provide specific, cogent rea-

sons for discrediting documentary evidence. Kourouma, 588

F.3d at 241.

The agency refused to credit the affidavits and letters pro-

vided by Djadjou’s uncle, sister, and friend on the ground that

such evidence is not objective. We have recognized before

that "evidence offered as corroborating evidence [must] be

objective . . . for it to be considered by the immigration judge

and BIA." Id. Letters and affidavits from family and friends

are not objective evidence in this context. See Gandziami-

Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2006).

20 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

Consequently, the agency did not err in refusing to credit the

affidavits and letters provided by Djadjou’s family and

friends.

The agency also refused to credit Njeck’s testimony and

Njoh’s affidavit with respect to Djadjou’s 2000 arrest and her

husband’s 1997 arrest. By noting the absence of reliable cor-

roborating evidence from the SCNC, the BIA essentially

found that Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements were unreliable.

Throughout their decisions, the BIA and IJ noted various defi-

ciencies with the statements, including the lack of personal

knowledge, the statements’ omission of key facts from Djad-

jou’s testimony, and Djadjou’s failure to submit the records

on which Njeck and Njoh based their assertions. The IJ also

expressed skepticism about whether the Cameroonian official

who provided the information to Njoh actually examined the

records. From both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions, we glean an

overall concern about the reliability of Njoh’s and Njeck’s

statements when they attested to events of which they had no

personal knowledge based on records that they had not

reviewed and were not submitted. In essence, the hearsay

nature of the statements, which involved multiple levels of

hearsay, contributed to the agency’s concerns about their reli-

ability.

We begin with the general observation that the Federal

Rules of Evidence do not apply in immigration hearings,

which means that hearsay evidence is admissible. Anim, 535

F.3d at 256-57. For that reason, the agency may not reject cor-

roborative evidence on the sole basis that it does not comport

with the Federal Rules of Evidence. Tassi, No. 10-2194, slip

op. at 16.

Nevertheless, we have previously recognized that letters

relying on multiple levels of hearsay raise special reliability

concerns. In Anim, the government introduced a letter from an

official at the United States Department of State asserting that

she had contacted the petitioner’s native country in evaluating

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 21

documents the petitioner had introduced. 535 F.3d at 250. She

noted that she did so without disclosing that her request per-

tained to an asylum application. Id. Officials from the peti-

tioner’s native country told the State Department that the

documents were forgeries. Id. The letter contained multiple

levels of hearsay, as the State Department official had con-

tacted an investigator at the local embassy, who then con-

tacted officials in the petitioner’s native country. Id. The

immigration judge allowed the government to introduce the

letter. Id. at 251.

We held that the letter was so unreliable that its use was

fundamentally unfair to the petitioner. Id. at 256. One of our

chief concerns was that it relied on multiple levels of hearsay.

Id. at 257. Despite noting that hearsay is admissible in immi-

gration hearings and that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not

apply in such hearings, we also recognized that "[h]ighly

unreliable hearsay might raise due process problems." Id.

(alteration in original) (quoting Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442

F.3d 395, 405 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omit-

ted). We reasoned that "[m]ultiple hearsay, where the declar-

ant is steps removed from the original speaker, is particularly

problematic because the declarant in all likelihood has been

unable to evaluate the trustworthiness of the original speaker."

Id. We also noted that the letter was made all the more unreli-

able because the original source was the native country’s gov-

ernment officials, who had a powerful incentive not to be

candid. Id. We further determined that the lack of sufficient

information as to how the officials conducted the investiga-

tion into the authenticity of the documents was problematic

because it prevented the agency from evaluating the reliability

of the letter’s conclusions and denied the petitioner a mean-

ingful ability to rebut its conclusions. Id. at 257-58. Because

the use of the letter was fundamentally unfair and prejudiced

the petitioner, we found a due process violation. Id. at 261.

Although Anim’s discussion of multiple hearsay arose in a

different context, many of the same concerns about letters

22 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

relying on multiple levels of hearsay are implicated here. We

think these concerns apply with equal force when determining

whether to credit such a statement submitted by an applicant.

Statements relying on multiple levels of hearsay are typically,

though not always, highly unreliable whether offered by the

government or the applicant. If such evidence can be so

highly unreliable as to render a proceeding fundamentally

unfair when the government introduces it, the agency may

likewise refuse to credit it due to its unreliability when intro-

duced by the applicant. Although we can conceive that state-

ments relying on multiple levels of hearsay may, at times,

contain sufficient indicia of reliability so as to counteract their

inherent unreliability, this is not one of those times.

In this case, Njoh’s and Njeck’s statements relied on multi-

ple levels of hearsay. Njoh and Njeck contacted officials in

Cameroon who conveyed information they observed in

records that were supposedly accurate. Neither Njeck nor

Njoh reviewed the records personally to ascertain their accu-

racy or trustworthiness. Therefore, they could not vouch for

their accuracy or reliability. Although the IJ found Njeck

credible insofar as his statement was consistent with Njoh’s

affidavit, that finding of credibility says nothing about the

reliability of the underlying information.

Moreover, Njeck and Njoh did not include any information

to alleviate the reliability concerns associated with multiple

levels of hearsay. They offered no information about the

Cameroonian officials who reviewed the records aside from

stating their names and titles. The IJ was utterly unable to

determine whether the Cameroonian officials were credible.

Njeck and Njoh did not detail the recordkeeping practices of

the SCNC in Cameroon, but instead generally noted that the

SCNC keeps records of members that include arrests. Because

neither Njeck nor Njoh could vouch for the reliability of the

information and they did not include anything to bolster its

reliability, the IJ was essentially left without any means of

assessing it. A reasonable fact finder would naturally be con-

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 23

cerned about the weight to ascribe such evidence. Thus, the

agency had reasonable grounds for concern about the reliabil-

ity of Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements that Djadjou was

arrested in 2000 and that her husband was arrested in 1997.

We therefore hold that the agency had an appropriate basis

for rejecting as unreliable Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements

about Djadjou’s arrest.3 In doing so, we continue to recognize

that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in immigra-

tion hearings and that hearsay is admissible. At the same time,

however, statements that rely on multiple levels of hearsay

can be so highly unreliable by their nature as to justify the

agency in refusing to credit them. Because the statements

offered by Njoh and Njeck, which relied on multiple levels of

hearsay, were highly unreliable by their nature and nothing in

the statements alleviated the concerns about their reliability,

the agency had adequate justification to find them unreliable

and refuse to credit them.

3

Djadjou argues that the agency erred in its decision to discredit Njoh’s

affidavit and Njeck’s testimony because it essentially required indepen-

dent corroborating evidence to support corroborating evidence. Indeed, we

previously announced that "[t]here is no general rule that evidence offered

in corroboration requires independent corroboration." Marynenka, 592

F.3d at 602. In Marynenka, we found the immigration judge erred in

declining to credit the statement of a witness who had personally observed

the petitioner’s arrest simply because there was no way to corroborate that

information. Id. We held that the statement "could not be discredited on

the ground that it automatically required corroboration." Id. In this case,

however, the agency refused to credit Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements

because of their unreliability. Although the IJ noted the absence of other

corroborating evidence concerning the 2000 arrest, that was an additional

observation among others and not the sole reason for disregarding their

statements. Unlike in Marynenka, the agency did not automatically reject

Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements simply because they were not indepen-

dently corroborated. We find that the agency rejected Njoh’s and Njeck’s

statements as unreliable and that it did not err by additionally observing

the lack of other corroborating evidence of her 2000 arrest and her hus-

band’s 1997 arrest.

24 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

The agency also gave appropriate reasons for discrediting

the two SDF letters. As the agency noted, the two letters were

inconsistent. One letter noted that Djadjou had been a member

from 1991 until 1996, but the other letter stated that she "is

an active member."4 A reasonable adjudicator could interpret

this as a direct inconsistency. Furthermore, one letter men-

tions that she was tortured, whereas the other letter does not.

And one letter mentions that she held a leadership role in the

SDF, but the other letter merely states that she was a member

with no mention of a leadership position. Based on the cumu-

lative effect of these various inconsistencies and omissions,

we are unable to say that any reasonable adjudicator would

have been compelled to find them credible. See Dankam, 495

F.3d at 122-23 (recognizing that the cumulative effect of

seemingly minor and tangential inconsistencies can form the

basis of an adverse credibility determination). Thus, the agen-

cy’s refusal to credit them is supported by substantial evi-

dence.

The agency discounted the police convocation and police

telegram on the ground that Djadjou failed to authenticate and

provide a chain of custody for them. Djadjou maintains that

these were legally improper reasons to reject the police docu-

ments. We agree.

As earlier noted, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not

apply in immigration hearings. Anim, 535 F.3d at 256. We

have previously determined that it was improper to reject a

4

Djadjou asserts that the letter stating she "is an active member" con-

tains a grammatical mistake and that it was meant to say she "was an

active member." Contrary to her assertion, however, it is unclear that this

was simply a grammatical error. The sentence, in full, states as follows:

"Djadjou Tekeu Pulcherie is an active member of the Social Democratic

Front (S.D.F.) opposition party based in Cameroon; registered in our book

of militants under the reference card [reference card number] since 1991."

Aside from Djadjou’s proffered interpretation, we see no suggestion of a

grammatical error. The agency’s interpretation of the letter as indicating

that she presently is a member is reasonable, and so we will defer to it.

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 25

document for lacking a chain of custody when no other rea-

sons existed for doubting its authenticity. Marynenka, 592

F.3d at 601. Also, we recently found it inappropriate to refuse

to credit a document because it was not authenticated when

doubts about its authenticity did not arise at the hearing and

the government did not object to its introduction. Tassi, No.

10-2194, slip op. at 19-20. Here, concerns about the authen-

ticity of the police telegram and convocation did not arise at

the hearing, and the government did not object to their intro-

duction. Furthermore, the agency provided no other reasons

for finding the documents unauthentic or unreliable. As a

result, the agency erred in rejecting the police convocation

and telegram.

Nevertheless, we hold that the agency’s error in rejecting

the police telegram and police convocation was harmless.

"Harmless-error analysis applies in immigration cases."

Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 190 n.8 (4th Cir. 2004).

We need not reverse the agency’s decision if we determine

that an "error ‘clearly had no bearing on the procedure used

or the substance of the decision reached.’" Id. (quoting Mass.

Trs. of E. Gas & Fuel Assocs. v. United States, 377 U.S. 235,

248 (1964)). Even had the agency credited the police telegram

and convocation, it is clear that insufficient independent evi-

dence existed to establish past persecution.

The remaining independent evidence, which the agency did

not discredit or appropriately discredit, includes Djadjou’s

SCNC and SDF membership cards,5 the police telegram and

convocation, the photographs of destroyed property, the

Amnesty International and United States Department of State

reports, and Justice Aloysius’s affidavit. This evidence, stand-

5

The IJ discredited one of Djadjou’s SCNC membership cards because

it misspelled the organization’s name. Djadjou challenges that finding. We

need not decide whether the IJ erred because any such error would be

harmless. The IJ credited that Djadjou was a member of the SCNC, just

not that she was persecuted because of her membership.

26 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

ing alone and without any credible explanation, fails to estab-

lish that Djadjou was persecuted. All that the membership

cards, reports, and Justice Aloysius’s affidavit demonstrate is

that Djadjou was a member of opposition organizations whose

members have suffered persecution in Cameroon. The police

documents, without any context or credible explanation, do

not demonstrate that she was among those persecuted.

Although the police telegram requests that Djadjou be stopped

and states "illegal political meetings," it says nothing about

what actually transpired. The police convocation similarly

lacks any meaningful significance without a credible explana-

tion as to its context. Likewise, the photographs are devoid of

meaning without a credible explanation as to what they

depict. Accordingly, we affirm the agency’s finding that inde-

pendent evidence does not exist to establish past persecution.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, we deny Djadjou’s petition for

review.

PETITION DENIED

WYNN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

There is much in the majority’s opinion with which I am

inclined to agree. But given that the salient factual findings

and reasoned legal conclusions in this well-crafted majority

opinion are products of an appellate court rather than the

products of the immigration judge or the Board of Immigra-

tion Appeals, I respectfully dissent.*

*I reemphasize, as we did in Zuh v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 504, 513-514

(4th Cir. 2008), that consistency in the resolution of immigration cases is

a problem area for this and other circuits. See also Benslimane v. Gon-

zales, 430 F. 3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005); Eric M. Fink, Liars and Terror-

ists and Judges, Oh My: Moral Panic and the Symbolic Politics of

Appellate Review in Asylum Cases, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2019 (2008);

Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adju-

dication, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 295 (2007).

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 27

The law applicable to Djadjou’s claim for asylum and with-

holding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality

Act is clear. To establish eligibility for asylum, Djadjou bears

the burden of showing either past persecution or a well-

founded fear of future persecution "on account of race, reli-

gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or

political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). If Djadjou is

able to demonstrate past persecution, she is "presumed to

have a well-founded fear of persecution . . . ." 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.13(b)(1)); see Marynenka v. Holder, 592 F.3d 594, 600

(4th Cir. 2010).

In the present case, given the absence of any evidence by

the government in rebuttal, if Djadjou demonstrated an

instance of past persecution on a protected ground, then Djad-

jou established an unrebutted presumption of her "well-

founded fear of persecution" and, consequently, her eligibility

of asylum in this country. Notably, Djadjou’s imprisonment

on account of her membership in a particular social group or

political opinion "indisputably can constitute [past] persecu-

tion." Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 2004)

(citing Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir.

2004)).

In determining whether an individual is eligible for asylum,

the agency must first undertake a credibility determination as

to the applicant’s evidence. Here, I am inclined to concur in

the majority’s holding that substantial evidence in the record

supported the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

However, in my view it is the eviction notice alone that

provided the agency with this substantial evidence. All other

evidence relied on by the agency was either erroneous as a

matter of law or implicated an abuse of discretion. Given that

the majority’s decision to affirm the adverse credibility deter-

mination is limited to two pieces of evidence relied upon by

the agency (i.e., the eviction notice and Djadjou’s asylum

28 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

application), I will, in turn, limit my expression of dissent to

this second piece of evidence—Djadjou’s asylum application.

According to the majority, the inconsistency between Djad-

jou’s testimony that she was elected secretary general of the

Southern Cameroons National Council ("SCNC") in 1997 and

her statement in support of her asylum application, which

omitted any reference to her position, provided the immigra-

tion judge with a basis for its adverse credibility determina-

tion. Ante at 17-18. For the majority, this omission is properly

characterized as substantial evidence because, in the majori-

ty’s view, Djadjou’s leadership role in SCNC is at the heart

of her claim of past persecution. Ante at 18. In my view, how-

ever, not only is this alleged omission illusory, this alleged

omission most assuredly does not go to the heart of Djadjou’s

claim.

First, notwithstanding the immigration judge’s unsupported

conjecture that Djadjou had "what appears to be a significant

position" J.A. 102, Djadjou’s responsibilities in SCNC were,

by all accounts, limited to passing out flyers and informing

SCNC members of meetings in her local area. Accordingly,

when Njeck called SCNC officials in Cameroon to verify

Djadjou’s participation and past persecution, he did not even

ask about her specific title. Further, when asked why an SDF

letter and the SCNC affidavit did not mention her specific

title, Djadjou testified that "they pay more attention to posi-

tions like the president’s position, the vice president’s posi-

tion . . . and the spokesperson position." J.A. 281. There is no

inconsistency in the failure of a document, whether Djadjou’s

application or otherwise, to mention a title where the authors

of such documents, whether Djadjou or others, considered

such title to be unimportant to Djadjou’s persecution claim or

her role in the organization. Consequently, this omission,

insofar as it is relied upon by the agency to make an adverse

credibility determination, is illusory and, indeed, based on the

unsupported conjecture that Djadjou’s position in the SCNC

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 29

was "a significant position" that necessarily required mention

in any discussion of Djadjou’s activities as an SCNC member.

Second, Djadjou’s asylum application states that she was

persecuted "[b]ecause [she] was a member of the SCNC"; it

does not claim that Djadjou was persecuted because of her

position in the SCNC. J.A. 560. Consequently, ambiguous

assertions that Djadjou made while testifying, that may or

may not be interpreted as indicating that she was targeted dur-

ing her second arrest because of her position in the SCNC, do

not replace the clear and unambiguous assertions that Djadjou

made in her asylum application and become, by judicial fiat

or otherwise, the "heart" of her persecution claim. Therefore,

not only are the alleged omissions in Djadjou’s application

illusory and based on unsupported conjecture, the alleged

omissions—even assuming some materiality—simply fail to

go to the heart of her persecution claim and, thus, do not pro-

vide substantial evidence for an adverse credibility determina-

tion. See Ante at 16 (citing Tassi v. Holder, No. 10-2194, slip

op. at 7 n.6 (4th Cir. Nov. 7, 2011)).

Nonetheless, as noted above, based solely on the immigra-

tion judge’s finding of an inconsistency between the eviction

notice and Djadjou’s testimony, I am inclined to concur in the

majority’s holding that substantial evidence in the record sup-

ported the agency’s adverse credibility determination.

However, as the majority aptly explains, notwithstanding

an adverse credibility determination, applicants for asylum,

such as Djadjou, may establish past persecution through inde-

pendent evidence. See Camara, 378 F.3d at 369-370. As the

majority states, "[t]he agency may not ignore such [indepen-

dent] evidence and reject the claim solely on the basis of the

adverse credibility determination." Ante at 19 (citing Camara,

378 F.3d at 369-70). Moreover, in reviewing Djadjou’s inde-

pendent evidence, the "immigration judge cannot reject docu-

mentary evidence without specific, cogent reasons why the

30 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

documents are not credible." Kourouma v. Holder, 588 F.3d

234, 241 (4th Cir. 2009).

Here, among other independent evidence submitted, Djad-

jou presented the affidavit of Njoh, which provided, in perti-

nent part, that:

1) . . . I am the chairman of the Southern Camer-

oons National Council in North America . . . .

2) . . . SCNC is viewed by the government of

[Cameroon] as a secessionist movement and in lieu

of this perception, the government persistently

embarks on a campaign of arrests, intimidation,

harassments, detentions and extrajudicial killing of

SCNC members.

***

5) That our records from the home front through

the SCNC Information and Statistic Bureau in

Southern Cameroons which is [the] repository of

vital biographical information of SCNC members

attest to [Djadjou’s] membership and active partici-

pation in popularizing the struggle to liberate and

restore the statehood of Southern Cameroons. Cor-

roborative and authentic information from the home

front reveals that [Djadjou’s] activism in the struggle

dates as far back as 1997 and she was instrumental

in distributing SCNC flyers, tracts, hand outs and

other paraphernalia to the population. Reports from

the home front also indicate that she attended meet-

ings and participated in demonstrations. These activ-

ities made her the target of acrimonious arrest and

detention such as the arrest of 2000. Unimpeachable

evidence from the home front reveal that the hus-

band of [Djadjou] . . . suffered an arrest and torture

as reprisal for [Djadjou’s] activism in the struggle.

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 31

6) That in fulfillment of my statutory responsibili-

ties as chairman of the SCNC, I undertake the verifi-

cation and confirmation of the affiliation of

members, as well as this claim of persecution on

account of their activities . . . . I have accordingly

verified and confirmed the affidavit from Mr. Henry

Nyaah, the Northern Zone Vice Chairman of the

SCNC relating to her membership and activism in

the SCNC struggle and I attest to it authenticity and

credibility. The verification was done through a lit-

any of telephone exchanges I had with Mr. Henry

Nyaah.

***

We are compelled by credible and authentic evi-

dence as well as verifiable facts from the home front

to state without fear of contradiction that . . . sending

[Djadjou] back to [Cameroon] will undoubtedly

make her a palpable target for harassment, arrests,

torture and she could possibly be killed . . . .

J.A. 369-371.

Although Njoh, the chairman of the Southern Cameroons

National Council of America, was the affiant who attested to

Djadjou’s past persecution, including her 2000 arrest, Howard

Njeck was appointed by Njoh to testify on behalf of Djadjou

in Njeck’s capacity as the Vice Chairman of the Southern

Cameroons National Council of America. Njeck’s testimony

was primarily directed at providing further authenticating and

corroborating details relevant to Njoh’s affidavit. Njeck testi-

fied that he and Njoh contacted Yuna, an SCNC official based

in Cameroon charged with keeping records of the details and

circumstances of SCNC members arrested in Cameroon.

Njeck reiterated that the Cameroonian SCNC official, Yuna,

reviewed relevant records and confirmed, among other things,

that Djadjou was arrested in 2000 for her SCNC activities.

32 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

Njeck further testified to the accuracy and reliability of

Njoh’s affidavit by explaining that the submission of affida-

vits by SCNC-USA in similar asylum proceedings is "some-

thing that [Njoh is] doing with a lot of people" and,

consequently, ensuring accuracy and reliability in such affida-

vits is essential "[i]n terms of credibility" and "in the best

interest of [SCNC-USA]" and for future asylum applicants

that seek the support of SCNC-USA. J.A. 343.

According to the majority, "[t]he agency . . . refused to

credit Njeck’s testimony and Njoh’s affidavit with respect to

Djadjou’s 2000 arrest and her husband’s 1997 arrest." Ante at

20. The problem, however, is that the immigration judge and

Board of Immigration Appeals made no such determination.

Indeed, the immigration judge expressly found that "[i]nsofar

as [Njeck] testified credibly with Mr. Njoh’s [affidavit] this

Court will find him credible." J.A. 102. Other than the immi-

gration judge’s positive determination of Njeck’s credibility,

the record is devoid of any specific, cogent reason(s) for the

immigration judge to have discredited Njeck’s testimony or

Njoh’s affidavit.

My review of the record reveals only four other findings

from the immigration judge relevant to Njoh’s affidavit or

Njeck’s testimony. First, the immigration judge noted that

Njoh’s affidavit "refers to [Djadjou] as having been arrested

one time in 2000 . . . . [However, Djadjou] has no satisfactory

explanation as to why the SCNC documents failed to mention

her other arrests." J.A. 103. Although potentially relevant to

the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination, the

immigration judge’s finding has no bearing on the reliability

of Njoh’s affidavit, which confirms Djadjou’s arrest in 2000.

Second, the immigration judge noted "that the records from

the SCNC that were purportedly examined by Mr. Yuna have

not been provided to this Court. In sum, this omission is a sig-

nificant omission." J.A. 103. This finding, however, to the

extent that it is relevant to Djadjou’s 2000 arrest, is erroneous

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 33

under this Court’s precedent because: (1) a "‘letter from [a]

party leader’ on behalf of a party member seeking asylum can

corroborate the applicant’s claims[,]" Tassi, No. 10-2194, slip

op. at 18 (quoting Camara, 378 F.3d at 369); and (2) "[t]he

[immigration judge] did not otherwise assess the probative

value of . . . or evaluate the reliability of" Njoh’s affidavit and

Njeck’s testimony. Id.

Third, the immigration judge found that "there are no

records to corroborate the 2000 arrest of [Djadjou] . . . ." J.A.

103-104. However, given Njoh’s affidavit that confirms the

2000 arrest and Njeck’s testimony, which the immigration

judge credited, this finding is unsupported and, indeed,

appears to "distort or disregard important aspects of the

[Djadjou’s] claim." Tassi, No. 10-2194, slip op. at 13.

Fourth, the immigration judge made an ambiguous finding

that "[p]erhaps [Djadjou] was an SCNC member in Cameroon

as testified by Mr. Njeck." J.A. 107. If we are to take anything

from this finding, it is a reaffirmation that the immigration

judge regarded Njoh’s affidavit as reliable and Njeck’s testi-

mony as credible.

Nonetheless, the immigration judge concluded that there "is

simply no persuasive objective evidence that [Djadjou] was

arrested." J.A. 108. Consequently, the immigration judge

found "that the [Djadjou] has not suffered past persecution in

Cameroon and accordingly there is no presumption of a well-

founded fear of persecution should she return to that country."

J.A. 108. The immigration judge arrived at this conclusion,

which either rejected Djadjou’s independent evidence or,

alternatively, failed to consider that independent evidence

separate and apart from the immigration judge’s adverse cred-

ibility determination, without offering specific, cogent reasons

why Djadjou’s independent evidence was not reliable, in con-

travention of this Court’s precedent.

In affirming the agency’s decision, the majority "glean[s]

an overall concern [of the immigration judge and Board of

34 DJADJOU v. HOLDER

Immigration Appeals] about the reliability of Njoh’s and

Njeck’s statements [because] they attested to events of which

they had no personal knowledge based on records that they

had not reviewed and were not submitted." Ante at 20. To this

end, the majority states that "the [Board of Immigration

Appeals] essentially found that Njeck’s and Njoh’s statements

were unreliable." Ante at 20. Given that this Court has held

that speculation and conjecture are insufficient reasons to dis-

count Djadjou’s evidence, Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d

182, 189 (4th Cir. 2007), it is confounding that the majority’s

speculation and conjecture of what the immigration judge and

Board of Immigration Appeals "essentially found" and what

the majority is able to "glean" from the cold record can form

the basis of its decision to affirm.

It is interesting to note that, although the majority opinion

repeatedly asserts that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not

apply to immigration hearings and concedes that hearsay evi-

dence is admissible in such proceedings (Ante at 20), the

majority nonetheless strains to find a basis for the agency’s

non-existent "unreliability determination" in relation to

Njoh’s affidavit and Njeck’s testimony by making an eviden-

tiary finding that is no where to be found in the record:

namely, that "the hearsay nature of [Njoh’s affidavit and

Njeck’s testimony], which involved multiple levels of hear-

say, contributed to the agency’s concerns about their reliabil-

ity." Ante at 20. Although this novel, well reasoned, and

potentially persuasive evidentiary finding would be entitled to

some consideration by this Court if issued by the immigration

judge, it is not the product of either the immigration judge or

the Board of Immigration Appeals. Instead, the majority

"gleans" it to be so based upon its review of a cold record. In

sum, while the record supports the immigration judge’s

adverse credibility determination, the record also shows that

Djadjou presented independent evidence, separate and apart

from her own testimony, that established her past persecution

in Cameroon. The agency may not ignore such independent

evidence, and the agency may not reject such independent

DJADJOU v. HOLDER 35

evidence solely on the basis of an adverse credibility determi-

nation. Nor may an appellate court "glean" a basis for reject-

ing independent evidence when no such basis is to be found

in the decisions of the immigration judge or Board of Immi-

gration Appeals. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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