Opinion

Cole v. Holder

  • 659 F.3d 762
  • 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 19402
  • 2011 WL 4395622
Court
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed
Sep 22, 2011
Status
Published
On the bench
Noonan, Berzon, Callahan
Cited by
445 cases
Authority
More cited than 71.5%

holding that “[a]cquiescence by government officials ‘requires only that [they] were aware of the torture but remained willfully ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 19 blind to it, or simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it’” (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)

How later courts described this case

  • holding that “[a]cquiescence by government officials ‘requires only that [they] were aware of the torture but remained willfully ROGRIGUEZ TORNES V. GARLAND 19 blind to it, or simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it’” (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
  • holding that acquiescence “requires only that [government officials] were aware of the torture but ‘remained willfully blind to it, or simply stood by because of their inability or unwillingness to oppose it’” (quoting Bromfield v. Mukaskey, 543 F. 3d 1071, 1074 (9th Cir. 2008))
  • holding that “misstating the record and failing to mention highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence” indicates that the agency failed to consider all the evidence
  • holding that a BIA decision “cannot stand” where it “misstat[es] the record and fail[s] to mention highly probative or potentially dispositive evidence”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

HUBERT GEORGE COLE, 

Petitioner, No. 09-73625

v.

 Agency No.

A092-817-988

ERIC H. HOLDER JR., Attorney

General, OPINION

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted

December 7, 2010—Pasadena, California

Filed September 22, 2011

Before: John T. Noonan, Marsha S. Berzon, and

Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon;

Concurrence by Judge Noonan;

Dissent by Judge Callahan

17957

17960 COLE v. HOLDER

COUNSEL

Fatma E. Marouf, Marouf Law Group, Los Angeles, Califor-

nia, for the petitioner.

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division,

Thomas B. Fatouros, Senior Litigation Counsel, and Pegah

Vakili and Yedidya Cohen, Trial Attorneys, Office of Immi-

gration Litigation, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C., for the respondent.

COLE v. HOLDER 17961

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

We consider the application of Hubert George Cole (Cole),

a citizen and national of Honduras, for deferral of removal

under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Board of

Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied the application, conclud-

ing that Cole had not established he would more likely than

not be tortured if removed to Honduras. Because the BIA

failed to give reasoned consideration to potentially dispositive

testimony by Cole’s expert witnesses and did not address all

of Cole’s claims, we grant the petition and remand to the BIA.

I.

Cole, a 40-year-old, black, former gang member, was born

in Honduras and entered the United States at age eleven with

his mother and two sisters. Cole has a lengthy criminal history

in the United States, beginning when he was a juvenile. While

in prison, he joined the Crips, an African American gang, as

a way to protect himself from Hispanic gangs. While a mem-

ber of the Crips, he was tattooed with gang-related symbols

and letters on his face and body. In August 2007, Cole was

the victim of a drive-by shooting; he was seriously injured

and needs ongoing medical care.

The Department of Homeland Security commenced

removal proceedings against Cole on July 11, 2008. The

Notice to Appear charged that Cole was removable because

he entered without being admitted or paroled and was con-

victed, on June 18, 1999, for possession of cocaine for sale.

Cole conceded removability and applied for asylum, with-

holding of removal, and relief under CAT. After the immigra-

tion judge (IJ) denied all his claims for relief, Cole appealed

only the CAT claim to the BIA, which dismissed the appeal.

Whether the BIA properly denied CAT relief is the only issue

before us.

17962 COLE v. HOLDER

A. Factual Background

Cole testified that while incarcerated as a young man, he

felt threatened by Hispanic gang members, joined the Crips

for protection, and acquired several Crips tattoos, including a

teardrop under his eye, a G behind his ear, and tattoos on his

calves, arms and back. Once released from prison Cole

stopped associating with the Crips and worked at a homeless

services agency. Nevertheless, rival gangs could still identify

him as a Crips gang member because of his tattoos. Accord-

ing to Cole, Hispanic gangs hate the Crips and kill Crips gang

members. Cole has not had the tattoos removed because tattoo

removal is a painful and long process.

Despite disassociating himself from the Crips, Cole contin-

ued to feel threatened by Hispanic gang members. In August

2007, Cole was the victim of a drive-by shooting by Hispanic

gang members.1 He was outside a store with a friend when a

car with four or five Hispanic people drove by; the car’s occu-

pants were pointing at him and yelling out their gang affilia-

tion — Santa Monica 13. Cole and his friend quickly got back

into their car. But, before his friend could get his car started,

the other car pulled up on the passenger side, where Cole was

sitting, and a Hispanic man started shooting at Cole.

Cole was shot in the head and abdomen. Half his liver and

part of his skull had to be removed because of the shooting.

Hospitalized for five or six months, Cole was still experienc-

ing problems related to his brain injury at the time of his testi-

mony. In his declaration, Cole stated that he now has a

1

Cole also testified about one other specific instance in which he

encountered Hispanic gang members after he was released from prison:

Once, while he and his friends were watching fireworks at the Santa Mon-

ica pier, 18th Street gang members approached and asked them if they

were Crips. Cole testified that there was a lot of tension until the police

appeared and took some of the 18th Street gang members to jail. He testi-

fied that he believes “something terrible,” such as someone being stabbed,

would have happened if the police had not arrived.

COLE v. HOLDER 17963

defective, fragile skull and that he can easily injure his brain

if he is not careful. A letter from his doctor confirmed that he

has a “sizable skull defect with no protection of his brain” and

asserted that, for this reason, incarceration could put him at a

high risk of serious injury. Cole’s doctor told him he will be

in pain for a long time and will likely have seizures in the

future, necessitating ongoing medical care.

Cole maintains that if returned to Honduras, he will be tor-

tured and possibly killed by gangs, police, or death squads,

because of his race and his gang-related tattoos.2 He testified

that his race,3 his tattoos, his general appearance, and even his

accent will mark him as an outsider in Honduras, and that he

believes that, even if the police do not harm him themselves,

they will think he is a gang member and so not protect him.

Cole also fears that the police will detain him and that he will

be intentionally exposed to torturous prison conditions

because of his tattoos. Finally, Cole contends that he will be

intentionally denied necessary medical care by public health

officials in Honduras because of his tattoos, and that the

intentional denial of medical care also qualifies as torture.

2

The dissent emphasizes that there is no evidence in the record to sug-

gest that the Crips operate in Honduras. It argues that there is, therefore,

no reason to think that Cole will suffer harm because of his Crips tattoos.

But Cole’s claim does not rely on the presence of Crips in Honduras.

Rather, he claims — and presented evidence — that (1) Hispanic gang

members removed from the United States and returned to Honduras are

likely to bring their rivalries with them and to recognize Cole’s tattoos as

those of a rival gang; (2) Honduran gangs are likely to see Cole as a threat

because of his tattoos regardless of whether they can identify the gang

with which he was affiliated; and (3) the Honduran government, police,

and medical personnel associate tattoos with gang membership, regardless

of the nature of the tattoo, and are not likely to inquire further as to the

meaning of the tattoo or whether a tattooed person maintains gang mem-

bership.

3

The record includes documentation of racial inequality and discrimina-

tion in Honduras against Afro-Hondurans.

17964 COLE v. HOLDER

Cole’s sister and mother testified that they are also afraid

Cole will be tortured or killed if returned to Honduras and

will not be able to receive the medical care that he needs.

1. Expert Testimony

Cole supported his CAT claim with testimony from two

experts. Luis Javier Rodriguez (Rodriguez) testified as an

expert on the “structure and dynamics of U.S. and Central

American gangs, including the racial rivalries among those

gangs.” He discussed the origins of two large Hispanic gangs,

Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and 18th Street, and how those

gangs spread to Central America, primarily through gang

members deported from the U.S. Rodriguez explained that the

Crips gang is viewed as an enemy by Hispanic gangs, includ-

ing MS-13 and 18th Street, whose members attack members

of African American gangs. According to Rodriguez, the His-

panic gangs can easily spot Crips tattoos. He also testified that

the Hispanic gang members brought their “anti-black culture”

down to Central America when they were deported and that

someone with Crips tattoos would likely be threatened,

beaten, or killed in Central America by either MS-13 or 18th

Street gang members.

Cole’s second expert, Elmer Javier Canales Mesa

(Canales), had about nine years experience working with gang

members and former gang members in Honduras. Canales tes-

tified that the two biggest gangs in Honduras are MS-13 and

18th Street and that members of these gangs kill people with

tattoos from rival gangs such as the Crips. In Canales’ experi-

ence, the Honduran police do not investigate the murders of

gang members or suspected gang members.

Canales also testified that it is illegal to be a member of a

gang in Honduras and that having a gang-related tattoo can

lead to a prison sentence of six to twelve years. According to

Canales, suspected gang members in the area where he works

are each detained by police two or three times per week and

COLE v. HOLDER 17965

sometimes jailed. Honduran police also physically abuse sus-

pected gang members by throwing them on the ground and

beating them with their weapons.4 In one case he knew of, a

police officer tortured two gang members to death. That offi-

cer, a former police chief, is in jail as a result of an investiga-

tion by the organization for which Canales works. Generally,

however, police are not held accountable for harming gang

members.

Canales also testified about specific incidents in which

police or prison guards killed suspected gang members in

prison. In an incident that occurred three or four years before

the hearing, 68 suspected gang members died after being shot

by prison guards. The year he testified, more than 20 sus-

pected gang members had been killed in jail on the first day

they arrived there; Canales attributed the slaughter to “police

negligence.” He also testified about an incident in which 104

gang members died in a fire in their cell block. The guards

blocked their escape by not opening the gate, and it was later

determined that the fire was set by the police.

In Canales’ opinion, based on statistics, studies, and his

experiences over the years, Cole has a 90% chance of being

detained by the Honduran police and a greater than 75%

chance of being killed by gang members in Honduras because

of his Crips tattoos. Canales also testified about the risk Cole

would face in Honduras from death squads and social cleans-

ing aimed at eliminating gang members. According to

Canales, groups of police and other powerful citizens torture

and kill those they find undesirable, including suspected gang

members. Canales reported that such groups act with com-

plete impunity in Honduras.

Finally, Canales spoke about the inability of suspected

gang members to get medical care in public hospitals in Hon-

4

Canales also testified that he had been punched in the back and chest

by police for defending the youth with whom he worked.

17966 COLE v. HOLDER

duras. He had personally accompanied gang members and

former gang members to hospitals and had seen doctors refuse

to care for them. One young man, wounded and bleeding,

died in the waiting room because doctors refused to treat him.

Most doctors in Honduras, Canales stated, would refuse to

treat an individual with tattoos because they would suspect

him of being a gang member. Also, he reported, the govern-

ment does nothing to hold healthcare workers accountable in

such situations, despite demands from his organization.

According to Canales, Cole would be denied emergency med-

ical care if he needed it and, in a non-emergency situation,

would get treatment only if accompanied by the Commis-

sioner for Human Rights.

Given the high risk of harm former gang members in Hon-

duras face from rival gangs, police, and vigilante groups, most

of the former gang members with whom he works attempt to

remove their tattoos to make themselves less identifiable.

There are some programs in Honduras to help former gang

members remove tattoos, but, Canales reported, they cannot

meet the demand,5 and the process is long, extremely painful,

and often results in visible scarring. In his written declaration,

Canales explained that because such “scars are often visible

. . . these individuals remain a target for gang members, death

squads, and the police.”

2. Documentary Evidence

Both Cole and the government submitted extensive docu-

mentary evidence, including reports by the U.S. government

and by United Nations agencies. Many of the reports corrobo-

rated aspects of Cole’s experts’ testimony.

5

Out of desperation, some former gang members attempt to remove

their tattoos using methods such as cigarette burns, mosquito repellent, car

battery acid, acid creams, and metal cleaners. Former gang members go

to such extreme lengths to remove their tattoos because young people with

tattoos run a great risk of being killed.

COLE v. HOLDER 17967

For example, the 2008 U.S. State Department report recog-

nized several human rights problems in Honduras, such as

“unlawful killings by members of the police and government

agents; arbitrary and summary killings committed by vigilan-

tes and former members of the security forces; violence

against detainees by security forces; harsh prison conditions;

[and] corruption and impunity within the security forces.” The

report confirmed that gang membership, without more, was

illegal in Honduras and punishable by up to 12 years in

prison, and that police arrested people based on factors such

as their tattoos. The report also noted that private security

companies and vigilante groups acted, with the complicity of

police, as death squads to kill “supposed habitual criminals.”

Moreover, although the Honduran constitution prohibits

torture, there were instances in which government officials

employed such practices, including beatings and other abuse

of detainees. The 2008 State Department report stated that the

Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Honduras had

reported that police arbitrarily detained and sometimes tor-

tured more than two dozen individuals during a government

program called Operation National. The 2007 State Depart-

ment report placed the number of individuals arbitrarily

arrested and, sometimes, tortured under Operation National at

more than 34,000 and noted that a number of prisoner deaths

had been attributed to members of the security forces.

On the other hand, the 2008 State Department report

acknowledged that the government had undertaken some

investigations of illegal activities by security forces. For

example, on June 6, 2008, a court found guilty and sentenced

21 of the 43 government officials implicated in a 2003 jail

massacre.

Other documentary evidence confirmed and expanded on

the information in the State Department reports. A 2007 Con-

gressional Research Service report noted that increased vio-

lence by gangs has led to corresponding vigilantism, with

17968 COLE v. HOLDER

increasing extrajudicial killings. It also acknowledged the July

2003 legislation in Honduras making membership in a gang

punishable by up to 12 years in prison and confirmed that a

prison fire in 2004 killed 107 inmates, mostly gang members.

Similarly, a 2006 U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID) report on gangs in Honduras noted that the Hondu-

ran government’s strict approach includes rounding up tat-

tooed individuals and putting them in prison for gang

membership. The report also noted that when gang members

were killed or died in prisons, often no one was punished.

An August 2008 report by the UN High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) counted “lack of accountability and pro-

fessionalism within the police,” “the frequent abuse of detain-

ees,” and “a culture of impunity for violations of human rights

including extrajudicial executions” as among Honduras’ big-

gest human rights problems. The report also discussed a 2006

anti-gang initiative that called for recruiting 30,000 to 60,000

private security personnel to join the efforts of the 10,000

armed services personnel and 8,000 police officers, and grant-

ing the private security personnel “the right to use any means

necessary to deter assailants from committing criminal acts.”

The report noted that the policy had led to mass arrests, and

that there were reports of excessive and even lethal force

being used by these private security forces. The UNHCR

report also discussed evidence that death squads were execut-

ing gang members, noting “the widespread conviction that

[the unlawful killings] are being committed by members of

the existing or former security forces.”

Finally, numerous newspaper articles also discussed the

problems of government-linked death squads, extrajudicial

killings, and the high level of violence in Honduran prisons.

Particularly disturbing were reports regarding fires in prison,

some reportedly deliberately set by security forces, which

have killed around 200 prisoners, mostly gang members. One

article noted that an independent report commissioned by the

President of Honduras found that in one prison fire, 51 of the

COLE v. HOLDER 17969

68 people who were killed had been “executed — shot,

stabbed, beaten or burned to death by a force of the state

police, soldiers, prison guards and prisoners working with the

guards.”

B. IJ and BIA Decisions

The IJ denied Cole’s application for deferral of removal

under CAT, finding that Cole’s evidence “str[ung] together a

series of suppositions,” but did not show that each step in the

hypothetical chain of events was more likely than not to occur.6

In particular, the IJ (1) faulted the expert testimony about the

likelihood that Cole would be tortured as lacking evidence

that individuals similarly situated to Cole had been incarcer-

ated and tortured; (2) noted that, according to the State

Department report, torture is against the law in Honduras, and

the state has prosecuted police officers for torture and other

abuses, including for one of the jail massacres; and (3) char-

acterizing Cole as arguing that lack of medical care and poor

prison conditions in Honduras amount to torture, held that

Cole had failed to meet the standard of specific intent to cause

harm established in Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984 (9th

Cir. 2008). Although Cole argued that he would be intention-

ally denied medical care and that prison officials have inten-

tionally created dangerous prison conditions, the IJ did not

address these arguments.

Like the IJ, the BIA discounted Cole’s expert witness testi-

mony about the likelihood that Cole would be tortured on the

ground that the expert failed to give specific examples corrob-

orating his opinion. The Board also held, as did the IJ, that

Cole had not established by sufficient evidence each link in

the chain of events that could result in his torture by police,

death squads, or other gang members. The BIA did recognize

that evidence in the record suggested that “the presence of a

6

Cole’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal were also

denied.

17970 COLE v. HOLDER

tattoo can cause an automatic association with gangs, and that

a tattoo or suspected gang affiliation can equate to harsh treat-

ment.” But the BIA found nothing in the record explaining

why Cole could not have his tattoos removed to avoid being

perceived as a gang member. Finally, the BIA determined that

lack of medical treatment is not tantamount to torture. The

BIA did not make any finding regarding government acquies-

cence in torture by death squads or gang members.

Cole timely filed this petition for review.7

II.

We review issues of law regarding CAT claims de novo.

Edu v. Holder, 624 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010). “Where

the BIA conducts its own review of the evidence and the law,

this panel only reviews the BIA’s decision, except to the

extent it expressly adopts the IJ’s decision.” Eneh v. Holder,

601 F.3d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 2010). “The BIA’s findings

underlying its determination that an applicant is not eligible

for relief under the CAT are reviewed for substantial evi-

dence.” Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir.

2007). “Under the substantial evidence standard, the court

upholds the BIA’s determination unless the evidence in the

record compels a contrary conclusion.” Id.

7

We note that Cole has been detained throughout these proceedings,

which have lasted for more than three years, seemingly without a bond

hearing. If so, then, as did the court in Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d

701 (9th Cir. 2010), “we express grave concerns over [Cole’s three]-year

detention,” id. at 704 n.3, particularly given Cole’s testimony that while

in detention, he was not permitted the medications he needed to control

the pain from his brain injury. Prolonged detention of aliens absent a bond

hearing is not authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). See Casa-Castrillon v.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950-51 (9th Cir. 2008); see also

Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that

a three-year detention “qualifies as prolonged by any measure”). “We

encourage [Cole] to challenge his detention by filing a habeas petition pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or by requesting a bond hearing.” Aguilar-

Ramos, 594 F.3d at 704 n.3.

COLE v. HOLDER 17971

“Because neither the BIA nor the IJ made an adverse credi-

bility finding, ‘we must assume that [Cole’s] factual conten-

tions are true.’ ” Aguilar-Ramos, 594 F.3d at 704 (quoting

Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 652 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000)). “As a

result, the facts to which [he] testified are ‘deemed true, and

the question remaining to be answered becomes whether these

facts, and their reasonable inferences, satisfy the elements of

the claim for relief.’ ” Edu, 624 F.3d at 1143 (quoting Nuru

v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2005)).

III.

A. General CAT Principles

[1] To qualify for CAT relief, a petitioner must establish

that “it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured

if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.16(c)(2). In other words, Cole must “show only a

chance greater than fifty percent that he will be tortured if

removed to” Honduras. Hamoui v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 821,

827 (9th Cir. 2004). In determining whether an individual will

more likely than not be tortured, “all evidence relevant to the

possibility of future torture shall be considered.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16(c)(3).

[2] Importantly, an application for CAT relief need not

show that he will be tortured “on account of” any particular

ground. See Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir.

2001). Moreover, where torture is sufficiently likely, “CAT

‘does not permit any discretion or provide for any excep-

tions.’ ” Edu, 624 F.3d at 1145 (quoting 64 Fed. Reg. 8478,

8481 (Feb. 19, 1999). Instead, the provision for deferral of

removal under CAT applies to all applicants, even those who,

like Cole, are former gang members convicted of an aggra-

vated felony. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a); Lemus-Galvan v.

Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that

“even if an alien has been convicted of a ‘particularly serious

crime,’ and is ineligible for withholding of removal under the

17972 COLE v. HOLDER

CAT, an IJ is required to grant deferral of removal if the alien

can establish the likelihood of torture upon return”). As we

explained in Edu, “the words of CAT . . . reach out to protect

even the most vile of actors against state vileness.” 624 F.3d

at 1146. Indeed, “in adopting the [CAT] regulations, the agen-

cies themselves recognized that even those who assisted in

Nazi persecutions, or engaged in genocide, or pose a danger

to our own security are not excluded from the protections of

CAT.” Id. at 1145. Futher, “[a foreign] government cannot

exempt torturous acts from CAT’s prohibition merely by

authorizing them as permissible forms of punishment,” Nuru,

404 F.3d at 1221, nor do other circumstances provide a justifi-

cation for denying deferral of removal where torture is suffi-

ciently likely.

[3] In other words, the policy against providing “sanctuary

for universal outlaws” that led this court to conclude that gang

members or former gang members are not a social group for

the purposes of asylum and withholding of removal, see

Arteaga, 511 F.3d at 946, does not preclude deferral of

removal under CAT. Both the governing regulations and the

case law of this circuit dictate that even gang members, both

current and former, cannot be returned to a country in which

they will more likely than not be tortured. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.17(a); Arteaga, 511 F.3d at 949.

“Acts constituting torture” under CAT “are varied, and

include beatings and killings.” Bromfield v. Mukasey, 543

F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2008). The implementing regula-

tions define torture as:

any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether

physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a per-

son for such purposes as obtaining from him or her

or a third person information or a confession, pun-

ishing him or her for an act he or she or a third per-

son has committed or is suspected of having

committed, or intimidating or coercing him or her or

COLE v. HOLDER 17973

a third person, or for any reason based on discrimi-

nation of any kind, when such pain or suffering is

inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the con-

sent or acquiescence of a public official or other per-

son acting in an official capacity.

8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1). Acquiescence by government offi-

cials “requires only that [they] were aware of the torture but

‘remained willfully blind to it, or simply stood by because of

their inability or unwillingness to oppose it.’ ” Bromfield, 543

F.3d at 1079 (quoting Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d

1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2006)). The torturer, whether a public

official or a private party acting with the government’s con-

sent or acquiescence, must have the specific intent to inflict

severe harm. See Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 989 (9th

Cir. 2008).

B. Expert Testimony

[4] Cole’s CAT claim depends heavily on the testimony of

two experts, Rodriguez and Canales, as well as on documen-

tary evidence corroborating their testimony. In determining

whether Cole had established that he would more likely than

not be tortured if returned to Honduras, the BIA was required

to evaluate the expert testimony, as well as the documentary

evidence in the record.

CAT’s implementing regulations so require: In making a

CAT decision, the regulations state, “all evidence relevant to

the possibility of future torture shall be considered, including

. . . [e]vidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human

rights within the country of removal . . . and . . . [o]ther rele-

vant information regarding conditions in the country of

removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3) (emphasis added). We

therefore grant petitions for review in CAT cases where the

BIA did not consider country conditions evidence in the

record. See Aguilar-Ramos, 594 F.3d at 705 (remanding for

the BIA to determine in the first instance whether the Country

17974 COLE v. HOLDER

Report demonstrates a likelihood of torture); see also Brom-

field, 543 F.3d at 1077, 1079; Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143,

1147 (9th Cir. 2001). Indeed, “country conditions alone can

play a decisive role in granting relief under the Convention.”

Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1280.

In Aguilar-Ramos, for example, the government argued that

“the Board is not required to cite and refute explicitly every

piece of evidence offered on appeal”; this court responded

that “[t]he regulations implementing CAT explicitly require

the IJ to consider ‘all evidence relevant to the possibility of

future torture,’ ” and also noted that country reports are

accorded special weight in removal proceedings. 594 F.3d at

705 n.6 (citations omitted).

That is not to say that the BIA must discuss each piece of

evidence submitted. When nothing in the record or the BIA’s

decision indicates a failure to consider all the evidence, a

“general statement that [the agency] considered all the evi-

dence before [it]” may be sufficient. See Almaghzar v. Gon-

zales, 457 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006). But, where there is

any indication that the BIA did not consider all of the evi-

dence before it, a catchall phrase does not suffice, and the

decision cannot stand. Such indications include misstating the

record and failing to mention highly probative or potentially

dispositive evidence. See Aguilar-Ramos, 594 F.3d at 705 &

n.6; Eneh, 601 F.3d at 948-49; Bromfield, 543 F.3d at 1076-

77; Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1283-84.

[5] In particular, where potentially dispositive testimony

and documentary evidence is submitted, the BIA must give

reasoned consideration to that evidence. See Eneh, 601 F.3d

at 948-49. We granted the petition for review in Kamalthas,

for example, because the BIA did not “consider probative evi-

dence in the record of country conditions which confirm[ed]”

torture of individuals with characteristics similar to the peti-

tioner. 251 F.3d at 1284.

COLE v. HOLDER 17975

[6] Here, the BIA neither asserted that it had considered all

of the evidence nor evidenced in its opinion reasoned consid-

eration of the potentially dispositive testimony of Cole’s two

experts. Instead, the BIA stated only that the testimony of one

of Cole’s experts “was unpersuasive in light of the other evi-

dence, including the State Department report, . . . because [he]

failed to give specific examples to corroborate his opinion.”

In so stating, the BIA did not clarify to which of Cole’s

experts it was referring; nor did it address the other expert’s

testimony at all. In other words, the Board did not evidence

reasoned consideration of the testimony of Cole’s two experts.

Further, as to whichever expert the BIA opinion did refer-

ence, the Board was obliged to “state[ ] reasons in the record

why the testimony was insufficient to establish the probability

of torture necessary to grant CAT relief.” Aguilar-Ramos, 594

F.3d at 706 n.7. It did not do that.

[7] The BIA’s sole stated rationale for rejecting the one

expert’s opinion is entirely unsupported by the record for two

reasons. First, although the Board opined that the expert’s tes-

timony was “unpersuasive in light of the other evidence,” spe-

cifically the State Department report, in fact that report

corroborates rather than contradicts many aspects of both

experts’ testimony. For example, although the 2008 report

noted that torture was illegal in Honduras,8 it also stated that

human rights problems in Honduras included “unlawful kill-

ings by members of the police and government agents; arbi-

trary and summary killings committed by vigilantes and

former members of the security forces; violence against

detainees by security forces; harsh prison conditions; [and]

corruption and impunity within the security forces.” The State

Department report also noted that there are instances in which

8

That a country’s constitution prohibits torture does not establish that

the country does not torture people. See Al-Saher, 268 F.3d at 1147 (stat-

ing that the country report noted that the Iraqi Constitution prohibited tor-

ture but reported that security forces routinely tortured detainees).

17976 COLE v. HOLDER

government officials beat and abuse detainees, and that

human rights groups had reported over two dozen instances of

torture due to one government initiative.9 Additionally, the

2008 report acknowledged that police arrest individuals for

having certain types of tattoos. Thus, while the report indi-

cated that some officials are being investigated and convicted

for abusing their authority, it also noted ongoing serious prob-

lems and so corroborated the experts’ testimony. Further, as

noted above, other documentary evidence corroborated their

testimony as well.

Moreover, contrary to the Board’s assertion, the experts, in

particular Canales, did testify about specific incidents of

police torturing or killing suspected gang members. For

example, Canales discussed an incident in which 68 suspected

gang members were shot in jail by “members of the police

guard”; an incident in which police set fire to a jail and killed

104 gang members; and an incident involving a police officer

who tortured two gang members to death. Canales also testi-

fied that he had personally experienced police brutality, and

personally witnessed tattooed individuals being denied medi-

cal care at public hospitals. Finally, Canales attempted to

quantify the risk Cole faced if returned to Honduras, placing

his risk of detention by the police at 90% and his risk of being

killed by other gang members at 75%. The Board did not

acknowledge these examples and estimates.

[8] The government argues that Canales’ testimony should

be discounted because he did not work with former members

of the Crips gang and had very little first-hand knowledge

regarding how former members of that particular gang are

treated in Honduras. Canales’ lack of knowledge about the

Crips gang does not mean, however, that his testimony is

inapplicable to Cole. As the BIA recognized, evidence in the

9

The 2007 State Department report, also in the record, placed the num-

ber of individuals arbitrarily arrested and sometimes tortured at more than

34,000.

COLE v. HOLDER 17977

record demonstrates that tattoos “can cause an automatic asso-

ciation with gangs,” which can “equate to harsh treatment.”

There is no record evidence suggesting that Cole would expe-

rience different treatment because his tattoos are affiliated

with the Crips rather than with the gangs with which Canales

primarily works. Moreover, Canales’ testimony about vio-

lence perpetrated by gang members on those they suspect of

being rivals should have been evaluated alongside Rodri-

guez’s testimony, which focused on the rivalries between the

Crips and the two dominant gangs in Honduras, MS-13 and

18th Street. Because the BIA acknowledged the testimony of

only one of Cole’s experts, it appears that it never considered

Cole’s CAT claim in light of the evidence presented by both

experts.

[9] Because the BIA mischaracterized the record with

regard to one of the expert’s consistency with the State

Department reports, criticized that expert’s testimony on a

basis belied by the record, and failed even to acknowledge

Cole’s other expert witness, it failed to give reasoned consid-

eration to the potentially dispositive testimony of Cole’s two

experts. We must therefore remand for the agency to recon-

sider Cole’s CAT claim in light of the expert testimony and

the corroborating documentary evidence. See INS v. Ventura,

537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam); see also Aguilar-Ramos,

594 F.3d at 705; Eneh, 601 F.3d at 948-49.

C. Intentional Denial of Medical Care

In addition to its errors regarding the testimony of Cole’s

expert witnesses, the BIA also failed to consider Cole’s claim

that he would face torture in Honduras as a result of inten-

tional denial of medical care.

[10] The applicable CAT regulations require that the tor-

turer have the specific intent to inflict severe harm. 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a)(5). Acts that merely have the foreseeable result

of inflicting harm are not sufficient; “the actor [must] intend

17978 COLE v. HOLDER

the actual consequences of his conduct.” Villegas, 523 F.3d at

989. Thus, inhumane conditions and lack of access to appro-

priate medical care do not, in and of themselves, constitute

torture. Id.; Eneh, 601 F.3d at 948. The IJ and BIA were

therefore correct that a claim of inadequate health care in

Honduras, without more, is insufficient to warrant CAT relief.

[11] This court has recognized, however, that the inten-

tional denial of medical care as a form of punishment could

suffice to establish a CAT claim. Eneh, 601 F.3d at 948. Here,

the BIA did not consider at all Cole’s claim that medical care

would be intentionally withheld because of his gang tattoos,

and that he, specifically, was likely to need medical care due

to his brain injury.10 There is at least some evidence support-

ing Cole’s contentions: Canales testified that he had person-

ally witnessed staff at public hospitals let a victim bleed to

death because he had tattoos. His opinion was that Cole, also

tattooed, would similarly be denied emergency medical care

in Honduras and would have only contingent, restricted

access to other medical care. The BIA should have considered

whether that was so, particularly given evidence in the record

that Cole will need medical care in Honduras to deal with

complications from his brain injury.

D. Tattoo Removal

Additionally, the BIA’s conclusion that Cole did not meet

his burden under CAT rested in part on its assertion that Cole

10

Cole also argues that the BIA inadequately considered his claim that

prison officials would intentionally allow him to be tortured and killed in

prison by rival gang members. The agency found that Cole had failed to

establish that he would more likely than not come to the attention of police

and be detained in prison, and so did not consider what would happen

were he detained. If, after reasoned consideration of potentially dispositive

testimony and documentary evidence, the BIA reconsiders its conclusion

regarding the likelihood that Cole will come to the attention of the police

and be detained, it should address his claim that prison officials will inten-

tionally subject him to dangerous conditions amounting to torture.

COLE v. HOLDER 17979

could “have his tattoos removed so that he would not be per-

ceived as a gang member upon return to Honduras.” Given

that statement, we cannot tell whether the BIA would have

reached the same result had it not assumed that the tattoos

could feasibly be removed in a timely manner.11 But that

assumption falters if the record evidence on the issue is cred-

ited: There is evidence that the tattoo removal process is quite

long and extremely painful. Moreover, the process can leave

permanent scarring. Canales also testified that there is a far

greater demand for tattoo removal in Honduras than there are

places that can provide such services, leading many tattooed

individuals to resort to dangerous home remedies such as

burning themselves with cigarette butts or battery acid. Added

to likely lengthy delay in beginning tattoo removal is the

length of time it takes to remove tattoos once the process

begins. As a result of these circumstances, Cole would likely

be unable to remove his tattoos until well after his arrival in

Honduras, and thus would face being perceived as a gang

member for as long as it took — likely quite a while — to get

them removed. And even after getting his tattoos removed,

the record indicates, visible scarring could mean that he

would still be a targeted by rival gangs, police, and death

squads.

[12] The BIA’s statement concerning tattoo removal does

not discuss any of this evidence or explain why it is not dispo-

sitive. Thus, once again, the BIA did not give reasoned con-

sideration to potentially dispositive testimony with regard to

the probability of torture, and we must remand for further

consideration and explanation.

11

It is also unclear whether, if it were feasible for Cole to remove his

tattoos sufficiently to reduce his risk of torture, the BIA could deny CAT

relief on that basis. The issue is not squarely before us, so we need not,

and do not, address it.

17980 COLE v. HOLDER

E. Aggregation of Risk

[13] Finally, the BIA did not consider the aggregate risk

that Cole would face from police, death squads, and gangs if

returned to Honduras. Cole need not prove that each group,

treated individually, would more likely than not torture him.

Rather, he must establish that, taking into account all possible

sources of torture, he is more likely than not to be tortured,

by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government, if

returned to Honduras. The BIA erred by treating each poten-

tial source of torture individually, never assessing Cole’s

overall risk of being tortured.

IV.

The BIA did not give reasoned consideration to potentially

dispositive testimony by Cole’s expert witnesses, corroborat-

ing documentary evidence, or evidence concerning removal of

tattoos. Nor did it address Cole’s argument regarding the

intentional denial of medical care or assess Cole’s risk of tor-

ture in the aggregate. We therefore GRANT Cole’s petition,

VACATE the BIA’s decision, and REMAND for further pro-

ceedings consistent with this opinion.

VACATED and REMANDED.

NOONAN, Circuit Judge, concurring:

Cole’s peril comes from his possession of tattoos. Before

exposing him to that peril, he should be given the chance to

remove the tattoos. The Board of Immigration Appeals has

the discretion, in these extraordinary circumstances, to defer

his deportation until the tattoos are removed. See Barapind v.

Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, I

vote to remand to the BIA to exercise this discretion.

COLE v. HOLDER 17981

If the BIA does exercise this discretion and the tattoos are

removed, or if Cole declines to seek removal of the tattoos,

I vote to deny Cole any further delay in his deportation. If the

BIA does not exercise its discretion or if the tattoos are not

removed, I concur in Judge Berzon’s opinion.

CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I dissent because the majority, in reviewing Cole’s asser-

tion that he will be tortured if returned to Honduras because

of his gang tattoos, improperly substitutes its judgment for

that of the BIA. Specifically, the majority: (1) manufactures

a procedural basis for remand by deciding that the BIA failed

to give “reasoned consideration” to Cole’s evidence; (2) fails

to follow the standard for granting relief under the Conven-

tion Against Torture (“CAT”), see Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511

F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007), by reweighing the evidence and

stringing together a series of hypothetical events to justify its

conclusion that Cole may be tortured if returned to Honduras

because he would be misidentified as being a gang member

based on his tattoos; (3) fails to appreciate the lack of evi-

dence that Cole would be intentionally deprived medical care

if he were returned to Honduras; and (4) accepts Cole’s prob-

lematic argument that he may be entitled to CAT relief on the

basis of his gang-related tattoos. I would deny Cole’s petition

on the basis that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s

decision and nothing Cole presented in his petition compels

a contrary result.

I

Neither the IJ nor the BIA made an adverse credibility find-

ing, therefore we take Cole’s factual allegations as true.

Aguilar-Ramos v. Holder, 594 F.3d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 2010).

Because of his criminal background, the IJ and BIA con-

cluded that Cole is not entitled to either asylum or withhold-

17982 COLE v. HOLDER

ing of removal. Cole does not challenge these decisions.

Rather, the only issue before this court is his assertion that he

is entitled to protection under CAT.

A

1. Cole’s Background and Testimony

Cole is a native and citizen of Honduras who entered the

United States with his family when he was eleven years old

and has since acquired a lengthy criminal record. He has no

extended family in Honduras. Cole is African-American and

has numerous gang tattoos on his arms, legs and face that he

acquired while in prison after he joined the Crips, an African-

American gang. After his release from prison, Cole apparently

left the gang and worked for a homeless services agency. He

states he did not get the gang tattoos removed because tattoo

removal is a long and painful process.

In 2007, Cole was shot in a drive-by shooting.1 As a result

of the shooting, he suffers from certain ongoing medical prob-

lems and has a defective, fragile skull.

In 2008, because of a 1999 conviction for possession of

cocaine for sale, Cole was placed in removal proceedings

where he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT

relief. The IJ determined that Cole was removable as an

aggravated felon and therefore ineligible for asylum and with-

1

Although the majority asserts that “rival gangs could still identify him

as a Crips gang member because of his tattoos,” Cole never testified that

any rival gang ever identified him as a gang member, whether because of

his tattoos or not. Cole testified about a confrontation with rival gang

members at the Santa Monica Pier while he was with friends, but he did

not assert that any of the rival gang members recognized him as a Crip or

that anyone noticed his tattoos. Similarly, when Cole was shot, he was

with a friend in his car and although he claimed that the people who shot

him identified themselves as members of a Hispanic gang, Cole does not

state that any mention was made of his race or his gang tattoos.

COLE v. HOLDER 17983

holding of removal. Cole did not contest those decisions

before the BIA.

At his immigration hearing, Cole testified that he feared he

would be tortured or killed if he were returned to Honduras.

He asserted that gangs, police, death squads, or even his

neighbors may torture or kill him because of his race, gang

tattoos, former gang membership, demeanor or accent, and

that the torture and killing would be done with the acquies-

cence of the government.2 Cole’s sister and mother also testi-

fied that they feared he would be tortured or killed if returned

to Honduras on the basis of his race and tattoos. In addition,

Cole claimed that he would be intentionally denied medical

care by public health officials and that this denial of health

care would constitute torture.

2. Cole’s Experts

Cole supported his claim with testimony from two pur-

ported experts: Luis Javier Rodriguez (“Rodriguez”) and

Javier Canales Mesa (“Canales”). Rodriguez was offered as

an expert on Central American gangs. Rodriguez testified that

he was a self-employed author who had not written about

Honduras and had no specific education, background, or

expertise on the subject of Honduras or gangs in Honduras.

The IJ was not convinced that Rodriguez was an expert on

Central American gangs or had any specialized knowledge on

the interaction between Honduran former gang members and

the Honduran authorities, but permitted Rodriguez to testify

as an expert on gangs and on the narrow issue of racial

dynamics between Los Angeles and Central American gangs.

2

Although Cole’s race is a factor, there is little discussion of race in the

proceedings, and neither Cole nor the majority contend that he would be

tortured based on his race alone. Rather, Cole’s race is raised as an addi-

tional way that Hispanic gang members, death squads, the police, or medi-

cal authorities may recognize Cole as a Crip. It is only the combination

of Cole being an African-American with Crips tattoos that would make

him identifiable as a (former) Crip.

17984 COLE v. HOLDER

Rodriguez testified that the major gangs in Honduras are

the Hispanic gangs, Mara Salvatrucha, also known as MS-13,

and the Mara 18, also known as the 18th Street, which are

American gangs that have spread to Central America. He

stated that the Crips are an African-American gang from Los

Angeles. He testified that, in Los Angeles, the Crips are

viewed as rivals to the Hispanic gangs. Rodriguez asserted

that, in the United States, gang members may recognize rival

gang members’ tattoos, which can lead to violence. He specu-

lated that the rivalry between the Hispanic gangs and the

Crips would exist in Honduras and that someone with Crips

tattoos might be “threatened, beaten, or killed” by the His-

panic gangs there if rival gangs were to see the Crips tattoos.

Rodriguez also testified that there is a “very strong anti-black

culture” in Honduras.

Rodriguez testified that gang members obtain tattoos as a

means of identifying their affiliation with a particular gang.

He stated that removing tattoos is an expensive and painful

process that could take several sessions and could leave scar-

ring. He testified that tattoo removal was possible in Hondu-

ras, but that he knew of only two facilities and they lacked

adequate personnel and equipment, so there was a backlog of

people wanting to get their tattoos removed.

The IJ accepted Cole’s second expert, Canales, as an expert

on the issue of the treatment of suspected gang members by

Honduran police and rival gang members. Canales had

worked with former gang members in Honduras. He testified

that because Cole’s gang tattoos indicate his membership in

the Crips, Cole may be seen as a threat to some Honduran

Hispanic gang members and accordingly there was a “big

possibility” that Cole could be killed. However, on cross-

examination, Canales admitted that he had not worked with

any Crips. Canales testified that former Honduran gang mem-

bers often try to remove their tattoos because of the risk of

violence from rival gangs, police, and “civil groups.” He

stated that some individuals try to remove the tattoos them-

COLE v. HOLDER 17985

selves, although there are three tattoo removal places in Hon-

duras that will professionally remove tattoos.3 He claims that

it takes four to six sessions to remove a tattoo and that it is

a painful process which may result in scarring.

Canales stated that it is illegal in Honduras to be a gang

member or to have a gang-related tattoo. He asserted that the

government does not investigate the murders of gang mem-

bers and that the police will direct violence at suspected gang

members, or may even kill them. In addition, Canales testified

about incidents in which Honduran police or prison guards

killed suspected gang members in prison. He also testified

that government-sanctioned death squads torture and kill

undesirables, including suspected gang members. Canales

opined that because of his tattoos, Cole has a greater than

75% chance he will be killed by Hispanic gang members and

a 90% probability that he would be detained by police.

Finally, Canales testified that most health care profession-

als in Honduras would refuse to treat an individual with tat-

toos because they would suspect he is a gang member.

Canales provided one example in which he stated that he

accompanied a bleeding tattooed gang member to a hospital

and that this individual died in the waiting room because the

staff would not treat the man on account of his tattoos.

Canales asserted that the government is “negligent” because

it does not hold doctors accountable and “these events occur

very often.”

B

1. The IJ’s Decision

The IJ denied Cole’s application for relief under CAT. The

3

It appears that the third program is run by doctors who come to Hondu-

ras every couple of months from the United States. They typically remove

90% of a tattoo in four sessions.

17986 COLE v. HOLDER

IJ considered both the documentary evidence and witness tes-

timony and discussed the arguments raised by both Cole and

the government.

The IJ recognized that torture is an extreme form of punish-

ment and that “an alien cannot establish eligibility for [CAT

relief] by stringing together a series of suppositions to show

that it is more likely than not that torture will result where the

evidence does not establish each step in the hypothetical chain

of events is more likely than not to happen.” The IJ found that

Cole was attempting to do just that, by asserting:

that it is more likely than not that he will be arrested

in Honduras and that once he is arrested, he will be

detained for a substantial amount of time and if so

detained, he will then be killed or tortured by the

security forces or he will receive no medical care or

the gangs will kill or torture him with the govern-

ment’s acquiescence.

The IJ concluded that although there was “evidence that

arrests, abuse, and killings occur, the evidence does not show

that it is more likely than not to happen to the respondent.”

The IJ noted that, according to the Country Report, torture is

illegal in Honduras. Further, “neither the witnesses [n]or the

documentary evidence presented in the case establishes that a

majority of deported gang members are in fact arrested by the

police, held in custody, and tortured or killed.”

The IJ rejected Cole’s assertion that “the lack of medical

care and poor prison conditions are specifically intended to

inflict severe physical or mental pain and suffering,” or that

the government intended those consequences. The IJ, citing

Villegas v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2008), found that

Cole was “unable to show that Honduras has a specific intent

to inflict suffering on prisoners or patients or suspected gang

members by creating the conditions in their jails or medical

facilities.”

COLE v. HOLDER 17987

Finally, the IJ concluded that:

The respondent also has not shown that the gov-

ernment of Honduras will acquiesce in his torture at

the hands of other gang members or the death squads

nor has he established that it is more likely than not

to occur to him. It is not enough to show that gang

members have killed other gang members or that

death squads have tortured and killed gang members.

. . . The evidence does not establish that the gov-

ernment acquiesces in such conduct and in fact,

reflects the opposite. The government is trying to

handle the huge gang problem they face and are

attempting to receive specialized training. They are

taking steps to prosecute police officers for abuse of

power. Accordingly, the Court finds that the respon-

dent is unable to establish a likelihood of torture in

Honduras by either the government or with the gov-

ernment’s acquiescence . . . .

2. The BIA’s Decision

In October 2009, the BIA, in a single judge decision,

affirmed the IJ. The BIA agreed with the IJ that Cole:

failed to meet his burden of proving that it is more

likely than not that he will be tortured based on his

race and gang related tattoos and former gang mem-

ber status upon return to Honduras. See 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.16-18; Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940

(9th Cir. 2007). The Immigration Judge properly

concluded that the expert witness’s claim that the

respondent will be tortured was unpersuasive in light

of the other evidence, including the State Depart-

ment report, contained in the record because the

respondent’s expert failed to give specific examples

to corroborate his opinion; the record does not com-

17988 COLE v. HOLDER

pel a contrary conclusion. See Dukuly v. Filip, 553

F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2009); Shehu v. Gonzales, 443

F.3d 435 (5th Cir. 2006). He further properly deter-

mined that the evidence does not establish that each

event in the chain of events proposed by the respon-

dent is more likely than not to occur. Matter of J-F-

F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006); 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.16-.18. For example, the evidence does not

establish that, as a black, tattooed, ex-gang member,

it is more likely than not that the police would

become aware of the respondent’s return to Hondu-

ras, that upon becoming aware of him, it is more

likely than not that the police would detain him, and

that it is more likely than not that, once the respon-

dent was detained, they would use physical force

against the respondent that would rise to the level of

torture. Id. Likewise, the respondent failed to meet

his burden of proving that it is more likely than not

that a death squad, rival gang members, or any other

entity would become aware of his return to Honduras

and that it is more likely than not that any of these

groups would then torture him. Additionally, the

respondent submitted numerous articles which detail

that the presence of a tattoo can cause an automatic

association with gangs, and that a tattoo or suspected

gang affiliation can equate to harsh treatment. How-

ever, there is no indication that the respondent could

not have his tattoos removed so that he would not be

perceived as a gang member upon return to Hondu-

ras. Finally, we cannot conclude that the lack of

medical treatment to the respondent is tantamount to

torture. Although the respondent has shown that he

faces some risks of harm when returned to Hondu-

ras, the Immigration Judge properly determined that

the testimony and evidence does not establish that he

will “more likely than not” be tortured.

Cole timely petitioned this court for review. In his petition,

Cole alleged that the BIA erred by (a) failing to give proper

COLE v. HOLDER 17989

weight to his experts’ testimony; (b) finding that he had failed

to establish a clear probability of future torture by the police,

rival gang members, or death squads; (c) failing to consider

Cole’s prison conditions and denial of medical care claims;

and (d) failing to give proper weight to Cole’s evidence he

will be tortured because the BIA found Cole could remove his

tattoos.

II

Our review focuses on the BIA’s single-member decision

but we look to the IJ’s decision “as a guide to what lay behind

the BIA’s conclusion.” Delgado v. Holder, 563 F.3d 863, 866

(9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Avetora-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d

1192, 1197 (9th Cir. 2000)).

We review factual determinations supporting the denial of

CAT relief under a deferential substantial evidence standard.

See Arteaga, 511 F.3d at 944 (“[t]he BIA’s findings underly-

ing its determination that an applicant is not eligible for relief

under the CAT are reviewed for substantial evidence”). Under

this standard, “the administrative findings of fact are conclu-

sive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to

conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (empha-

sis added); see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481

& n.1 (1992) (“To reverse the BIA finding we must find that

the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels

it.”). This court “must uphold the IJ’s determination if it is

supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence

in the record.” Halim v. Holder, 590 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.

2009) (quoting Zehatye v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th

Cir. 2006).

We have held that “[t]his strict standard bars the reviewing

court from independently weighing the evidence and holding

that the petitioner is eligible for asylum, except in cases where

compelling evidence is shown.” Kotasz v. I.N.S., 31 F.3d 847,

851 (9th Cir. 1994). “We are not free to look anew at the testi-

17990 COLE v. HOLDER

mony and then measure the soundness of the agency’s deci-

sion by what we would have found. Nor does evidence

compel the opposite conclusion just because it would also

support a different result.” Donchev v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d

1206, 1213 (9th Cir. 2009).

To be eligible for deferral of removal under the CAT, the

applicant must establish that he would more likely than not be

tortured at the instigation of, or with the consent or acquies-

cence of, a public official. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2),

1208.18(a)(1); Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1282 (9th

Cir. 2001). The “consent or acquiescence” requirement means

that the government must be aware of the allegedly tortuous

conduct, or at least willfully blind to it. Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332

F.3d 1186, 1188-89 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

The applicable regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1) states:

Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or

suffering, whether physical or mental, is intention-

ally inflicted on a person . . . , when such pain or suf-

fering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with

the consent or acquiescence of a public official or

other person acting in an official capacity.

See also Kamalthas, 251 F.3d at 1282; Sinha v. Holder, 564

F.3d 1015, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009). In addition, “[t]orture is an

extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not

include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment

or punishment that do not amount to torture.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a)(2). Furthermore, “[t]orture does not include pain

or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to

lawful sanctions.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(2); Al-Saher v.

I.N.S., 268 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 2001).

III

Applying the applicable standard of review, the majority

commits four errors in granting Cole’s petition. First, the

COLE v. HOLDER 17991

majority manufactures a procedural basis for remand by con-

cluding that the BIA failed to give “reasoned consideration”

to Cole’s experts’ testimony and evidence related to Cole’s

ability to get his tattoos removed. Second, the majority imper-

missibly (a) reweighs the evidence, see, e.g., Kotasz, 31 F.3d

at 851; and (b) strings together a series of hypothetical events,

related to Cole’s claim that he will be misidentified as being

a gang member and then tortured by rival gangs, police, or

death squads, none of which is more likely than not to occur.

See Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. 912 (A.G. 2006). Third,

the majority misreads the record in concluding that the BIA

did not adequately consider whether Cole would be intention-

ally deprived of medical care if he were returned to Honduras.

Fourth, the majority decision allows a petitioner to obtain

CAT relief on the basis of having voluntarily obtained a gang-

related tattoo. This is problematic for a number of reasons, not

the least of which is that it appears to undermine our holding

in Arteaga, 511 F.3d 940, that being a tattooed ex-gang mem-

ber does not constitute belonging to a particular social group.

A

The majority manufactures a procedural basis for remand

by deciding that the BIA failed to give “reasoned consider-

ation” to “the potentially dispositive testimony” of both of

Cole’s experts. Maj. Op. at 17975, 17978-79. Contrary to the

majority’s perspective, the BIA and IJ considered all of

Cole’s evidence.

1. The BIA Considered Both Experts’ Testimony

The majority finds the BIA erred because “the BIA stated

only that the testimony of one of Cole’s experts ‘was unper-

suasive in light of the other evidence, including the State

Department report, . . . because [he] failed to give specific

examples to corroborate his opinion.’ ” The majority claims

that the BIA failed to address Cole’s other expert at all. Maj.

Op. at 17975-77. The majority professes not to know which

17992 COLE v. HOLDER

expert the BIA was referring to, but concludes that whichever

expert it was, the BIA was obligated to state the reasons

“ ‘why the testimony was insufficient to establish the proba-

bility of torture necessary to grant CAT relief.’ ” Id. (quoting

Aguilar-Ramos, 594 F.3d at 706 n.7). This is not a fair read-

ing of the record.

The BIA stated that “[t]he Immigration Judge properly con-

cluded that the expert witness’s claim that the respondent will

be tortured was unpersuasive in light of the other evidence,

including the State Department report, contained in the record

because the respondent’s expert failed to give specific exam-

ples to corroborate his opinion . . . .” Only two experts testi-

fied — Rodriguez, who primarily testified about the racial

dynamics of Los Angeles gangs spreading to Central Amer-

ica, rather than about Cole being tortured in Honduras, and

Canales, who testified extensively about the various ways that

Cole might be tortured. In context, it is clear that the BIA was

specifically referring to Canales’s testimony.4

Furthermore, we do not review the BIA’s decision in a vac-

uum, but rather look to the IJ’s decision “as a guide to what

lay behind the BIA’s conclusion.” Delgado, 563 F.3d at 866

(quoting Avetova-Elisseva, 213 F.3d at 1197). The BIA’s

decision generally affirmed the IJ’s decision and the IJ explic-

itly discussed both Canales’s and Rodriguez’s testimony,

before concluding that “neither the witnesses [n]or the docu-

mentary evidence presented in the case establishes that a

majority of deported gang members are in fact arrested by the

police, held in custody, and tortured or killed.” It is clear that

the IJ considered both of Cole’s experts’ testimony, but found

other evidence more compelling, and it is equally clear that

the BIA considered the IJ’s decision and affirmed on the same

basis.

4

Another possibility, not considered by the majority, is that the BIA’s

statement is a typographical error: the BIA failed to pluralize “witness”,

writing “witness’s” when it actually meant “witnesses’ ” which would ren-

der the majority’s argument moot.

COLE v. HOLDER 17993

The majority asserts that the BIA’s “rationale for rejecting

one expert’s opinion is entirely unsupported by the record for

two reasons”: (1) the State Department report “corroborates

rather than contradicts many aspects of both experts’ testimo-

ny”; and (2) the experts “did testify about specific incidents

of police torturing or killing suspected gang members.” Maj.

Op. at 17975-76. The majority cites examples from the report

and from Canales’s testimony in support of these contentions.

Id. at 17976-77.

The majority, however, overlooks the documentary evi-

dence and testimony supporting the opposite conclusion.5 The

BIA stated:

the evidence does not establish that, as a black, tat-

tooed, ex-gang member, it is more likely than not

that the police would become aware of the respon-

dent’s return to Honduras, that upon becoming aware

of him, it is more likely than not that the police

would detain him, and that it is more likely than not

that, once the respondent was detained, they would

use physical force against the respondent that would

rise to the level of torture. Id.

The IJ found that “[n]either the witnesses [n]or the documen-

tary evidence presented in this case establishes that a majority

of deported gang members are in fact arrested by the police,

held in custody, and tortured or killed.” The IJ noted that,

“[h]ere, the Department of State report for Honduras reflects

that torture is against the law,” and observed that:

5

In addition to Cole’s testimony, over 700 pages of documents were

submitted by the parties, including newspaper articles regarding gang vio-

lence in the United States and Honduras, general research articles related

to gang issues in the United States and Honduras, Department of State

Human Rights Reports and Country Reports for 2007 and 2008, a sum-

mary of criminal proceedings against Cole, as well as Cole’s medical his-

tory related to his gunshot wound.

17994 COLE v. HOLDER

The report reflects that the public ministry has filed

charges against police officers for torture and illegal

detention and that an office of internal affairs has

been created. There is a special prosecutor for

human rights and charges against the police have

been found to have merit. Members of the govern-

ment, including the chief of police of Lasaba and the

police commissioner have been prosecuted and sen-

tenced for the Porvener Jail massacre and authorities

prosecuted 268 police officers for offenses ranging

from abuse of authority to drug trafficking, rape, and

homicide. Furthermore, the evidence reflects that

Honduras is one of the poorest countries in the hemi-

sphere and therefore, a lack of resources remains a

problem.

A review of the 2008 Country Report (the most current at

the time of Cole’s hearing) supports the IJ’s and BIA’s con-

clusions. That report noted that the Honduran constitution and

law prohibit torture. In addition, arbitrary arrest and detention

are prohibited by the Honduran constitution and other laws.

Regarding arrests, the State Department Human Rights report

states that:

The law states that police may arrest a person only

with a court order, unless the arrest is by order of a

prosecutor, made during the commission of a crime,

made when there is strong suspicion that a person

has committed a crime and may try to evade criminal

prosecution, or made when the person is caught with

evidence related to a crime. Police must clearly

inform the person of the grounds for the arrest.

Police must bring a detainee before a competent

authority within 24 hours. The prosecutor has 24

hours to decide if there is probable cause for an

indictment, and a judge then has 24 hours to decide

whether to issue a temporary detention order that can

last up to six days, by which time the judge must

COLE v. HOLDER 17995

hold a pretrial hearing to examine probable cause

and make a decision on whether pretrial detention

should continue.

Further, while the reports document instances of abuses

committed by police and prison authorities, they also docu-

ment the government’s efforts to investigate prison officials

who allegedly abused their authority, and note that twenty-

one members of the government, including a chief of police

and a police commissioner, had been convicted for their part

in a jail “massacre” in 2003. The State Department’s Human

Rights report noted that “[t]he Office of Internal Affairs

investigates allegations of illegal activities committed by

members of the police force. The Preventive Police and the

DGIC each have an office of professional responsibility that

conducts internal reviews of police.” Other evidence also sup-

ports the conclusion that the Honduran government investi-

gates and prosecutes police officers accused of wrongdoing.

And Honduras has sought assistance in training its law

enforcement and military: “Foreign donors and international

organizations provided human rights training to police and

military officials.” There was also evidence that the govern-

ment actively investigated and prosecuted gang members. The

2007 Congressional Research Service report documented the

government’s efforts to crack down on gang members and

noted that Honduras had received assistance in its efforts from

several U.S. agencies.

In sum, it appears that the BIA’s rationale for rejecting

Cole’s evidence is supported by the record. When presented

with a record containing conflicting evidence, we are

restrained to determine only whether the agency’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 &

n.1; Halim, 590 F.3d at 975.

B

The above discussion of the majority’s alleged procedural

errors implicates a more fundamental issue: there is no com-

17996 COLE v. HOLDER

pelling evidence that Cole will be tortured by rival gangs,

death squads, or the police on the basis of being misidentified

as a gang member because of his tattoos.

The majority suggests that Cole may be identified by rival

gangs because of his tattoos, and that if he were identified as

a rival gang member, he would be in peril of being tortured

or killed by them. See Maj. Op. at 17964, 17965, 17976-77,

17979. This assumes that a Honduran gang would recognize

Cole’s tattoos and consider him a rival.6 But there is no evi-

dence that the Crips operate in Honduras. The majority also

assumes that Honduran gangs will direct violence against

Cole even though he is a former member of a gang that does

not operate in Honduras. Furthermore, even if all of these pos-

sibilities were considered probabilities, it is only “torture” for

the purposes of CAT relief if the Honduran government con-

dones or acquiesces in such gang activity.

There is evidence in the record that the Honduran govern-

ment does not condone gang activity. For example, Canales

testified that being a member of a gang is a crime in Honduras

and that the police will detain and arrest gang members. There

is also documentary evidence that the police investigated and

prosecuted suspected gang members.

This, however, is not evidence that Cole will be tortured by

the police or prison officials because he is misidentified as

being a gang member based on his Crips tattoos. Although

there was evidence that having gang-related tattoos can lead

to imprisonment in Honduras, see Maj. Op. at 17964, 17967,

Cole is a former member of a gang — a gang that does not

6

Neither of Cole’s experts testified that Honduran gangs would assault

Cole because of his tattoos. Rodriguez testified that rival gangs in the

United States “may recognize rival gang members’ tattoos,” and admitted

that he had no specific knowledge about gangs in Honduras. Canales, who

worked with former gang members in Honduras, testified that Cole,

because of his tattoos, may be seen as a threat by a Honduran gang.

COLE v. HOLDER 17997

operate in Honduras — and there is no evidence that the

police or prison authorities would continue to detain a person

who they mistakenly identified as a gang member.7 Even if

the police and prison officials did detain or imprison Cole,

neither of these acts by themselves constitute torture. See,

e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(3) (“Torture does not include pain

or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to

lawful sanctions.”); Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th

Cir. 1995) (no past persecution where the petitioner was

arrested once, detained for four to six hours and beaten).

The majority cites Canales’s testimony and documentary

evidence that Honduran police physically abuse suspected

gang members. See Maj. Op. 17965. Similarly, the majority

discusses evidence of violent acts directed at prisoners,

including gang members. Id. at 17965, 17967-69, 17976.

However, there was also evidence in the record that tended to

show that the Honduran government neither instigates nor

acquiesces in such behavior by police officers and that it pros-

ecutes police officers who violate the law. Moreover, evi-

dence that the Honduran government opposes gangs is not

evidence that it would condone violence against a person mis-

identified as a gang member or would torture such a person.

Cole’s argument that he will be tortured by death squads,

with the government’s acquiescence, also lacks compelling

evidence. Cole must show that the government “is unwilling

or unable to control those elements of its society responsible

7

It seems questionable that having a gang-related tattoo that was

obtained in another country and has no relationship to gangs that are active

in Honduras would be considered to be illegal and would lead to Cole’s

detention and torture. The State Department Human Rights report sets

forth the procedures for arresting a suspect, which include the prosecutor

determining whether there is probable cause for an indictment and a

requirement that the suspect be brought before a judge for a probable

cause determination. Accordingly, it is unlikely that Cole would be

arrested, detained, processed by a prosecutor and a judge, and then tor-

tured by police on the basis of his American gang tattoos.

17998 COLE v. HOLDER

for targeting a particular class of individuals.” See Avetova-

Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir. 2000) (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted). The majority notes

Canales’s testimony that death squads, comprised of “police

and other powerful citizens” kill suspected gang members

with “complete impunity,” as well as documentary evidence

of killings committed by “vigilantes.” Maj. Op. at 17965,

17967. But other than the possibility of someone recognizing

Cole’s tattoos as gang tattoos, the majority does not explain

how Cole might come to the attention of these groups. Fur-

thermore, because Cole is not a member of a Honduran gang,

there is no evidence that such groups — with or without the

government’s acquiescence — would torture Cole once the

misidentification became known.8 Also, there is evidence that

the government prosecuted government officials who violated

its laws.

In sum, the majority does not point to any compelling evi-

dence that individuals such as Cole — who are tattooed ex-

gang member deportees to Honduras — have come, or are

more likely than not to come, to the attention of rival gangs,

police, or death squads and are then tortured at the instigation

of, or with the acquiescence of, the government. It is only by

taking a number of hypothetical events and then assuming

that each one of them inexorably leads to the next hypotheti-

cal event in the sequence, that one can reach the conclusion

that it is more likely than not that Cole will be tortured if he

is returned to Honduras.

The majority does just that. It strings together a series of

hypothetical events to reach a thoroughly speculative conclu-

sion. Matter of J-F-F-, 23 I&N Dec. at 917-18 (“The evidence

does not establish that any step in this hypothetical chain of

8

Indeed, the facts that Cole is an African-American and that his tattoos

do not indicate membership in a Honduran gang — which appear to be

primarily of Hispanic ethnicity — suggest that he is not likely to be a tar-

get of death squads or vigilantes.

COLE v. HOLDER 17999

events is more likely than not to happen, let alone that the

entire chain will come together to result in the probability of

torture of respondent.”); see also Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518

F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that a series of

hypothetical events related to the petitioner’s economic hard-

ship if returned to the Ukraine were too speculative to estab-

lish that he would be tortured under CAT). The majority

cannot, and does not, point to any compelling evidence that

Cole will be misidentified as a gang member on the basis of

his tattoos or that this misidentification is likely to lead to his

being tortured at the instigation of, or with the acquiescence

of, the government.

C

The majority concedes that for Cole’s claim that he may be

denied medical care to rise to the level of torture for CAT pur-

poses, he must show that the denial is intentional.9 Maj. Op.

at 17977-78 (citing, inter alia, C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(5); Ville-

gas, 523 F.3d at 989). The majority then concludes that the

BIA failed to consider Cole’s claims that he would be tortured

as a result of the intentional denial of medical care. Maj. Op.

at 17977-78. Again, the majority misconstrues the record.

Although the majority does not specifically identify the rel-

evant language in the BIA’s decision related to Cole’s denial

of medical care claim, it appears to be referencing the BIA’s

statement that it “cannot conclude that the lack of medical

9

The majority also appears to have concluded that because the BIA did

not specifically refer to whether prison officials will intentionally subject

Cole to dangerous conditions amounting to torture, the BIA failed to give

adequate consideration to this contention. Maj. Op. at 17978, 17878 n.10.

However, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and the IJ specifically found

that Cole was “unable to show that Honduras has a specific intent to inflict

suffering on prisoners or patients or suspected gang members by creating

the conditions in their jails or medical facilities.” In addition, there is evi-

dence that the authorities are doing their best with limited resources to

enforce the laws, even against police officers and prison officials.

18000 COLE v. HOLDER

treatment to the respondent is tantamount to torture.” The

majority interprets this as the BIA failing to specifically con-

sider whether Cole would be intentionally denied health care.

Maj. Op at 17978.

However, the majority overlooks the IJ’s decision. See Del-

gado, 563 F.3d at 866. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s determina-

tion that Cole was “unable to show that Honduras has a

specific intent to inflict suffering on prisoners or patients or

suspected gang members by creating the conditions in their

jails or medical facilities.” A review of the IJ’s decision con-

firms that the IJ specifically rejected Cole’s contention that he

would be tortured as a result of intentional denial of medical

care.

Furthermore, there appears to be but a single anecdote pro-

vided by Canales to support the contention that Cole may be

intentionally denied medical care. Canales described an inci-

dent in which he witnessed staff at a hospital let a tattooed

gang member that he had brought to the hospital bleed to

death, allegedly on account of his gang tattoos. Maj. Op. at

17978. Even assuming that the events occurred as Canales

described them, this is too slender a reed to compel the con-

clusion that Cole will more likely than not be intentionally

denied medical care because of his gang tattoos. It is more

than offset by the evidence in the 2008 Country Report of the

efforts undertaken by the Honduran government to combat

gangs and gang violence.

In sum, the BIA, in affirming the IJ’s decision, agreed that

Cole was “unable to show that Honduras has a specific intent

to inflict suffering on prisoners or patients or suspected gang

members by creating the conditions in their jails or medical

facilities,” and the evidence does not compel a contrary result.

D

While the majority is careful not to explicitly hold that

being a tattooed gang member or tattooed ex-gang member is

COLE v. HOLDER 18001

a particular social group for the purposes of obtaining CAT

relief, all of the harm that Cole will allegedly be exposed to

is based on his being misidentified as belonging to a gang.

The majority appears to assume that because Cole has gang

tattoos, he is in effect like every tattooed gang suspect, gang

member, or former gang member.

The majority’s apparent acceptance of an undifferentiated

class of tattooed gang members and tattooed former gang

members as being eligible for CAT relief on account of their

tattoos, appears to be contrary to our decision in Arteaga, 511

F.3d at 944. In Arteaga, in the context of a withholding of

removal claim, we rejected the petitioner’s contention that he

was part of a particular social group based on his status as a

tattooed gang member, gang member, or tattooed former gang

member. Id. at 945-46. We stated:

We cannot conclude that Congress, in offering refu-

gee protection for individuals facing potential perse-

cution through social group status, intended to

include violent street gangs who assault people and

who traffic in drugs and commit theft. Following in

the analytical footsteps of President Lincoln, calling

a street gang a “social group” as meant by our

humane and accommodating law does not make it

so. In fact, the outlaw group to which the petitioner

belongs is best described as an “antisocial group[.]”

Id. at 945-46. Further,

To do as Arteaga requests would be to pervert the

manifest humanitarian purpose of the statute in ques-

tion and to create a sanctuary for universal outlaws.

Accordingly, we hold that participation in such

activity is not fundamental to gang members’ indi-

vidual identities or consciences, and they are there-

fore ineligible for protection as members of a social

group under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).

18002 COLE v. HOLDER

Id. at 946. We also rejected Arteaga’s claim that he belonged

to a particular social group comprised of tattooed former gang

members. Id. We stated, “Arteaga’s attempt to present himself

as a former member of a social group fares no better. Disasso-

ciating oneself from a group does not automatically put one

in another group as group is meant in the law.” Id.

Of course, relief under CAT is not dependant upon an indi-

vidual being a part of a protected group, see, e.g., Kamalthas.,

251 F.3d at 1283-84. Nonetheless, I cannot square the majori-

ty’s concern for the harm Cole will allegedly be exposed to

on being misidentified as belonging to a gang with our deci-

sion in Arteaga.

Moreover, I have grave doubts as to whether a tattoo, or at

least Cole’s tattoos, should form a basis for relief under CAT.

A tattoo is not something that is innate to an individual or

beyond his or her control. We have held that “tattooing is

purely expressive activity, fully protected by the First Amend-

ment.” Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F.3d 1051,

1055 (9th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, there are limits to speech

under the First Amendment and even consequences to speech

that is constitutionally protected. Furthermore, there seems to

be no disagreement that tattoos are removable, even if this

process may entail some pain.

Basing CAT relief on a tattoo would appear to encourage

an individual who does not want to be deported to his home

country to get a tattoo that is offensive in his home country

(even if it is not necessarily offensive in the United States)

and refuse to have it removed.10 Would this lead an individual

10

Judge Noonan’s concurrence appears to misconceive Cole’s desires.

Cole does not want to return to Honduras. Accordingly, he has no incen-

tive to remove his tattoos — which appear to be the thing delaying his

removal to Honduras. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the BIA could force

Cole to remove his tattoos. See Anderson, 621 F.3d at 1055.

Rather, on remand, the BIA might ascertain whether Cole has made any

effort to remove his tattoos. If Cole has not removed his tattoos and

COLE v. HOLDER 18003

who did not want to return to China to obtain a Falun Gong

tattoo? Would a prominent swastika tattoo compel CAT relief

against repatriation to Israel?

Fortunately, this case does not present such extreme situa-

tions. Still, I would not grant CAT relief to an individual

because of tattoos that allegedly may cause the individual to

be misidentified as a member of a violent street gang which

is disapproved of by the government.

CONCLUSION

I disagree with the majority on several counts. First, the

majority manufactures reasons to remand the case by mis-

characterizing the BIA’s decision and reweighing the evi-

dence. Second, the majority concludes that remand is

necessary because the BIA failed to give “reasoned consider-

ation” to evidence that Cole may be tortured in Honduras by

rival gangs, police or death squads, on account of his gang tat-

toos, when there is no compelling evidence of a likelihood of

torture, and there is evidence that the government neither

instigates nor acquiesces in torture by any of these groups.

Third, the majority incorrectly asserts that remand is neces-

sary because the BIA failed to consider whether Cole would

be intentionally denied medical care rising to a level of tor-

ture. But the record shows that the BIA affirmed the IJ’s fac-

tual determination that Cole would not be intentionally denied

medical care, and that determination is adequately supported

by the evidence. Finally, the majority’s reliance on Cole’s tat-

toos as a basis for relief under CAT is problematic and

appears to be inconsistent with our decision in Arteaga, 511

F.3d 940, that gangs do not constitute particular social groups

for immigration purposes. Because I believe the majority

erred as to each of these matters, and because I find that the

BIA’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, I dissent.

declines to do so — and Cole is otherwise determined to be removable —

the BIA should be free to remove him immediately, or possibly after a

short period of time in which he could have the tattoos removed in the

United States.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.