vacating district court’s grant of summary judgment where “it made a dispositive credibility determination on the basis of competing affidavits”
How later courts described this case
- vacating district court’s grant of summary judgment where “it made a dispositive credibility determination on the basis of competing affidavits”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-6523
PATRICK STEPHEN WATSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
K. BROWN; BHAGIRATH, Sgt.,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
UNKNOWN, Defendant No. 3; UNKNOWN, Defendant No. 4,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Anthony John Trenga,
District Judge. (1:09-cv-00731-AJT-JFA)
Submitted: September 13, 2011 Decided: September 19, 2011
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Patrick Stephen Watson, Appellant Pro Se. Jeff W. Rosen, PENDER
& COWARD, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Patrick Stephen Watson appeals the district court’s
order granting summary judgment to the Defendants on his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) complaint. For the reasons that follow, we
affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
We review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment, viewing the facts and drawing reasonable
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-
movant. Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011).
Summary judgment may be granted only when “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). “[T]here is
no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring
the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249
(1986). For a non-movant to present a genuine issue of material
fact, “[c]onclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice,
nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of [the non-
moving party’s] case.” Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312
F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Watson, a former pre-trial detainee, premises his
claim against Brown on the excessive use of force. He claims
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Brown deliberately closed a prison door on him and thus
aggravated his already-broken shoulder. The Eighth Amendment
prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.”
U.S. Const. amend. VIII. This prohibition “not only outlaws
excessive sentences but also protects inmates from inhumane
treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v.
Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). “Eighth Amendment
analysis necessitates inquiry as to whether the prison official
acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind (subjective
component) and whether the deprivation suffered or injury
inflicted on the inmate was sufficiently serious (objective
component).” Id.
To meet the subjective component of an excessive force
claim, the claimant must show that the prison official applied
force “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm” rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21
(1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, as to the
objective component, “[w]hen prison officials maliciously and
sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary standards of
decency always are violated. This is true whether or not
significant injury is evident.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1, 9 (1992) (internal citation omitted). “An inmate who is
gratuitously beaten by guards does not lose his ability to
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pursue an excessive force claim merely because he has the good
fortune to escape without serious injury.” Wilkins v. Gaddy,
130 S. Ct. 1175, 1178-79 (2010) (per curiam).
Brown’s and Watson’s factual assertions effectively
boiled down to a swearing contest backed chiefly by the parties’
own affidavits. Crediting Watson’s version of events as we must
on summary judgment review, Brown deliberately shut the door on
him and told him as much. Watson did not perceive the door was
closing until he was pinned against the doorway. The district
court therefore erred when it made a dispositive credibility
determination on the basis of the competing affidavits. We
vacate the district court’s summary judgment in Brown’s favor
and remand for consideration of Brown’s alternative grounds for
summary judgment.
Watson claims deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need against Bhagirath. For a claimant to prevail on
such a claim, “the need must be both apparent and serious, and
the denial of attention must be both deliberate and without
legitimate penological objective.” Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d
692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999). “Deliberate indifference is a very
high standard—a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”
Id. at 695. Instead, a prison guard evinces deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need by intentionally denying
or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering
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with the treatment once prescribed. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104-05 (1976). Watson failed to show a serious injury
sufficient to avoid summary judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on Watson’s claim against Bhagirath. We vacate
the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Brown and
remand so that the district court may consider in the first
instance the alternative grounds raised by Brown’s summary
judgment motion. We deny Watson’s request for transcripts at
the Government’s expense. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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