VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. Chertoff

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JUAN CARLOS VALADEZ-LOPEZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF; ALBERTO R.

GONZALES; JERRY J. ENOMOTO; JOHN

MCGINNESS; MACK WIMBISH; No. 09-16375

YAKOV GRINBERG, in his individual  D.C. No.

capacity; DONALD LOWN, in his 2:07-cv-01566-LEW

individual and official capacities,

Defendants,

and

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant-Appellee.



16385

16386 VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES

JUAN CARLOS VALADEZ-LOPEZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF; ALBERTO R.

GONZALES; JERRY J. ENOMOTO; No. 09-17479

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  D.C. No.

Defendants, 2:07-cv-01566-LEW

and

DONALD LOWN, in his official

capacities,

Defendant-Appellee.



JUAN CARLOS VALADEZ-LOPEZ, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MICHAEL CHERTOFF; ALBERTO R. No. 09-17481

GONZALES; JERRY J. ENOMOTO;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  D.C. No.

2:07-cv-01566-LEW

Defendants,

OPINION

and

YAKOV GRINBERG, in his individual

capacity,

Defendant-Appellee.



Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Ronald S.W. Lew, Senior District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

November 30, 2010—San Francisco, California

VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES 16387

Filed August 26, 2011

Before: Mary M. Schroeder, Sidney R. Thomas, and

Ronald M. Gould, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Thomas

16390 VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES

COUNSEL

Carter C. White, Lorin Kline (certified law student), and Eliz-

abeth Liang (certified law student); University of California

VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES 16391

Davis School of Law (King Hall) Civil Rights Clinic, Davis,

California; Laurence O. Masson, Berkeley, California, for the

plaintiff/appellant.

J. Scott Smith, Angelo, Kilday & Kilduff, Sacramento, Cali-

fornia, for defendants/appellees Donald Lown and Richard

Van Zandt.

Tony West, Assistant Attorney General, Benjamin B. Wag-

ner, United States Attorney General, Thomas M. Bondy and

Kelsi Brown Corkran, United States Department of Justice,

Washington, DC, for the federal defendants/appellees.

OPINION

THOMAS, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal, we consider whether the plaintiff properly

exhausted his administrative remedies under the Federal Tort

Claims Act (“FTCA” or the “Act”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346,

2671-80, see id. § 2675(a), where the federal agencies denied

the plaintiff’s administrative tort claims before he amended

his complaint in an ongoing civil action to name the United

States as a party and allege a new cause of action under the

Act. We conclude that the claims were properly exhausted,

but affirm the district court’s dismissal on the alternate

ground that Valadez-Lopez stated FTCA claims that fall out-

side the Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity. We also affirm

the grant of summary judgment on Valadez-Lopez’s ineffec-

tive assistance of counsel claims, premised on 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S.

658 (1978).

I

This case has a complicated procedural and factual history.

Distilled to its essence, the salient facts are as follows: Juan

16392 VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES

Carlos Valadez-Lopez’s public defender knew that Valadez-

Lopez was an undocumented immigrant, yet nonetheless

advised him to plead no contest to attempted burglary in the

first degree on charges that he jiggled the door knob of a

house that was not his own. Based on Valadez-Lopez’s con-

viction, the government detained him for a year pending his

removal proceedings in local jails on contract with the federal

government. Valadez-Lopez was ultimately permitted to with-

draw his plea and eventually prevailed on his applications for

asylum and cancellation of removal. He claims that various

authorities unconstitutionally deprived him of medication for

his schizophrenia during his immigration detention, and that

that detention resulted from the insufficient training that Yolo

County, California, provided to its public defenders regarding

the immigration consequences of criminal pleas.

He initially filed suit against local officials under § 1983

and federal officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, 403

U.S. 388 (1971). He separately filed administrative tort claims

with the appropriate federal agencies, pursuant to the FTCA’s

exhaustion requirement. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). In his

administrative tort claims, Valadez-Lopez alleged that federal

authorities negligently deprived him of medication he needed

to control his schizophrenia during his immigration detention.

After six months, having received no response from the agen-

cies as to his administrative claims, he considered the requests

to have been deemed denied, see id., and amended his com-

plaint to name the United States as a defendant and allege lia-

bility under the FTCA. Subsequently, he received notification

from the agencies that his administrative claims had been

denied. The notice contained the form language stating that if

he were dissatisfied with the denial of his claims, he could file

suit in federal district court within six months after the denial

notification was mailed.

The district court granted the United States’ motion to dis-

miss the FTCA claims for lack of administrative exhaustion

VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES 16393

and granted the local defendants’ motion for summary judg-

ment on the § 1983 claims. Valadez-Lopez timely appealed.

II

The district court erred in concluding that Valadez-Lopez

had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and that it

therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over his FTCA

claims.

[1] The FTCA “waives the sovereign immunity of the

United States for actions in tort” and “vests the federal district

courts with exclusive jurisdiction over suits arising from the

negligence of Government employees.” Jerves v. United

States, 966 F.2d 517, 518 (9th Cir. 1992). “However, the Act

further provides that before an individual can file an action

against the United States in district court, [he] must seek an

administrative resolution of [his] claim.” Id. (emphasis added)

(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). Specifically, the FTCA provides

that:

An action shall not be instituted upon a claim

against the United States for money damages . . .

unless the claimant shall have first presented the

claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his

claim shall have been finally denied by the agency

in writing and sent by certified or registered mail.

The failure of an agency to make final disposition of

a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at the

option of the claimant any time thereafter, be

deemed a final denial of the claim for purposes of

this section.

28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (emphasis added). “The requirement of

an administrative claim is jurisdictional.” Brady v. United

States, 211 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Cadwalder

v. United States, 45 F.3d 297, 300 (9th Cir. 1995)). “Because

the requirement is jurisdictional, it ‘must be strictly adhered

16394 VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES

to. This is particularly so since the FTCA waives sovereign

immunity. Any such waiver must be strictly construed in

favor of the United States.’ ” Id. (quoting Jerves, 966 F.2d at

521). Indeed, the Supreme Court has described the FTCA’s

exhaustion requirement as a “clear statutory command.”

McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

[2] As applied to these facts, the plain text of the FTCA’s

“clear statutory command” in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) establishes

that Valadez-Lopez properly exhausted his administrative

remedies under the Act. Valadez-Lopez’s original complaint

neither named the United States as a defendant nor stated a

claim under the Act. He only amended his complaint to name

the United States and include an FTCA cause of action after

the government had failed to respond to his administrative

claims within six months. The statute provides that “[t]he fail-

ure of an agency to make final disposition of a claim within

six months after it is filed shall, at the option of the claimant

any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim for

purposes of this section.” 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). As we noted

in Jerves, “[a] tort claimant may not commence proceedings

in court against the United States without first filing her claim

with an appropriate federal agency and either receiving a con-

clusive denial of the claim from the agency or waiting for six

months to elapse without a final disposition of the claim being

made.” 966 F.2d at 519 (emphasis added) (citing Caton v.

United States, 495 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1974)). Here,

Valadez-Lopez exhausted his administrative remedies before

“institut[ing] . . . a claim against the United States” under the

FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). The government subsequently

acknowledged that his FTCA claim was administratively

exhausted by notifying Valadez-Lopez that the claim was

denied and that he had six months from that date in which to

file an FTCA lawsuit. Under these facts, there is no doubt that

the FTCA claims were administratively exhausted, and that

the district court had jurisdiction over his FTCA claim.

[3] Although it portrays its argument to the contrary as one

founded on failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the

VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES 16395

government’s central thesis is that “[t]he filing of an amended

complaint is not the equivalent to instituting an action follow-

ing the exhaustion of administrative remedies.” (Emphasis

added.) The government reasons that the court is required to

dismiss the FTCA claim in the amended complaint and to

require the plaintiff to file an entirely new lawsuit founded on

the same nucleus of facts. The government concedes, how-

ever, that if the plaintiff had filed a new lawsuit as it suggests,

the second suit could be—and probably should be—

consolidated with the prior pending action.

[4] The government’s position finds support in neither the

plain language of the statute nor in the law of our circuit. In

Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security, 538 F.3d 1250

(9th Cir. 2008), for example, we stated that where a plaintiff

filed suit before exhausting administrative remedies, she

might have saved her FTCA claim by “ask[ing] the district

court to stay the litigation so she could attempt to [exhaust]

while the litigation was pending.” Id. at 1258 (citing McNeil,

508 U.S. at 113). There is nothing in the statute or our case

law that would prevent a plaintiff from amending an existing

complaint asserting non-FTCA claims to name the United

States as a defendant and include FTCA claims once those

claims have been administratively exhausted.

[5] The cases cited by the government are inapposite,

because they involve the circumstance in which a plaintiff

filed an FTCA lawsuit before exhausting his or her FTCA

administrative remedies. For example, in McNeil, the

Supreme Court considered whether a plaintiff’s FTCA claim

was properly brought where the claimant filed an FTCA suit,

“invok[ing] the federal court’s jurisdiction under the FTCA,”

four months before he submitted an administrative tort claim

to the federal agency. 508 U.S. at 108 (emphasis added).

McNeil argued that his claim was proper because “no sub-

stantial progress ha[d] been made in the litigation by the time

[he had] exhausted his administrative remedies.” Id. at 111.

The Supreme Court rejected McNeil’s argument, holding that

16396 VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES

“[t]he most natural reading of the statute indicates that Con-

gress intended to require complete exhaustion of Executive

remedies before invocation of the judicial process” because

“[e]very premature filing of an action under the FTCA

imposes some burden on the judicial system.” Id. at 112

(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

McNeil does not control the outcome here, where Valadez-

Lopez “invoked the federal court’s jurisdiction under the

FTCA” in his amended complaint after he exhausted his

administrative remedies. Id. at 108.1

[6] Furthermore, McNeil ought not be read as preventing a

plaintiff who wishes to state a number of federal and state law

claims against an array of defendants from filing a complaint

alleging common facts and amending it after exhaustion to

state an additional claim under the FTCA. Such a reading

would require undue acrobatics of such a plaintiff, given the

1

The government is incorrect to rely on Barrett ex rel. Estate of Barrett

v. United States, 462 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2006); Edwards v. District of

Columbia, 616 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D.D.C. 2009); Ortiz-Romany v. United

States, 497 F. Supp. 2d 285 (D.P.R. 2007); Schneider v. Kissinger, 310 F.

Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004); and Estate of Przysiecki v. Eifert, No.

07cv0039-WQH, 2007 WL 3306074 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2007). In each of

these cases, the plaintiff’s original complaint, filed before administrative

remedies were exhausted, sought “redress from the government pursuant

to the FTCA.” Barrett, 462 F.3d at 31 (emphasis added); see Edwards,

616 F. Supp. 2d at 115 (plaintiff conceding that the claims in her original

complaint, filed prior to exhaustion, were “cognizable only under the

FTCA”); Ortiz-Romany, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (pre-exhaustion suit filed

“under . . . the Federal Tort Claim[s] Act”); Schneider, 310 F. Supp. 2d

at 269-70 (pre-exhaustion complaint “sued the United States for damages”

and therefore “met the definition of the FTCA for ‘a claim against the

United States’ under § 2675(a)”); Przysiecki, 2007 WL 3306074, at *1

(pre-exhaustion complaint “allege[d] causes of action . . . pursuant to the

Federal Tort Claims Act”). Even while citing Sparrow v. U.S. Postal Ser-

vice, 825 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Cal. 1993), in support of its argument, the

government concedes that there the plaintiff had attempted to assert FTCA

claims against the United States in his original complaint, which was filed

prior to administrative exhaustion.

VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES 16397

different statutes of limitations at play. For example, in his

original and amended complaints, Valadez-Lopez stated

Bivens claims against various federal actors alleging that they

unlawfully deprived him of medication during his immigra-

tion detention. “Although federal law determines when a

Bivens claim accrues, the law of the forum state determines

the statute of limitations for such a claim. In California, the

statute of limitations is one year.” Papa v. United States, 281

F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2002) (footnotes omitted) (citing

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340(3)); W. Ctr. for Journalism v.

Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)

(noting that the personal injury statute of limitations of the

state applies in Bivens actions). By contrast, under the FTCA,

administrative tort claims can be filed with the federal agency

up to two years after they accrue, 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b), and,

unless the agency acts more swiftly, such claims are only

deemed denied after six months of agency inaction, id.

§ 2675(a). Accordingly, reading § 2675(a) and McNeil as the

government urges would effectively overrule § 2401(b)’s

two-year statute of limitations for administrative claims made

pursuant to the FTCA for those plaintiffs wishing to also

allege Bivens theories in states where the latter claims are

governed by shorter limits. Assuming he filed administrative

tort claims immediately upon his release from immigration

detention, and assuming that the agencies did not act on his

claims within six months, Valadez-Lopez would be left with

only an additional six months in which to file a combined

Bivens and FTCA action—well short of the time allowed by

the Act for filing administrative claims. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).

[7] A requirement to file a new separate lawsuit and then

consolidate it with a prior pending action would undermine

the objectives of the exhaustion requirement as recognized by

the Supreme Court and ours: saving judicial resources and

promoting settlement. See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 111-12 & nn.

7-8; Brady, 211 F.3d at 503 (“[t]he purpose of the FTCA’s

administrative claim procedure is ‘to encourage administra-

tive settlement of claims against the United States and thereby

16398 VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES

to prevent an unnecessary burdening of the courts’ ” (quoting

Jerves, 966 F.2d at 520)); accord Cadwalder, 45 F.3d at 302.

[8] Alternatively, the government cites Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 15(c) for the proposition that Valadez-

Lopez’s amended complaint asserting the FTCA claim “re-

lates back” to the date of the filing of his original complaint,

at which point he had not yet exhausted administrative reme-

dies. Rule 15(c) states that “[a]n amendment to a pleading

relates back to the date of the original pleading when . . . the

amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the

conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted to

be set out—in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

15(c)(1)(B). However, it is well-established that an

“ ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being

treated thereafter as non-existent.’ ” Forsyth v. Humana, Inc.,

114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Loux v. Rhay,

375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967)). Furthermore, Rule 15(c) “is

addressed primarily to statute of limitations problems,” Lewis

v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495, 502 (9th Cir. 1966), which are not

presented by these facts. See also Rural Fire Prot. Co. v.

Hepp, 366 F.2d 355, 362 (9th Cir. 1966) (“[T]he purpose of

Rule 15(c) is to defeat the bar of statutes of limitations . . . .”

). The government’s argument fails. The district court’s exer-

cise of subject matter jurisdiction over Valadez-Lopez’s

FTCA claim was not precluded by the Act’s exhaustion

requirement, and the district court was incorrect to dismiss the

claim based on that ground.

III

[9] Although we disagree with the government’s assertion

that dismissal was proper for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies, we agree with the government’s alternative argu-

ment that the claims were properly dismissed because

Valadez-Lopez did not state a claim within the FTCA’s

waiver of sovereign immunity. The FTCA waives sovereign

immunity only for claims alleging “the negligent or wrongful

VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES 16399

act or omission of any employee of the Government while act-

ing within the scope of his office or employment.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1346(b)(1) (emphasis added). The Act defines “employee of

the government” to include, as relevant here,

officers or employees of any federal agency . . . and

persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an

official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the

service of the United States, whether with or without

compensation[.]

Id. § 2671. The Act further specifies that

the term “Federal agency” includes the executive

departments, the judicial and legislative branches,

the military departments, independent establishments

of the United States, and corporations primarily act-

ing as instrumentalities or agencies of the United

States, but does not include any contractor with the

United States.

Id. (emphasis added). The government may be sued under the

Act “for the actions of a government contractor and its

employees” only if the contractor is acting as an agent of the

government, i.e. “if the government has the authority ‘to con-

trol the detailed physical performance of the contractor’ and

supervise its ‘day-to-day operations.’ ” Letnes v. United

States, 820 F.2d 1517, 1518 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting United

States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814-15 (1976)).

[10] Accordingly, in order to state a claim within the

FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity, Valadez-Lopez must

allege negligence (1) by “officers or employees of a[ ] federal

agency,” which includes executive departments such as ICE

and the Department of Homeland Security but which does not

include contractors, 28 U.S.C. § 2671; (2) by “persons acting

on behalf of a federal agency in an official capacity,” id.; or

(3) by a government contractor over whose “day-to-day oper-

16400 VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES

ations” the government maintains “substantial supervision,”

Letnes, 820 F.2d at 1519 (citing Ducey v. United States, 713

F.2d 504, 516 (9th Cir. 1983)). The district court below

denied the government’s initial motion to dismiss to the

extent it argued that Valadez-Lopez’s medication claim did

not fall within any of these three categories, and therefore was

not encompassed by the FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immu-

nity. It stated without elaboration that the allegations in

Valadez-Lopez’s complaint were “sufficient to state a claim

under the Federal Tort Claims Act.” We disagree.

A complaint “must contain a ‘short and plain statement of

the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Ash-

croft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949

(2009) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). It need not state “de-

tailed factual allegations,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), but it must aver “sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plau-

sible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S. Ct. at 1949

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A complaint does not

suffice “if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.’ ” Id. (alteration in the original) (quot-

ing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

[11] Valadez-Lopez was detained in local jails, by all

accounts staffed by local officials, that maintain contracts

with the federal government to house immigration detainees.

In his complaint, Valadez-Lopez does not identify how any

federal government employee negligently caused or contrib-

uted to his being deprived of his schizophrenia medication,

nor does he state that any other defendants acted on behalf of

a federal agency in an official capacity, see 28 U.S.C. § 2671,

or that they qualified as government contractors for whose

conduct the United States is liable under the FTCA, see Let-

nes, 820 F.2d at 1518-19. Rather, the complaint makes vague

and somewhat incomprehensible assertions concerning the

federal employees. To conclude that such a complaint stated

claims sufficient to invoke the waiver of sovereign immunity

VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES 16401

would unreasonably require trial courts and defendants to

piece together a theory of liability from a string of unrelated

and incoherent assertions. See Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817,

821, 824-25 (9th Cir. 2001). Therefore, we affirm the district

court’s dismissal of Valadez-Lopez’s FTCA claim because it

does not fall within the Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity.

IV

[12] The district court properly granted summary judgment

on Valadez-Lopez’s § 1983 claims. The sole individual claim

remaining on appeal is plaintiff’s complaint against Yolo

County Deputy Public Defender Donald Lown.2 Valadez-

Lopez asserted that Lown was liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for his conduct in training and supervising Van Zandt,

Valadez-Lopez’s defense attorney. The district court con-

cluded that Valadez-Lopez had not shown that Lown trained

or supervised Van Zandt at the relevant times. On appeal,

Valadez-Lopez concedes this argument: he points to no evi-

dence in the record that would establish a triable issue of fact

regarding Lown’s alleged training of Van Zandt when Van

Zandt was advising Valadez-Lopez. Therefore, the district

court correctly granted summary judgment on this claim.

[13] The district court also properly granted summary

judgment on Valadez-Lopez’s Monell claim. Valadez-Lopez

never named Yolo County as a defendant.3 His pleadings did

2

On appeal, Valadez-Lopez also argues that the district court erred in

granting Yolo County Deputy Public Defender Richard Van Zandt sum-

mary judgment on his § 1983 claim. This argument is not properly before

us, however, as the relevant notice of appeal only specified “the district

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Donald Lown.”

The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide “that the notice of

appeal must ‘designate the judgment, order, or part thereof being

appealed.’ ” Lolli v. Cnty. of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 414 (9th Cir. 2003)

(quoting Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B)).

3

We acknowledge that § 1983 claims “against government officials in

their official capacities are really suits against the governmental employer

because the employer must pay any damages awarded.” Butler v. Elle, 281

F.3d 1014, 1023 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S

159, 165-66 (1985)); see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. In his briefing

before us, however, Valadez-Lopez concedes that “the better practice is to

name the employing public entity as a defendant at the outset of the case.”

16402 VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES

not reference Monell, City of Canton,4 or related cases. Sim-

ply put, his suit did not put Yolo County on notice of his the-

ory of liability.

[14] The Supreme Court has emphasized that, particularly

when a plaintiff’s claim “turns on a failure to train” and there-

fore when “[a] municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of

rights is at its most tenuous,” proper notice is imperative.

Connick v. Thompson, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 1350,

1359 (2011); see id. at 1359-60; Board of Cty. Comm’rs of

Bryan Cty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407-10 (1997); Graham,

473 U.S. at 166 (“As long as the government entity receives

notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit

is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit

against the entity.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).

While the Court’s emphasis is primarily on whether, prior to

a plaintiff’s lawsuit, a pattern of constitutional violations has

put the municipality on notice that its training regimen is

insufficient, see, e.g., Bryan, 520 U.S. at 407, it is equally

applicable where successive pleadings leave the municipality

to guess as to the plaintiff’s theory. Faced with Valadez-

Lopez’s many amended complaints, none of which cited

Monell or related cases and only the last of which introduced

language referencing them, Yolo County cannot be blamed

for being caught unaware as to Valadez-Lopez’s claims. Nor

can it be held liable under them. The district court’s order

granting summary judgment was proper.

V

If the allegations of his complaint are true, Valadez-Lopez

suffered needless harm. He was apparently wrongfully

detained and then denied medication while in custody. How-

ever, as presented, his legal claims are not viable, and the dis-

trict court afforded him multiple opportunities to amend his

complaint. We affirm the dismissal of the FTCA claim and

4

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).

VALADEZ-LOPEZ v. UNITED STATES 16403

the grant of summary judgment on the § 1983 claims. We

have reviewed Valadez-Lopez’s remaining contentions and

have determined that they are without merit.5

AFFIRMED.

5

We acknowledge and thank the University of California Davis School

of Law (King Hall) Civil Rights Clinic for its excellent pro bono represen-

tation of Valadez-Lopez on appeal.