Opinion

Timothy Russell Hoffman v. Signature Bank of Georgia

  • 22 F.4th 1341
Court
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Filed
Jan 24, 2022
Status
Published
Nature of suit
NEW
Cited by
3 cases
Authority
More cited than 50.3%

The opinion

USCA11 Case: 20-12823 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 Page: 1 of 10

[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 20-12823

____________________

In re: TIMOTHY RUSSELL HOFFMAN,

Debtor.

___________________________________________________

TIMOTHY RUSSELL HOFFMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

SIGNATURE BANK OF GEORGIA,

Defendant-Appellee.

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2 Opinion of the Court 20-12823

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00095-TCB

____________________

Before WILSON, LAGOA, and ED CARNES, Circuit Judges.

WILSON, Circuit Judge:

Appellant-Debtor Timothy Hoffman appeals the district

court’s affirmance of the bankruptcy court’s order granting Appel-

lee-Creditor Signature Bank of Georgia’s (the Bank) objection to

Hoffman’s claimed bankruptcy estate exemptions. The Bank ob-

jected to Hoffman’s claimed exemptions of various retirement ac-

counts. The bankruptcy court granted the Bank’s objections as to

Hoffman’s Roth Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA), concluding

that Roth IRAs—unlike traditional IRAs and 401(k) accounts—are

not excluded from bankruptcy estates. The district court affirmed

the bankruptcy court’s order.

This appeal presents an issue of first impression for this

court: Are Roth IRAs excluded from Georgia debtors’ bankruptcy

estates pursuant to federal law? Because we answer the question in

the affirmative, we reverse the district court’s affirmance of the

bankruptcy court’s order and remand for further proceedings con-

sistent with this opinion.

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20-12823 Opinion of the Court 3

I.

Timothy Hoffman is a retired U.S. Air Force Colonel and

private pilot. Hoping to help his son-in-law pursue his dream of

opening a restaurant, Hoffman guaranteed a loan of approximately

$432,000 with the Bank. The restaurant ultimately failed, resulting

in Hoffman defaulting on his loan from the Bank and filing for

Chapter 7 bankruptcy.

In his bankruptcy schedules, Hoffman disclosed an interest

in the following retirement accounts: (1) Traditional IRA, (2) Roth

Conversion IRA, (3) Roth Contributory IRA, and (4) Fidelity

401(k). Hoffman claimed all of the accounts as exempt on his bank-

ruptcy Schedule C. 1

The Bank filed an objection in the bankruptcy court to Hoff-

man’s claimed exemptions, asserting that his retirement accounts

either were not qualified retirement plans or did not otherwise

qualify as exempt. In reply, Hoffman maintained that all of his re-

tirement accounts are legally exempt. Specifically regarding the

Roth IRAs, Hoffman asserted that they either were excluded from

the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2), or, if not excluded,

1 One of the many forms a debtor has to complete when filing for bankruptcy

is Schedule C: The Property You Claim as Exempt. Schedule C is where debt-

ors list all of the legally exempt property that they want to keep.

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4 Opinion of the Court 20-12823

were exempt under O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100(a)(2)(E). 2 As to exclusion,

Hoffman argued that Georgia’s revised garnishment statute applies

to Roth IRAs. Accordingly, Hoffman contended that the court

should revisit precedent analyzing a prior version of Georgia’s gar-

nishment statute—a version that applied only to traditional IRAs.

The bankruptcy court entered a final order overruling the

Bank’s objections as to Hoffman’s traditional IRA and 401(k) ac-

count but sustaining the objections as to Hoffman’s two Roth IRAs.

Regarding Hoffman’s Roth IRAs, the bankruptcy court acknowl-

edged that Georgia’s garnishment statute underwent an expansive

overhaul but noted that there appeared to be no recent authority

addressing the contention that Roth IRAs should be excluded un-

der § 541(c)(2). 3

2Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2), Georgia has opted out of the federal bank-

ruptcy estate exemptions, and O.C.G.A. § 44-13-100 governs the exemptions

available to a debtor in bankruptcy in Georgia.

3 The bankruptcy court also found that a Roth IRA is exempt under O.C.G.A.

§ 44-13-100(a)(2)(E), but only to the extent that it is reasonably necessary for

the support of the debtor and his dependents. The court concluded that Hoff-

man’s Roth IRAs were not exempt under state law, and thus properly included

in the estate, because the funds were not reasonably necessary to support him

and his wife. Hoffman does not take issue with this alternative finding on ap-

peal. Instead, Hoffman argues only that his Roth IRAs should be excluded

from the bankruptcy estate pursuant to federal law (11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2))—

not that they should be exempt under state law (O.C.G.A. § 44-13-

100(a)(2)(E)).

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20-12823 Opinion of the Court 5

Hoffman appealed the bankruptcy court’s ruling that the un-

distributed funds in his Roth IRAs are not excluded from his bank-

ruptcy estate. The district court agreed with the bankruptcy court’s

assessment, declining to rule otherwise on an issue of first impres-

sion. Hoffman timely appealed.

This appeal requires us to determine what is properly in-

cluded in, and excluded from, the property of a bankruptcy estate.

After a careful review of the record and with the benefit of oral

argument, we reverse the ruling of the district court. Statutory in-

terpretation as well as the development of caselaw in this area con-

vince us that IRAs—whether they be traditional IRAs or Roth

IRAs—are excluded from the bankruptcy estates of Georgia debt-

ors pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code and Georgia’s garnishment

statute. This conclusion follows naturally from the applicable law

and statutory amendments, an overview of which we provide be-

low.

II.

We act as a second court of review in bankruptcy appeals,

independently examining the factual and legal determinations of

the bankruptcy court and applying the same standard of review as

the district court. In re Brown, 742 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir. 2014).

When, as here, the district court affirms the bankruptcy court’s or-

der, we consider the bankruptcy court’s decision directly. Id. Be-

cause the sole issue in this case is a pure question of law—the

proper construction and interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code—

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6 Opinion of the Court 20-12823

we conduct a de novo review. See In re Meehan, 102 F.3d 1209,

1210 (11th Cir. 1997).

III.

The Bankruptcy Code provides that property of a bank-

ruptcy estate includes “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor

in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C.

§ 541(a)(1). The Code, however, “excludes from the bankruptcy es-

tate property of the debtor that is subject to a restriction on transfer

enforceable under ‘applicable nonbankruptcy law.’” Patterson v.

Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 755 (1992) (quoting § 541(c)(2)). “[A]pplica-

ble nonbankruptcy law” has been interpreted to include “any rele-

vant nonbankruptcy law”—whether it be federal or state law. Id.

at 759.

On appeal, Hoffman contends that his Roth IRAs should be

excluded from his estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). Section

541(c)(2) provides that “[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial

interest of the debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable

nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title.” Thus,

a debtor’s property is excluded from his bankruptcy estate pursuant

to § 541(c)(2) if three elements are met: (1) the debtor has “a bene-

ficial interest in a trust”; (2) the interest has a restriction on transfer;

and (3) the restriction is enforceable under either state or federal

law. See id.; see also In re Upshaw, 542 B.R. 619, 622 (Bankr. N.D.

Ga. 2015).

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20-12823 Opinion of the Court 7

The relevant state law here is the exemptions provision of

Georgia’s garnishment statute, O.C.G.A. § 18-4-6 (exemptions pro-

vision). Georgia’s current exemptions provision provides that

“[c]ertain earnings or property” may be exempt from the process

of garnishment. Id. § 18-4-6(a)(1). One such example of exempt

property concerns funds from an IRA: “Funds or benefits from an

individual retirement account or from a pension or retirement pro-

gram shall be exempt from the process of garnishment until paid

or otherwise distributed to a member of such program or benefi-

ciary thereof.” Id. § 18-4-6(a)(2).

We have found that the prior version of the exemptions pro-

vision, § 18-4-22(a), 4 “clearly constitutes ‘applicable nonbankruptcy

law’” and that the prohibition on garnishment is an enforceable re-

striction on transfer for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). See

Meehan, 102 F.3d at 1211–12. We therefore concluded that an IRA

established under 26 U.S.C. § 408—a traditional IRA—is excluded

from a debtor’s estate under § 541(c)(2) because it is exempt from

garnishment pursuant to Georgia law. Id. at 1211–14.

At the time that we decided Meehan, traditional IRAs were

the only type of IRAs in existence. It was not until the following

4 The prior version of the exemptions provision provided that “funds or bene-

fits from an individual retirement account as defined in Section 408 of the

United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, shall be exempt

from the process of garnishment until paid or otherwise transferred to a mem-

ber of such program or beneficiary thereof.” O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22(a) (amended

2006) (current version at § 18-4-6).

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8 Opinion of the Court 20-12823

year, 1998, that Roth IRAs were created with the enactment of 26

U.S.C. § 408A. Section 408A(a) instructs us that “a Roth IRA shall

be treated for purposes of this title in the same manner as an indi-

vidual retirement plan.”

In 2005, eight years after Meehan and seven years after the

creation of Roth IRAs, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern Dis-

trict of Georgia considered whether Meehan’s reasoning should ex-

tend to a Roth IRA. See In re Bramlette, 333 B.R. 911, 914 (Bankr.

N.D. Ga. 2005). The Bramlette court declined to extend Meehan’s

reasoning, finding that Roth IRAs should be included in a debtor’s

bankruptcy estate when they were not statutorily exempt from gar-

nishment. Id. The court reasoned that the exemptions provision

“applies only to an individual retirement account within the mean-

ing of 26 U.S.C. § 408 and Georgia law provides no similar protec-

tion for a Roth IRA established under 26 U.S.C. § 408A.” Id.

However, in April 2006—the year after Bramlette was de-

cided—the Georgia Assembly amended the exemptions provision

to include IRAs listed under 26 U.S.C. § 408 or § 408A. The

amended statute stated that “funds or benefits from an individual

retirement account as defined in Section 408 or 408A . . . shall be

exempt from the process of garnishment.” O.C.G.A. § 18-4-22(a)

(amended 2016) (current version at § 18-4-6).

A decade later, in 2016, the Georgia Assembly further

amended the exemptions provision, now codified at § 18-4-6, to

state that “[f]unds or benefits from an individual retirement ac-

count . . . shall be exempt from the process of garnishment.”

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20-12823 Opinion of the Court 9

O.C.G.A. § 18-4-6(a)(2). Georgia’s current exemptions provision

thus no longer differentiates between a traditional IRA and a Roth

IRA, referring solely to “an individual retirement account.” See id.

IV.

We find that the development of the caselaw in this area and

the subsequent amendments to the Georgia Code reflect the Geor-

gia Assembly’s intention to clarify that both traditional IRAs as de-

fined in 26 U.S.C. § 408 and Roth IRAs as defined in § 408A are

exempt from garnishment, thus subjecting IRAs to a restriction on

transfer by state statute, see Meehan, 102 F.3d at 1211–12, and mak-

ing both types of IRAs eligible for exclusion under the Bankruptcy

Code. The current version of the exemptions provision compels

this result. By no longer listing the kinds of retirement accounts

that are exempt from garnishment, and instead exempting “indi-

vidual retirement account[s],” there is no basis for us to conclude

that Georgia intended to treat traditional IRAs differently than

Roth IRAs for the purpose of garnishment. It is undisputable that a

Roth Individual Retirement Account, by its very name and defini-

tion, is “an individual retirement account.” See O.C.G.A. § 18-4-

6(a)(2); see also 26 U.S.C. § 408A(a) (noting that Roth IRAs shall be

treated “in the same manner” as IRAs for the purposes of this title).

As noted above, a debtor’s property is excluded from his

bankruptcy estate pursuant to federal law if: (1) the debtor has “a

beneficial interest in a trust”; (2) the interest has a restriction on

transfer; and (3) the restriction is enforceable under either state or

federal law. See § 541(c)(2); Upshaw, 542 B.R. at 622. Roth IRAs

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10 Opinion of the Court 20-12823

meet all three requisite elements. No one contests that, just like a

traditional IRA’s corpus, a Roth IRA’s corpus qualifies as a benefi-

cial interest in a trust. And, pursuant to both the 2006 and the 2016

amendments to the exemptions provision, Roth IRAs have a re-

striction on transfer that is enforceable under state law. The Bank

offers no viable reason why Roth IRAs should not be treated like

traditional IRAs in the context of bankruptcy estate exclusion.

V.

We accordingly now hold that Roth IRAs are excluded from

a Georgia debtor’s bankruptcy estate pursuant to federal law. The

judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, and the case is

remanded so that the district court may reverse the order of the

bankruptcy court.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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