STEELE

Interim Decision #1752

Rama or STEELE

In Deportation Proceedings

A.-8199592

Decided by Board July 11, 1967

(1) Since evidence or record establishes respondent was a hornosevuol at time

of his entry for permanent residence in 1952, he is deportable on. the charge that

he was excludable at entry as a person of constitutional psychopathic inferiority

[Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 38711i.S. 118 (1967) ].

(2) Failure to advise respondent of right to conneel at the time a preliminary

sworn statement was voluntarily made by him does not render such statement

inadmissible in evidence in deportation proceedings since there is no right to

counsel during the baring of a statement in the investigative stage INaaan v.

Immigration and Naturalization Service, 370 F.2d 805 (1937) 3.

Ca seers :

Order: Act of 1952--SectIon 241(a) (1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (1)]—Excludable

at entry—section 212(a) (4) [8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (4)]—

psychopathic personality.

Lodged : Act of 1952--Section 241(a) (1) [8 U.B.C. 1251(a) (1)1—Excludable

at entry—section 2, Act of February 5, 1917—consti-

tutional psychopathic inferiority.

ON Basis Or BESPONDICRT: Max Frederick Brown, Esquire

2025 First National Building

Detroit, Michigan 42:=6

The respondent appeals from the order of the special inquiry officer

requiring his deportation on the lodged charge.

Consideration of this case had been delayed pending the decision of

the Supreme Court in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization

Service, 35 L.W. 4453 (May 22, 1967). This decision makes it clear that

proof. an alien was a. homosexual at the time of entry makes him

deportable on the charge that he was a psychopathic personality at the

time of entry. The term psychopathic personality replaced the term

constitutional psychopathic inferiority in the previous law—the law

under which the respondent's charge is plated. It would follow then

'that proof an alien was a homosexual at the time of entry would be

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Interim Decision #1752

sufficient to find he was deportable as one who was a. constitutional

psychopathic inferior (Matter of LaRochelle, Int. Dec. No. 1538). The

issue before us now is simply whether competent evidence of record

establishes that the respondent, a 55-year-old divorced male alien, a

native and citizen of Canada, was a homosexual at the time of his entry

for permanent residence on January 3, 1952.

The facts and law have been fully stated by the special inquiry officer.

In support of its claim that the respondent was a homosexual at the

time of entry, the Service relies upon the respondent's sworn statement

of January 3, 1963 in which he admitted that he had homosexual

tendencies from about the age of 14 and that prior to coming to the

United States, he had had homosexual relations about every two or

thrco'monthc in Canada (Ex. 9).

Dr. Lbwinger, an expert witness presented by the Servith, testified

that on the basis of an examination made of the respondent which in-

cluded conduct of the respondent up to the date of the examination

(April 9, 1963), he concluded that the respondent had shown a life-

long pattern of homosexuality and that he considered the condition

existed at the time of the respondent's entry in 1952.

Counsel contends that the respondent's statement is inadmissible

because he was upset at the time it was taken. The record does not

establish this. The respondent displayed considerable self-possession,

his answers are clear, deliberate, full, and to the point. The respond-

ent had not been rushed to an interview: he had advance notice. He

had not thought the interview important enough to consult an attor-

ney (pp. 4.1 44).

-

Counsel believes the statement is inadmissible because the respond-

ent was not specifically advised concerning his right to counsel when

it was taken. There is no right to counsel during the taking of a state-

ment in the investigative stage (Nason v. Immigration and Naturaliza-

tion Service, 370 F. 2d 865, 868-869 (1967) ; see Matter of Argyros,

Lit. Dec. No. 1577; Matter of Pang, Int. Dec. No. 1479). Moreover,

the respondent does not claim that he was refused the right to call an

attorney. He apparently could have called one had he wanted one but

he did not think he needed one (p. 44) .

The record reveals the respondent was told the statement must be

made voluntarily and that it could be used by the Government against

him. We believe the statement was properly admitted in evidence.

Counsel contends the decision of the special inquiry officer was

based upon factors which occurred after the 1952 entry: arrests (for

soliciting, two convictions 1957, one arrest 1962) , psychiatric examina-

tion and diagnosis as of the date of the examination, and the respond-

Interim Decision #1752

ent's admission that after entry and up to November 1962, he engaged

in homosexual conduct about two or three times a month.

The special inquiry officer was concerned with the respondent's

condition as of the time of entry. Moreover, decision can be made -with-

out reference to post-entry conduct. In view of these facts, and since

we do not rely upon post-entry conduct, we believe the charge may

properly be sustained.

Counsel contends that the statute under which deportation is sought

is unconstitutional. The contention must be rejected on the basis of

the decision in Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,

supra.

The special inquiry officer has dealt in detail with other contentions

raised by counsel at the hearing. We find no error in the disposition

of these contentions. We find no prejudicial error committed at the

hearing.

ORDER : It is ordered that the appeal be and the same is hereby

dismissed.

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