SANCHEZ AND ESCOBAR

Interim Decision #2996

MAITER OF SANCHEZ AND ESCOBAR

In Deportation Proceedings

A-24224793

A-24235796

Decided by Board October 15, 1985

(1) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has concluded that the

"well-founded fear" standard for asylum and the "clear probability" standard for

withholding of deportation are meaningfully different and that the former is

"more generous" than the latter.

(2) In describing the amount, and type of evidence required to establish that a fear of

persecution is "well founded," the Ninth Circuit has held that an alien must point

to specific, objective facts that support an inference of past persecution or risk of

future persecution; that the necessary objective facts may be established through

the credible and persuasive LeeLimuny of the alien; and that only alter objective

evidence sufficient to suggest a risk of persecution has been introduced do the

alien's subjective fears become relevant.

(3) The term "persecution" as it appears in section 101(aX42XA) of the Immigration

and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(aX42XA) (1982), requires that the alien dem-

onstrate a well-founded fear that he would be targeted for harm or suffering on

the basis of one of the enumerated grounds within the Act for which asylum may

be granted.

(4) Our conclusion that the harm resulting from country-wide civil strife and anar-

chy is not persecution is based not only on the pre-1980 construction of the word

"persecution" but also on the fact that Congress specifically rejected a definition

of "refugee" in section 101(aX42XA) of the Act that would have included "dis-

placed persons," i.e., individuals who flee wide-spread conditions of indiscriminate

violence resulting from civil war or military strife in a country.

(5) Throughout these proceedings the respondents have argued that they have a

well-founded fear of persecution if returned to El Salvador on the basis of their

"membership in a particular social group," comprised of young (18 to 30 years of

age), urban, working-class males of military age who have not served in the mili-

tary or otherwise affirmatively demonstrated their support for the Government of

El Salvador; however, the respondents have not established the existence of a

"particular social group" which is persecuted on account of the group's specific

identifying characteristics and whose treatment based on those characteristics is

distinct from the general population.

(G) While the rcopondcnts have shown statistically that many of those being killed

in El Salvador are young males, a purely statistical showing is not by itself suffi-

cient proof of the existence of a persecuted group; additionally, it is not enough to

simply identify the common characteristics of a statistical grouping of a portion of

276

Interim Decision # 2996

the population at risk, but in the context of the asylum and withholding provi-

sions related to "membership in a particular social group" under the Act there

must be a showing that the claimed persecution is on account of the group's iden-

tifying characteristics.

CHARGE:

Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(0(2) [8 U.S.C. § 1251(aX2)]—Entered without inspec-

tion (both respondents)

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS; ON BEHALF OF SERVICE:

Marc Van Der Hout, Esquire Beverley M. Phillips

3689-18th Street General Attorney

San Francisco, California 94110

Carolyn P. Blum, Esquire

International Institute, Fast Bay

297 Lee Street

Oakland, California 94610

BY: Milhollan, Chairman; Maniatis, Dunne, Morris, and Vacca, Board Members

In a well-written decision dated September 7, 1982, resulting

from jointly held deportation proceedings, an immigration judge

found the respondents deportable es charged, denied their requests

for asylum and withholding of deportation under sections 208(a)

and 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.

§§ 1158(a) and 1253(h) (1982), but granted them the privilege of vol-

untary departure, with an alternate order of deportation to El Sal-

vador. The respondents have appealed. The appeal will be dis-

missed.

Luis Alonzo Sanchez Trujillo is a 32-year-old native and citizen of

-

El Salvador who last entered the United States without inspection

at San Ysidro, California, on or about November 29, 1979. The co-

respondent, Luis Armando Escobar Sanieto, is a 24 year old native

- - -

and citizen of El Salvador who last entered this country without

inspection at San Ysidro, California, in June 1980. At their depor-

tation hearing, begun on April 12, 1982, and completed on June 18,

1982, the respondents, who were represented by counsel, admitted

the factual allegations contained in their respective Orders to Show

Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form 1-221) and conceded deportabil,

ity for entry without inspection under section 241(a)(2) of the Act, 8

§ 1251(a)(2) (1982). The respondents do not now challenge the

finding of deportability, and we are satisfied from a review of the

record that they received a fair hearing and that their deportabil-

ity has been established by evidence which is clear, unequivocal,

and convincing as required by Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966).

The only issue to be decided by the present appeal is whether the

Interim Decision # 2996

respondents' requests for asylum and withholding of deportation

were properly denied.'

On appeal, the respondents argue that the immigration judge

failed to apply the proper legal standard in evaluating their re-

quests for asylum and withholding of deportation and that the

record establishes the existence of a legally cognizable "particular

social group," as well as the respondents' membership in that

group. They argue that they have a well -founded fear of persecu-

tion based on that membership. They further contend that the

record establishes a well-founded fear of persecution based on

actual and imputed political opinion, that respondent Escobar was

a victim of actual persecution prior to his departure from El Salva-

dor, and that respondent Sanchez has a well-founded fear of perse-

cution based on his religion and membership in his church's

"Christian community" or "youth group." Finally, it is submitted

that the 'immigration judge improperly excluded certain documen-

tary evidence, that the Government should be compelled to disclose

any evidence in its possession which is favorable to the respond-

ents' asylum claims, and that returning the respondents to El Sal-

vador constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the

eighth amendment.

The respondents bear the evidentiary burdens of proof and per-

suasion in any application for withholding of deportation under

section 243(h) or asylum under section 208 of the Act. Matter of

Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211 (BIA 1985); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.5, 242.17(c)

(1985). The respondents must establish the facts underlying their

claims for such relief by a preponderance of credible, probative evi-

dence. They must also establish that the facts proven satisfy the

statutory standards of eligibility for these forms of relief. As this

case arises within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Ap-

peals for the Ninth Circuit, the law of that circuit controls.

To be eligible for withholding of deportation pursuant to section

243(h) of the Act, an alien's facts must show a clear probability of

persecution in the country designated for deportation on account of

race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,

or political opinion. INS v. Stevie, 467 U.S. 407 (1984); Bolanos-Her-

nandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1984). This means that the

alien's facts must establish that it is more likely than not he would

be subject to persecution for one of the grounds specified. INS v.

Stevie, supra, at 429-30.

Under the regulations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, an appli-

cation for asylum made after the institution of deportation proceedings shall also be

considered as a request for withholding of deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 208.3(b) (1985).

278

Interim Decision #2996

To be eligible for asylum under section 208 of the Act, an alien

must meet the definition of a "refugee," which requires him to

show persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution in a particu-

lar country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in.

a particular social group, or political opinion. Section 101(aX42XA)

of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982); section 208 of the Act.

The Board's analysis of this standard is set forth in Matter of

Acosta, supra. The Ninth Circuit has concluded that the "well-

founded fear" standard and the "clear probability" standard are

meaningfully different and that the former is "more generous"

than the latter. Cardoza Fonseca v. INS, 767 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th

-

Cir. 1985); Bolanos Hernandez v. INS, supra, at 1282. In describing

-

the amount and type of evidence required to establish that a fear

of persecution is "well founded," the Ninth Circuit has held:

Applicants must point to specific, objective facts that support an inference of past

persecution or risk of future persecution. That the objective facts are established

through the credible and persuasive testimony of the applicant does not make

those facto lace akijoetive "Mere assertions of possible fear" are still insufficient.

Shoaee v. INS, 'M. F.2d 1079, 1084 (9th Cir. 1983). It is only after objective evi-

dence sufficient to suggest a risk of persecution has been introduced that the

alien's subjective fears and desire to avoid the risk-laden situation in his or her

native land become. relevant

Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, supra, at 1453.

In the case before us, the respondents have not shown a clear

probability of persecution under section 243(h) or a well-founded

fear of persecution under section 208(a) of the Act, as that standard

is described in Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, supra, based on any of the

enumerated grounds within the Act for which asylum and with-

holding of deportation may be granted.

The record contains more than 1,860 pages of transcript, span-

ning 15 days of hearing, and includes the testimony of 13 witnesses.

During the course of these proceedings, the respondents have sub-

mitted more than 51 exhibits and addenda, containing approxi-

mately 1,200 pages, consisting of newspaper and magazine articles,

scholarly reports, news releases, sworn statements, letters and

other publications by people and international organizations in-

volved or interested in the Salvadoran conflict. This evidence docu-

ments the conditions in El Salvador and the violence perpetrated

against the population of that country through 1982. The evidence

has been adequately and fairly discussed by the immigration judge

in his decision and by the parties in their briefs on appeal.

During the hearing, respondent Escobar testified that between

1976 and 1980 he was employed as an auto mechanic for the Toyota

dealership in San Salvador. He was laid off in April 1980 when a

portion of the premises of that dealership was destroyed by bombs.

orb

Interim Decision #2996

He stated that in April 1980, while walking home from a movie at

approximately 11 o'clock in the evening, he was attacked by two

men in civilian clothes who placed him in an unmarked van with

government license plates, beat him, questioned him with regard to

guerrilla activities, robbed him, threatened him with death, and

threw him from the van approximately an hour and a half later.

He subsequently recognized one of his assailants who was riding in

a vehicle which belonged to the municipal police. The respondent

could ascribe no motive for the incident.

The respondent participated in two demonstrations while in El

Salvador. The first occurred in October 1979 and involved a protest

on behalf of mothers of disappeared children and relatives. The re-

spondent joined the group as it passed by his house and walked

with them for an hour carrying a peace flag. He left the demon-

stration before it reached the Plaza Libertad, where government

troops fired on the demonstrators, killing more than 70 people. He

stated that he participated in the demonstration because he was

against the atrocities the Government was committing. In March

1980 he participated in the funeral of Archbishop Romero. He

stated that thousands of people had gathered in an area between

the national cathedral and the presidential palace, that he was on

the outskirts of the demonstration, and that he observed smoke

bombs dropping from the presidential palace, heard gunshots, and

saw some of the demonstrators killed. The record contains no evi-

dence that respondent Escobar was ever stopped or questioned as a

result of his participation in either of these demonstrations, or that

he was otherwise identified by government forces as a participant.

The respondent testified that three of his young male friends had

been killed in Santa Cruz Michapa by the national guard when

they attempted to run away. In May 1980 the respondent observed

the bodies of five young men, ranging from 15 to 32 years old, who

had been killed near Santa Cruz Michapa. Their bodies had been

disfigured and dismembered. In February 1980, a 26-year-old male

friend of the respondent was killed in San Salvador. It was believed

that he had been killed by the national guard. The respondent

stated that he had also seen the bodies of six young males on the

road to the airport and that they had all been shot through the

head. The respondent had no knowledge of the actual circum-

stances surrounding any of these deaths. The respondent admitted

that he had never publicly spoken out against the Government be-

cause of the danger and that such conversations were limited to his

friends. Similarly, the respondent never belonged to any labor

union because of the danger membership in such associations rep-

resented. He stated that he had not served in the army because he

280

Interim Decision #2996

had objected to the way that the military recruited young men and

that he had avoided being recruited by staying in his house when

the army was in the area.

In May 1980 the respondent applied for and received a valid

passport from government authorities with a tourist visa for

Mexico. He had no difficulties in obtaining the passport and de-

parted the country 3 days later. He stated that the bus he was

traveling on was stopped twice by government forces before cross-

ing the border. On both occasions his passport was inspected and

he was permitted to proceed without incident. Subsequent to his ar-

rival in the United States, the respondent was informed that sever-

al of his co-workers from the Toyota dealership were killed when

the car they were in was machine gunned. The respondent stated

that they had been traveling late at night to one of the beach areas

and may have been killed as a result of curfew violations.

Respondent Sanchez testified that he was employed in El Salva-

dor as an electrician until his departure from the country on No-

vember 22, 1979. The respondent was accompanied by his father at

the time of his departure. They applied for and received valid pass-

ports with tourist visas for Mexico from government authorities

and were permitted to depart the country without incident.

The respondent admitted that he was not politically active while

in El Salvador and that he never publicly spoke out against the

Government or expressed the views and opinions held by Archbish-

op Romero and his parish priest, Father Villaran. Four of the re-

spondent's brothers, whose ages range between 22 and 83, continue

to live and work in El Salvador. There is no evidence that any of

the respondent's brothers have ever been arrested, imprisoned, or

otherwise persecuted. His last contact with his family in El Snlva-

dor was in November 1981. At that time there was no indication

that they were experiencing any problems except for increased in-

flation resulting in higher food costs.

The respondent testified that between October and November

1979 he was stopped and interrogated on four occasions by mem-

bers of the national guard. On each of these occasions the respond-

ent was waiting with others at a bus stop when the national guard

required them to submit to a search for weapons and documents.

The respondent stated that the national guard brandished their

weapons, used abusive language, and threatened to kill anyone

who did not cooperate. The respondent admitted that on none of

these occasions was anyone harmed or arrested. Except for these

four incidents, the record contains no evidence that the respondent

had any other contact with government or guerrilla forces which

resulted in harm or threats of harm.

281

Interim Decision #2996

The respondent's only organizational involvement while in El

Salvador was as a member of his church's "Catholic committee" or

"Catholic community," a youth group of 20 people, mostly in their

late teens, who assisted the parish priest in planning certain reli-

gious celebrations and performing other internal functions of the

church. The respondent participated in this group beginning in

1977 and continued until approximately September 1979. He stated

that the "Catholic committee" was not politically involved and had

no political significance. Nor does the record contain any evidence

which suggests that the members of this "Catholic committee"

were ever arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise persecuted as a result

of their participation in the group. Respondent Sanchez related two

incidents involving demonstrations which took place in the vicinity

of his church and were violently dispersed by the national guard,

resulting in the deaths of many of the demonstrators. He admitted

that these demonstrations were not sponsored by his church, that

his priest took no active role in them, and that the church's

"Catholic committee" did not participate in the demonstrations.

Subsequent to his arrival in the United States, the respondent

joined an organization known as Frente Unido Salvadoreno (FUS),

a solidarity group concerned with the conditions of the people of El

Salvador. The respondent also attended a demonstration in front of

the El Salvadoran Consulate following the death of Archbishop

Romero. The respondent terminated his active participation in

FUS in August 1981 as a result of employment conflicts. Although

the respondent strongly suspected that his participation in PUS ac-

tivities in this country was known by the Government of El Salva-

dor, he admitted that he had not actually heard, seen, or experi-

enced anything which established a basis to conclude that he was

known by name, had been identified by name, or would be singled

out for mistreatment by the Government of El Salvador.

Much of the testimony and documentary evidence submitted by

the respondents concerned the general conditions of violence in El

Salvador. The evidence reflects that as of 1982, the threat of injury

or death in El Salvador was country-wide, affecting the entire civil-

ian population and reaching both males and females of every age

group. The record suggests, contrary to the respondents' claims,

that an individual's sex and age were not significant factors with

regard to the risk of harm. Rather, the risk of harm appears to

have been in large part a function of the coincidental violence of

country-wide civil strife, resulting from misidentification, curfew

violations, or simply being in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Considerable evidence was offered relating to claims that persecu-

tion occurred because of participation in specific groups that active-

282

Interim Decision #2996

ly and publicly opposed the Government's policies, including cam-

pesino 2 or agrarian reform groups, union leaders and active mem-

bers of labor movements, religious leaders and activists, educators

and active members of teachers unions, medical and health care

professionals, journalists, and human rights activists and workers.

The respondents have not claimed, nor does the evidence establish,

their membership in any of the identified groups. The evidence, as

a whole, demands the conclusion that as of 1982 the militarily con-

trolled Government of El Salvador was in crisis, that there existed

country-wide civil strife and anarchy, that the Government, in re-

sponse to the crisis, was intolerant of public opposition to its poli-

cies, and that the violence taking place in El Salvador at the hands

of the government forces and guerrillas reached all segments of

that country's civilian population. 3

To be eligible for a grant of asylum, an alien must demonstrate

that he is a "refugee" within the meaning of section 101(aX42)(A) of

the Act. 4 The definition of "refugee" contained in that section has

four elements that must be sa Lisfied: (1) The alien must show a

"fear" of "persecution"; (2) that fear must be "well founded"; (3)

the "persecution" must be "on account of race, religion, national-

ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion";

and (4) the alien must show he is unable or unwilling to return to

his country of nationality or to the country in which he last habit-

ually resided because of persecution or a well-founded fear of perse-

cution.

2 The term "campesino" as used here refers to peasant farmers and their families

located in the rural areas of El Salvador.

3 Because these proceedings are adversarial in nature, our findings with regard to

the conditions in El Salvador must be based solely on the record before us. These

findings are limited to the present record and do not purport to constitute anything

other than our assessment of the evidence presented.

Congress added a definition of refugee to our law by means of the Refugee Act of

1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 91 Stat. 102. In so doing, Congress intended to conform the

Immigration and Nationality Act to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the

Status of Refugees, Januoxy 31, 1967 [19681 19 U.S.T. 6222, T.I.A.S. No. 6517, 606

U.N.T.S. 268 ("Protocol"), to which the United States had acceded in 1968. RR. Rep.

No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 160,

160; S. Rep. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 14-15, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong.

& Ad. News 141, 144, 154-55; H.R. Rep. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 a979) ; see

also INS v. Steak, supra, at 422. Section 101(aX42XA) defines a refugee as

any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the case

of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person

last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable

or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because

of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,

nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

283

Interim Decision #2996

Prior to inclusion of the definition of a refugee in section

101(aX42)(A) of the Act, the term "persecution" was construed to

mean either a threat to the life or freedom of, or the infliction of

suffering or harm upon, those who differ in a way regarded as of-

fensive. Cardoza-Fonseea v. INS, supra, at 1452; Bolanos -Hernandez

v. INS, supra, at 1283 n.13; Matter of Acosta, supra, at 222. One of

the significant aspects of this construction of "persecution" was the

concept that the harm or suffering had to occur as the result of a

belief or characteristic an oppressor sought to overcome or punish

in an individual. Matter of Acosta, supra. This concept required an

individual to show he would be singled out or treated differently

from others in his country because he possessed a characteristic a

persecutor sought to punish. See, e.g., Matter of Surzycki, 13 I&N

Dec. 261, 262 BIA 1969). It also meant that generally harsh condi-

tions shared by many others in a country and the harm arising out

of civil strife did not amount to "persecution" within the meaning

of our law. Matter of Acosta, supra; see also Cheng Kai Fu v. INS,

386 F.2d 750, 759 (2d. Cir. 1967), cert_ cierdec4, 390 U S. 1003 (1963)

We have recently concluded that, in using the term "persecu-

tion" in the definition of a refugee, Congress intended to adopt the

previously accepted construction of that term. Matter of Acosta,

supra. Thus, it follows that "persecution" as it appears in section

101(a)(42)(A) of the Act requires that the alien demonstrate a well-

founded fear that he would be targeted for harm or suffering on

the basis of one of the enumerated grounds within the Act for

which asylum may be granted. Id.; cf. INS v. Stevic, supra; Rejaie

v. INS, 691 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1982); Moghanian v. United States .De-

partment of Justice, 577 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1978); Matter of Dunar,

14 I&N Dec. 310 (BIA 1973). Furthermore, the tragic and wide-

spread savage violence affecting all Salvadorans as the result of

civil strife and anarchy is not persecution. 7,epeda- M-Plandez v_ TNS,

741 F.2d 285, 289-90 (9th Cir. 1984); Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431,

1434 (9th Cir. 1984); Sanchez v. INS, 707 F.2d 1523, 1526-28 (D.C.

Cir. 1983); Martinez-Romero v. INS, 692 F.2d 595, 595-96 (9th Cir.

1982), aff'g Matter of Martinez-Romero, 18 I&N Dec. 75 (BIA. 1981);

Matter of Acosta, supra.

Our conclusion in this regard is based not only on the pre-1980

construction of the word "persecution," but also on the fact that

Congress specifically rejected a definition of "refugee" in section

101(a)(42)(A) of the Act that would have included "displaced per-

sons," i.e., individuals who flee widespread conditions of indiscrimi-

nate violence resulting from civil war or military strife in a coun-

try. Matter of Acosta, supra. Indeed, we note that, in discussing the

284

Interim Decision #2996

limitations inherent in the definition of a "refugee" under the Act,

Senator Alan K. Simpson stated in 1981:

The statute says "persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, member-

ship in a particular social group or political opinion." That is all it says. So a

country can be exceedingly dangerous and perilous for human beings and in no

case would that qualify the people leaving that country as refugees under U.S.

law. I think that it is very critical to keep this in mind, and each time I hear the

phrase "persecution" I am going to refer back to the statute, and hope others will,

and read exactly what it says. So it is going to be an interesting few months.

... jTjt really does not say that you can include a person in the definition of

refugee who is just scared to death of his country or the turmoil in his country.

Special Project, Displaced Persons: "The New Refugees," 13 Ga. J.

Intl and Comp. Law 755, 757 n.8 (183) (citations omitted). 5

Throughout these proceedings the respondents have argued that

they have a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to El Sal-

vador on the basis of their "membership in a particular social

group," comprised of young (18 to 30 years of age), urban, working-

class males of military age who have not served in the military or

otherwise affirmatively demonstrated their support for the Govern-

ment of El Salvador. They claim that the group to which they

belong is a legally distinct and cognizable social group, citing a

series of jury composition cases eta applicable precedent on the

question of group cognizability. See Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S.

475 (1954); Ciudadanos Unidos de San Juan v. Hidalgo County

Grand Jury Comm'rs, 622 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450

U.S. 964 (1981).

The respondents have shown statistically that many of those

being killed in El Salvador are young males. This is not surprising

in view of the ongoing country-wide civil strife which presently

exists in El Salvador. Historically, it has been the young who have

primarily been involved in both the internal and external armed

conflicts of a country. Although it may be an element of the proof,

a purely statistical showing is not by itself sufficient proof of the

existence of a persecuted group. It is not enough to simply identify

the common characteristics of a statistical grouping of a portion of

the population at risk. In the context of the asylum and withhold-

ing provisions related to "membership in a particular social group"

under the Act, there must be a showing that the claimed persecu-

s See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook of

Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention

and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 39 (Geneva, 1979), stating

that "hgersons compelled to leave their country of origin as a result of international

or national armed conflicts are not normally considered refugees under the 1951

Convention or 1957 Protocol."

285

Interim Decision #2996

tion is on account of the group's identifying characteristics. 6 This

the respondents have not shown.

The record does not establish that individuals in El Salvador are

singled out for persecution on the basis of their age. Nor has it

been established that individuals are targeted for persecution on

the basis of urban residence. Similarly, there has been no showing

that the risk of persecution is based solely on. the masculine

gender. Nor has it been shown that economic status or means of

livelihood is a basis for persecution in El Salvador. On the con-

trary, the record indicates that both the government forces and

guerrillas are actively seeking support from all segments of the

population. It is not the above characteristics, singularly or in the

aggregate, which form the basis of a realistic likelihood of persecu-

tion. Rather, the only factor shown to be a basis for persecution in

El Salvador within the meaning of the Act is the nonsupport or op-

position to the respective political positions of the Government and

the guerrilla forces. Absent this core factor or characteristic, which

is essentially a political opinion-based ground of persecution, the

risk of harm on the basis of the other characteristics claimed by

the respondents has not been shown. Where this factor does exist,

the resulting risk of persecution is not limited to young urban

males but equally affects all segments of the rural and urban popu-

lations of El Salvador.

We are satisfied from a review of the record that the respondents

have not established the existence of a "particular social group"

which is persecuted on account of the group's specific identifying

characteristics and whose treatment based on those characteristics

is distinct from the general population. The only characteristic

shown to be a basis for persecution is the individual's actual or per-

ceived political opinions. While we recognize that a "particular

social group" may embody or overlap one or more of the other enu-

merated grounds for which asylum and withholding of deportation

may be granted, the existence of a "particular social group" is not

established solely on the basis of such ground.

Nor have the respondents established that their claims of perse-

cution on the basis of political opinion or religion are well founded

within the meaning of the Act. The respondents have presented no

"specific, objective facts that support an inference of past persecu-

6 We note that even the jury composition decisions, relied on by the respondents

to show legal cognizability of a social group, required a showing that the actual

treatment of the claimed group was on account of national origin and age, respec-

tively, and that such treatment was distinct or different from that of the general

community. See Hernandez v. Texas, supra, at 478-79; Ciudadanos Unidos de San.

Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Comm'rs, supra, at 816-18.

286

Interim Decision #2996

tion or risk of future persecution." Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, supra,

at 1453.

In the present case, there is no evidence of any personal experi-

ences or other objective events that demonstrate that the respond-

ents hold political opinions or religious beliefs the Government

seeks to punish. Nor have the respondents shown that the Govern-

ment is aware, or could easily become aware, that they hold such

opinions and beliefs. Neither respondent was politically active in El

Salvador, or called public attention to himself by expressing opposi-

tion to the Government, or affiliated himself with trade unions or

other politically active opposition groups. Neither of the demon-

strations that respondent Escobar participated in was shown to

have brought him into official contact with the Government or to

have resulted in his detention or persecution. There are no facts

that show he was identified by the Government as having been a

participant in these demonstrations. Although respondent Sanchez

was a member of his church's youth group from 1977 until 1979,

there arc no facts showing the group was politically active or that

any members of the group were ever punished by the Government,

whether on the basis of their religious beliefs or political opinions.

While the priest who directed the group was detained and appar-

ently tortured, the evidence shows that this incident resulted from

an unrelated demonstration taking place near the church, and not

from a specifically directed attack on the church or priest because

of the youth group's activities or existence. Neither respondent

ever received specific threats as a result of his political and reli-

gious beliefs. Nor is there any evidence that respondent Sanchez's

activities in this country between November 1979 and August 1981,

while a member of FITS, are known by the Government of El Sal-

vador.

Moreover, the respondents' experiences do not show that the

Government of El Salvador has the inclination or willingness to

single them out for persecution. Neither of the respondents was

ever arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise persecuted in El Salvador

because of his political opinions. There is no indication that the in-

cident in which respondent Escobar was beaten and robbed, while

walking home after curfew, was other than a random criminal act.

The record does not suggest that his assailants knew who he was or

had targeted and singled him out for political reasons. The death

threat he received appears to be related to the accomplishment of

the robbery and not the result of political motivations. He re-

mained in El Salvador for a month following the incident without

further threats or harm. Nor do the four occasions in which re-

spondent Sanchez was subjected to document checks and weapon

287

Interim Decision #2996

searches constitute "persecution." These incidents were coinciden-

tal to the prevalent conditions of violence in El Salvador and the

happenstance of time and location. Moreover, both of the respond-

ents were given valid passports and permitted to depart the coun-

try without incident. Respondent Sanchez's four brothers continue

to live and work in El Salvador, and there is no evidence that they

have ever been arrested, imprisoned, or otherwise harmed. We con-

clude that the respondents have not shown eligibility for asylum

under any of the enumerated grounds for which that relief may be

granted. The respondents have not shown any special, individual-

ized circumstances indicating that they have been or will be sin-

gled out for persecution beyond the general threat of harm affect-

ing the entire population. See Chavez v. INS, supra. We find that

the respondents are more akin to "displaced persons," having fled

the widespread violence which exists in El Salvador, than "refu-

gees" within the meaning of the Act. The respondents' risk of harm

is no greater than that experienced by all other Salvadorans.?

For the reasons contained in the above discussion, we also con-

clude that the respondents have not established eligibility for with-

holding of deportation. As we have previously indicated, an appli-

cation for withholding of deportation under section 243(h) of the

Act must be "supported by evidence establishing that it is more

likely than not that the alien would be subject to persecution for

one of the grounds specified." INS v. Stevie, supra, at 429-30. The

Ninth Circuit has concluded that the well-founded fear standard

under section 208(a) of the Act is "more liberal" or "more gener-

ous" than the clear probability standard under section 243(h) of the

Act. See Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, supra; Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS,

supra. Since we have already concluded that the respondents' facts

do not demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution at the hands

of the Government for purposes of asylum on account of "member-

ship in a particular social group," "political opinion," or "religion"

within the meaning of the Act, it follows that the respondents' evi-

dence does not show a clear probability of persecution required for

withholding of deportation.

Finally, the respondents' arguments that the immigration judge

improperly excluded certain documentary evidence, that the Gov-

ernment should be compelled to disclose any evidence in its posses-

7 Our conclusion that the respondents' risk of harm is no greater than that suf-

fered by the general population, in view of the country-wide conditions of violence

and anarchy, does not preclude an alien from El Salvador from showing that he has

been singled out for persecution and thus qualifies as a "refugee" within the mean-

ing of the Act. We conclude only that the respondents here have not made such a

showing.

288

Interim Decision #2996

sion favorable to their asylum claims, and that returning them to

El Salvador constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation

of the eighth amendment are without merit. The record clearly

shows that the immigration judge permitted the respondents every

opportunity to fully present their asylum claims. If he erred, he did.

so in their favor. There has been no showing of prejudice concern-

ing the excluded documents. See Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 809

(9th Cir. 1979). The respondents have not identified any evidence

which they believe is favorable to their claims and in the posses-

sion of the Government. Nor have they shown that the Govern-

ment intentionally withheld such evidence. The argument that no

one should be returned to El Salvador because of the present condi-

tions of anarchy and country-wide violence has been rejected. Mar-

tinez-Rontero v. INS, supra. Moreover, deportation is a civil conse-

quence and has never been regarded as punishment for a crime.

Consequently, it does not violate the eighth amendment's prohibi-

tion of cruel and unusual punishment. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v.

United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893); Burr v. INS, 350 F.2d 87, 90-

91 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966).

In view of the conditions which presently exist in El Salvador,

we share the respondents' concern for their welfare. However, the

respondents have not established their eligibility for the requested

relief, and we must, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to the immigration judge's

order and in accordance with our decision in Matter of Chouliaris,

16 I&N Dec. 168 (BIA 1977), the respondents are permitted to

depart from the United States voluntarily within 30 days from the

date of this order or any extension beyond that time as may be

granted by the district director; in the event of failure so to depart,

the respondents shall be deported as provided in the immigration

judge's order.

289