P. SINGH

Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2015) Interim Decision #3843

Matter of P. SINGH, Attorney

Decided as amended June 25, 20151

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Board of Immigration Appeals

An attorney who admitted to engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of

justice by enlisting his legal assistant to impersonate him during multiple telephonic

appearances before Immigration Judges was appropriately suspended from practice

before the Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Department of

Homeland Security for a period of 16 months and prohibited from appearing

telephonically in the Immigration Courts for 7 years.

FOR RESPONDENT: David J. Chapman, Esquire, Fargo, North Dakota

FOR EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, OFFICE OF GENERAL

COUNSEL: Jennifer J. Barnes, Disciplinary Counsel; Christina Baptista, Associate

General Counsel

FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: Diane H. Kier, Associate

Legal Counsel

BEFORE: Board Panel: HOLMES, MILLER, and GUENDELSBERGER, Board

Members.

HOLMES, Board Member:

In an August 13, 2014, decision, an Immigration Judge, acting as the

Adjudicating Official in this case, issued a decision and order in which he

suspended the respondent from practice before the Immigration Courts, the

Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Department of Homeland Security

(“DHS”) for 16 months. The respondent was also prohibited from

appearing telephonically in the Immigration Courts for 7 years. The

respondent filed an appeal with the Board.2 Both he and the Executive

Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) Disciplinary Counsel have filed

1

The Office of General Counsel for the Executive Office for Immigration Review

submitted a request that we designate our December 29, 2014, order in this case as a

precedent. While the respondent’s counsel has opposed this request, the request is

granted. This amended order makes editorial changes consistent with our designation of

the case as a precedent.

2

The respondent’s request to present oral argument before the Board is denied.

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briefs, which we have considered in reaching this decision. The

respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.

The respondent is a licensed attorney in California. The EOIR

Disciplinary Counsel initiated these disciplinary proceedings by filing a

Notice of Intent To Discipline on January 9, 2014, and sought to have the

respondent suspended from practice for 2 years. The DHS then asked that

the respondent be similarly suspended from practice before that agency.

The EOIR Disciplinary Counsel specifically alleged that, on at least

eight occasions, the respondent enlisted his legal assistant to appear in

his place and impersonate him during telephonic appearances before

Immigration Judges. The EOIR Disciplinary Counsel alleged that the

respondent assisted and facilitated the unlawful practice of law in at least

eight cases in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(m) (2014); knowingly made

false statements of material fact to an officer of the Department of Justice in

violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(c); engaged in conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice in violation of 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(n); and failed

to provide competent representation to a client in violation of 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.102(o).

The respondent conceded that he had violated 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(n).

He admitted that improper telephone appearances took place as early as

2011 and happened in eight more cases not mentioned in the Notice

of Intent To Discipline. The Adjudicating Official sustained all charges

except the charge brought under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(c).

We review findings of fact to determine whether they are “clearly

erroneous.” 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i); 1003.106(c) (2015). We review

questions of law, discretion, and judgment and all other issues in appeals

de novo. Matter of Kronegold, 25 I&N Dec. 157, 159−60 (BIA 2010);

8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(d)(3)(ii); 1003.106(c).

We have considered the arguments raised on appeal by the respondent

and find no reason to disturb the factual findings or any other conclusion or

ruling reached by the Adjudicating Official. We will therefore adopt and

affirm the Adjudicating Official’s order with the following comments.

See, e.g., Matter of Burbano, 20 I&N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994) (noting

that adoption or affirmance of a decision of an Immigration Judge, in whole

or in part, is “simply a statement that the Board’s conclusions upon review

of the record coincide with those which the Immigration Judge articulated

in his or her decision”).

As stated, we concur with the Adjudicating Official’s findings and

analysis and his determination that the respondent violated 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1003.102(m), (n), and (o). Specifically, we agree with his determination

that the fact that the respondent “either instructed or knowingly permitted

[the legal assistant] to impersonate him on even one occasion qualifies as

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Cite as 26 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2015) Interim Decision #3843

assistance in the unauthorized practice of law.” In any event, as the

Adjudicating Official found, the respondent admitted that he had engaged

in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of

8 C.F.R. § 1003.102(n). This conduct, which dated back to 2011, involved

16 immigration cases and various Immigration Courts.

In light of these findings, we agree that it was in the public interest to

sanction the respondent. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.102 (stating that where a

practitioner violates one or more of the regulatory grounds for sanctions,

“[i]t is deemed to be in the public interest for an adjudicating official or the

Board to impose disciplinary sanctions”). Further, we agree that the

discipline imposed is reasonable and fair. The respondent’s act of enlisting

his legal assistant to impersonate him is a serious offense that warrants

the sanctions the Adjudicating Official imposed after carefully weighing

the aggravating and mitigating factors presented. Regardless of whether

the respondent violated the other regulatory provisions, the disciplinary

sanctions imposed in this case are appropriate. See 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1003.101(a)(1)−(4) (2015).

The respondent argues that the Adjudicating Official erred by excluding

the testimony of Ellen A. Pansky. According to Ms. Pansky’s resume, she

is a “California Bar Certified Specialist in the area of legal malpractice

law.” The respondent claims that Ms. Pansky would have testified

concerning the reciprocal discipline that the California Bar was likely to

impose against him. The Adjudicating Official found that the evidence

would have been “insufficiently probative” given that Ms. Pansky is not an

expert concerning immigration disciplinary proceedings. We agree. As

argued by the EOIR Disciplinary Counsel, Ms. Pansky’s testimony

regarding the nature of possible sanctions by the California Bar would be

speculative and, in any event, not relevant to these proceedings.

We are also unpersuaded by the respondent’s claim that he was barred

by client confidentiality concerns from fully defending himself against the

allegations of the EOIR Disciplinary Counsel. The respondent has not

established that such a duty precluded him from presenting a fair defense

against the charges.

Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107(b) (2015), the respondent may petition

for reinstatement to practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and

the DHS after 1 year has elapsed. To be reinstated, the respondent must

show that he meets the regulatory definition of an “attorney” in 8 C.F.R.

§ 1001.1(f) (2015). He will also have the burden to demonstrate “by clear

and convincing evidence that he . . . possess[es] the moral and professional

qualifications required to appear before the Board and the Immigration

Courts or DHS, or before all three authorities, and that his . . . reinstatement

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will not be detrimental to the administration of justice.” 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.107(b)(1); see also Matter of Krivonos, 24 I&N Dec. 292

(BIA 2007).

Accordingly, the respondent’s appeal will be dismissed.

ORDER: The respondent’s appeal is dismissed, and the Adjudicating

Official’s decision is affirmed.

FURTHER ORDER: The respondent is suspended from practice

before the Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the

DHS for a period of 16 months, effective 15 days from December 29, 2014,

pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.106(c).

FURTHER ORDER: The respondent is prohibited from appearing

telephonically in the Immigration Courts for 7 years, effective 15 days from

December 29, 2014, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.106(c).

FURTHER ORDER: The respondent is directed to promptly notify,

in writing, any clients with cases currently pending before the Board, the

Immigration Courts, or the DHS that he has been suspended from

practicing before these authorities.

FURTHER ORDER: The respondent shall maintain records to

evidence compliance with this order.

FURTHER ORDER: The Board directs that the contents of this

notice be made available to the public, including at Immigration Courts and

appropriate offices of the DHS.

FURTHER ORDER: The respondent may petition the Board for

reinstatement to practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and the

DHS pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.107(b).

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