Opinion

Hayes, Anthony v. Elmington Property Management

  • 2022 TN WC App. 2
Court
Tennessee Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
Filed
Jan 13, 2022
Status
Published
On the bench
Pele I. Godkin, David F. Hensley, Timothy W. Conner
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 2.9%

The opinion

FILED

Jan 13, 2022

08:24 AM(CT)

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Anthony Hayes ) Docket No. 2018-08-1204

)

v. ) State File No. 56539-2018

)

Elmington Property Management, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Deana C. Seymour, Judge )

Affirmed and Certified as Final

In this compensation appeal, the employee challenges the jurisdiction of the trial court,

which dismissed his case with prejudice when he failed to appear for a scheduled trial.

The employee did not attend the trial despite having been given notice of the date and

time of the hearing. On appeal, the employee failed to file a brief or identify any

appealable issues. We affirm the trial court’s decision dismissing the employee’s case

with prejudice and certify the trial court’s order as final.

Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding

Judge Timothy W. Conner and Judge David F. Hensley joined.

Anthony Hayes, Memphis, Tennessee, employee-appellant, pro se

Stephen P. Miller, Memphis, Tennessee, for the employer-appellee, Elmington Property

Management

Memorandum Opinion 1

There have been multiple interlocutory appeals in this case prior to Anthony

Hayes’s (“Employee’s”) appeal of the trial court’s final compensation order dismissing

his claim with prejudice after he failed to appear for trial. While a recitation of the entire

1

“The appeals board may, in an effort to secure a just and speedy determination of matters on appeal and

with the concurrence of all judges, decide an appeal by an abbreviated order or by memorandum opinion,

whichever the appeals board deems appropriate, in cases that are not legally and/or factually novel or

complex.” Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-22-.03(1) (2020).

1

history of the litigation is not necessary to address the current appeal, we have set out

portions of the factual and procedural background for context.

Employee was working in the course and scope of his employment with

Elmington Property Management (“Employer”) in July 2018 when he fell, allegedly

injuring his left knee, left arm, right hand, and head. His claim for workers’

compensation benefits was accepted as compensable, and he began treating with Dr.

David Deneka, an orthopedic specialist. In September 2018, Dr. Deneka reported that

Employee had reached maximum medical improvement for his work-related injuries and

would retain no permanent medical impairment associated with his injuries.

Thereafter, Employee complained that he had not received medical treatment for

neck and back symptoms he asserted were related to his fall at work. He filed a petition

seeking additional medical benefits, and, based on his assertion he had been terminated

from his employment, he also sought temporary disability benefits. Following an

expedited hearing, the trial court concluded Employee had offered credible testimony

regarding his need for additional medical treatment for injuries related to his fall but did

not present sufficient evidence of his entitlement to temporary disability benefits. The

court ordered Employer to schedule an appointment with Dr. Deneka but denied

Employee’s request for temporary disability benefits. Employee appealed the trial

court’s denial of his request for temporary disability benefits, and we affirmed the trial

court’s order and remanded the case. See Hayes v. Elmington Prop. Mgmt., No. 2018-08-

1204, 2019 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 49, at *1-2 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App.

Bd. Sept. 3, 2019).

Employee subsequently returned to Dr. Deneka, who indicated he was unable to

address Employee’s neck and back complaints because he does not treat those body parts

in his medical practice. As a result, Employer provided a panel of physicians from which

Employee selected Dr. Mark Harriman, a physician at OrthoSouth, whom Employee first

saw on October 8, 2019. The report of that visit reflects the appointment was for an

independent medical evaluation at the request of Employer’s counsel rather than for

treatment. It also reflects that Dr. Harriman obtained a history from Employee, examined

him, and reviewed numerous medical records. The report noted Employee had a history

of “a back injury from a motor vehicle accident years ago” and indicated Employee’s

story regarding the neck and back complaints he related to his employment “had changed

considerably.” It stated Employee “said that his initial neck and back problems were

very minor, and he did not think anything of them until they started bothering him when

Dr. Deneka returned him back to work.” Further, Dr. Harriman’s report stated that he

“asked [Employee] again specifically when he had started having neck and back

problems” and that Employee “went on to tell him that he had a second fall, unrelated to

his on-the-job injury, in September 2018 going home from a store,” and that “things got

worse then and he sought care for his neck and back through the [Veterans

Administration].” Two days after Employee’s evaluation by Dr. Harriman, the doctor

2

signed an amendment to his report stating, “[s]pecifically, I can state with greater than

50% assurance that [Employee’s] complaints of lumbar and cervical neck pain are not

related to his on-the-job injury of July 27, 2018.”

On October 25, 2019, Employee filed a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions in

which he asserted Dr. Harriman would not treat him and told him the October 8 visit was

for an evaluation only. On November 4, 2019, the trial court granted Employee’s motion,

finding that Employer was obligated to provide Employee with a panel of physicians for

treatment of Employee’s back and neck complaints. The order noted that Employee had

returned to Dr. Deneka, who “does not treat neck and back issues” and that Employee

was later evaluated by Dr. Harriman who concluded that Employee’s “neck and back

complaints were less than fifty percent related to the work injury.” However, the court

determined that Employer “should have provided [Employee] a panel from which he

could select a physician to address his head and neck complaints rather than providing

only an independent medical examiner.” The court ordered Employer to provide a panel

of physicians to “evaluate [Employee’s] head and neck conditions” within ten days,

adding that Employer’s failure to do so would “result in referral to the Compliance

Program for investigation and possible assessment of penalties.”

Three days later, Employer filed a motion requesting the court to reconsider its

November 4, 2019 order. Employer supported its motion with a document electronically

signed by Dr. Harriman on November 5, 2019, which stated that “[t]he report on

[Employee] was improperly titled as an Independent Medical Evaluation,” and that “[i]n

fact, the report should have been titled as a medical opinion with option to treat should

treatment be required and related to the alleged work incident.”

On November 20, 2019, the trial court granted Employer’s motion to reconsider,

concluding that Employer had satisfied its obligation to provide Employee “with a proper

panel under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204 and is not required to provide

him with another panel.” On December 4, 2019, Employee filed an untimely notice of

appeal of the court’s November 20 order. As a result, we dismissed the appeal on

December 5, 2019, and remanded the case. On December 6, 2019, Employee filed a

“Demand for Reconsideration of Appeal,” citing the Tennessee Rules of Appellate

Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, neither of which apply to us.

We treated Employee’s filing as a motion to reconsider the dismissal of the appeal, which

we denied by order filed on December 9, 2019.

A scheduling order was subsequently filed in the trial court on January 14, 2020,

setting forth dates for discovery and other procedural matters, including a June 17, 2020

trial date. On January 22, 2020, Employee filed numerous documents in the trial court

that included a “Sworn Complaint for Shelby County Government,” which identified nine

separate individuals, offices, or other entities alleged to be “violators,” including the trial

judge. Several documents were filed as “Exhibits” to the Sworn Complaint, including

3

Employee’s “Request for Recusal of [the Trial Judge] & Ethical Complaint,” which was

addressed to the Chief Judge of the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims and to the

Tennessee Attorney General. The “Exhibits” also included a “Complaint Against Judge

Under Code of Judicial Conduct” that was purportedly filed with the Tennessee Board of

Judicial Conduct. Among other numerous allegations in these documents, Employee

alleged that the trial judge conspired with other members of the Bureau of Workers’

Compensation to prevent him from timely receiving the court’s orders, falsified a court

order, and proceeded with a scheduling hearing over his objection.

The trial court addressed Employee’s motion for recusal in a February 7, 2020

order. The court determined Employee had presented no evidence of prejudice or bias

and there was no reasonable basis to question the judge’s impartiality. In addition, the

court concluded that Employee had not complied with Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-

21-.18(3) (2019), which requires an affidavit to be filed with a motion to recuse setting

out the factual and legal grounds supporting the recusal. Based upon Employee’s failure

to present supporting evidence and his failure to file an appropriate affidavit, the trial

court denied his recusal motion.

Employee appealed the trial court’s February 7 order, asserting that the trial judge

cited “wrongful codes [and] laws that [do] not apply to the issues being raised to [enable]

[Employer] to continue to discriminate and wrongfully deny[] claimant benefits.”

Employee asserted, and continues to assert in his voluminous filings, that disqualification

of the trial judge is automatic and that the orders entered by the trial court are invalid. He

cited federal law and the laws of other states to support his contentions but provided no

Tennessee law to support his claim that disqualification of the trial judge is “automatic.”

We affirmed the trial judge’s order denying Employee’s motion to recuse on April 16,

2020. See Hayes v. Elmington Prop. Mgmt., No. 2018-08-1204, 2020 TN Wrk. Comp.

App. Bd. LEXIS 17 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Apr. 16, 2020).

On April 17, 2020, Employer filed a motion for partial summary judgment that

sought the dismissal of Employee’s claims for neck and back injuries that allegedly

resulted from his July 2018 work injury. On April 29, 2020, Employee filed several

documents with the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims, including a document

purportedly submitted to the Tennessee Supreme Court seeking to appeal our April 16,

2020 decision. On May 8, 2020, Employee filed additional documents with the Court of

Workers’ Compensation Claims, including a document that appears to be intended, in

part, to request a continuance of the hearing on Employer’s motion for partial summary

judgment. The following day, Employee filed more documents in the trial court

addressing his efforts to disqualify the trial judge. On May 13, 2020, additional

documents were filed with the trial court, including a notice from the Tennessee Supreme

Court indicating Employee had filed a “TRAP 3 Notice of Appeal” on April 29, 2020.

4

On May 19, 2020, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims issued an order

acknowledging that Employee had filed a notice of appeal of our April 16 decision with

the Supreme Court. In its order, the trial court stated that “[s]ince [Employee] appealed

the Appeals Board’s April 16, 2020 decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court on April

29, 2020, all hearings . . . are continued until the case is remanded to [the trial court].”

Employer subsequently filed a motion in the Supreme Court requesting that

Employee’s appeal be dismissed. On June 16, 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order

noting that our April 16, 2020 decision was an interlocutory recusal order and, therefore,

not reviewable by the Supreme Court. The Court granted Employer’s motion to dismiss

Employee’s appeal. The following day, Employee filed voluminous documents in the

Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims, some of which were also filed with the

Supreme Court. On July 9, 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order noting its earlier

dismissal of Employee’s appeal in which the Court stated that Employee “subsequently

issued a ‘demand’ for the Court to take judicial notice” of certain matters, which the

Supreme Court refused to do, adding that “no appeal is pending with this Court.” On the

same date the Supreme Court issued its order, Employee filed over 200 pages of

documents with the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims. Additional documents

were filed the following day, and, on July 15, 2020, Employee filed more documents in

the trial court.

On July 24, 2020, the trial court issued an amended scheduling order setting

various dates for specific procedural matters leading to an October 2020 trial date. A

telephonic hearing on Employer’s motion for partial summary judgment was set for

August 21, 2020. 2 However, due to what the trial court described as Employee’s

“disruptions,” the trial court determined an in-person hearing would be conducted to

address Employer’s motion. The motion for partial summary judgment was reset for

hearing on September 2. On August 31, 2020, Employee filed another notice of appeal to

us, this time identifying, by date, three separate orders that were being appealed. We

issued an order on September 1, 2020, addressing the documents identified in

Employee’s notice of appeal, and we dismissed the appeal and remanded the case.

Employee did not appear at the September 2 hearing on Employer’s motion for

partial summary judgment, and court personnel were unable to reach him by telephone.

On September 8, 2020, the trial court issued an order granting Employer’s motion for

partial summary judgment, concluding that Employer successfully established that

Employee’s evidence was insufficient to prove an essential element of his claim.

Because Employee did not respond to Employer’s motion for partial summary judgment

as provided in Rule 56.03 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and did not appear

2

Employee attempted to appeal the notice setting Employer’s motion for partial summary judgment for

hearing. However, the notice was not an order of the court but was a docketing notice signed by the clerk

and, therefore, was not appealable to us. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-217(a)(2) (2019) (only orders

“issued by a workers’ compensation judge” may be appealed to the Appeals Board).

5

at the hearing, the court found Employee had not presented any evidence to refute

Employer’s proof and had not identified a genuine issue of material fact. Employee

appealed the trial court’s grant of a partial summary judgment dismissing his claims for

neck and back injuries that allegedly resulted from the July 2018 work injury, asserting

the trial judge was “disqualified on the records, she violated constitutional due process

notice and perpetrated a fraud by going against her own [s]cheduling order to render this

bogus decision that was already on appeal to the Supreme Court.” Further, Employee’s

notice of appeal asserted there was “[f]raud upon the Courts enacted by the Court.”

However, Employee failed to identify any appealable issue, failed to identify any errors

allegedly made by the trial court, and failed to provide any explanation of how the court

erred by conducting the motion hearing. Moreover, Employee did not assert that he did

not receive notice of the September 2 hearing or that he was denied an opportunity to

participate in the hearing. We affirmed the trial court’s order granting partial summary

judgment on November 10, 2020. See Hayes v. Elmington Prop. Mgmt., No. 2018-08-

1204, 2020 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 66 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Nov.

10, 2020).

In April 2021, Employee filed two more notices of appeal concerning the trial

court’s orders awarding attorneys’ fees and setting a compensation hearing. We

consolidated the two appeals and, on May 13, 2021, filed an order dismissing the

consolidated appeals for failure to pay the filing fee or file a current affidavit of

indigency. We also noted our agreement with Employer’s position that Employee had

not raised any reviewable issues on appeal, as the only issue raised was the jurisdiction of

the trial court, which had been previously decided. We deemed the appeal frivolous and

remanded the case for the trial court to award attorneys’ fees.

On July 28, 2021, the trial court convened an in-person compensation hearing at

which Employer appeared through counsel. Employee, despite having been given notice

on multiple occasions of the date of the trial, did not appear or file anything in support of

his claim. After allowing Employee time to appear, Employer moved for dismissal of the

claim, and the court granted the motion, dismissing Employee’s claim with prejudice.

Employee has appealed.

In his notice of appeal, Employee stated as follows:

Judge violated the rule to show cause proceedings prejudicing the

substantive rights of this plaintiff to challenge the jurisdiction of this court.

Judge unlawfully permitted something the law expresly [sic] forbids. Judge

allow[ed] fraud that permeates every part of these proceedings [and]

unlawfully continued with the taint and judge acted in absent [sic] of all

jurisdiction to rule.

6

Employee, despite being granted multiple extensions of time, did not file a brief. He did

not identify any appealable issue in the notice of appeal, choosing to reiterate his belief

that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to rule on his claim. However, he has

provided no pertinent legal authority to support his position. We have addressed the

issue of jurisdiction on multiple occasions.

We are mindful that Employee is self-represented in this appeal, as he was in the

trial court. Parties who decide to represent themselves are entitled to fair and equal

treatment by the courts. Whitaker v. Whirlpool Corp., 32 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tenn. Ct.

App. 2000). However, as explained by the Court of Appeals,

courts must also be mindful of the boundary between fairness to a pro se

litigant and unfairness to the pro se litigant’s adversary. Thus, the courts

must not excuse pro se litigants from complying with the same substantive

and procedural rules that represented parties are expected to observe. . . .

Pro se litigants should not be permitted to shift the burden of the litigation

to the courts or to their adversaries.

Hessmer v. Hessmer, 138 S.W.3d 901, 903-04 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted).

Employee failed to articulate specific issues for our review, failed to describe how

the trial court purportedly erred in its rulings, and failed to provide any relevant legal

authority in support of his position. When an appellant fails to offer substantive

arguments on appeal, an appellate court’s ability to conduct meaningful appellate review

is significantly hampered. Holmes v. Ellis Watkins d/b/a Watkins Lawn Care, No. 2017-

08-0504, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 7, at *3-4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App.

Bd. Feb. 13, 2018). Moreover, “where a party fails to develop an argument in support of

his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.”

Sneed v. Bd. of Prof’l Responsibility of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn.

2010). It is not our role to search the record for possible errors or to formulate a party’s

legal arguments where that party has provided no meaningful argument or authority to

support its position. Cosey v. Jarden Corp., No. 2017-01-0053, 2019 TN Wrk. Comp.

App. Bd. LEXIS 3, at *8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 15, 2019). As Tennessee

appellate courts have explained, were we to search the record for possible errors and raise

issues and arguments for Employee, we would be acting as his counsel, which the law

prohibits. See, e.g., Webb v. Sherrell, No. E2013-02724-COA-R3-CV, 2015 Tenn. App.

LEXIS 645, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 12, 2015).

We affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing Employee’s claim with

prejudice and certify the trial court’s order as final. Costs on appeal have been waived.

7

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

Anthony Hayes ) Docket No. 2018-08-1204

)

v. ) State File No. 56539-2018

)

Elmington Property Mangement, et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )

Compensation Claims )

Deana C. Seymour, Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced

case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 13th day

of January, 2022.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:

Mail Mail Fax Email

Anthony Hayes X X 555 South 3rd Street

Memphis, TN 38101

555 B.B. King Blvd.

Memphis, TN 38101

ah.hayes1@gmail.com

Stephen P. Miller X smiller@mckuhn.com

Melissa Doherty mdoherty@mckuhn.com

Deana C. Seymour, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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