Rogers v. Hooper

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

March 27, 2008

No. 07-40809 Charles R. Fulbruge III

Summary Calendar Clerk

DAVID ROGERS; KATHRYN ROGERS

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

MATT HOOPER; MIKE TAYLOR; JACE ANGLIN; CHRIS HILL

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

5:06-CV-165

Before STEWART, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiffs David Rogers and Kathryn Rogers appeal the district court’s

grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants Mike Taylor, Jace Anglin,

and Chris Hill. The Plaintiffs also appeal the grant of partial summary

judgment to Defendant Matt Hooper. Finding no error, we affirm.

*

Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

No. 07-40809

FACTS

This case arises from the Defendants’ mistaken execution of a search

warrant on Plaintiffs’ home. The Defendants are all members of either the

Sulphur Springs Special Response Team or the Red River Valley Drug Task

Force. All were involved with executing the warrant. Defendants Hooper and

Taylor were part of an undercover investigation in which confidential informants

purchased drugs at 131 Russell Drive in Sulphur Springs, Texas. They arranged

two drug purchases at the residence. The second occurred on the day they

obtained the search warrant for the residence. After this purchase, the

confidential informant told Taylor and Hooper that he saw a large amount of

drugs inside the house.1 As a result of the information acquired during the

investigation, Defendants Hooper and Taylor obtained a search warrant for a

“single family white frame home facing east. The residence is municipally

known as 131 Russell St. . . .” Because Hooper and Taylor were familiar with

the area, they were selected to guide the team serving the warrant.

On the night the warrant was executed, Hooper and Taylor drove by the

house in preparation for later serving the warrant. During this surveillance,

Hooper and Taylor noticed a small maroon vehicle parked in front of 131 Russell

Drive. This car appeared to be the suspect’s car that they had previously

observed parked at that address. Hooper and Taylor returned and briefed the

members of the team executing the warrant about the location of the home, and

developed a plan for executing the warrant.

Because the suspect at 131 Russell Drive was known to carry a weapon

and to be dangerous, the raid was conducted in a no-knock fashion at night. The

plan called for Hooper and Taylor to lead the team; Hooper would drive and

1

The record is unclear what time of day these drug transactions took place. The

transaction on the date the warrant was obtained, however, would have occurred prior to 9:00

p.m., the time that members of the search team were assembled.

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No. 07-40809

Taylor would ride with him. Their vehicle would park in front of 131 Russell

Drive. That act would identify to the remaining members of the team the

location of the proper house to search. Hooper chose to approach the residence

from a different direction than they had previously used in order to use a tree

line for cover as they approached. As Hooper and Taylor went down Russell

Drive, they passed the tree line. Hooper saw what he thought was the vehicle

they had seen parked in front of 131 Russell Drive during their earlier

surveillance. Hooper said that he relied on the location of this vehicle to cue

him as to the proper house.

However, the car was not parked in front of 131 Russell Drive, but instead

in front of the Plaintiffs’ residence located next door at 127 Russell Drive. Taylor

testified that after exiting the vehicle, he immediately realized that it was the

wrong address because the Plaintiffs’ house did not have a bay window as did

the target house. Hooper stated that he also immediately realized they were at

the wrong house upon leaving the vehicle. Taylor called out to stop the entry

team, but it was too late – others had already entered the Plaintiffs’ home.

During the raid, Defendant Anglin broke through the Plaintiffs’ front door

with a door ram. The Plaintiffs, who were in bed asleep at the time, were

awakened by the sound of police entering their bedroom. They were handcuffed.

After realizing they were at the wrong residence, the officers removed the

handcuffs from the Plaintiffs, apologized, and left.2

The Plaintiffs subsequently filed this Section 1983 suit, alleging that the

Defendants’ actions violated their right to be free from unreasonable searches

and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

2

Members of the Task Force returned later and repaired the damage to the Plaintiffs’

home that occurred as a result of the forced entry.

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No. 07-40809

States Constitution.3 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Defendants filed motions for

summary judgment which asserted a qualified immunity. The district court

granted summary judgment in favor of each Defendant, except Matt Hooper.

The court found no disputed issue regarding Hooper except as to whether he had

remained in the plaintiffs’ house for an unreasonable length of time after

learning of the error. A trial was held as to that issue, resulting in a jury verdict

for Hooper. There is no appellate issue arising from the trial.

DISCUSSION

This Court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

engaging in the same evaluation of the evidence as did the district court. XL

Specialty Ins. Co. v. Kiewit Offshore Servs., Ltd., 513 F.3d 146, 149 (5th Cir.

2008). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and [] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Our sole question is whether the district court properly

held that the Defendants were entitled to immunity.

Public officials have a qualified immunity “not only from liability, but also

from defending against a lawsuit.” Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep’t, 958

F.2d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1992). The purpose of the immunity is to prevent

“distraction of officials from their government duties, inhibition of discretionary

action, and deterrence of able people from public service.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

457 U.S. 800, 816 (1982). The question is whether a reasonable officer could

have believed, even if mistakenly, that the conduct at issue was lawful. Goodson

v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000) (law enforcement

officers have immunity when they “reasonably but mistakenly” commit a

3

Plaintiffs sued a number of individuals involved in the service of the search warrant

who are not parties to this appeal. The Plaintiffs settled with these individuals after

mediation. All references to “Defendants” in this opinion refer only to those Defendants who

are parties to this appeal.

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constitutional violation). Officers who make reasonable mistakes have

immunity; “the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” do

not. Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Malley v. Briggs,

475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). However, if a plaintiff (1) alleges a violation of a

constitutional right; and (2) demonstrates that the official’s conduct was

objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established law at the time of the

conduct, the qualified immunity defense fails. Glenn v. City of Tyler, 242 F.3d

307, 312 (5th Cir. 2001). The question of whether an official’s conduct is

objectively unreasonable is a question of law to be determined by the court.

Magieri v. Clifton, 29 F.3d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1994).

The Plaintiffs unquestionably demonstrated the violation of a

constitutional right. The Defendants did not have a warrant or any other

constitutionally sufficient justification for entering the Plaintiffs’ home.

The district court accepted that a constitutional right was violated but

rejected that the Defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable. On appeal

Plaintiffs argue that unreasonableness is shown by these facts: (1) the Plaintiffs’

home was brown or beige while the proper house was white with green trim; (2)

Plaintiffs’ house had a large tree in the front yard while the proper house did

not; (3) Plaintiffs’ house had a covered front porch while the proper house did

not; and (4) both houses had marked house numbers. Plaintiffs also allege that

the fact that Taylor and Hooper had been at the correct house at least twice

before and that the address listed in the search warrant was accurate are facts

that weigh against the grant of qualified immunity to the Defendants.

In determining whether qualified immunity was appropriately found here,

we examine a recent precedent involving similar facts. Simmons v. City of

Paris, Texas, 378 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2004). Officers were attempting to serve a

search warrant at the home of a suspected drug dealer whose address was

correctly shown on the warrant. Id. at 478. After obtaining the warrant, the

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officers met with members of the team that would go to the home. The plan was

for the officer in the lead vehicle to park at the property immediately south of

the home, and that act would alert the entry team to serve the warrant on the

house immediately to the north. Id. Instead, the lead vehicles stopped directly

in front of the residence that was to be searched. This caused the entry team to

enter the Plaintiffs’ house that was the next one north. The Plaintiff and her son

were on the front porch of their home and retreated inside when they saw the

entry team sprinting toward them. Id. After the officers detained the Plaintiffs,

they realized they had entered the wrong house. Id. Summary judgment was

proper for all officers who entered the home due to this mistake and then had

departed immediately upon discovering their error. Id. at 480-81.

The Simmons court discussed with approval Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49

F.3d 1154 (6th Cir. 1995). In Pray, officers obtained a warrant for the upper

level of a duplex, but mistakenly sought to execute the warrant on the lower

level of the duplex. The Plaintiffs, an elderly couple, lived in the lower half of

the duplex, and brought suit for the mistaken entry. Id. at 1156. Almost

identically to our case, the Pray district court granted summary judgment to the

officers on the basis of the initial mistaken entry, but denied summary judgment

on the question of whether the officers remained in the home too long after the

mistaken entry was discovered. The Sixth Circuit affirmed:

We agree that a reasonable officer in the defendants’ position could

have believed that he was initially entering the correct residence

described on the warrant. Police officers are regularly forced to

make critical decisions under extreme pressure--decisions which

seem much easier after facts have unfolded and time for reflection

has been afforded. Given the circumstances at the time of entry, it

appears that the officers had to make a quick judgment in what was

initially a tense situation. At the time the officers entered the Pray

home, it was dark, vision was poor, and any delay could have been

potentially detrimental to an arrest of [the suspect] and seizure of

evidence.

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No. 07-40809

Id. at 1159 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Plaintiffs find an Eleventh Circuit precedent to be more applicable.

Hartsfield v. Lemacks, 50 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995). There, officers executed a

search warrant on the wrong house. The officer who obtained the warrant and

led the search warrant team had been to the home on the day before the search,

and had the warrant in his possession. However, he did not check the warrant

again to see that he was leading the team to the proper address. Id. at 955.

Determinative to the court was that the officer leading the team did not take

“any precautionary measures” to ensure that he was leading the team to the

right house. Id. Additional indications of the unreasonableness of the error was

that execution of the warrant was during daylight hours; the numbers on the

homes were clearly marked; the homes were on different parts of the street; and

the homes were separated by at least one house. Id. The court held that the

officer did nothing to avoid the mistaken execution, that the mistaken entry

would have been avoided by simply checking the address on the warrant, and

there was no reasonable justification for failing to do so. Id. The court

concluded that “searching the wrong residence when [the officer] had done

nothing to make sure he was searching the house described in the warrant,” did

not constitute “reasonable effort” on the part of the officers.

In the present case, Taylor and Hooper made an initial surveillance of the

house shortly before the warrant was executed, though they increased the

chance for mistake by approaching the house in the opposite direction than they

would use later. The relevant houses were next door to each other. Despite

differences in appearance, those differences were less noticeable at night. It is

also true that because the search was to occur at night, the chance for a mistake

was greater and the need for precautions proportionately were increased.

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No. 07-40809

Finally, a car that earlier had been thought to be in front of the house to be

searched was instead in front of the Plaintiffs’ home when the search began.

Before these facts can be said to block qualified immunity for these

officers, they must not be “consistent with a reasonable effort to ascertain and

identify the place intended to be searched.” Id. at 955 (quoting Maryland v.

Garrison, 480 U.S. 72, 87 (1987)). Evaluating the Plaintiffs’ claims in light of

Simmons and Pray, the district court found qualified immunity for Taylor and

Hooper based on the mistaken entry into the Plaintiffs’ home. The key to us is

that the officers made reasonable efforts, though obviously insufficient ones, to

identify the correct house. We agree they were entitled to qualified immunity.

We are sympathetic to the Plaintiffs, as what happened here must have

been an intensely frightening event for those who believed they were in the

safety of their own home. The intrusion caused by an unannounced, no-knock

entry into a home in the middle of the night is substantial, no matter how

quickly the mistake is noted and leave is taken.

However, the doctrine of qualified immunity balances the “vindication of

citizens’ constitutional rights and . . . public officials’ effective performance of

their duties.” Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984). The limited question

that we answer in this appeal is whether Defendants Taylor and Hooper were

objectively unreasonable in the manner that they led the team. No one has

alleged that the Defendants intentionally entered the wrong home. Neither do

we find, despite the significance of the error to the Plaintiffs and the ease that

hindsight provides in determining how this mistake could have been avoided,

that the Defendants were incompetent. Gibson, 44 F.3d at 277.

The district court correctly found that Taylor and Hooper did not act in an

objectively unreasonable manner. The Plaintiffs make a derivative argument

that supposed error in granting Hooper qualified immunity for leading the

search team to the wrong house infected the trial on whether Hooper remained

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No. 07-40809

in the Plaintiffs’ home too long after learning of the team’s mistake. The jury

returned a verdict in favor of Hooper, and no separate error is alleged to have

occurred at trial. Because the summary judgment was properly entered, there

was no error from that judgment to contaminate the trial.

The two remaining Defendants, Hill and Anglin, did not direct the search

team. Anglin rammed open the door to the Plaintiffs’ home, and Hill handcuffed

Plaintiff David Rogers. This Court has held that “when law enforcement officers

are executing a search warrant and discover that they have entered the wrong

residence, they should immediately terminate their search.” Simmons, 378 F.3d

at 479-80. The Plaintiffs presented no evidence supporting that either Anglin

or Hill failed in their duty of immediate termination of a search upon learning

of the mistake. The record instead shows that Anglin had already left and Hill

was exiting the residence when it was learned that the warrant was served on

the wrong residence.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the summary judgments entered on the basis of

qualified immunity.

9