Anderson v. School Board of Madison County

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 11, 2008

No. 06-60902 Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

JOAN ANDERSON

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

SCHOOL BOARD OF MADISON COUNTY

Defendant-Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

Before JONES, Chief Judge, and DeMOSS and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:

Since 1969, the Madison County School District (“MCSD”) in Mississippi

has been under a federal court order to desegregate its schools. On June 18,

2004, the MCSD filed a motion for full unitary status, claiming it had complied

with the district court’s orders and had “to the extent practicable, eliminated the

vestiges of racial discrimination resulting from the former racially dual system.”1

The United States (“Government”) and a group of private citizens (“Private

Plaintiffs” or “Appellants”) opposed the motion and argued that the MCSD was

1

We use the term “unitary” in this context to refer to a school district that “has done

all that it could to remedy the [prior] segregation caused by official action.” Price v. Austin

Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1991).

No. 06-60902

not entitled to full unitary status. After discovery and a hearing, the district

court granted the MCSD’s motion on April 7, 2006, ending more than three

decades of federal court supervision over the school district. Only the Private

Plaintiffs have appealed.

I.

The MCSD is one of many school districts in Mississippi that at one time

practiced de jure raced-based segregation. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s

directive in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 20

(1969), we mandated that those school districts could “‘no longer operate a dual

school system based on race or color’ and [that] each district is to operate . . . as

a unitary school system within which no person is ‘effectively excluded from any

school because of race or color.’” United States v. Hinds County Sch. Bd., 423

F.2d 1264, 1267 (5th Cir. 1969) (quoting Alexander, 396 U.S. at 20). The district

court for the Southern District of Mississippi, finding that the MCSD operated

a de jure segregated school system, issued its original desegregation order in

1969, requiring the MCSD to (1) divide the school district into three attendance

zones, (2) implement a transportation scheme that is “non-segregated and

non-discriminatory,” and (3) select locations for school construction and school

consolidation “in a manner which will prevent the recurrence of the dual school

structure once this desegregation plan is implemented.”

Since the issuance of the 1969 order, the district court has supervised the

MCSD’s desegregation efforts and enforced compliance through a series of

consent orders. The most recent consent order, approved by the district court on

April 24, 2000, addressed a number of issues including school construction,

transportation, majority-to-minority transfers, staff recruitment, hiring,

assignment and compensation, and the creation of a bi-racial advisory

committee.

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No. 06-60902

On June 18, 2004, the MCSD filed a motion for declaration of full unitary

status. Following discovery, the Government and Private Plaintiffs stipulated

in a pretrial order that they did not object to a finding of unitary status with

regard to eleven operational areas: (1) student assignment, except as it related

to the magnet program at Velma Jackson High School (“VJHS”), (2) enforcement

of student attendance zones and student transfers, (3) transportation, (4)

extracurricular activities, (5) majority-to-minority transfers, (6) special

education programs, (7) gifted programs, (8) student discipline, (9) the bi-racial

advisory committee, (10) a Title I initiative program, and (11) the MCSD’s

reporting obligations.

However, both the Government and Private Plaintiffs objected to a finding

of unitary status with respect to the magnet program and facilities at VJHS, and

facilities at other schools. The Private Plaintiffs further objected to a finding of

unitary status regarding (1) faculty assignment, (2) employment procedures, (3)

the use of sixteenth section funds2 and contributions from private groups, and

(4) an alternative school. The Private Plaintiffs also argued that the motion

should be denied because the MCSD did not act in good faith to comply with the

court’s orders to remedy problems in these areas.

In February 2006, the district court held a four-day public hearing on the

MCSD’s motion and both sides presented witness testimony. Members of the

public were also invited to comment on the motion. On April 7, 2006, the district

court issued a thorough and well-reasoned Memorandum Opinion and Order

concluding that the MCSD was entitled to full unitary status. Based on that

2

“Both the Northwest Ordinance and the Act of 1802 called for the territory to be

divided into townships having thirty-six numbered sections and required that the sixteenth

section of each township be used for the support of the public schools within each township.”

Madison County Bd. of Educ. v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co.,728 F. Supp. 423, 425 (S.D. Miss. 1989).

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conclusion, the court granted the MCSD’s motion and dissolved all existing

desegregation and consent orders. The Private Plaintiffs timely appealed.

A basic description of the MCSD’s geography is helpful in understanding

the present dispute over whether the district court erred in finding that the

MCSD is entitled to full unitary status. The MCSD serves all of Madison County,

except for an area served by the Canton Public School District. In 1969 the

MCSD served approximately 4,500 students, 75% of whom were African-

American. By contrast, in the fall of 2005, the MCSD served almost 11,000

students, approximately 38% of whom were African-American and 58% were

white. Pursuant to the 1969 desegregation order, the MCSD is divided into three

zones. Zone I, located in the northeast part of Madison County, covers a

geographically large but rural and sparsely populated area. Student enrollment

at Zone I schools is more than 96% African-American. Zone II accounts for 85%

of the MCSD’s total enrollment, and encompasses the cities of Ridgeland and

Madison in the southern part of Madison County. Zone III covers a rural area

and only serves about 5% of the MCSD’s students.

II.

A. Standards of Review

The district court’s finding that the MCSD is unitary is a factual finding

that we review for clear error. See Flax v. Potts, 915 F.2d 155, 157 (5th Cir.

1990). “[A] finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson v. City of

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).

However, if the district court’s factual findings are “plausible in light of the

record viewed in its entirety, we must accept them, even though we might have

weighed the evidence differently if we had been sitting as a trier of fact.” Price

v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 945 F.2d 1307, 1312 (5th Cir. 1991) (internal

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No. 06-60902

quotation marks omitted). We have also recognized that, given the unique

factual circumstances present in school desegregation cases, the district court’s

factual findings are entitled to “great deference.” Flax, 915 F.2d at 158. This is

particularly true when, as here, the district judge has “supervised the case for

many years.” Id. We review de novo whether an issue is ripe for judicial review.

See Groome Res., Ltd. v. Parish of Jefferson, 234 F.3d 192, 198-99 (5th Cir. 2000).

B. Ripeness

As an initial matter, Appellants argue that several issues decided by the

district court were not ripe for review. In determining whether a matter is ripe

for judicial review we consider “the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and

the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.” Orix Credit

Alliance, Inc. v. Wolfe, 212 F.3d 891, 895 (5th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation

marks omitted); see United Transp. Union v. Foster, 205 F.3d 851, 857 (5th Cir.

2000) (“Ripeness separates those matters that are premature because the injury

is speculative and may never occur from those that are appropriate for judicial

review.”). Generally, issues are not ripe if “further factual development is

required.” Wolfe, 212 F.3d at 895.

First, Appellants point out that in 2005 the parties agreed to a create a

committee to evaluate and recommend changes to the magnet program at VJHS.

It is undisputed that the committee had not completed its evaluation by the time

the district court granted the MCSD’s motion. Appellants argue that the district

court should have postponed its ruling until the committee completed its

evaluation. Second, Appellants contend that the district court did not wait long

enough following renovations and repairs at VJHS in 2005 to be able to

adequately judge whether the magnet program could attain its goal of attracting

white students. Lastly, Appellants argue that because of the MCSD’s poor track

record in honoring construction commitments, the court erred by ruling on the

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No. 06-60902

MCSD’s motion while construction projects remained pending throughout the

district.

We find these arguments unavailing. The factual record in this case has

been extensively developed over more than thirty years of district court

supervision. Further, prior to ruling on the MCSD’s motion, the court conducted

a lengthy public hearing where both sides presented evidence. Appellants cite

no authority, and we have found none, requiring district courts to consider

motions for unitary status only upon the completion of all school district

construction projects and committee evaluations. Given the unique nature of

desegregation litigation, such a requirement would be impractical, and as the

MCSD points out, would likely result in the MCSD remaining forever under

federal court supervision. Also, the current magnet program at VJHS had been

in full operation since the 2000-2001 school year, long enough to allow the

district court to make informed findings concerning its

effectiveness—nothwithstanding Appellants’ argument that the 2005

renovations could possibly have some future effect that was not observable to the

court in 2006. Thus, we find that no further factual development was required,

and the issues decided by the district court were ripe for review.

C. Motion for Unitary Status

The district court granted the MCSD’s motion for declaration of unitary

status. The ultimate inquiry in determining whether a school district is unitary

is whether (1) the school district has complied in good faith with desegregation

orders for a reasonable amount of time,3 and (2) the school district has

eliminated the vestiges of prior de jure segregation to the extent practicable. See

3

This prong has alternately been stated as requiring good faith compliance with the

desegregation decree “since it was entered.” See Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell,

498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991). However, in Freeman v. Pitts, the Supreme Court cited to this

language in Dowell and construed it as requiring “good-faith compliance . . . over a reasonable

period of time.” 503 U.S. 467, 498 (1992) (emphasis added).

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No. 06-60902

Hull v. Quitman County Bd. of Educ., 1 F.3d 1450, 1454 (5th Cir. 1993); see also

Freman, 503 U.S. at 492, 498.

1. Good faith compliance with the district court’s orders

A school district seeking the termination of federal court supervision must

first show that it has “consistently complied with a court decree in good faith.”

Hull, 1 F.3d at 1454; see also Freeman, 503 U.S. at 498 (“A history of good-faith

compliance is evidence that any current racial imbalance is not the product of

a new de jure violation. . . .”). To meet this obligation, “[f]or at least three years,

the school board must report to the district court.” Monteilh v. St. Landry Parish

Sch. Bd., 848 F.2d 625, 629 (5th Cir. 1988). Further, “the district in question

must have for several years operated as a unitary system.” Lemon v. Bossier

Parish Sch. Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (5th Cir. 1971).

Appellants make two related arguments concerning this prong. First,

Appellants assert that the MCSD has not complied in good faith with the district

court’s orders, as evidenced by the MCSD’s alleged failure to, inter alia,

adequately support the magnet program and facilities at VJHS, construct an

adequate music facility at Northeast Madison Middle School (“NMMS”), and to

monitor minority hiring throughout the district. Second, Appellants argue that

the district court erred in finding the MCSD unitary without first finding that

it had been in compliance with desegregation orders for at least three years.

According to Appellants, at the time the district court issued its Order, the

MCSD had not yet completed several facilities projects, and had only recently

completed others, indicating that the MCSD had not been in compliance for a

reasonable amount of time.

Appellants correctly observe that the district court did not expressly state

that the MCSD had been in compliance with its desegregation orders for at least

three years. However, following its thorough review of the evidence, the district

court found that the MCSD worked in good faith to comply with the 2000

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No. 06-60902

consent order since its adoption in April 2000. The district court’s finding that

the MCSD has complied in good faith with the 2000 consent decree is “plausible

in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” See Price, 945 F.2d at 1312 (internal

quotation marks omitted). For example, the MCSD’s good faith compliance is

illustrated by the fact it has devoted a considerable amount of resources to

renovating VJHS and implementing a new magnet program there. It has also

implemented procedures to recruit minority teachers, established a bi-racial

advisory committee, and fulfilled its reporting obligation to the district court.

Further, the MCSD’s compliance with the 2000 consent order since its adoption

constitutes compliance for a reasonable amount of time. See Lemon, 444 F.2d at

1401. Thus, we find no error in the district court’s analysis of the first prong.

2. Elimination of the vestiges of prior de jure segregation to the extent

practicable

Regarding the requirement that a school district eliminate the vestiges of

prior de jure segregation to the extent practicable, “every reasonable effort

[must] be made to eradicate segregation and its insidious residue,” although

complete racial balance is not required. Ross v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 699

F.2d 218, 227-28 (5th Cir. 1983). Rather, the emphasis is on whether “the school

district has done all that it could to remedy the segregation caused by official

action.” Price, 945 F.2d at 1314; see also United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717,

728 (1992) (“[W]e have consistently asked whether existing racial identifiability

is attributable to the State. . . .”). To guide courts in determining whether the

vestiges of de jure segregation have been eliminated as far as practicable, the

Supreme Court has identified several aspects of school operations that must be

considered, commonly referred to as the Green factors: student assignment,

faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities.4 See Bd.

4

Appellants conceded below that the MCSD has satisfied its obligations with regard to

transportation and extracurricular activities.

8

No. 06-60902

of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250 (1991) (discussing

Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968)).

a. Student assignment

Student assignment within a school district is relevant to determining

whether a school district has remedied, to the extent possible, the vestiges of

prior de jure segregation. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250. While racial imbalance in a

particular school is relevant for that purpose, racial imbalance, without more,

does not violate the Constitution. Cavalier ex rel. Cavalier v. Caddo Parish Sch.

Bd., 403 F.3d 246, 260 (5th Cir. 2005). “Once the racial imbalance [in student

assignment] due to the de jure violation has been remedied, the school district

is under no duty to remedy imbalance that is caused by demographic factors.”

Freeman, 503 U.S. at 494; Price, 945 F.2d at 1314 (“‘[I]mmutable geographic

factors and post-desegregation demographic changes that prevent the

homogenation of all student bodies do not bar judicial recognition that the school

system is unitary.’” (quoting Ross, 699 F.2d at 225)).

We note that the only objection Appellants appear to assert on appeal

regarding student assignment is that the MCSD has allegedly failed to comply

with court orders regarding the magnet program at VJHS and, as a result, the

magnet program has failed to attract white students whose attendance would

diversify that school and further eliminate the vestiges of prior segregation.5

5

To the extent that Appellants may object to other aspects of student assignment

within the MCSD, the record contains evidence sufficient to support a finding that the MCSD

is unitary with respect to all aspects of student assignment. For example, the MCSD’s expert,

Dr. Rossell, noted that the MCSD “met or surpassed the original plan on all measures of racial

balance and complies with the 1999 and 2000 court orders,” and thus “has met the standard

for unitary status on student assignment.” We also note that none of the district court’s orders

established a racial quota for student assignment at each school and the presence of several

schools in a district with a high percentage of students of a particular race does not preclude

a finding of unitary status. See, e.g., Ross, 699 F.2d at 226-228 (upholding a declaration of

unitary status when 55 of the school district’s 226 schools had 90% or more African-American

students).

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VJHS, located in Zone I, traditionally has been a “one-race” school, and

had a 98.5% African-American student population in 2005. To encourage white

students living in different zones to attend VJHS, and to enhance VJHS’s

educational curriculum, the parties agreed in 1990 to implement a magnet

program at the school. In the 2000-2001 school year, the MCSD implemented a

new magnet program at VJHS, called Eco-Journeys. Despite the MCSD’s efforts

to develop and promote the magnet program, the parties agree that the program

failed to draw a significant number of white students to VJHS. The Government

and Private Plaintiffs argued below that the failure to attract white students to

the magnet program at VJHS is attributable to the MCSD’s lack of a good faith

commitment to the magnet program. Thus, they argued, the MCSD was not

entitled to a finding of unitary status on this aspect of student assignment. The

district court disagreed and held that the MCSD complied in good faith with the

2000 consent order and that the program failed to attract white students

primarily because of demographic and cultural factors.

On appeal, Appellants disagree with that conclusion and challenge the

district court’s findings that: (1) the implementation of the magnet program

strengthened the curriculum at VJHS, (2) the magnet program had been

adequately funded, (3) teacher inexperience at VJHS was not indicative of the

MCSD’s lack of good faith and did not affect the magnet program’s success in

attracting white students, (4) restructuring the administration at VJHS did not

affect the magnet success in attracting white students, (5) the MCSD did not

disregard known facilities deficiencies, and (6) no magnet program could attract

white students to VJHS. In sum, Appellants claim that the district court erred

by holding that the magnet program’s inability to attract white students was

attributable to demographic and cultural factors, as opposed to the deficiencies

they alleged exist in the magnet program itself.

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No. 06-60902

The evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that location and

demographic factors outside the MCSD’s control, as opposed to the alleged

inadequacies cited by Appellants, were responsible for the magnet program’s

failure to attract white students. With that in mind, we briefly review the

Appellants’ arguments regarding the magnet program.

First, Appellants argue that the magnet program weakened the

curriculum at VJHS, contrary to the district court’s assertion. Appellants cite

nothing in the record, and we have found nothing, to support their contention.

The magnet program at VJHS has received good reviews and the fact that VJHS

may be rated lower than other schools, without more, simply does not lead to the

conclusion that the magnet program has weakened the curriculum.6

Additionally, evidence in the record supports the finding that, given VJHS’s

location, even an improved curriculum would not have made it successful in

attracting white students.

Second, Appellants argue that the magnet program was inadequately

funded, in large part because the MCSD sought no outside funds after receiving

a federal grant in 1998. The record shows that the new magnet program was

initially funded by a federal grant of over $2.3 million and that the MCSD spent

an additional $1.5 million from 2000-2006, not counting general operational

funding or funding for instructional supplies. Appellants fail to explain why the

MCSD was required to seek further outside funding, and have presented no

evidence that additional funds would have made a significant difference in the

number of white students enrolling in the magnet program.

Appellants next argue that the inexperience of the teachers at VJHS

demonstrates the MCSD’s lack of good faith commitment to the magnet program

and contributed to its failure to attract white students. The district court held

6

We note that VJHS was rated a level three (successful) school in the No Child Left

Behind report.

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No. 06-60902

that the MCSD made reasonable efforts to attract more experienced teachers to

VJHS, and that it did not act in bad faith by refusing to exercise its authority to

force more experienced teachers from other schools in the district to transfer to

VJHS, because such a measure would have been counterproductive. Appellants

have not shown that the MCSD’s decision to not implement forced transfers was

motivated by anything other than practical concerns about losing teachers to

other districts. Further, Appellants have not shown that more experienced

teachers at VJHS would have attracted more white students, and given the

geographic challenges facing the magnet program, such a proposition would be

doubtful at best. Thus, we find no clear error on this point.

Relatedly, Appellants assert that the MCSD’s restructuring of the

administrative staff at VJHS affected the magnet program’s success, contrary

to the district court’s finding. The restructuring at issue involved elimination of

an administrative position located at the MCSD’s central office and assigning

control of the entire magnet program to VJHS’s principal. The district court held

that the restructuring reasonably consolidated several functions in one on-site

position, and that this action did not affect the magnet program’s success. Again,

we find no clear error in this conclusion.7

Appellants next argue that an important factor contributing to the magnet

program’s failure to attract white students was the poor condition its facilities,

at least prior to renovations in 2005.8 The Government’s expert, Dr. Gordon,

reported that in January 2005 the physical facilities at VJHS were ill-equipped

and in a state of general disrepair. Dr. Gordon conceded, however, that by the

7

We note that Appellants’ argument that this conclusion is erroneous because three

VJHS principals were removed for incompetence is unpersuasive because it fails to establish

any relationship between the removals and the implementation of the restructuring plan.

8

To the extent that the condition of VJHS’s facilities affected the success of the magnet

program, it is relevant to the present discussion of the “student assignment” factor. We note

that the condition of facilities is also its own Green factor, discussed infra.

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No. 06-60902

time of the district court’s hearing on the MCSD’s motion, the MCSD had fixed

many of the problems he previously noted and that VJHS’s classrooms were

comparable to those at other high schools in the district. Appellants do not

appear to object to the current state of VJHS’s classrooms. Instead, they argue

that the MCSD disregarded known deficiencies in facilities prior to 2005 because

it did not begin renovations until after Dr. Gordon issued his report in January

2005. They also contend that the athletic facilities at VJHS are substandard.

The district court acknowledged that, if the evidence showed that the

MCSD disregarded known facilities’ deficiencies, it likely would have failed in

its duty to act in good faith to establish and maintain the magnet program.

However, the court found that the evidence indicated that the facility was

generally in good repair, and that no evidence supported the claim that the

MCSD was aware or should have been aware of the problems cited by Dr.

Gordon in his report. Further, the district court found that the alleged state of

disrepair of the athletic facilities at VJHS did not play a significant role in the

failure of the magnet program. We find that the evidence relied upon by the

district court supports this conclusion.

Lastly, and most fundamentally, Appellants take issue with the district

court’s ultimate conclusion that “no matter the quality of the program, the

facilities, the teachers, [and] regardless of how much money is spent, no magnet

program is going to draw white students to [VJHS], at least not in numbers

sufficient to affect the racial imbalance of the school.” The district court

thoroughly documented the MCSD’s efforts to develop a successful magnet

program, and based on its review, found that the failure of the program to

attract white students was not attributable to the MCSD’s actions or lack of good

faith. Instead, the court found that the magnet program’s goal of attracting

white students was doomed because of location and cultural factors that were

not attributable to the MCSD.

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We find no error in these findings. The evidence confirms that the MCSD

devoted considerable time and resources in a good faith effort to establish the

magnet program. Moreover, the record also supports the conclusion that the

magnet program’s inability to attract white students resulted from VJHS’s very

inconvenient location.9 Testimony confirmed that VJHS is geographically distant

from the large number of students in Zone II, as well as from businesses and

cultural opportunities. For example, the MCSD’s superintendent testified that

it is approximately forty miles between the schools in the south end of the MCSD

and VJHS. Dr. Rossell, an expert for the MCSD, opined that while the magnet

program may have succeeded at a different location, “I don’t think there’s any

magnet program that could be designed that would overcome those issues,

location, distance, and the difference in socioeconomic status.”

In sum, the district court did not err in finding that the MCSD acted in

good faith and that its efforts to implement a successful magnet at VJHS were

reasonable. Moreover, any evidence that additional resources might have

improved the alleged deficiencies in the magnet program must yield to the

reality that the school’s location presented an apparently insurmountable

challenge to attracting white students. Given the evidence documenting this

challenge and the evidence confirming the MCSD’s substantial efforts to

implement a successful magnet program, the district court’s findings concerning

the magnet program and student assignment are “plausible in light of the record

9

In response to the district court’s conclusion that the magnet failed because of location

and demographic factors, Appellants argue that “accommodating the racial animus of white[s]

is not a legitimate basis” to excuse the MCSD’s duty to properly support the magnet program.

This argument misses the mark. First, the district court held that the MCSD undertook good

faith efforts to support the magnet program—not that it was excusing the MCSD’s failure to

support the magnet program. Second, the evidence indicates that the failure of the magnet

program to attract white students was not about racial animus, it was about distance and a

lack of nearby opportunities. Dr. Rossell acknowledged as much when she stated that the

“magnet may have succeeded if it was located in a cosmopolitan area that provided cultural

and work opportunities.”

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viewed in its entirety” and are not clearly erroneous. See Price, 945 F.2d at 1312

(internal quotation marks omitted).

b. Facilities

Another consideration in determining whether a school district has

eliminated the vestiges of prior de jure segregation to the extent practicable is

whether school facilities are adequate. Green, 391 U.S. at 435. Appellants argue

that (1) facilities at VJHS were substandard prior to 2005, (2) that the baseball

field and football stadium at VJHS do not compare favorably with others in the

district, and (3) it is unacceptable that the music program at one primarily

African-American middle school, Northeast Madison Middle School (“NMMS”),

is housed in a portable building.10

The district court held that the challenged school facilities are adequate.

The court noted that, of the four schools in Zone I, where VJHS is located, two

are new and two have been renovated. Regarding athletic facilities, the district

court noted that the MCSD was making improvements to VJHS’s football

stadium, and that while the VJHS baseball field was not as nice as others in the

district, there was less interest in baseball at VJHS compared to other sports.

Regarding the music program at NMMS, the district court pointed out that the

school has a music room in the main building, but due to excessive noise, the

principal moved the music program to portable buildings away from classrooms

in order to avoid disturbance. The court acknowledged that the school’s design

10

Appellants also appear to argue that the facilities at the MCSD’s Alternative School

are inadequate because the school has no kitchen, it has no “real” classrooms, and elementary

students are taught in a trailer. However, MCSD’s superintendent, Michael Kent, testified that

while the Alternative School has no kitchen, there is a dining hall and the school provides food

prepared off-site for the students. Further, he testified that the Alternative School conducts

classes in rooms that were once district offices, and that those rooms “lend themselves fairly

well to [being] classrooms because of the size of a typical class.” This unchallenged testimony

permits a finding that the Alternative School facilities are adequate in those areas. Also,

Appellants do not explain why a trailer is inadequate to conduct an elementary class at the

Alternative School.

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may have been flawed, but pointed out that the MCSD relied upon assurances

from the architect that the same configuration had been used successfully at

other schools. The court held that “[i]ndisputably, the alleged inadequacy of the

music facility at [NMMS] is not a vestige of former segregation practices, nor a

result of the District’s inattention to the needs of the students at the school, and

certainly not the product of intentional discrimination.”

The court concluded: “The proof unequivocally shows that the [MCSD] has

undertaken to address known relevant deficiencies at all its schools, and to

provide adequate and proper educational facilities for all its students, both black

and white.” We find no error in these conclusions. First, it is undisputed that the

MCSD was in the process of making improvements to the football facilities at

VJHS prior to the district court’s ruling. Additionally, although the record

supports Appellants’ claim that the VJHS baseball field pales in comparison to

the one at Ridgeland High School, which is also in the MCSD, the record does

not show that the baseball field at VJHS is inadequate. Further, a number of

improvements to the Ridgeland High School baseball field were the result of

private fund-raising efforts. Regarding the allegedly inadequate music facilities

at NMMS, Appellants have failed to establish that the decision to move the

music program from the main building to portables is a vestige of past

discrimination.11

c. Faculty and staff assignment and pay

Faculty and staff issues are also relevant under Green. Dowell, 498 U.S.

at 250. In Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, we

announced several requirements for hiring and assigning faculty and staff in

11

Relatedly, Appellants argue that the MCSD has discriminated in its use of sixteenth

section loan funds. The district court held that in 2005, the MCSD approved a $630,000 loan,

$400,000 of which went to fund improvements to the track and stadium at VJHS—a use

selected by a parent group at VJHS. Based on our review, we simply find no clear error in the

court’s conclusion that the sixteenth section loan funds have not been used in a discriminatory

manner.

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schools under desegregation orders. See 419 F.2d 1211, 1217-18 (5th Cir. 1969)

(en banc), rev’d in part sub. nom., Carter v. West Feliciana Parish Sch. Bd., 396

U.S. 290 (1969). Only two of the Singleton requirements are relevant here. First,

a school must show that faculty and staff who work directly with children are

assigned in such a manner that the racial composition of the faculty and staff

would not indicate that the school is intended for either African-American or

white students. Id. Second, “discrimination on the basis of race, color or national

origin in the hiring, assignment, promotion, pay, demotion or dismissal of faculty

members and administrative staff” is prohibited. Fort Bend Ind. Sch. Dist. v.

Stafford, 651 F.2d 1133, 1138 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing Singleton, 419 F.2d at

1217-18). We have made clear that these requirements do not establish an

arbitrary racial quota. See id. at 1139.

The 2000 consent order required the MCSD to meet its Singleton

obligation by ensuring that the faculty composition at each school in the district

is within a 15% range of the district-wide ratio of African-American to white

teachers. Appellants claim the MCSD has failed to satisfy its obligation and that

this failure is due, in large part, the MCSD’s unwillingness to exercise is power

to force teachers to transfer. Appellants further contend that the MCSD’s hiring

is not centralized, making it difficult to monitor how many minorities apply for,

and are considered, for teaching positions district-wide. Lastly, Appellants

accuse the MCSD of paying minority administrators inequitably. The MCSD

admits that it has failed to satisfy the required faculty ratio at VJHS, but claims

it has expended its best efforts to bring more white teachers to the school. The

MCSD explains that it has not forced teachers to transfer because that effort

would be counterproductive and would lead to teachers leaving the district

entirely. Further, the MCSD points out that in the 2005-2006 school year, the

faculty at VJHS was 44% white, 47% African-American, and 8% other, a

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composition that would not indicate that VJHS is intended for either African-

American or white students.

The district court, having heard testimony from the MCSD’s

superintendent and its personnel director, concluded that “every principal is

keenly” aware of Singleton’s requirements and the requirements of the 2000

consent order as it relates to faculty hiring. The court also found that the only

options to remedy the faculty assignment problem are forced faculty transfers

or increased pay for faculty who agree to transfer. Regarding the first option, the

court found the that MCSD’s decision not to force teachers to transfer was

reasonable, given the risk that the district would likely lose teachers to other

districts under such a policy. Regarding the second option, the court noted that

increased pay, beyond what is authorized by statute, is apparently prohibited by

state law. Further, the district court concluded that the MCSD’s method for

determining administrator pay, including consideration of such factors as the

size of the school, grade levels taught at the school, and experience, was rational

and non-discriminatory.

The MCSD has not satisfied its requirement to ensure that the faculty

composition at each school in the district is within a 15% range of the district-

wide ratio of African-American to white teachers. However, the MCSD provided

the district court with considerable evidence that each school is aware of its

Singleton obligation and that it has worked aggressively to ensure that each of

its schools is staffed with a diverse faculty. As to VJHS, we note that while

falling short of the requirement of the 2000 consent decree, the faculty

composition is, in fact, quite diverse. Furthermore, the MCSD has documented

its extensive minority recruitment efforts, which includes recruiting at

predominantly African-American colleges and universities in Mississippi. And

there is no evidence that the MCSD’s faculty and staff employment and

assignment practices, or its compensation scheme for administrators, is

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No. 06-60902

currently discriminatory or that the district did not adequately remedy the

adverse effects of prior de jure segregation. See Stafford, 651 F.2d at 1140

(holding that Singleton requirements are satisfied if the district’s current

employment practices are non-discriminatory and in compliance with the

Constitution and the adverse effects of any prior unlawful employment practices

have been adequately remedied). Lastly, the MCSD’s expert, Dr. Rossell,

evaluated the available information and opined that the MCSD has met the

standard for unitary status on this factor “because it has racially balanced its

staff to the extent practicable and [is] comparable to the level of other districts

that have attained unitary status.” Based on the evidence in the record, the

district court did not clearly err in finding the MCSD unitary regarding faculty

and staff policies.

III.

After its thorough review of the evidence, the district court ultimately

concluded that the MCSD:

[H]as met its constitutional obligation to eliminate the vestiges de

jure segregation to the extent practicable and that it has shown a

good faith commitment to and compliance with its desegregation

orders and to the rights that were the impetus for the court’s orders.

The court thus concludes that unitary status has been achieved in

all of the District’s operations, so that further judicial oversight is

neither required nor desirable.

Based on our review of the record, we find no clear error in these findings.

We are also cognizant of the important interest in “[r]eturning schools to the

control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date” in order to “restore

their true accountability . . . . to the citizenry [and] to the political process.”

Freeman, 503 U.S. at 490; see Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247 (“From the very first,

federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a temporary measure

to remedy past discrimination.”).

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Lastly, we would like to recognize those who have contributed their

substantial efforts—teachers, administrators, parents, citizens, and others—to

the difficult task of transforming the MCSD from a district practicing de jure

segregation to one that has remedied the adverse affects thereof to the extent

practicable. With our compliments to those involved in bringing about this

accomplishment, and having found no clear error in the district court’s findings,

we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

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No. 06-60902

CARL E. STEWART, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:

I concur in the majority opinion and its affirmance of the district court’s

grant of the Madison County School District’s motion for unitary status. I

nonetheless write separately to highlight the significant and sensitive issues

raised in this appeal.

When this lawsuit began in 1969, racial isolation of students was fostered

by a de jure system of racial segregation. Indeed, Brown v. Board of Education,

347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny were primarily concerned with rooting out

racial isolation and the accompanying pernicious effects it has on children.

Here, the district court concluded and our panel affirms that the Madison

County School District has achieved unitary status even though it is undisputed

that many black students, particularly those in Zone I, continue to attend

schools that are racially isolated. Further, hundreds of black students who have

exercised their prerogative not to attend racially isolated schools will no longer

be able to do so once federal court supervision ends, and the majority-to-minority

transfer program with it. While the record provides a detailed account of the

many obstacles that prevent the existence of fully integrated schools—such as

the confluence of the geography and demography in the district—the cruel irony

is that racial isolation, albeit not as the product of de jure segregation, largely

remains as foreboding and potentially deleterious as it was when federal court

supervision began. Of course, this case is only the latest indication that despite

the societal progress that has been made in dismantling systems of segregation,

many of the concerns highlighted in Brown still remain as viable today as when

that opinion was first authored.

Justice Kennedy recently observed: “This Nation has a moral and ethical

obligation to fulfill its historical commitment to creating an integrated society

that ensures equal opportunity for all its children.” Parents Involved in Cmty.

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Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2797 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,

concurring). Despite the grant of unitary status, this commitment undeniably

remains unfulfilled in Madison County.

Unquestionably, there have been substantial efforts on the part of the

district and all the parties involved to create a unitary school district while also

ameliorating the effects of the de jure segregation that was in place for so many

decades. Moreover, it is encouraging that the school district avowed to the

district court that even after unitary status is granted, it will remain committed

to improving any disparities between the facilities at majority-black and

majority-white schools and providing resources targeted at improving learning

and teaching opportunities at Zone I and similarly-situated schools. I take these

overtures to bespeak a continuing good faith effort on the part of the district to

seek out creative and effective remedies that are designed at maximizing

educational opportunities for all its students. Hopefully, the difficulties inherent

in this challenge will not hinder the district from moving closer to fully meeting

the promises of Brown.

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