explaining that “[c]ases requiring the renewal of the objection at trial rely on Hunter v. State, which held only that a lack of similarity argument was not preserved by other objections at the pretrial similar transaction hearing, which objections were simply renewed at trial”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[c]ases requiring the renewal of the objection at trial rely on Hunter v. State, which held only that a lack of similarity argument was not preserved by other objections at the pretrial similar transaction hearing, which objections were simply renewed at trial”
- holding that, before enactment of the “new” evidence code, that a defendant had the right to be present at a hearing under former Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3(B
- holding that videotape recording of drug transaction was the key factor weighing against the need to reveal the Cl’s identity, since the objective evidence diminished the need for the Cl to testify
- noting inconsistency between motion in limine rule, where objection need not be renewed at trial, and similar transaction rule, where trial objection is required
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
POPE, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree with the opinion in full and with the majority’s conclusion in Division 2 that McClarity waived his objection to the similar transaction evidence by failing to object to the evidence at trial. McClarity did not file a motion in limine regarding the prior transactions, but merely objected at the hearing on the State’s motion to introduce evidence of similar transactions. Given these circumstances, the argument here was waived. See Sapeu v. State, 222 Ga. App. 509, 510 (4) ( 474 SE2d 703 ) (1996).
Despite my agreement that McClarity waived his objection, I concur specially with the opinion because of an important fact which is omitted from the majority’s discussion in Division 2. That fact is that the December 1988 similar transaction evidence which McClarity claims was improperly admitted was properly before the jury. Thus, regardless of the lack of an objection, McClarity’s argument that the evidence was erroneously admitted is meritless. McClarity was on trial for selling cocaine in 1996 to an undercover police officer in a certain area of Cedartown. Evidence regarding the prior act showed that eight years earlier McClarity was driving a vehicle in the same geographical area and that police searched his vehicle and found 30 grams of cocaine on the person of the passenger in McClarity’s vehicle. The witness who had conducted the 1988 search testified that the search was conducted after the police received information that McClarity would be in the area after leaving a local motel. After a jury trial, McClarity was convicted of trafficking in cocaine. The court’s finding that there was sufficient similarity between the crimes was proper. See Tate v. State, 230 Ga. App. 186, 187 (2) ( 495 SE2d 658 ) (1998); Collins v. State, 205 Ga. App. 341, 343 (2) ( 422 SE2d 56 ) (1992).