The opinion
Beasley, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in Divisions 1 and 2. With respect to Division 3,1 concur as we have followed this procedure before. Lark v. State, 190 Ga. App. 821 ( 380 SE2d 505 ) (1989).
However, it should be noted that defendant did not raise this issue in the trial court, as could have been done. New counsel filed a notice of appeal instead of first seeking correction in the trial court. Doing so would have met what the Supreme Court regards as “a requisite of a sound system of criminal justice, serving alike the proper ends of defendants and of the public, [which is] that any contention concerning the violation of [a] constitutional right . . . should be made at the earliest practicable moment.” Smith v. State, 255 Ga. 654 ( 341 SE2d 5 ) (1986). This principle, which was there applied to the right of counsel, has been similarly applied subsequently in Thompson v. State, 257 Ga. 386, 388 ( 359 SE2d 664 ) (1987), and Dawson v. State, 258 Ga. 380 ( 369 SE2d 897 ) (1988).
It ought also apply here, with waiver occurring in the future if the principle is not observed. Otherwise we become complicitors in delay by institutionalizing it. Overlooking the absence of a timely raising in the trial court encourages a lack of vigilance during the criminal proceeding in the knowledge that this court would simply return the case for further hearing. Piecemeal direct appeals, whereby a criminal case is shunted back and forth between the courts, ought to be avoided rather than reach routine proportions. Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 311 ( 357 SE2d 578 ) (1987) is a good example.