Opinion

People v. Onofre

  • 51 N.Y.2d 476
  • 434 N.Y.S.2d 947
  • 415 N.E.2d 936
  • 20 A.L.R. 4th 987
  • 1980 N.Y. LEXIS 2743
Court
New York Court of Appeals
Filed
Dec 18, 1980
Status
Published
Author
Jasen
On the bench
Another, Cooke, Fuchsberg, Gabrielli, Jasen, Jones, Meyer, Wachtler
Cited by
108 cases
Authority
More cited than 27.2%

holding that the right of privacy extends to people who engage in "deviant" sexual conduct "so long as the decisions are voluntarily made by adults in a noncommercial, private setting”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the right of privacy extends to people who engage in "deviant" sexual conduct "so long as the decisions are voluntarily made by adults in a noncommercial, private setting”
  • invalidating “consensual sodomy” statute prohibiting “deviate sexual intercourse” on constitutional privacy and Equal Protection grounds because the statute “reach[ed] noncommercial, cloistered personal sexual conduct of consenting adults and ... permitted] the same conduct between persons married to each other without sanction”
  • New York's sodomy law impermissibly invades "the cloak of the right of privacy... in acts of sexual intimacy ... voluntarily made by adults in a noncommercial private setting."
  • involving the commission of sexual acts in an automobile parked on a public street

Written by the judges who cited it.

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education, 729 F.2d 1270 (1984)

    Baker and Onofre are inapplicable to the instant case.
    Court of Appeals for the Tenth CircuitMar 14, 1984Read it

The opinion

Jasen, J.

(concurring in result). While I cannot accept the majority’s premise that the so-called “penumbral” right to privacy which first appeared in Griswold v Connecticut ( 381 US 479 ) should be extended to encompass and protect any and all types of consensual sexual behavior in private, I nonetheless concur in result herein for I can discern no rational basis upon which the Legislature could have decided to freely allow the conduct in issue among married people and to make identical conduct criminal among those for whom that estate is undesirable or unattainable.

I hasten to add that, in my opinion, the Legislature does have the power to make moral judgments. However, that legislative power is, as all others are, limited by the supervening requirement that it be exercised with the requisite evenhandedness. Here, it was not.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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