concluding that defamatory per se statements in any “written or 31 No. 22-558-cv printed article” are actionable without alleging special damages (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- concluding that defamatory per se statements in any “written or 31 No. 22-558-cv printed article” are actionable without alleging special damages (internal quotation marks omitted)
- applying Karaduman and Weiner v. Doubleday & Co., 74 N.Y.2d 586, 550 N.Y.S.2d 251, 549 N.E.2d 453 (1989
- applying Karaduman and Weiner v. Doubleday & Co., 74 N.Y.2d 586, 550 N.Y.S.2d 251, 549 N.E.2d 453 (1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930, 110 S.Ct. 2168, 109 L.Ed.2d 498 (1990)
- acknowledging the Restatement of Torts 2d § 582 in conflict with its holding that a plaintiff has the burden to prove a defamatory statement made about a public figure is false
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Lewis v. Newsday, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 434 (1998)
The cases cited by the motion court and by defendants to support such reliance, Weiner v Doubleday & Co. (74 NY2d 586, cert denied 495 US 930) and Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston (42 NY2d 369, cert denied 434 US 969), are inapposite because the journalists in those cases had themselves conducted the necessary research and investigation, and the defendant publishers were found entitled to rely, without independent…
Distinguished by Pace v. Rebore, 107 A.D.2d 30 (1985)
Moreover, since, as is discussed above, the literature did not accuse plaintiffs of a crime, the exception to the normal rule recognized in Rinaldi v Holt, Rinehart & Winston (42 NY2d 369, 381-382) and Silsdorf v Levine (supra, p 16) is inapplicable.
The opinion
Chief Judge Breitel (concurring).
I concur in result and subscribe to the opinion of Judge Jasen. I do so however on the constraint of the controlling Supreme Court cases which at this time place undue burdens of proof on the defamed, whether public officials or private persons injected into the arena of public interest. For an illustration, I find it virtually impossible to bear the burden of proving that one is not "corrupt” or "probably corrupt”. Moreover, ordinarily, the test of clear and convincing evidence of malice would be one addressed as an evidence-weighing standard for fact finders to follow rather than a standard applied as a matter of law on summary judgment. Yet the present state of the law as declared by the Supreme Court makes necessary the implications and analysis cogently drawn by Judge Jasen. Consequently, I vote to reverse and grant summary judgment in accordance with the majority opinion.