the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that the California death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it did not require "(3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt"
How later courts described this case
- the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that the California death penalty statute was unconstitutional because it did not require "(3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt"
- “[W]e have consistently concluded, both before and since Lackey, that delay inherent in the automatic appeal process is not a basis for concluding that either the death penalty itself, or the process leading to its execution, is cruel and unusual punishment.”
- “[Appellate delay in a capital case is not cruel and unusual punishment.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I concur in the opinion of the court.
It has long been my position that we should vacate a sentence of death imposed on a criminal defendant as unreliable, in violation of both the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and also the cruel or unusual punishment clause of article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of whatever evidence was available. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1385 [ 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 ] (cone. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence]; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn. 1 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 892 P.2d 1287 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 835 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 , 889 P.2d 588 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same], reiterating People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1074 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 , 846 P.2d 756 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.), revd. sub nom. Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318 [ 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 ] (by the court); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 577 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; see also People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1197 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [finding a sentence of death unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 when trial counsel introduced in mitigation none of the available evidence, albeit at the defendant’s request]; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 531-533 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1059-1062 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1158-1161 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 635 , 751 P.2d 901 ] (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [to similar effect under the Eighth Amendment]; People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 360-368 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925 ] [same].)
In this case, I would not vacate the sentence of death imposed on Anderson as unreliable. To be sure, trial counsel did not introduce in mitigation any of the presumably available evidence relating to Anderson’s background and character. But he did indeed introduce extensive evidence to raise a lingering doubt about Anderson’s guilt of any of the murders in question. He proved unsuccessful in his efforts. He nevertheless made the attempt. That is enough.