noting tension between right to speedy trial and right to effective assistance of counsel that arises "when the defendant's desire to invoke the right to speedy trial by refusing to waive time [comes] into conflict with defense counsel's request for a continuance"
How later courts described this case
- noting tension between right to speedy trial and right to effective assistance of counsel that arises "when the defendant's desire to invoke the right to speedy trial by refusing to waive time [comes] into conflict with defense counsel's request for a continuance"
- holding that in California “one may be con- victed of burglary even if he enters with consent”
- “The entry need not be a trespass to support a burglary conviction. Thus, a person who enters for a felonious purpose may be found guilty of burglary even if he enters with the owner’s or occupant’s consent.”
- “Courts have uniformly held that it 12 is proper to allocate to the defendant the burden of proving that a witness is an accomplice.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disapproved on other grounds by People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390 (2009)
18 Cal.4th 894, 970 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22
Distinguished
Distinguished by People v. Mungia, 44 Cal. 4th 1101 (2008)
Although defendant argues that Frye is distinguishable because the request there was open ended, here there was no guarantee that on April 19, 1996, Deputy Public Defender Isaacs’s physician would have been able to
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I generally concur in the opinion of the court.
I write separately because I would reject, at the very threshold, appellant’s contention that the sentence of death imposed on him in the judgment on appeal amounts to cruel and/or unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution, because of the effect that it has assertedly had on him as he has awaited its execution during years in confinement. “Appellate jurisdiction,” however, “is limited to the four comers of the record on appeal” (In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 646 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ]), and to “matters” that are “properly subject to judicial notice” (People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 57, fn. 10 [ 177 Cal.Rptr. 458 , 634 P.2d 534 , 23 A.L.R.4th 776 ]). By its very terms, appellant’s claim, which has arisen postjudgment, goes beyond the record and judicial notice. It is not trivial. But it may not be presented here. 1
Whether appellant’s claim is “narrowly framed” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 1030, fn. 5) is open to question. Whether it “may be resolved without reference to external matters” (ibid.) is not. It may not. That is because it is, in fact, based on such “external matters,” including an assertion by appellant that respondent and the superior court “took nearly seven years to obtain a [sufficient] record," and did so only after he “was compelled to force [them] to provide him with transcripts which were correct versions of what transpired in the course of his case.” As such, it is not similar to the point in People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1014 [ 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475 , 839 P.2d 984 ], which was a “frontal attack on the validity of the death penalty in all cases” predicated on the “delay inherent in the capital appeal process.”