Opinion

People v. Ramos

  • 15 Cal. 4th 1133
  • 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 892
  • 97 Daily Journal DAR 8678
  • 938 P.2d 950
  • 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5405
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Jul 7, 1997
Status
Published
Author
Mosk
On the bench
Brown, Kennard, Mosk
Cited by
249 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.2%

“When a defense witness, other than the 25 defendant himself, has testified to the reputation of the accused, the prosecution may inquire of the 26 witness whether he has heard of acts or conduct by the defendant inconsistent with the witness’ 27 testimony. So long as the People have a good faith belief that the acts or conduct about which 1 they wish to inquire actually took place, they may so inquire.”

How later courts described this case

  • “When a defense witness, other than the 25 defendant himself, has testified to the reputation of the accused, the prosecution may inquire of the 26 witness whether he has heard of acts or conduct by the defendant inconsistent with the witness’ 27 testimony. So long as the People have a good faith belief that the acts or conduct about which 1 they wish to inquire actually took place, they may so inquire.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

MOSK, J.

I concur in the opinion of the court prepared by Justice Brown.

After careful review, I cannot deem reversible whatever error the superior court may have committed by assertedly not permitting defendant to ask prospective jurors, in accordance with language that would subsequently appear in People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1004 [ 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818 , 874 P.2d 248 ], “whether they would always . . . vote for the death penalty in cases involving any generalized facts . . . that were likely to be shown by the evidence at trial.” The error, if such it be, is a violation solely of California decisional law. It is subject to review for harmlessness. (See id. at p. 1005.) In my view, it survives scrutiny. Notwithstanding any restriction by the superior court, there was in fact inquiry that was adequate to determine that none of the 12 persons who would be sworn as jurors and actually vote for the death penalty held “views on capital punishment” that “would ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.’ ” (Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [ 105 S.Ct. 844, 852 , 83 L.Ed.2d 841 ], quoting Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45 [ 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 ].) Certainly, as to eight of the twelve, defendant posed questions that presented “generalized facts” similar to those that would be “shown by the evidence at trial”; as to four, he probed by like means. As to none can he now raise any doubt concerning the performance of his duties.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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