Opinion

People v. Francis

  • 71 Cal. 2d 66
  • 75 Cal. Rptr. 199
  • 450 P.2d 591
  • 1969 Cal. LEXIS 234
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
May 6, 1969
Status
Published
Author
Mosk
On the bench
Burke, McComb, Mosk, Peters, Sullivan, Tohriner, Traynor
Cited by
291 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.2%

Distinguished

  • Distinguished by People v. Vela, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 880 (2018)

    *1111In Francis , the Attorney General argued that Estrada was distinguishable because the Legislature had not unambiguously reduced the defendant's sentence; rather, it had changed the crime from a straight felony to a "wobbler." ( *889Francis , supra , 71 Cal.2d at p. 76, 75 Cal.Rptr. 199, 450 P.2d 591.
    California Court of Appeal, 5th DistrictMar 28, 2018Read it
  • Distinguished by People v. Mendoza, 10 Cal. App. 5th 327 (2017)

    People v. Francis, supra, 71 Cal.2d 66 relied on by Ramirez, is distinguishable.
    California Court of AppealMar 30, 2017Read it

The opinion

MOSK, J.

I concur and dissent.

I agree with the-rationale of the opinion, and with the general relevance of In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740 [ 48 Cal.Rptr. 172 , 408 P.2d 948 ], However, the disposition ordered by the majority is an exercise in futility that serves no. useful purpose other than mere bookkeeping.

I Section 11530 of the Health and Safety Code as amended, and properly found by the majority to be applicable to defendant, gives the trial judge the option of sentencing a defendant to state prison for one to ten years or to the county Ijail for not more than one year. On the date the defendant Iwas sentenced, the trial judge had the option of sending him jfco state prison for one to ten years or placing him on probation with appropriate conditions, including up to a year in the county jail.

I Given the alternatives of imposing a state prison sentence Ir probation with up to a year in the county jail, this trial Budge rejected the lesser and pronounced the maximum sentence upon a defendant who he determined, in the exercise of Bndicial discretion, required the maximum in order to effect lis rehabilitation. A fortiori the judge, had he been given the ill lesser alternatives now permitted under the amended Batute, would have rejected them.

Therefore the return of the defendant to court for resentencing at this late date is an idle act that merely disrupts prison routine and burdens a court calendar with an unnecessary and unproductive proceeding. It would appear to exalt form over substance. For that reason I dissent from the judgment.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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