“Because the parties do not dispute that Trooper Dean was acting within his discretionary authority, we must consider whether Trooper Dean violated a clearly established constitutional right.”
How later courts described this case
- “Because the parties do not dispute that Trooper Dean was acting within his discretionary authority, we must consider whether Trooper Dean violated a clearly established constitutional right.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
------------------------------------------- ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 07, 2007
No. 06-14739
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
--------------------------------------------
D.C. Docket No. 05-00384-CV-W-N
GEORGE HOEY MORRIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DANIEL DEAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
-------------------------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
---------------------------------------
(May 7, 2007)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant George Hoey Morris appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Alabama State Trooper Daniel Dean on Morris’s claims
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and against Trooper Dean in his individual
capacity. The district court determined that Trooper Dean was entitled to qualified
immunity on all claims. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s entry of summary judgment based on
qualified immunity. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002).
We resolve all issues of material fact in favor of Plaintiff; and we determine
whether Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity under that version of the facts.
Id.
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials
sued in their individual capacities if their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal
quotation omitted). To receive qualified immunity, the defendant must prove that
he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority. Williams v. Consol.
City of Jacksonville, 341 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2003). After the defendant
establishes that he was acting within his discretionary authority, “the burden shifts
to the plaintiff to demonstrate that qualified immunity is not appropriate” by
showing (1) that a constitutional violation occurred and (2) that the constitutional
right was clearly established. Lumley v. City of Dade City, 327 F.3d 1186, 1194
(11th Cir. 2003). Because the parties do not dispute that Trooper Dean was acting
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within his discretionary authority, we must consider whether Trooper Dean
violated a clearly established constitutional right.
On appeal, Morris -- who was stopped by Trooper Dean for driving 61
m.p.h. in a 30 m.p.h. zone -- argues that Trooper Dean detained him beyond a
reasonable time needed to complete the traffic stop. Trooper Dean pulled Morris’s
vehicle to the side of the road at approximately 4:09 p.m. At 4:36 p.m., Trooper
Dean issued Morris a traffic ticket; and a police dog, previously requested by
Trooper Dean, arrived on the scene at 4:40 p.m. Morris was allowed to leave the
scene of the stop at 4:52 p.m. Morris asserts that being detained for 43 minutes for
a traffic stop was unreasonable.1
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from “unreasonable searches
and seizures” by government officials; “and its protections extend to brief
investigatory stops of persons or vehicles . . . .”2 United States v. Arvizu, 122
S.Ct. 744, 750 (2002). A traffic stop must be of “limited duration,” and “may not
last any longer than necessary to process the traffic violation unless there is
articulable suspicion of other illegal activity.” United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d
1
We note that Morris previously abandoned his claims that Trooper Dean performed an illegal
pat-down on Morris and unconstitutionally handcuffed him.
2
The Fourth Amendment was incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Ingraham v. Wright, 97 S.Ct. 1401, 1413 n.42 (1977).
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1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted). Therefore, the stop
“may be prolonged where an officer is able to articulate a reasonable suspicion of
other illegal activity beyond the traffic offense.” United States v. Perkins, 348
F.3d 965, 970 (11th Cir. 2003).
“[R]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause
and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence . . .
.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675 (2000). “When making a determination
of reasonable suspicion, we must look at the totality of the circumstances of each
case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Perkins, 348 F.3d at 970 (internal quotation
omitted). In addition, officers can “conduct a variety of checks on the driver and
his car, including questioning the driver about the traffic violation, requesting
consent to search the car, and running a computer check for outstanding warrants.”
United States v. Simmons, 172 F.3d 775, 778 (11th Cir. 1999).
Before pulling Morris over, Trooper Dean observed that Morris’s vehicle
sped up when Morris saw Trooper Dean’s car. Morris was driving a convertible
car with its top down on a chilly December day. After pulling Morris over,
Trooper Dean ran a check of the driver’s license that Morris had provided -- a
Florida license listing an Alabama address; and Trooper Dean learned that Morris
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also had a current Alabama driver’s license as well as a prior drug arrest. Morris
did not reveal that he had an Alabama license; and he evaded Trooper Dean’s
question about whether he had a prior arrest for a drug offense. Trooper Dean also
noticed that Morris’s pupils were small and that his eyes were watery, which
Trooper Dean believed could indicate drug use because Morris denied taking
medication. Trooper Dean also detected that Morris had a strong body odor,
which Trooper Dean had been taught can indicate drug use; and Trooper Dean
noted that the area where Morris was stopped is known for drug activity.
In the light of the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Trooper
Dean had a reasonable, articulable suspicion for detaining Morris until the police
canine unit arrived at the scene of the stop.3 After pulling Morris over, Trooper
Dean discovered that Morris had an Alabama license and a prior drug arrest, both
of which Morris failed to disclose to Trooper Dean. As the district court noted,
these facts combined with the other circumstances of the stop -- such as the
appearance of Morris’s pupils -- indicate that it was reasonable for Trooper Dean
3
The police dog arrived approximately four minutes after Trooper Dean issued Morris’s traffic
ticket. To the extent that Morris argues that Trooper Dean took an unreasonable time in issuing the
traffic citation, we reject this argument as without merit. After pulling Morris over, Trooper Dean,
among other things, spoke with Morris about his traffic offense, obtained Morris’s license, ran a
check on Morris, asked Morris for consent to search, and questioned Morris about why he had two
licenses. And Trooper Dean briefly handcuffed Morris after Morris disobeyed Trooper Dean’s
instruction to stand with his hands on his vehicle.
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to suspect Morris of criminal activity beyond his traffic offense. Morris has failed
to meet his burden of demonstrating that his detention was in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
We next address Morris’s claim that Trooper Dean’s warrantless search of
Morris’s vehicle was unconstitutional. Morris did not consent to a search of his
vehicle; but a police dog sniffed around Morris’s vehicle and alerted on the
passenger side of the car. As a result, Trooper Dean had probable cause to search
the limited area of the vehicle where the dog had alerted. See United States v.
Glinton, 154 F.3d 1245, 1257 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[O]fficers had no probable cause
to search [defendant’s] car until the drug-sniffing dog, which officers called to the
scene, began scratching and biting at the car’s driver-side door.”); Merrett v.
Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1551 n.7 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n alert by a narcotics trained
dog establishes probable cause to believe a car contains illegal narcotics.”).
Morris has failed to demonstrate that a constitutional violation occurred with the
limited search of his vehicle.
We affirm the grant of summary judgment to Trooper Dean.
AFFIRMED.
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