The opinion
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-13856 FEBRUARY 23, 2007
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 05-00183-CV-RLV-4
FLOYD D. MANNING,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEVE WILSON,
Sheriff, Walker County, Georgia,
in his Official and Individual Capacity, et al.,
Defendants,
RON CLARK,
Deputy Sheriff, Walker County, Georgia,
in his Official and Individual Capacity,
PAMELA S. PANGLE,
Parole Officer, State Board of Pardons and
Paroles, Walker County, Georgia, in her Official
and Individal Capacity,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(February 23, 2007)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ron Clark and Pamela Pangle appeal from an adverse summary judgment
denying them qualified immunity from Floyd Manning’s claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 that Clark and Pangle violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. In our de novo review of the
district court’s ruling, we first resolve all issues of material fact in favor of the
plaintiff, and then proceed to the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled
to qualified immunity under his version of the facts. Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d
1188, 1190 (11th Cir. 2002). Under Manning’s version of the relevant facts, Clark
and Pangle “jimmied” the front lock of his house and searched the premises
without a warrant, and in the absence of any exigent circumstances. If proven at
trial, these facts would compel the conclusion that Clark and Pangle, acting in a
discretionary capacity, committed a “clearly established” constitutional violation,
Crosby v. Monroe County, 394 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004). Therefore, they
are not entitled to qualified immunity and the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
2