Opinion

J.P. Sivick v. Com. of PA, SEC

Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Dec 22, 2021
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Covey, J.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.3%

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

John P. Sivick, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

State Ethics Commission, : No. 307 C.D. 2021

Respondent : Argued: October 18, 2021

BEFORE: HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COVEY FILED: December 22, 2021

John P. Sivick (Sivick) petitions this Court for review of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) State Ethics Commission’s

(Commission) February 3, 2021 final adjudication and order (Adjudication After

Remand),1 wherein the Commission concluded that Sivick violated Section 1103(a)

of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act2 (Ethics Act), Section 1104(d) of the

Ethics Act,3 and Section 1105(a) and 1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act,4 ordered Sivick

to file complete and accurate amended Statements of Financial Interests (SFI) for

2011 and 2014, and directed that the matter be referred to the Pike County (County)

District Attorney and the Pennsylvania Attorney General with the Commission’s

recommendation that criminal prosecutions be initiated against Sivick. On appeal,

1

The order is Commission order number 1731-2, mailed on February 25, 2021.

2

65 Pa.C.S. § 1103(a).

3

65 Pa.C.S. § 1104(d).

4

65 Pa.C.S. § 1105(a), (b)(5).

Sivick presents one issue for this Court’s review: whether the Commission

erroneously concluded that Sivick committed conflict of interest violations under

Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act relative to activities Sivick undertook before

Lehman Township5 (Township) hired his son, J. Justin Sivick (Son). After review,

this Court affirms.6

The Township is a second class township with a three-member Board

of Supervisors (Board). Sivick served as a Supervisor on the Board (Supervisor)

from January 1994 until December 2017, and as Board Chairman since 2004.

Sivick has also held the Township’s full-time Roadmaster position since 1995. In

2005, the Board assigned Sivick the additional responsibilities of Public Works

Director. Other Supervisors during the subject time periods included Richard C.

Vollmer (Vollmer), Paul D. Menditto (Menditto), and Robert H. Rohner (Rohner).

Vollmer became a Supervisor on July 5, 2000, and, at the time of the Commission’s

proceeding, was serving his third term.7 Vollmer has been Board Vice Chairman

since January 2004. Menditto served as a Supervisor from January 2004 through

January 2014, when he resigned his position following his election as a Magisterial

District Judge. Rohner, who had been Township Secretary/Treasurer since 1995,

became a Supervisor in January 2014, replacing Menditto on the Board.

In 2009, during his time as Supervisor, Menditto substantially upgraded

the Township’s existing three-page employee pamphlet to an employee handbook

(Handbook), which included detailed rules and regulations, and contained a policy

that prohibited the hiring of an individual if that person would supervise or be

5

Lehman Township is located in Pike County, Pennsylvania.

6

References herein to witness testimony are, in fact, references to deposition testimony

that, pursuant to the parties’ stipulations, would have been presented to the Commission, under

oath, had a hearing been held.

7

See Section 403 of The Second Class Township Code, Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as

amended, added by Section 1 of the Act of November 9, 1995, P.L. 350, 53 P.S. § 65403.

2

supervised by a member of the person’s immediate family (Nepotism Policy).8 The

Board approved the Handbook, which included the Nepotism Policy.

The Township did not have a formal hiring process, and Sivick

conducted all of the Township’s hiring. In late 2012, Sivick verbally expressed to

his fellow Supervisors in one-on-one, unadvertised meetings, that he wanted the

Township to employ his Son. During these conversations, Sivick and the other

Supervisors acknowledged that the Nepotism Policy would need to be removed from

the Handbook before his Son could be hired.9 Shortly thereafter, Menditto, in

consultation with the Supervisors, including Sivick, revised the Handbook to remove

the Nepotism Policy.

8

The Nepotism Policy defined “immediate family” as “one’s spouse, parent, son or

daughter, sister or brother, grandparent or grandchild.” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 94a-95a.

9

Rohner testified that, in the fall of 2012, Sivick told him: “I want to hire my [S]on, [so]

we need to change the [Handbook].” R.R. at 127a. Rohner opined that Sivick did not present

the Handbook change and hiring of his Son as a suggestion, but rather as a directive. See

R.R. at 128a. Rohner stated: “If you know [Sivick], that’s how it goes.” Id. “Rohner [explained]

that . . . Sivick was the Township Supervisor who primarily ran things at the Township, and

if he wanted things done[,] they got done.” Commission Adjudication (February 25, 2021 Order

1731-2) at 11, ¶ 33(b)(1) (emphasis added). Vollmer testified:

In late 2012, [Sivick] came and he said[,] . . . “I’d like to somebody

[sic] maybe have my [S]on work here” . . . also in our [H]andbook

we have a thing about hiring employees you know like relatives and

. . . I questioned him on it. I said look, I said “do you really think

that’s a good idea?” I said “because a lot of time you know a father

can’t work with his son.” Now I don’t [sic] know [Son] at this time.

So [Sivick] proceeds to tell me that in the past there have been

[S]upervisors who had their families working in there etc. And I

know this is true . . . [.] But anyway that wasn’t the reason so I asked

him. I said “are you absolutely sure?” I said you know. So he

talked it up and I said [sic] and I had mixed emotions[,] I really did.

I was one way or the other and I said alright look I said “but you

know it’s in the [Handbook] and all” and he said [“]we[]ll we’re

going to have to change the [Handbook] then.” So anyway I

agreed[.] I said okay we’ll change the [Handbook].

R.R. at 156a-157a.

3

On January 7, 2013, at a Township reorganizational meeting, Menditto

moved the Board to approve the “employee benefits and information[,]” that

included the revised Handbook without the Nepotism Policy. Reproduced Record

(R.R.) at 190a. Vollmer seconded Menditto’s motion, and it was approved.

Although present at the meeting, Sivick abstained from voting on the revision, as

instructed by the Township’s Solicitor. Despite the Board’s general practice of

preparing an errata sheet reflecting Handbook changes, Sivick told Menditto not to

prepare an errata sheet, and no errata sheet was created.10 The meeting minutes

do not reflect that the Nepotism Policy was removed. Rather, the minutes reference

the Supervisors approving “the employee benefits and information[,]” and further

document that Sivick abstained from that vote. R.R. at 190a.

As Roadmaster, Sivick coordinated and scheduled training classes for

Township road crew employees. On March 20, 2013, Rohner submitted a

registration form on the Township’s behalf enrolling six individuals in a traffic

control flagger training course that the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation

10

Menditto described the usual process used for implementing changes to the Handbook:

The Supervisors would discuss what change they wanted to make[,]

and then I would make the changes and[,] under most

circumstances[,] I would then develop a[n] errata sheet that would

say here’s what’s changed[,] and I would give out the new

[H]andbook or the revised [H]andbook along with the errata sheet

to the employees . . . and I would have them sign for it so . . .

everybody knew, they didn’t have to look through the whole book

to see what changed.

R.R. at 140a. Menditto recounted that, with respect to the Nepotism Policy’s removal: “[T]hat

process was different. Again the Supervisors did discuss it, it was agreed that [the Nepotism

Policy] would come out[,] along with other minor changes that might have taken place in the

[Hand]book at that point. But I was told [by Sivick] not to make an errata sheet.” R.R. at 141a

(emphasis added). When asked if Sivick explained his reason for directing that no errata sheet be

made, Menditto stated: “I think it was obvious. I don’t remember him telling me why but I think

it was obvious. . . . [H]e didn’t want people seeing that we were taking the [N]epotism [Policy]

out of the [Hand]book.” R.R. at 141a.

4

mandated for individuals with flagging duties. Although Sivick’s Son had not yet

applied for Township employment, his name was among those included in the

Township’s flagger course enrollment form. The Township submitted a $300.00

payment, reflecting a $50.00 enrollment fee for each of the six registered enrollees.

On the same date, Sivick issued a $50.00 check to the Township wherein the memo

line read: “Flagging Class.” R.R. at 172a.

On June 3, 2013, Son applied for Township employment in public

works maintenance.11 In early June 2013, Sivick again approached the Supervisors

about hiring his Son. Although both Vollmer and Menditto admitted that they voted

to approve Son’s employment at a June 2013 meeting,12 the June 2013 Township

meeting minutes do not reflect an official Board vote approving Son’s hiring.

Sivick’s Son began employment on the Township’s road crew on June

10, 2013. His initial pay rate was $15.00 per hour for regular work hours and $22.50

per hour for overtime hours. His starting pay rate was consistent with pay rates for

new Township employees. In 2014, Son’s regular pay rate was $16.20 per hour and

his overtime rate was $24.30 per hour. In 2015, his regular pay rate was $17.45 per

hour and his overtime rate was $26.18 per hour. In 2016, his regular pay rate was

$18.20 per hour and his overtime rate was $27.30 per hour.

11

Son checked a box on the employment application to indicate that he had a relative

employed by the Township, but did not provide information requested therein to identify the

relative, the relative’s relationship to him, or the relative’s position with the Township.

12

According to Menditto, during the time Menditto served as a Township Supervisor,

Sivick did all of the hiring and there was no formal hiring process at the Township. Menditto

testified: “I don’t recall ever being asked an opinion on whether we should hire a certain person or

not.” R.R. at 143a. He further stated that the Board did not ordinarily vote on hiring, and the vote

to hire Son was not recorded in the meeting minutes. Adjudication After Remand at 11, Finding

of Fact 34(d), (f). Record evidence reflects that Son was the only Township employee hired by a

Board vote. Rohner testified that, although Vollmer and Menditto officially moved to hire Son,

“[Sivick] was the one who wanted him hired.” R.R. at 125a.

5

The Township employed Son for 81 pay periods from June 2, 2013, to

July 9, 2016, during which time his gross earnings totaled $126,552.24 (his net

earnings totaled $87,949.36). The Township terminated Son’s employment on June

30, 2016.

On November 15, 2015, the Commission’s Investigative Division

(Investigative Division) received a signed, sworn complaint, wherein it was alleged

that Sivick had violated the Ethics Act. On January 19, 2016, the Investigative

Division initiated a preliminary inquiry and, thereafter, a full investigation, and

notified Sivick accordingly.13 On September 13, 2016, the Investigative Division

13

In his brief, Sivick cites to and relies upon statements contained in a February 3, 2016

Investigative Division Report of Interview prepared by Joseph Sherbaum (Sherbaum) regarding

his interview of Rohner that day. Sherbaum’s February 3, 2016 report provides, in relevant part:

Rohner stated that [Sivick] had asked Vollmer and Menditto to hire

[his Son]. Rohner stated that [Sivick], Vollmer, and Menditto had

told Rohner that “they were going to change the employee

[Handbook] to take out the [N]epotism [P]olicy.” Rohner stated that

those statements had occurred in Rohner’s office at the Township

building. Rohner stated that those statements had occurred multiple

times and that Rohner had replied to them: “[I]t would be nothing

but trouble if they did that.”

Rohner stated that there was never an advertisement or job

announcement for the full-time position that [Son] obtained at

the Township. . . . Rohner stated that there were no other

candidates for that road crew position.

Rohner stated that he did not personally witness [Sivick]

intimidating the other Supervisors into hiring [his Son]. Rohner

stated that Menditto had struggled with the decision to hire [Son].

R.R. at 100a (emphasis added).

Notably, according to a February 8, 2016 Investigative Division Report of Interview,

Rohner called Sherbaum after his February 3, 2016 interview. Sherbaum’s February 8, 2016

report explains:

I had sensed that Rohner had not been as forthcoming with

information . . . and that Rohner seemed to be uneasy due to the

presence of [Township] Solicitor, Robert Bernathy, at said

interview. After that interview, I had told Rohner that he may call

6

mailed Sivick an Investigative Complaint/Findings Report, in response to which

Sivick filed an answer on November 12, 2016. The parties filed a Stipulated Record

in lieu of an evidentiary hearing and filed briefs.

On February 1, 2018, the Commission issued its final adjudication

(First Final Adjudication), wherein it determined that Sivick violated the conflict of

interest provisions of Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act, that Sivick filed timely but

deficient SFIs for calendar years 2011 and 2014 in violation of Section 1105(a) and

1105(b)(5) of the Ethics Act, and that Sivick violated Section 1104(d) of the Ethics

Act because he received compensation from the Township when he did not have

accurate and complete SFIs on file with the Township.

Specifically, the Commission ruled:

[Sivick] used the authority of his public positions for the

private pecuniary benefit of his [Son], when he

participated in discussions and actions of the Board to

eliminate the Township’s Nepotism Policy with the intent

and for the purpose of having his [S]on hired as a

Township road crew employee; when he discussed,

recommended, lobbied, influenced, or sought the support

of the Board to effectuate the hiring of his [S]on as a

Township employee; and when he verified Township

records enabling and/or otherwise directing the payment

of salary/wage to his [S]on from public monies.

....

[Sivick] used the authority of his public office as a

Supervisor by participating in the aforesaid discussions[,]

as well as later discussions with his fellow Supervisors[,]

or email me at any time with additional information. Rohner called

on his own volition to provide additional information . . . .

....

Rohner stated that the road crew position that [Son] had

obtained with the Township in June 2013 was created by

[Sivick] specifically for [his Son] . . . .

R.R. at 112a (emphasis added).

7

regarding the changes to the [Handbook] to remove the

Nepotism Policy. [Sivick]’s discussions/actions to

effectuate the removal of the Nepotism Policy - a policy

that [Sivick] had voted to approve only a few years earlier

- were undertaken with the specific intent, motivation, and

purpose of enabling the hiring of [his Son] by the

Township. Although [Sivick] abstained from the January

7, 2013[] vote of the Board that approved the revised

[Handbook], he had already used the authority of his office

to effectuate the removal of the Nepotism Policy from the

[Handbook] prior to the vote.

....

[Sivick] used the authority of his public office as a

Supervisor when he discussed, recommended, lobbied,

influenced, or sought the support of the Board to effectuate

the hiring of his [S]on as a Township employee. [Sivick]

“pled his case” to Vollmer about seeing his [S]on “get a

chance.” After the Nepotism Policy had been removed

from the [Handbook], [Sivick] again asked Vollmer if it

would be alright if he brought his [S]on in to be a

Township employee. When Vollmer asked [Sivick] if [his

Son] had qualifications for the Township position,

[Sivick] responded affirmatively and informed Vollmer of

his [S]on’s qualifications.

First Final Adj. at 20-21 (citation omitted).

Finally, the Commission held:

[Sivick] used the authority of his public office when he

used the actual power he had by being a Township

Supervisor to access and influence his fellow Township

Supervisors to effectuate both the elimination of the

Township’s Nepotism Policy and the hiring of [his S]on.

Given that the Nepotism Policy would have precluded the

hiring of [his S]on, and given that at least one of the

Supervisors (Vollmer) raised concerns regarding hiring

[his S]on, it is clear that [his Son] would not have been

hired as a Township employee but for [Sivick]’s use of the

authority of his public office as a Supervisor to engage in

discussions with and make recommendations to his fellow

Supervisors and to lobby/influence or seek the support of

those Supervisors with regard to eliminating the Nepotism

8

Policy and hiring his [S]on. But for being a Supervisor,

[Sivick] would not have been in a position to engage in

such communications and to exert such influence to

effectuate the hiring of his [S]on]. [Sivick] was

consciously aware of the private pecuniary benefit his

[S]on would receive if hired by the Township, and

[Sivick]’s actions in getting the Nepotism Policy

eliminated and his [S]on hired were steps to secure that

private pecuniary benefit.

Id. at 21-22. The Commission ordered Sivick to pay $30,000.00 in restitution to the

Commonwealth, and to file complete and accurate SFIs for 2011 and 2014. Sivick

appealed to this Court.

On January 3, 2019, in Sivick v. State Ethics Commission, 202 A.3d 814

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (Sivick I), appeal granted in part, 217 A.3d 182 (Pa. 2019), and

rev’d, 238 A.3d 1250 (Pa. 2020), this Court affirmed the Commission’s First Final

Adjudication. The Sivick I Court concluded that the Commission properly

determined that Sivick had violated Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act when he used

the authority of his office to solicit the elimination of the Township’s Nepotism

Policy and his Son’s hiring, for his Son’s pecuniary gain. This Court also concluded

that Sivick had violated Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act by verifying and

approving his Son’s payroll records. Finally, this Court determined that the

Commission acted in accordance with Section 1107(a)(2) of the Ethics Act when it

ordered Sivick to pay restitution.

9

Sivick sought, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted, an

allowance of appeal;14 however, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court limited its review

to the following issues:15

1) Whether, under Section 1107(13) of the [Ethics Act],

the [] Commission, upon a finding that a public official or

public employee violated the [Ethics] Act, has the

authority to order restitution when the individual who

obtained financial gain is not the public official or

employee, but is an immediate family member of the

public official or employee?

14

Sivick’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal (Pa. No. 118 MAL 2019) raised the following

issues:

1. Whether the Panel abused its discretion and erred by ordering

restitution from a public official on account of wages paid by the

Township to his laborer-son notwithstanding the exemption of

laborers as “public employees” under the Ethics Act and avoiding

other restitutional arguments of the public official by sua sponte

dismissing his standing.

2. Whether the Panel erred by determining a public official commits

a conflict of interest violation under the Ethics Act by inquiring and

discussing, in the same way general members of the public could,

the potential hiring of his [S]on under the First Amendment [, U.S.

Const. amend. I,] with other elected supervisors and without

evidence of threats, intimidation, any quid pro quo arrangements, or

voting of any kind.

3. To what extent, if any, does the Ethics Act require proof of efforts

to furnish improper compensation in order to sustain a conflict of

interest violation?

4. To what extent must the Commonwealth prove alleged ethical

misconduct of supervisory public employees exceeds the

class/subclass exemption for conflicts of interest relative to [eight]

subordinate employees, one of whom was recently added and a

member of supervising public employee’s immediate family?

Id. at 1-2 (italics added).

15

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s per curiam Order declared: “AND NOW, this 6th

day of August, 2019, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is GRANTED, LIMITED TO the

issues set forth below. Allocatur is DENIED as to all remaining issues.” Sivick v. State Ethics

Comm’n (Pa., No. 118 MAL 2019, filed Aug. 6, 2019) (per curiam).

10

2) Whether the action of a public official or public

employee reviewing and approving payroll records of a

group of subordinate employees, one or more of whom is

the public official’s or employee’s immediate family

member, falls within the class/subclass exemption of the

“conflict of interest” definition in the [Ethics Act]?

Sivick v. State Ethics Comm’n (Pa., No. 118 MAL 2019, filed Aug. 6, 2019) (per

curiam). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not grant allowance of appeal on the

issue of whether this Court correctly concluded that the Commission properly

determined that Sivick violated Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act by using the

authority of his offices to solicit the elimination of the Township’s Nepotism Policy

and his Son’s hiring.

On October 1, 2020, in Sivick v. State Ethics Commission, 238 A.3d

1250 (Pa. 2020) (Sivick II), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed this Court’s

Sivick I decision, held that Sivick did not violate Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act

by reviewing and approving his Son’s timesheets, and declared that Section

1107(13) of the Ethics Act did not authorize the Commission to order restitution

where a public official or employee confers a financial benefit on an immediate

family member.

The Sivick II Court explained:

Having established that one of the three stated bases for

the Commission’s finding that Sivick violated Subsection

1103([a]) of the [Ethics] Act is infirm and that the

Commission lacked statutory authority to impose

restitution under the circumstances of this case, we now

must address how to proceed on remand. Although

conflict of interest is a felony, the Commission’s approach

to this case was not like a conventional criminal matter,

which typically proceeds by reference to individual counts

as to each of which a defendant is convicted or acquitted,

with certain potential penalties attaching to each

conviction. By contrast, the Commission’s adjudication

identified three distinct but interrelated actions as

violating [S]ection 1103(a) [of the Ethics Act] without

11

making clear whether each cited basis was sufficient by

itself, or whether the violation was based upon

aggregating the cited wrongdoing into one course of

conduct. This creates a degree of uncertainty that is only

exacerbated by the Commission’s imposition of a single

sanction. It is exacerbated further still, now, by this

Court’s determination that the lone sanction imposed

lacked a statutory basis - and was, in a sense, an illegal

sentence. The parties do not address this complication,

which was immaterial to the court below because it

affirmed the Commission’s [First Final] Adjudication.

When an appellate court invalidates any among a number

of convictions in a given case, or otherwise deems invalid

any component of a sentencing scheme in such a matter,

we assume that the court, having imposed sentence with

an overarching understanding of the aggregate sanction,

should have the opportunity to fashion a new judgment of

sentence. Here, it isn’t even entirely clear that the

Commission would have found a conflict of interest

violation at all without one of its three cited bases for the

violation deemed invalid. But even if the Commission

sustains its finding of a conflict of interest violation on the

cited bases that remain undisturbed by our ruling, it may

well wish to consider alternative sanctions available to it

under Section 1109 of the [Ethics] Act. That is the

Commission’s decision to make on remand.

Sivick II, 238 A.3d at 1266-67 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). Thus, the Sivick

II Court vacated the Commission’s First Final Adjudication, and remanded the

matter to the Commission for further proceedings, including, in the Commission’s

discretion, the entry of a new adjudication and, if appropriate, the imposition of any

sanction available under the Ethics Act.

On February 25, 2021, the Commission mailed its Adjudication After

Remand addressing the remaining charges. The Commission again concluded that

Sivick violated Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act by using the authority of his office

for his Son’s private pecuniary benefit by initiating discussions and taking action to

eliminate the Township’s Nepotism Policy in order to effectuate his Son’s hiring.

12

Further, the Commission’s findings of fact, discussion, and conclusions of law are

almost identical to those in its First Final Adjudication.

The Commission ruled:

[Sivick] used the authority of his public office as a

Township Supervisor by participating in the aforesaid

discussions as well as later discussions with his fellow

Supervisors regarding the changes to the [Handbook] to

remove the Nepotism Policy. [Sivick’s]

discussions/actions to effectuate the removal of the

Nepotism Policy - a policy that [Sivick] had voted to

approve only a few years earlier - were undertaken with

the specific intent, motivation, and purpose of enabling

the hiring of [his Son], by the Township. Although

[Sivick] abstained from the January 7, 2013[] vote of the

Board that approved the revised [Handbook], he had

already used the authority of his office to effectuate the

removal of the Nepotism Policy from the [Handbook]

prior to the vote.

....

[Sivick] further used the authority of his public office as a

Township Supervisor when he discussed, recommended,

lobbied, influenced, or sought the support of the Board

to effectuate the hiring of his [S]on as a Township

employee. [Sivick] “pled his case” to Vollmer about

seeing his [S]on “get a chance.” After the Nepotism

Policy had been removed from the [Handbook], [Sivick]

again asked Vollmer if it would be alright if he brought his

[S]on in to be a Township employee. When Vollmer

asked [Sivick] if [his Son] had qualifications for the

Township position, [Sivick] responded affirmatively and

informed Vollmer of his [S]on’s qualifications.

Adj. After Remand at 21 (citation omitted).

Finally, the Commission held:

[Sivick] used the authority of his public office when he

used the actual power he had by being a Township

Supervisor to access and influence his fellow Township

Supervisors to effectuate both the elimination of the

Township’s Nepotism Policy and the hiring of [his Son].

13

Given that the Nepotism Policy would have precluded

the hiring of [his S]on, and given that at least one of the

Supervisors (Vollmer) raised concerns regarding hiring

[his S]on, it is clear that [his Son] would not have been

hired as a Township employee but for [Sivick’s] use of

the authority of his public office as a Supervisor to

engage in discussions with and make recommendations

to his fellow Supervisors and to lobby/influence or seek

the support of those Supervisors with regard to

eliminating the Nepotism Policy and hiring his [S]on.

But for being a Supervisor, [Sivick] would not have been

in a position to engage in such communications and to

exert such influence to effectuate the hiring of his [S]on.

[Sivick] was consciously aware of the private pecuniary

benefit his [S]on would receive if hired by the Township,

and [Sivick’s] actions in getting the Nepotism Policy

eliminated and his [S]on hired were steps to secure that

private pecuniary benefit.

Adj. After Remand at 22 (emphasis added).

Unlike the First Final Adjudication, the Commission did not order

restitution, but rather, directed that the matter be referred to the Pike County District

Attorney with the recommendation that criminal charges be initiated against Sivick.

Sivick appealed to this Court.16 On March 26, 2021, the Commission filed an

16

“This Court’s review is limited to determining whether the Commission’s necessary

factual findings are supported by substantial evidence or whether the Commission committed an

error of law.” Quaglia v. State Ethics Comm’n, 986 A.2d 974, 979 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010).

During appellate review, the “substantial evidence” test must first

be applied to determine whether each of the necessary findings of

fact relied upon for the determination of a violation are supported

by substantial evidence. After the facts are found to be supported,

this Court must then consider whether all the facts found by the

Commission are “clear and convincing proof” that [the] [p]ublic

[o]fficial violated the [Ethics] Act.

Pulice v. State Ethics Comm’n, 713 A.2d 161, 163 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (citation omitted).

Further,

[s]tatutory interpretation is a question of law, for which our standard

of review is de novo, and our scope is plenary. [S]ee Malt Beverages

Distrib[s.] Ass’n v. P[a.] Liquor Control B[d.], . . . 974 A.2d 1144,

1154 ([Pa.] 2009) (citing Seeton v. P[a.] Game Comm[’n], . . . 937

14

Application for Summary Relief (Application for Summary Relief) which this Court

listed for disposition along with the merits of Sivick’s appeal.

Initially,

[t]he Ethics Act is remedial legislation with the salutary

purpose of assuring the integrity and honesty of []

Commonwealth employees and, as such, must be

“liberally construed.” Section 1101.1(a) of the Ethics

Act[, 65 Pa.C.S. § 1101.1(a)]; Maunus v. State Ethics

Comm’n, . . . 544 A.2d 1324, 1328 ([Pa.] 1988).

Consequently, the coverage of the Ethics Act must be

construed broadly, and its exclusions must be

construed narrowly.

Quaglia v. State Ethics Comm’n, 986 A.2d 974, 979 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (emphasis

added).

The Commission bears the burden of proving a violation

of the Ethics Act. In order to find a violation of the Ethics

Act, at least four members of the Commission must find

clear and convincing proof of a violation. Clear and

convincing proof is evidence that is so clear, direct,

weighty, and convincing that it enables the trier of fact to

come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth

of the precise facts at issue.

G.L. v. State Ethics Comm’n, 17 A.3d 445, 453 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citations

omitted).

Sivick argues that the Commission erred by concluding that he violated

the conflict of interest prohibition in Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act due to his

discussions with the Supervisors for the purpose of eliminating the Nepotism Policy

A.2d 1028, 1037 ([Pa.] 2007)[,] for the proposition that “while

courts traditionally accord the interpretation of the agency charged

with administration of the act some deference, the meaning of a

statute is essentially a question of law for the court”).

Kistler v. State Ethics Comm’n, 22 A.3d 223, 227 (Pa. 2011) (citation omitted).

15

so the Township could hire his Son, and the actions he took to effectuate his Son’s

hiring.

Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act prohibits a “public official or public

employee [from] engag[ing] in conduct that constitutes a conflict of interest.” 65

Pa.C.S. § 1103(a). Section 1102 of the Ethics Act defines “[c]onflict” or “conflict

of interest” as:

Use by a public official or public employee of the

authority of his office or employment or any

confidential information received through his holding

public office or employment for the private pecuniary

benefit of himself, a member of his immediate family[17]

or a business with which he or a member of his immediate

family is associated. The term does not include an action

having a de minimis economic impact or which affects to

the same degree a class consisting of the general public or

a subclass consisting of an industry, occupation or other

group which includes the public official or public

employee, a member of his immediate family or a business

with which he or a member of his immediate family is

associated.

65 Pa.C.S. § 1102 (italics and bold emphasis added). “Thus, in order to prove a

violation, the Commission must establish by clear and convincing proof that: (1) a

public official[18] (2) used the authority of his office (3) for the private pecuniary gain

17

The Ethics Act defines “[i]mmediate family” as “[a] parent, spouse, child, brother[,] or

sister.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102.

18

The Ethics Act defines “[p]ublic official” as:

Any person elected by the public or elected or appointed by a

governmental body or an appointed official . . . of this

Commonwealth or any political subdivision thereof, provided that it

shall not include members of advisory boards that have no authority

to expend public funds other than reimbursement for personal

expense or to otherwise exercise the power of the [s]tate or any

political subdivision thereof.

65 Pa.C.S. § 1102. Sivick does not dispute that he was a public official during the relevant time

periods.

16

of himself[, a member of his immediate family] or a business with which he is

associated.” G.L., 17 A.3d at 453.

Section 1102 of the Ethics Act defines the term “[a]uthority of office or

employment” as “[t]he actual power provided by law, the exercise of which is

necessary to the performance of duties and responsibilities unique to a particular

public office or position of public employment.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 1102. With respect

to the use of the authority of office necessary to violate Section 1103(a) of the Ethics

Act, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

[T]o violate subsection 1103(a) [of the Ethics Act], a

public official must “use” his or her office for private

pecuniary benefit. Kraines v. P[a.] State Ethics

Comm[’n], 805 A.2d 677, 681 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002). The

word “use” is not defined in the Ethics Act. The dictionary

definition of the noun “use” is “[t]he act of using or putting

to a purpose[, e.g.,] the use of a car;” analogously, the

definition of the verb “use” is “1. [t]o bring or put into

service or action: employ[, e.g.,] use a pen [or] use your

imagination[, or] 2. to put to some purpose: avail oneself

of[, e.g.,] use the bus to get to work.” Webster’s II New

College Dictionary, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1995, at 1215.

Thus, the common and approved usage of the word “use,”

which must guide our inquiry, indicates an action directed

toward a purpose. Accordingly, to violate [Section]

1103(a) [of the Ethics Act], a public official must act in

such a way as to put his office to the purpose of obtaining

for himself a private pecuniary benefit. Such directed

action implies awareness on the part of the public official

of the potential pecuniary benefit as well as the motivation

to obtain that benefit for himself.

That the General Assembly intended such an interpretation

of [S]ection 1103(a) [of the Ethics Act] is strengthened by

a declaration in the Ethics Act’s purpose provision: “The

Legislature hereby declares that public office is a public

trust and that any effort to realize personal financial gain

through public office other than compensation provided by

law is a violation of that trust.” 65 Pa.C.S. § 1101.1(a)

Purpose (emphasis added).

17

Kistler v. State Ethics Comm’n, 22 A.3d 223, 227-28 (Pa. 2011) (underline emphasis

added).

Further,

to violate the conflict of interest provision in [S]ection

1103(a) of the Ethics Act, a public official must be

consciously aware of a private pecuniary benefit for

himself, his family, or his business, and then must take

action in the form of one or more specific steps to attain

that benefit. . . . [T]his interpretation derives from the

plain meaning of the statutory definition of conflict of

interest, which requires that a public official use the

authority of his office for private pecuniary benefit.

Id. at 231 (underline emphasis added).

In Kistler, a member of an intermediate unit board of directors voted to

authorize an architect to pursue construction of a school while simultaneously

seeking a subcontract for his business from the same individual. The Pennsylvania

Supreme Court held that the Commission erred by holding that Kistler had violated

the Ethics Act because there was “no evidence that [Kistler] had acted with

awareness that his . . . vote . . . could or would result in his receipt of a

subcontract . . . .” Id.

In Pulice v. State Ethics Commission, 713 A.2d 161 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1998), Pulice, a school district board of directors president, was charged with

violating the Ethics Act’s conflict of interest provision by participating in meetings

from which a new assistant principal position was created, and by voting two months

later to hire his son-in-law for the newly-created position. In concluding that no

violation had been proven, this Court reasoned:

[The] facts found by the Commission present strong,

uncontradicted evidence that this newly[-]created position

was not created specifically to promote or otherwise

benefit [the] son-in-law, but was for the benefit of the

[d]istrict. There is no evidence at all from which it can be

inferred, rather than speculated, that [Pulice] “used his

18

authority” for the private pecuniary benefit of [his] son-in-

law by voting for the creation of the new position.[19] At

the time that [Pulice] voted on the creation of the new

position there were no applicants. Consequently, there is

not even substantial evidence, let alone clear and

convincing evidence that supports the Commission[’s]

adjudication that [Pulice] violated [S]ection 3(a) of the

[State Ethics Law20] . . . .

Pulice, 713 A.2d at 164.

Unlike in Kistler and Pulice, the evidence in this case reflects Sivick’s

intent to have the Township remove the Nepotism Policy from the Handbook for the

purpose of hiring his Son, and Sivick’s intent that the Township hire his Son. In

fact, Sivick, after referencing the Kistler standard, admits his “conscious awareness

that his [S]on would be benefitted, i.e.[,] the mens rea element,” but he argues that

there is “no evidence that [he] used ‘the actual power provided by law’ related to his

position, i.e.[,] the actus reus element, for the private pecuniary benefit of his [S]on.”

Sivick Br. at 18. In other words, Sivick concedes that he was “consciously aware of

a private pecuniary benefit for himself, his family, or his business,” but strenuously

disputes that he “t[ook] action [using the authority of his office] in the form of one

or more specific steps to attain that benefit.” Kistler, 22 A.3d at 231.

The Commission has repeatedly and consistently explained that “[u]se

of authority of office is more than the mere mechanics of voting[,] and encompasses

all of the tasks needed to perform the functions of a given position. Use of authority

includes . . . discussing, conferring with others, and lobbying for a particular

19

Here, in contrast, Rohner told the Investigative Division that Sivick specifically created

the Township position for his Son. See R.R. at 112a.

20

The original State Ethics Law, Act of October 4, 1978, P.L. 883, was reenacted and

amended by the Act of June 26, 1989, P.L. 26, formerly 65 P.S. § 403(a). The original State Ethics

Law was repealed by the Act of October 15, 1998, P.L. 729, and replaced by the Ethics Act.

The Pulice Court also concluded that the Ethics Act’s conflict of interest provision did not

apply to in-laws.

19

result.”21 In re Gallen, Comm’n Order No. 1198, at 37 (2001) (citation omitted);

see also Bloom, Comm’n Order No. 1722 (2017); Yusko, Comm’n Order No. 1705

(2016); Esposito, Comm’n Order No. 1333 (2004); Yurek, Comm’n Order No. 1286

(2003); Zwick, Comm’n Order No. 1062 (1997); Juliante, Comm’n Order No. 809

(1991).

Section 607 of The Second Class Township Code (Code)22 describes

the Supervisors’ duties to include general Township governance and employ persons

necessary for the conduct of Township business. Section 603 of the Code, 53 P.S. §

65603, requires the Board to meet at least once per month to transact business. An

affirmative majority vote at a public meeting is required for the transaction of any

business. Id. Section 2302 of the Code23 mandates that, as Roadmaster, Sivick

“shall:”

(1) Report to the [Board] any information that may be

required by the [Board] and by the Department of

Transportation.

(2) Inspect all roads and bridges as directed by the [Board].

(3) Do or direct to be done all work necessary to carry out

the responsibilities imposed by the [Board] with respect to

the maintenance, repair and construction of [T]ownship

roads.

53 P.S. § 67302.

The Code governs and authorizes the Supervisors’ authority to engage

in meetings for the purpose of conducting Township business.24 Clear and

21

Although the issue before this Court is a question of law, the Court may consider the

interpretation of the agency charged with administrating the statute at issue. Section 1921(a) of

the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a), provides that the object of statutory

interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the General Assembly’s intent.

22

Added by Section 1 of the Act of November 9, 1995, P.L. 350, 53 P.S. § 65607.

23

Added by Section 1 of the Act of November 9, 1995, P.L. 350, 53 P.S. § 67302.

24

Such discussions are deemed “deliberation[s]” under Section 703 of the Sunshine Act.

65 Pa.C.S. § 703 (“The discussion of agency business held for the purpose of making a decision.”).

20

convincing record evidence reflects that Board Chairman, Supervisor, and

Roadmaster Sivick met with Vollmer and Menditto to initiate and promote official

Board action to eliminate the Township’s Nepotism Policy, directed Menditto not to

prepare an errata sheet reflecting the change to the Handbook,25 and met to discuss

and encourage his Son’s hiring. Thus, Sivick’s access to and influence over the other

Supervisors was rooted in his official authority, as “actual power provided by law,

the exercise of which is necessary to the performance of duties and responsibilities

unique to” his position as Board Chairman, Supervisor and Roadmaster. 65 Pa.C.S.

§ 1102. Regardless of whether Sivick’s interactions with the other Supervisors about

repealing the Nepotism Policy and hiring his Son were considered requests,

recommendations or veiled heavy-handed mandates, they were nevertheless made

in his capacity as Board Chairman, Supervisor and Roadmaster, and were made for

the purpose of obtaining a Township job for his Son. Sivick’s use of his authority

to promote his Son’s hiring was the use of “actual power provided by law[.]” 65

Pa.C.S. § 1102.

The fact that Sivick abstained from voting to remove the Nepotism

Policy from the Handbook and to hire his Son is not dispositive when he initiated

and encouraged the other Supervisors to eliminate the Nepotism Policy so the Board

could vote on his Son’s hiring, directed that no errata sheet be created, and then

lobbied the Township to hire his Son. Notably, in Sivick II, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court, in dicta, contrasted the facts in Kraines26 with Sivick’s actions,

observing:

25

Absent his role as a Supervisor, Sivick would not have had the authority or influence to

demand that no errata sheet be created.

26

In Kraines, this Court reversed the Commission’s adjudication declaring that a county

controller violated the Ethics Act’s conflict of interest provisions when she signed payroll checks

to her husband, a forensic pathologist who provided services to her county. This Court found that

Kraines did not improperly use her office to gain pecuniary benefits to which her husband was not

entitled because he had been performing autopsies for the county years before Kraines was county

21

To be sure, there are differences between this case and

Kraines. In particular, the sum of Kraines’ behavior in

that case was clearly less blameworthy than was Sivick’s

in this case, where the Commission found other bases

for violations in connection with Sivick’s role in

soliciting the elimination of the [N]epotism [P]olicy and

the hiring of [his] Son in the first instance. In those

actions, Sivick plainly “used” his office to facilitate

[his] Son’s private pecuniary benefit.[27]

Sivick II, 238 A.3d at 1261 (bold and underline emphasis added).

The Commission found that Sivick “participated in discussions and

actions of the Board to eliminate the Township’s Nepotism Policy with the intent

and for the purpose of having his [S]on hired as a Township road crew employee.”

Adj. After Remand at 21. The Commission also found that Sivick “discussed,

recommended, lobbied, influenced, or sought the support of the Board to effectuate

the hiring of his [S]on as a Township employee.” Id. Based on this Court’s record

review, substantial record evidence supports the Commission’s findings that Sivick

engaged in such conduct.

Curiously, despite admitting to satisfying Kistler’s mens rea element -

Sivick’s conscious awareness of a pecuniary benefit - Sivick, citing Commonwealth

controller. In addition, Kraines had no role in the county coroner’s decision to use her husband’s

services and had no involvement in the amount her husband and other pathologists were paid.

27

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has described obiter dictum as “[a] judicial comment

made during the course of delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision

in the case and therefore not precedential . . . .” Commonwealth v. Lee, 935 A.2d 865, 867 n.4 (Pa.

2007) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1100 (7th ed. 1999)); see also Commonwealth v. Romero,

183 A.3d 364, 400 n.18 (Pa. 2018) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1240 (10th ed. 2014), defining

obiter dictum as “[a] judicial comment made while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is

unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential (although it may be

considered persuasive”)) (emphasis added).

Here, because the conflict of interest issues regarding the Nepotism Policy removal and

Son’s hiring were not before the Sivick II Court, the Supreme Court’s statement that “in soliciting

the elimination of the Nepotism Policy and the hiring of Son in the first instance[,]” “Sivick plainly

‘used’ his office to facilitate [his] Son’s private pecuniary benefit[,]” Sivick II, 238 A.3d at 1261,

is non-binding dicta, it is nonetheless persuasive.

22

v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435, 446-48 (Pa. 2016), argues that regarding the actus reus

element, “the ‘actual power provided by law[,]’ [65 Pa.C.S. § 1102,] must yield a

private pecuniary benefit, not merely a political impact[,]” and no such pecuniary

benefit exists.28 Sivick Br. at 28.

The Ethics Act does not define the term “private pecuniary benefit[.]”

65 Pa.C.S. § 1102. In Veon, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “[a]

pecuniary benefit or detriment must be financial. While it may not be possible to

come up with a to-the-dollar value of a given pecuniary benefit, various statutes

make clear that difficulties with precise quantification do not preclude grading of the

offense by assessment of value.” Veon, 150 A.3d at 446 (footnote omitted). Thus,

“to prove ‘pecuniary benefit’ as used in the conflict of interest statute, the

prosecution must show some private financial gain.” Id. at 448 (emphasis added).

The Veon Court held that pecuniary benefit does not include “intangible political

gains.” Id. at 448. Relying on Veon, Sivick argues that, at most, his comments and

discussions only had a political impact on the other Supervisors, and could not have

furnished an economic benefit to his Son.

Specifically, Sivick contends:

Here, the statements may have had a political impact upon

the other supervisors, but the [Ethics] Act requires more to

constitute a violation. There must be an economic impact

for himself or his [S]on from the official actions of Sivick

himself. Because Sivick’s non-official comments and

discussions only had a political impact at most on the other

members of the [Board], Sivick’s comments and

discussions could not in any capacity furnish an economic

benefit to his [S]on. The [S]on did not receive a single

28

In Sivick II, the Court, citing to Veon, noted, “[f]or present purposes, we assume

arguendo that Son’s receipt of fair compensation for services duly rendered qualifies as a ‘private

pecuniary benefit’ bestowed upon a member of Sivick’s immediate family.” Sivick II, 238 A.3d

at 1259 n.39.

23

dollar, nor could he, until the other members of the Board

actually hired the [S]on.

Sivick Br. at 29.

Sivick’s argument ignores the fact of his admitted intent to obtain

Township employment for his Son - not some “intangible political gain.” Veon, 150

A.3d at 447. The record evidence reflects that Sivick’s clear goal was to see the

Township employ his Son, and he used the authority of his office to achieve that

outcome. As a result, Son received gross earnings of $126,552.24 (net earnings of

$87,949.36) from a job he would not have had, but for Sivick’s use of his authority

of office in having the Nepotism Policy removed from the Handbook and having the

Board hire his Son. Sivick’s actions resulted in a private pecuniary benefit to his

Son.

Recently, in Commonwealth v. Como (Pa. Super., No. 1687 EDA 2018,

filed November 23, 2020),29 the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a school

district superintendent’s conflict of interest conviction for, inter alia, “violating the

Ethics Act by procuring a job for his son[, i.e., a pecuniary benefit] . . . as a [school

district] night supervisor, a custodial position.” Id., slip op. at 34. The Como Court

concluded:

The evidence demonstrates that [the superintendent] used

the authority of his position for his son’s pecuniary

benefit. He placed his son before the [s]chool [b]oard as

the lone candidate for the job by overriding [the school

district manager’s] selection for the night supervisor

position, selecting his son instead, and failing to inform

the [s]chool [b]oard about these behind-the-scene steps he

took to position his son as the candidate.

Id., slip op. at 36 (emphasis added). Similarly, Sivick “used the authority of his

position for [his Son’s] pecuniary benefit.” Id. In its Adjudication After Remand,

29

Pursuant to Pennsylvania Superior Court Internal Operating Procedure 65.37, “[n]on-

precedential decisions filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value[.]” 210 Pa.

Code § 65.37.

24

the Commission properly concluded that Sivick’s “use of the authority of his office

. . . resulted in a private pecuniary benefit consisting of the compensation [his Son]

received from the Township for a job he would not otherwise have held.” Adj. After

Remand at 23. Accordingly, Sivick’s argument contending the absence of a

pecuniary benefit fails.

The record evidence reflects that Sivick violated Section 1103(a) of the

Ethics Act when he took the above-referenced actions.30 Accordingly, the

Commission properly determined based on clear and convincing evidence that

Sivick violated Section 1103(a) of the Ethics Act’s conflict of interest prohibition

when he lobbied for the removal of the Nepotism Policy and for his Son’s hiring.

30

Sivick also argues that “[t]he inquiries made by Sivick should be treated in a manner

consistent with the First Amendment[ to the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. amend. I].”

Sivick Br. at 29. However, the Commission, as trier of fact, found Sivick’s conduct far more

intrusive than mere “inquiries[.]” Sivick Br. at 21.

Sivick contends that Pennsylvania courts have “reminded the Commission to remain within

the parameters of the statutory language itself,” citing to Sivick II, Kistler, and Commonwealth v.

Orie, 88 A.3d 983 (Pa. Super. 2014). Sivick Br. at 30. Notably, in Sivick II, the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court noted that in lobbying for the removal of the Nepotism Policy and Son’s hiring,

“Sivick plainly ‘used’ his office to facilitate Son’s private pecuniary benefit.” Sivick II, 238 A.3d

at 1261. In Kistler, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court merely disagreed with the Commission’s

statutory interpretation, “declin[ing] to infer that when the General Assembly chose to use the

phrase ‘an open and public process’ in the context of subsection 1103(f) [of the Ethics Act], its

actual intent was to specify a competitive bidding process.” Kistler, 22 A.3d at 235. In Orie, the

Superior Court rejected a claim that the Ethics Act impermissibly intruded on First Amendment

rights, stating: “[T]he [Ethics Act] places no restrictions on a public official’s federal or state

protected rights of expression and association, but only prohibits officials from using state-funded

resources for non-de minimis private pecuniary gain.” Id. at 1026. Accordingly, Sivick’s

argument is without merit.

25

For all of the above reasons, the Commission’s Adjudication After

Remand and Order is affirmed.31, 32

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

31

In its brief, the Commission contends that this Court should dismiss Sivick’s appeal

based on the law of the case doctrine. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the

Commission’s First Final Adjudication, this Court reviewed the merits of the Commission’s

Adjudication After Remand.

32

Given this Court’s disposition of the merits of Sivick’s appeal, the Commission’s

Application for Summary Relief is dismissed as moot.

26

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

John P. Sivick, :

Petitioner :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

State Ethics Commission, : No. 307 C.D. 2021

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 22nd day of December, 2021, the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission’s (Commission) February 3, 2021 final

adjudication and order is affirmed.

The Commission’s Application for Summary Relief is dismissed as

moot.

_________________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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