The opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4923-18
STEPHEN KOWAL,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
RANDI HARTMAN, f/k/a
RANDI KOWAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued December 9, 2021 – Decided December 20, 2021
Before Judges Haas and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County,
Docket No. FM-11-0444-04.
John A. Patti argued the cause for appellant (Patti
Family Law, attorneys; John A. Patti, on the briefs).
Seth D. Josephson argued the cause for respondent.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Randi Hartman appeals from a June 3, 2019 order terminating
plaintiff Stephen Kowal's alimony obligation. We affirm.
The parties were divorced in 2005, following a twenty-five-year marriage.
They entered into a Property Settlement Agreement (PSA) wherein plaintiff
agreed to pay $400 per week in permanent alimony based on earnings of
approximately $110,000 per year and imputed income to defendant of $35,000
per year. The PSA stated the alimony range was between $575 and $600 per
week, but the parties agreed to $400 because plaintiff did not seek child support.
The PSA contained the following relevant provision:
Cohabitation by [defendant] shall be an event
subjecting alimony to a review consistent with existing
case law. [Plaintiff's i]nvoluntary [l]oss of
[e]mployment, other than temporary, shall be an event
subjecting alimony to a review consistent with existing
case law. In the event [plaintiff] is permanently
disabled, as defined and to the extent payable by his
disability insurance policy, it shall be an event
subjecting alimony to review, recalculation derived
only from proceeds from said disability insurance
policy.
[Emphasis added.]
In 2008, plaintiff moved to modify alimony because he ceased working
and became permanently disabled. The court found he made a prima facie
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showing of changed circumstances and scheduled a plenary hearing. However,
plaintiff withdrew the motion.
In 2011, defendant moved for entry of a qualified domestic relations order
(QDRO) dividing plaintiff's pension, alleging she was entitled to equitable
distribution. She also sought an increase in alimony and other financial relief
based on plaintiff's alleged increased income. Plaintiff opposed the motion.
The court granted defendant's motion, ordered the QDRO, and increased
alimony. Plaintiff sought reconsideration and provided proof the pension
benefits were an ordinary disability retirement allowance and not a pension
payout and that the allowance did not vest during the marriage. He also argued
the parties agreed only plaintiff's disability insurance proceeds could be used to
calculate alimony. Defendant disputed plaintiff's claims and income.
The trial court reconsidered, denied equitable distribution of the pension,
and directed the parties to file updated Case Information Statements (CIS) to
recalculate alimony. Plaintiff submitted a CIS; defendant did not. The court
calculated alimony in accordance with the PSA, using only the disability policy
proceeds, and reduced alimony to $655.21 per month. Defendant sought
reconsideration, which the court denied on January 20, 2012.
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Defendant appealed from the alimony provisions of the 2012 order. We
denied her challenge and affirmed the trial court's calculation of alimony,
holding "the terms of the PSA limited plaintiff's income to his disability
insurance proceeds." Kowal v. Hartman, No. A-2618-11 (App. Div. Feb. 10,
2014) (slip op. at 10-11).
In 2016, plaintiff moved to modify or terminate alimony on grounds of
cohabitation. He attached social media postings showing defendant had a
romantic relationship and cohabited with Daniel Opielski beginning in March
2015. Plaintiff alleged Opielski paid defendant's living expenses, which reduced
defendant's need for alimony. Plaintiff's CIS showed his only sources of income
were disability insurance and the ordinary disability retirement pension. The
trial judge found plaintiff established a prima facie case of cohabitation and
scheduled a plenary hearing.
On November 14, 2016, the judge granted plaintiff's motion in limine to
ensure only his disability insurance was considered. The judge cited our prior
decision.
In a 2017 plenary hearing, the judge heard testimony from the parties,
Opielski, and defendant's mother. He also reviewed seventy-six pieces of
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evidence. The judge rendered a detailed written opinion finding the witnesses
were credible, except for defendant and Opielski.
The judge noted defendant stipulated to cohabiting with Opielski. He also
found other credible evidence of cohabitation, namely, the social media posts in
which defendant and Opielski held themselves out as a couple in an "exclusive
. . . stable, persistent, and permanent" relationship. He found defendant
benefitted from the cohabitation because it "substantially reduc[ed] her shelter
costs[,]" and significantly increased her account balances. 1 He noted that on
cross-examination, "defendant acknowledged that the benefits to her from living
with . . . Opielski exceeded $2,700 per month, including eliminated mortgage
payments and homeowner association dues, utility bills, repair and maintenance,
and other lesser home maintenance costs." The judge noted even if the deposits
to defendant's accounts were excluded, "defendant still benefits from
cohabitation by more than $1,700 per month." The judge found Opielski
benefitted economically from the cohabitation because defendant contributed
her income to his shelter expenses.
1
The judge noted there were unidentified deposits to defendant's accounts that
plaintiff did not prove came from Opielski, but that defendant had not identified
the source of the funds either.
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The judge concluded the economic benefit to defendant from the
cohabitation was three to four times the alimony paid by plaintiff. He terminated
alimony effective March 2015, the date defendant began living with Opielski,
and ordered defendant to repay alimony she received since that date at $100 per
month.
Defendant alleged plaintiff committed fraud by concealing the fact his
disability insurance proceeds were tax-free. She argued the court was required
to "retroactively reverse the financial hardships that have been thrust upon
[defendant] in the form of [o]rders[] misinterpret[ing] . . . the [PSA] . . . and
intentional concealment of information that should have been provided to
[the c]ourt and other [c]ourts going back [to] 2008."
The judge analyzed defendant's claims through the lens of Rule 4:50-1(f).
He noted it was undisputed the parties voluntarily entered into the PSA over
fourteen years ago and that it was heavily negotiated with the assistance of
counsel. The judge also noted the PSA disability provision, which limited a
recalculation of alimony based solely on the disability insurance policy
"proceeds." He found "[t]he agreement did not envision or require the
calculation of a taxable value, as the policy is not subject to taxation" because
the PSA's use of the term proceeds meant "the amount of money received from
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the policy[,]" which would be a net figure. The judge concluded plaintiff did
not conceal the nontaxable nature of the policy because neither his benefits
statements nor his tax returns reported the insurance proceeds as taxable income .
Moreover, "defendant never argued in this matter['s] entire history . . . that the
term ['proceeds'] meant anything other than the amount received from plaintiff's
disability pension." He further noted this "novel argument emerged during this
round of litigation" but was "nowhere" in the pleadings she filed prior to the
plenary hearing.
The judge also noted plaintiff was declared "permanently disabled within
the terms of his disability insurance policy, an event accounted for in the parties'
agreement." Citing the prior litigation history, he concluded "the court modified
plaintiff's alimony obligation in light of a change of circumstances and denied
defendant's motion for reconsideration, and the Appellate Division affirmed the
court in all respects." He noted defendant challenged the taxable nature of
plaintiff's income during "[t]he parties' 2011 motion practice[,]" and that
defendant "pursued her right of appeal, and she lost." The judge concluded the
PSA's terms were fair and defendant's arguments were barred by res judicata.
Each party requested counsel fees. The judge conducted a detailed
analysis of Rule 5:3-5(c) factors and concluded each should bear their own fees.
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Defendant raises the following points on appeal:
I. THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BARRING EVIDENCE ON THE
INTRODUCTION OF PLAINTIFF'S INCOME,
INCLUDING PENSION INCOME OTHER THAN
HIS DISABILITY INSURANCE PROCEEDS.
II. THE PSA PROVISIONS REGARDING USE OF
ONLY DISABILITY INCOME SHOULD BE SET
ASIDE BASED UPON THE FACT THAT THE
PENSION WAS NOT DISTRIBUTED AND
PLAINTIFF RECEIVES PENSION INCOME.
III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
FAILING TO ADJUST THE AMOUNT OF
ALIMONY PURSUANT TO OZOLINS V. OZOLINS,
308 N.J. SUPER. 243 ([APP. DIV.] 1998).
IV. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DECRETION BY
NOT CONSIDERING ALL SOURCES OF INCOME
AND RECALCULATING ALIMONY PRIOR TO
FORMULATING THE COHABITATION
DEDUCTION AND RETROACTIVE ARREARS.
V. ALIMONY SHOULD BE REESTABLISHED
AT THE RATE AGREED TO IN THE PSA.
VI. THE SUPERIOR COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION BY NOT FINDING A VIOLATION
PURSUANT TO NEW JERSEY COURT RULE
4:50-1.
VII. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF
BASED UPON THE CONCEALMENT BY
PLAINTIFF ON THE CIS AND ADMITTED TO BY
PLAINTIFF DURING THE PLENARY HEARING.
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VIII. COUNSEL FEES SHOULD HAVE BEEN
AWARDED BASED UPON THE INTENTIONAL
CONCEALMENT BY PLAINTIFF.
IX. COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE
AWARDED TO DEFENDANT FOR ALL COST[S]
OF THIS APPEAL.
"Our review of the trial court's evidential rulings 'is limited to examining
the decision for abuse of discretion.'" Ehrlich v. Sorokin, 451 N.J. Super. 119,
128 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Parker v. Poole, 440 N.J. Super. 7, 16 (App. Div.
2015)). We apply the same standard of review to in limine motions adjudicating
the admissibility of evidence. State v. Cordero, 438 N.J. Super. 472, 483 (App.
Div. 2014).
We defer to a trial judge's factfinding "when supported by adequate,
substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)
(citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)).
However, "legal conclusions, and the application of those conclusions to the
facts, are subject to our plenary review." Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552,
568 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of
Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
The Family Part has "special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters,"
which often requires the exercise of reasoned discretion. Cesare, 154 N.J. at
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413. For these reasons, Family Part judges have broad discretion to make
alimony determinations. Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J. 341, 355 (1956).
Counsel fee determinations are also discretionary. Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super.
18, 46 (App. Div. 2011). Likewise, the denial of a Rule 4:50-1 motion for relief
from judgment will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. In re
Guardianship of J.N.H., 172 N.J. 440, 473 (2002).
Having thoroughly reviewed the record pursuant to these principles, we
affirm for the reasons expressed in the trial judge's thorough and well-written
opinion. We add the following comments.
"Alimony is an economic right that arises out of the marital relationship
and provides the dependent spouse with a level of support and standard of living
generally commensurate with the quality of economic life that existed during
the marriage." Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 48 (2016) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70, 80 (2005)). The Quinn Court
stated mutually agreed upon arrangements that are "fair and definitive . . . should
not be unnecessarily or lightly disturbed" because
"the law grants particular leniency to agreements made
in the domestic arena" and vests "judges greater
discretion when interpreting such agreements."
Pacifico [v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 266 (2007)]. . . .
Nevertheless, the court must discern and implement
"the common intention of the parties[,]" Tessmar [v.
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Grosner, 23 N.J. 193, 201 (1957)], and "enforce [the
mutual agreement] as written[,]" Kampf [v. Franklin
Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 43 (1960)].
[Quinn, 225 N.J. at 44-46 (second, fourth, and fifth
alterations in original).]
We reject defendant's arguments. The facts, evidence, and circumstances
did not support deviating from the parties' clearly worded agreement. Only the
disability insurance proceeds could be considered for alimony purposes. This
conclusion was underscored by the fact the cohabitation was clearly proven and
showed defendant's lifestyle with Opielski was enhanced to the point it
exponentially exceeded the alimony, which defendant no longer needed.
Defendant's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in
a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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