City of Philadelphia v. F. Galdo

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Philadelphia :

:

v. : Nos. 532 & 537 C.D. 2020

: Argued: November 15, 2021

Francis Galdo, et al., :

Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE J. ANDREW CROMPTON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: December 13, 2021

This matter returns to our Court following a remand to the Court of Common

Pleas of Philadelphia County (Trial Court) for consideration of whether Francis

Galdo (Galdo) met the requirements to adversely possess property owned by the City

of Philadelphia (City). See City of Phila. v. Galdo, 181 A.3d 1289

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018) (Galdo I), aff’d, 217 A.3d 811 (Pa. 2019) (Galdo II). On

remand, the Trial Court issued a new opinion, dated January 23, 2020, it which it

concluded that Galdo met the requirements to adversely possess the subject property.

On a motion for post-trial relief filed by the City, however, the Trial Court, by order

dated February 28, 2020, narrowed its ruling to a smaller area of the subject property

than Galdo claimed to adversely possess. Galdo appeals from the Trial Court’s grant

of post-trial relief.1 We now reverse and remand.

1

As discussed in more detail below, the City initially appealed from the Trial Court’s

January 23, 2020 opinion and Galdo filed a cross appeal. Thereafter, however, the City

discontinued its appeal. While Galdo’s cross appeal remains active and has been consolidated with

this appeal from the Trial Court’s grant of post-trial relief, it does not appear that Galdo has

advanced any arguments relative to the cross appeal in his brief to this Court. Because it appears

I. Background

The City initiated this matter on April 24, 2014, by filing a complaint against

Galdo for continuing trespass, permanent trespass, and ejectment. We explained the

factual basis underpinning the City’s action in Galdo I, as follows:

Between the streets of Lee, Front, Wildey, and Girard

Avenue in Philadelphia is a rectangular lot of undeveloped

land (Property) that is the subject of the instant appeal. In

July 1962, the City entered into an agreement with the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Commonwealth) to

assist in the development of various state roads. In

furtherance of that agreement, on November 13, 1974, the

City obtained title to the Property by condemnation, in

order to reroute the [elevated portion of the Market-

Frankford Line] to provide additional space for

construction of Interstate 95 (I-95). Then on January 19,

1976, the Commonwealth filed a notice of condemnation

against several of the City’s lots in the area, including the

Property. The notice of condemnation indicated that the

Commonwealth would permanently retain the land in the

I–95 right-of-way, and that the Commonwealth would

have a temporary easement on the Property for the period

that the [Market-Frankford Line] was rerouted. The parties

agree that the City has not physically occupied or provided

any maintenance of the Property since the completion of

the construction that rerouted the [Market-Frankford Line]

in the late 1970s.

In September 1989, Galdo purchased his house on Lee

Street, across from the Property. Shortly after purchasing

the house, Galdo began using a portion of the Property that

the parties refer to as the “Galdo Parcel.” It appears that

to this Court that Galdo was not aggrieved by the Trial Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion, and he

fails to develop any issues or arguments in his brief relative thereto, we conclude that Galdo has

waived any issues he may have raised for failure to develop them on appeal. In re Condemnation

ex rel. Com., Dep’t of Transp., 76 A.3d 101, 106 n.8 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (“A party’s failure to

develop an issue in the argument section of its brief constitutes waiver of the issue.”), appeal

denied, 86 A.3d 234 (Pa. 2014).

2

over the years, Galdo used the Galdo Parcel in a variety of

ways, including for storage, parties, and parking. It also

appears that he made various improvements or alterations

to the Galdo Parcel, including, but not limited to, pouring

concrete slabs, installing and (later) removing a fence,

installing two large trailers for storage, building a fire

pit/brick barbeque and pavilion, and creating a volleyball

court, horseshoe pits, and treehouse.

On February 5, 2013, the City posted a public notice on

the Property, notifying the public to remove all personal

property within 30 days. Galdo refused to comply with the

notices and removed them.

Galdo I, 181 A.3d at 1290-91 (citations omitted).

The City then filed its ejectment action, and Galdo filed a counterclaim to

quiet title, claiming ownership of the Galdo Parcel by adverse possession. Following

a non-jury trial, the Trial Court found in favor of the City and ordered Galdo ejected

from the Property. The Trial Court concluded that the City was immune from a claim

of adverse possession because the Property was devoted to public use in relation to

condemnation proceedings at the behest of the Commonwealth and because the

Property was held by the City for subsequent resale. Accordingly, the Trial Court

concluded that Galdo could not claim title to the Galdo Parcel through adverse

possession.

Galdo appealed the Trial Court’s order to this Court, and we vacated the Trial

Court’s order and remanded the matter to the Trial Court for further consideration.

Galdo I, 181 A.3d at 1290. Recognizing that a claim for adverse possession could

not lie against a political subdivision as to land that is subject to public use, we

concluded that the Property was no longer held at the behest of the Commonwealth

in relation to the condemnation proceedings and that a potential subsequent resale

was similarly insufficient to constitute a public use. Thus, we remanded to the Trial

3

Court to consider whether Galdo met the requirements of a claim for adverse

possession against the City. Id. at 1291-95.

Prior to any determination by the Trial Court on remand, however, the City

appealed this Court’s decision in Galdo I to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which

granted allocatur to consider whether the Property was devoted to public use. The

Supreme Court affirmed this Court’s decision on all grounds and remanded the

matter to the Trial Court to consider the merits of Galdo’s claim of adverse

possession. Galdo II, 217 A.3d at 822-24.

II. Trial Court Opinion On Remand

The Trial Court, without holding additional evidentiary hearings, issued an

opinion on January 23, 2020, concluding that Galdo met his burden to adversely

possess the Galdo Parcel.2 In so doing, the Trial Court individually considered and

discussed each of the elements required for a claim of adverse possession—i.e.,

whether Galdo’s possession of the property was actual, exclusive, continuous, open

and notorious, and hostile for 21 years.

A. Actual

The Trial Court first considered whether Galdo had actual possession of the

Galdo Parcel, and concluded that, based on the facts stipulated to by the parties, it

was clear that Galdo had established actual possession of the Galdo Parcel, but not

2

As will become evident below, the Trial Court appears to be inconsistent in its references

to the Property and the Galdo Parcel in its January 23, 2020 opinion. Because Galdo raises this

inconsistency on appeal, we have left the Trial Court’s terminology in place where the Trial

Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion is quoted directly, as opposed to substituting “the Galdo Parcel”

or “the Property,” to avoid any confusion as to what part of the Property the Trial Court was

referring to—i.e., the Property, the Galdo Parcel, or the two concrete slabs—as this issue will be

considered in more detail later in this opinion.

4

the rest of the Property, for the requisite time period—i.e., 21 years. Trial Court Op.

at 5.

B. Exclusive

Regarding exclusivity, the Trial Court determined that Galdo began

possessing the Galdo Parcel exclusively in 1990. Id. at 6. While the Trial Court

recognized that Galdo began using the Galdo Parcel in 1989 when he purchased his

home across the street from the Property, it was not until 1990, when Galdo first

poured a concrete slab on the Galdo Parcel to park his vehicles on, he erected a fence

around the concrete slab, and he began actively chasing people away who were

attempting to dump waste on the Property, that such possession became exclusive.

Id. The Trial Court further noted that City workers complied with Galdo’s

instructions that they refrain from putting up barriers on or near the Galdo Parcel

after a fire. Id. Thus, the Trial Court reasoned that “[b]y chasing others off the

property, maintaining the property, and using it every day for various reasons[,] this

court finds the possession of [t]he Parcel to be exclusive to . . . Galdo from 1990 to

present.” Id.

C. Continuous

The Trial Court first concluded that the statutory time period for Galdo’s claim

against the City began running on April 24, 1993, which was 21 years prior to the

date the City filed its ejectment suit—i.e., April 24, 2014. Id. at 7. The Trial Court

then reasoned, as follows:

As previously discussed, the parties stipulated that

sometime in early 1990 Galdo poured a concrete slab on

[t]he Parcel to park vehicles. . . . Galdo also performed

various activities and continued to improve the [P]roperty

by laying a[n additional] concrete slab and park[ing] his

vehicles there every day. Additionally, . . . Galdo

maintained the lawn, stored materials, installed a firepit,

5

and threw parties every weekend prior to 1993. Since

1993, . . . Galdo has continued to take care of and improve

the land and perform various activities[,] including:

plac[ing] a flagpole, plant[ing] trees, build[ing] a

barbeque, install[ing] picnic tables, and build[ing] a

treehouse[,] to name a few. . . . Galdo testified that since

1990 he uses and continues to use the [P]roperty in

question every single day and nothing was presented to

dispute that fact. Further, there was no evidence presented

of interruption of . . . Galdo’s use of [t]he Parcel and it has

not been abandoned since . . . Galdo, to this day, is using

[t]he Parcel. This court finds that . . . Galdo has

continuously possessed the land with[out] interruption or

abandonment since 1990.

Id. (internal citation omitted).

D. Open and Notorious

The Trial Court next considered whether Galdo’s possession was open and

notorious such that the City had actual notice of Galdo’s adverse possession or had

a reasonable opportunity to learn of its existence. In this regard, the Trial Court

reasoned, as follows:

The evidence indicates that sometime in early 1990, Galdo

poured a 20’ x 16’ concrete slab on [t]he Parcel on which

to park his car. By 1992, Galdo poured an additional 16’ x

16’ concrete slab, put up a fence to store materials, cleaned

away debris . . . and weeds, and began grading a portion

of the lot. Additionally, Galdo parked his vehicles on [t]he

Parcel every day and hosted parties on the weekends. The

City has stipulated that visual improvement to the Galdo

Parcel can be seen in photographs taken by the Delaware

Valley Regional Planning Commission as early as 1990.

Further, over the years, Galdo has continued to improve

[t]he Parcel for the benefit not only of him and his family

but the community as well. In 1994, a fire pit, flagpole,

and picnic table were added. In 1997, a driveway was

built, certain trees were planted, a volleyball court . . . and

horseshoe pit [were built] as well as a carport . . . [and]

6

barbeque pit. During this time[,] Galdo also planted grass

seeds and continued to maintain the property by weeding

and mowing, among other activities[.] Over the next few

years[,] two (2) storage containers were added to [t]he

Parcel. In 2008, Galdo built a wooden pavilion. From

2010-2014[,] Galdo built a treehouse on [t]he Parcel.

....

The policy reasoning behind adverse possession is to

promote active and efficient land use, which is exactly

what Galdo did. In all the years Galdo had been using [t]he

Parcel[,] the City . . . did not once send a single person by

to check on the [P]roperty. Additionally, the City . . . did

not maintain the [P]roperty by mowing the grass or pulling

the weeds. The City . . . only needed to intervene through

effective monitoring at sometime within the [21] years.

The only time anyone from the City visited the [P]roperty

was after a fire in 1997 and when the [City attempted to

sell the land] in 2008. Neither time was notice [sic] was

given for Galdo, or anyone[,] to vacate [t]he Parcel.

Our appellate courts have made it clear: visible and

notorious possession is possession that either puts the

owner on notice or provides the owner with a reasonable

opportunity to learn of the use. In this case[,] Galdo poured

two (2) separate concrete slabs, put up a fence, stored

building materials, cleaned the property, removed debris,

pulled weeds, and parked every day[,] among many other

things[,] throughout the [21] years on [t]he Parcel. In

labeling a property as surplus and belonging to a

municipality it is still [the City’s] duty to monitor, use, or

sell the property or risk losing it to adverse possession. The

City . . . had the opportunity to learn of the use of [t]he

Parcel by the continued actions of Galdo. Oversight and

mistakes are not reasons why this [trial] court should

rewrite well-established law to effectuate an unnecessary

and unfair change. [Thus,] [t]his court finds[,] based on the

activity prior to April 24, 1993, Galdo did open and

notoriously use [t]he Parcel.

Id. at 8-10 (internal citation omitted).

7

E. Hostile

Lastly, the Trial Court considered whether Galdo’s possession was hostile—

i.e., whether it was done without the City’s permission. The Trial Court observed

that where all other elements of adverse possession are present, hostility would be

implied. Id. at 10-11. Thus, because Galdo had met all the other elements for his

claim of adverse possession against the City, the Trial Court concluded that the final

element of hostility was met as well. Id.

F. Conclusion

In sum, the Trial Court concluded that Galdo had “consistently and

continuously maintained and notoriously used the property in plain view for over

[21] years to the portion know as ‘[t]he Parcel[,]’” and he was, therefore, “lawfully

occupying and legally entitled to the property.” Id. at 11. The Trial Court, thus,

granted Galdo’s counterclaim to quiet title based on adverse possession.

III. Post-Trial Proceedings

On February 3, 2020, the City filed a motion with the Trial Court for post-trial

relief pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Pa.R.Civ.P.) 227.1(a),

seeking a modified judgment.3 Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 1390a. In support of

the motion, the City alleged that the factual finding that Galdo adversely possessed

the entire Galdo Parcel was not supported by record evidence. The City contended,

rather, that prior to April 24, 1993, the only improvements and/or modifications

Galdo made to the area known as the Galdo Parcel included the two concrete slabs

poured in 1990 and 1992, which made up only a portion of the Galdo Parcel. The

City claimed that all other improvements occurred after 1994, and the only other

3

The City also sought a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the Trial Court later

denied. The denial of the City’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not at issue

in this appeal.

8

evidence as to Galdo’s activities on the Galdo Parcel prior to April 24, 1993,

consisted of the storage of items, an undetermined amount of maintenance, and

reference to throwing parties on weekends. The City insisted that Galdo offered no

evidence as to what portion or portions of the Galdo Parcel these activities were

conducted on or how frequently. Accordingly, the City contended that the evidence

did not support a finding that Galdo adversely possessed the entire Galdo Parcel, but

rather, only the two concrete slabs poured in 1990 and 1992. The City, thus,

requested that the Trial Court modify its January 23, 2020 opinion to reflect that

Galdo adversely possessed only the 20’ x 16’ and 16’ x 16’ concrete slabs.

Id. at 1391a-93a.

On February 24, 2020, prior to any determination by the Trial Court on the

City’s motion for post-trial relief, the City filed a notice of appeal with this Court

relative to the Trial Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion.4 Shortly thereafter, however,

on February 28, 2020, the Trial Court entered an order (Post-Trial Order) granting

the City’s motion for post-trial relief and modifying its January 23, 2020 opinion to

hold that Galdo had adversely possessed “only the portion of the land that is covered

by two concrete slabs, one 20’ x 16’ and the other 16’ x 16’ in size[,] and not the

entire Parcel . . . .” Id. at 1451a. In a footnote to the Post-Trial Order, the Trial Court

stated:

To clarify[,] when this [trial] court refers to “The Parcel” in

the discussion section of its opinion, it is specifically

detailing the two (2) concrete slabs [Galdo] poured prior to

1993. This [trial] court, in its opinion, did not find [that

Galdo] adversely possessed the entire property but merely a

portion of it that was used prior to 1993.

4

The City’s appeal of the Trial Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion was docketed with this

Court at No. 283 C.D. 2020.

9

Id. Galdo thereafter appealed the Trial Court’s Post-Trial Order to this Court.5

IV. Discussion

On appeal,6 Galdo contends that the Trial Court erred in granting the City’s

motion for post-trial relief because: (1) the Trial Court was precluded from granting

post-trial relief based on Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Pa. R.A.P)

1701, and the Official Note to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c); and (2) Galdo presented

sufficient evidence to the Trial Court to establish that he adversely possessed the

entire Galdo Parcel, not just the two concrete slabs.7

A. Trial Court’s Authority To Enter Post-Trial Order

1. Pa. R.A.P. 1701

Galdo contends that Pa. R.A.P. 1701 divested the Trial Court of authority to

act upon the City’s motion for post-trial relief because the City filed an appeal of the

Trial Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion prior to the Trial Court ruling on the City’s

motion for post-trial relief. Galdo argues that Pa. R.A.P. 1701 instructs that once an

appeal of a trial court’s order is filed, the lower tribunal can take no further action

on the matter. Galdo, thus, claims that the City’s act in filing their appeal of the

January 23, 2020 opinion prevented the Trial Court from ruling on the City’s motion

for post-trial relief, and, hence, the Trial Court erred by entering the Post-Trial Order

and granting post-trial relief.

5

The City subsequently filed a praecipe to discontinue its appeal of the Trial Court’s

January 23, 2020 opinion.

6

“Our standard of review of a non-jury trial is to determine whether the findings of the

trial court are supported by competent evidence, and whether an error of law was committed.”

Swift v. Dep’t of Transp., 937 A.2d 1162, 1167 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007), appeal denied,

950 A.2d 270 (Pa. 2008).

7

We have reordered Galdo’s arguments for purposes of our discussion herein.

10

The City counters that Pa. R.A.P. 1701(b)(6) provides that a trial court may

proceed further in a matter, notwithstanding that an appeal was taken, if the order is

a non-appealable interlocutory order. The City argues that the Trial Court’s January

23, 2020 opinion was simply an opinion, and, thus, it was not a final order from

which an appeal could have been taken. Indeed, the City notes that there was no

judgment entered after the opinion was issued and the opinion was never reduced to

an order. According to the City, the Trial Court was, therefore, free to issue the

Post-Trial Order notwithstanding that an appeal had been taken by the City.

The City further directs this Court to the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s

decision in Melani v. Northwest Engineering, 909 A.2d 404 (Pa. Super. 2006). The

City observes that, in Melani, the Superior Court concluded that an appeal taken

prior to a trial court’s ruling on a post-trial motion was deemed premature, because,

pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4, a post-trial motion must be disposed of prior to the

entry of judgment in the matter. The City further observes that, given that the

post-trial motion in Melani had not been disposed of, “the appeal did not divest the

trial court of jurisdiction since the appeal [was] from an interlocutory order.”

City’s Br. at 16 (alteration in original) (quoting Melani, 909 A.2d at 406).

In his reply brief, Galdo claims that the Trial Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion

was not interlocutory but was indeed a final order pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 341 because

it disposed of all the claims in the underlying action. Galdo alleges that the January

23, 2020 opinion was clear in this regard in providing that “Galdo’s action to quiet

title based on a claim of adverse possession, is granted for the . . . [Galdo] Parcel.”

Galdo’s Reply Br. at 6-7 (quoting Trial Court Op. at 11). Galdo notes that both the

Trial Court and the City referred to the January 23, 2020 opinion as a decision,

thereby establishing that it was a final order. Galdo further distinguishes this case

11

from Melani by observing that the procedural posture here was on remand, whereas

Melani was on a direct appeal. Galdo contends that we cannot rely upon Melani

because Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 instructs that post-trial motions may not be filed to remand

proceedings.

Given the parties’ arguments, we must consider whether, pursuant to Pa.

R.A.P. 1701, the City’s appeal from the Trial Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion

operated to divest the Trial Court of authority to rule on the City’s motion for post-

trial relief. Pa. R.A.P. 1701 provides in general that “[e]xcept as otherwise

prescribed by these rules, after an appeal is taken or review of a quasijudicial order

is sought, the trial court or other government unit may no longer proceed further in

the matter.” It is beyond cavil that “[a]n appeal will lie only from a final order, unless

otherwise permitted by rule or statute.” In re Econ. Borough Mun. Auth., 922 A.2d

77, 79 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). Therefore, it is necessary for us to delve into when an

appeal may properly be taken in the context of post-trial motion practice. Post-trial

motions are governed by Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1, which pertinently provides:

(a) After trial and upon the written Motion for Post-Trial

Relief filed by any party, the court may

(1) order a new trial as to all or any of the issues; or

(2) direct the entry of judgment in favor of any

party; or

(3) remove a nonsuit; or

(4) affirm, modify or change the decision; or

(5) enter any other appropriate order.

In turn, Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4 concerns the entry of judgment in a matter in relation to

post-trial motions, and offers the following, relevant directives:

In addition to the provisions of any Rule of Civil

Procedure or Act of Assembly authorizing the

prothonotary to enter judgment upon praecipe of a party

12

and except as otherwise provided by Rule 1042.72(e)(3),

the prothonotary shall, upon praecipe of a party:

(1) enter judgment upon a nonsuit by the court, the

verdict of a jury or the decision of a judge following

a trial without jury, if

(a) no timely post-trial motion is filed; or

(b) one or more timely post-trial motions are

filed and the court does not enter an order

disposing of all motions within one hundred

twenty days after the filing of the first

motion. A judgment entered pursuant to this

subparagraph shall be final as to all parties

and all issues and shall not be subject to

reconsideration; . . . .

We deem the Superior Court’s decision in Melani to be illuminating with

regard to the interplay between Pa. R.A.P. 1701, Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1, and Pa.R.Civ.P.

227.4.8 In Melani, the Superior Court considered an appeal from an order quieting

title to a parcel of property following a non-jury trial. The trial court issued an

opinion and order finding in favor of the appellee, and the appellants filed a timely

motion for post-trial relief pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1. Before the trial court ruled

on the post-trial motion, however, the appellants filed a notice of appeal with the

Superior Court. The trial court then filed an order indicating that it no longer had

jurisdiction to entertain the appellants’ motion for post-trial relief pursuant to Pa.

R.A.P. 1701.

On appeal, the Superior Court stated that, “[i]n the context of an equity action

decided by a trial judge without a jury, ‘an appeal lies from the entry of judgment[.]’”

8

Generally, this Court is not bound by the decisions of the Superior Court, but such

decisions provide persuasive authority, and we may rely on the decisions of our colleagues where

they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545, 550

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

13

Melani, 909 A.2d at 405 (alteration in original) (quoting Croyle v. Dellape, 832 A.2d

466, 470 (Pa. Super. 2003)). The Superior Court recognized that, in an equity action,

post-trial motions pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1 must be filed by an appellant to

preserve issues for appeal. The Superior Court further observed that, pursuant to

Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4, “[o]nce a post-trial motion is timely filed, judgment cannot be

entered until the trial court enters an order disposing of the motion or the motion is

denied by operation of law one hundred and twenty days after the filing of the

motion.” Melani, 909 A.2d at 405.

Based on the foregoing, the Superior Court concluded that the appellants’

appeal was premature, because the post-trial motion had not been disposed of and

there had been no judgment entered by praecipe or otherwise. Id. at 406. The

Superior Court opined that “[t]he entry of an appropriate judgment is a prerequisite

to this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction and ‘an appeal filed while a post-trial motion

is pending before [the] trial court will be considered premature.’” Id. (alteration in

original) (quoting Croyle, 832 A.2d at 470). Thus, the Superior Court quashed the

appeal and remanded the matter to the trial court for the trial court to consider the

motion for post-trial relief.

This Court’s decision in Valley Gypsum Company, Inc. v. Pennsylvania State

Police, 581 A.2d 707 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990), provides further instruction. There, both

of the parties filed post-trial motions, but one of the parties subsequently filed an

appeal prior to the trial court ruling on those motions. The trial court issued an order

dismissing the post-trial motions pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1701, indicating that it had

no jurisdiction to act further in the matter. Upon review, we quashed the appeal and

remanded the matter to the trial court so that it could dispose of the post-trial

motions. While we may not have labeled the appeal as “premature,” or considered

14

the appeal in relation to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4, we clearly indicated that the appeal

“frustrated the orderly disposition of the post-trial relief motions.” Valley Gypsum,

581 A.2d at 709.

Although not binding on this Court, we find the Superior Court’s rationale

and analysis in Melani to be persuasive here, particularly where its holding is

reinforced by this Court’s decision in Valley Gypsum. Applying those holdings here,

we conclude the City’s appeal was prematurely filed—i.e., prior to the Trial Court

ruling on the City’s post-trial motion and the entry of any judgment in the matter—

and the appeal, therefore, did not divest the Trial Court of its authority to rule on the

City’s post-trial motion. In this instance, an appealable order is one from which

judgment has been entered, and because Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.4 prevents judgment from

being entered prior to the resolution of outstanding post-trial motions, the City’s

post-trial motion prevented any subsequent appeal from divesting the Trial Court of

authority pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1701 until the post-trial motion was resolved.

Indeed, it appears to this Court that holding otherwise would, as we observed in

Valley Gypsum, “frustrate” the purpose of Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1, which serves the

“important function in [the] adjudicatory process [of] afford[ing] the trial court in

the first instance the opportunity to correct asserted trial court error and also clearly

and narrowly fram[ing] issues for appellate review.” Newman Dev. Grp. of

Pottstown, LLC v. Genuardi’s Family Mkts., Inc., 52 A.3d 1233, 1239 (Pa. 2015)

(quoting Diamond Reo Truck Co. v. Mid-Pac. Indus., Inc., 806 A.2d 423, 428

(Pa. Super. 2002)). For all these reasons, we conclude that the Trial Court did not

err pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1701 in addressing the City’s motion for post-trial relief.9

9

Moreover, the City’s appeal of the Trial Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion was, as the

City explains in its brief, “prophylactic” in nature, in that it was intended to preserve an appeal in

15

2. Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c)

In the alternative, Galdo contends that Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c) and its Official

Note10 instruct that post-trial motions are prohibited in remand proceedings that do

not constitute a trial. In support thereof, Galdo directs our attention to the Supreme

Court’s decision in Newman, for the proposition that remand proceedings do not

constitute a trial, and, therefore, post-trial motions are prohibited in a remand

posture. Again, however, we disagree with Galdo’s contentions.

Galdo misinterprets the holding of Newman. Newman concerned whether,

pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1, a party must file a post-trial motion in a remand

the event the Trial Court denied the City’s post-trial motion. City’s Br. at 4; see also Pa. R.A.P.

903 (“[T]he notice of appeal required by Rule 902 (manner of taking appeal) shall be filed within

30 days after the entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.”). Thus, this was not a situation

where the City was attempting to abandon its post-trial motion in favor of an appeal of the Trial

Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion.

10

Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c) provides, in relevant part:

Post-trial motions shall be filed within ten days after

(1) verdict, discharge of the jury because of inability to

agree, or nonsuit in the case of a jury trial; or

(2) notice of nonsuit or the filing of the decision in the case

of a trial without jury.

If a party has filed a timely post-trial motion, any other party may

file a post-trial motion within ten days after the filing of the first

post-trial motion.

Note: A motion for post-trial relief may be filed following a

trial by jury or a trial by a judge without a jury pursuant to

[Pa.R.Civ.P.] 1038 [(relating to nonjury trials)]. A motion

for post-trial relief may not be filed to orders disposing of

preliminary objections, motions for judgment on the

pleadings or for summary judgment, motions relating to

discovery or other proceedings which do not constitute a

trial. See U.S. Nat’l Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson, 487 A.2d

809 (Pa. 1985).

16

proceeding in order to avoid waiver of issues on appeal. A party is generally required

to file a post-trial motion to preserve issues on appeal and to allow the trial court to

correct any errors and frame the issues for appellate review. See L.B. Foster Co. v.

Lane Enters., Inc., 710 A.2d 55 (Pa. 1998). Newman held, however, that in a remand

posture that does not involve further proceedings that amount to a “trial” before the

lower tribunal, and where the trial court’s subsequent determination is made upon

an existing record, post-trial motions are not required to preserve issues on appeal.

Newman, 52 A.3d at 1245-51. Newman did not, by any means, hold that post-trial

motions are prohibited in remand proceedings, as Galdo claims.

Furthermore, while the Official Note to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c) certainly

indicates that post-trial motions are prohibited in proceedings that do not amount to

a trial, the Note does not specifically consider remand proceedings. Indeed, after the

Supreme Court issued its decision in Newman, the Civil Procedural Rules

Committee amended Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1 in 2015 to include subpart (i), which

addresses remand proceedings, which provides:

When an appellate court has remanded a case for further

proceedings, a motion for post-trial relief relating to

subsequent rulings in the trial court shall not be required

unless

(1) the appellate court has specified that the remand

is for a complete or partial new trial, or

(2) the trial court indicates in its order resolving the

remand issues that a motion for post-trial relief is

required pursuant to this rule.

Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(i) (emphasis added). The explanatory comment to subpart (i)

further provides:

In Newman . . . , the Supreme Court . . . examined the

provisions of Rule 227.1 to determine whether a party

must file a motion for post-trial relief following the

17

resolution by the trial court of matters remanded by an

appellate court. While it concluded in that case that a

motion for post-trial relief was not required because the

remand proceeding, which relied on an existing record,

was not a trial, even though the trial court drew a different

conclusion from that record to comport with the appellate

court’s directive, the [Supreme] Court held that Rule 227.1

is silent as to any procedure for post-trial relief when a

matter has been remanded for further consideration by the

trial court. Id. at 1251.

To close this gap, the Supreme Court has amended Rule

227.1 by adding new subdivision (i). Specifically

addressing the remand context, the amendment would not

require the filing of a motion for post-trial relief following

the resolution of matters remanded by an appellate court

except under the following circumstances: (1) the

appellate court has specified that the remand is for a

complete or partial new trial, or (2) the trial court states in

its order resolving the issue remanded that a motion for

post-trial relief is required in order to preserve those issues

for appellate review.

The amendment is intended to give the practitioner

certainty as to when a motion for post-trial relief is

required in the remand context, and thus, to prevent waiver

of those issues upon further appellate review. It is also

intended to facilitate the underlying purpose of the rule,

which is to allow the trial court to reconsider its

determination and to make any corrections before it is

appealed without inundating it with unnecessary motions.

Id., Explanatory Comment 2015. Nowhere in this language is it indicated that post-

trial motions are expressly forbidden in remand proceedings that do not necessarily

constitute a trial. Thus, based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Newman and the

2015 amendment to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1 concerning remand proceedings, we cannot

agree with Galdo’s contention that post-trial motions are prohibited in remand

18

proceedings.11 The Trial Court, therefore, did not err pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P.

227.1(c) in addressing the City’s motion for post-trial relief.

B. Adverse Possession

Galdo next argues that the Trial Court erred by granting the City’s motion for

post-trial relief and narrowing its prior ruling to hold that Galdo only adversely

possessed the 20’ x 16’ and 16’ x 16’ concrete slabs poured in 1990 and 1992. More

specifically, Galdo contends that the evidence presented at trial revealed that Galdo’s

use of the Galdo Parcel extended “far beyond” the two concrete slabs and included

the entirety of the Galdo Parcel. Galdo’s Br. at 28. In furtherance of his argument,

Galdo first takes issue with the Trial Court’s terminology and use of the term “The

Parcel” in its January 23, 2020 opinion and subsequent Post-Trial Order. Galdo

claims that the Trial Court clearly defined the entire plot of land as “the [P]roperty”

and the smaller portion that Galdo sought to adversely possess as “the Parcel.” Galdo

argues that, despite the fact that the Trial Court used the terms “the [P]roperty” and

“the Parcel” often interchangeably, the Trial Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion

recognized that “the Parcel” concerned more than just the two concrete slabs. Galdo

further quotes the Trial Court in stating that “[t]he parties agree that [Galdo] is in

possession of the Parcel, but not the remainder of the Property.” Id. at 28-29 n.18

(quoting Trial Court Op. at 5). Thus, Galdo claims that the Trial Court’s Post-Trial

Order is at odds with its January 23, 2020 opinion and is unsupported by the record.

11

We note that this conclusion is at odds with the Superior Court’s decision in Lenhart v.

Travelers Insurance Company, 596 A.2d 162, 163-64 (Pa. Super. 1991), which concluded that

post-trial motions were prohibited in a remand proceeding pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1(c).

Lenhart, 596 A.2d at 164. Lenhart, however, was issued in 1991, prior to the Supreme Court’s

holding in Newman and the subsequent amendment of Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1. This subsequent history

makes clear to this Court that our holding here is, nevertheless, in line with the Supreme Court’s

precedent and the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

19

Galdo further contends that the Trial Court erred in holding that his possession

of the entire Galdo Parcel was not actual possession—i.e., that Galdo did not

maintain, cultivate, or make improvements to the Galdo Parcel—prior to

April 24, 1993. Galdo alleges that he was in actual possession of the Galdo Parcel

beginning in September 1989. Galdo observes that the City specifically stipulated to

various uses prior to 1993, which included installing the concrete slabs, depositing

dirt excavated from Galdo’s basement which he leveled and filled, and clearing the

Galdo Parcel of weeds and debris. Galdo notes that “use of a piece of land for lawn

purposes in connection with a residence, together with continued maintenance of

such lawn, is sufficient to establish adverse possession,” which Galdo claims stands

for the proposition that physical improvements are not necessary to establish adverse

possession. Id. at 30 (quoting Reed v. Wolyniec, 471 A.2d 80, 84 (Pa. Super. 1983).

Thus, Galdo contends that these stipulated facts clearly show that he had actual

possession of the Galdo Parcel prior to 1993.

Galdo notes that the City also admitted in its Trial Memorandum that the

evidence established these other uses, including “cleaning away debris and weeds

and grading a portion of the lot with dirt and construction waste excavated from

Galdo’s home.” Id. at 31-32 (quoting R.R. at 1285a). Galdo further observes that the

Trial Court held that “[a]ctual possession in the case at hand is of no issue . . . [t]he

parties agree that [Galdo] is in possession of [t]he [Galdo] Parcel, but not the

remainder of the Property.” Id. at 32 (quoting Trial Court Op. at 5). Galdo further

argues that his uncontested testimony at trial established additional uses on the Galdo

Parcel prior to 1993, which included “storing building materials, using it daily as a

parking lot, hosting parties every Friday and Saturday night, clearing, weeding and

20

grading the Galdo Parcel, burning wood, fencing in one of the slabs and using the

Galdo [P]arcel as a driveway . . . .” Id. at 32.

The City responds first by noting that, in a claim for adverse possession,

establishing the exact geography and the specific location of the property in question

is critical. The City contends that piecemeal aggregation of various temporary acts

is insufficient to establish adverse possession. While the City admits that, prior to

April 24, 1993, Galdo engaged in other “affirmative actions” or activities on the

Galdo Parcel other than pouring the concrete slabs, it contends that Galdo failed to

show sufficient “temporal or geographic specificity with these particular acts”

sufficient to meet his strict burden to adversely possess the entire Galdo Parcel.

City’s Br. at 23.

As it concerns lawn maintenance, the City admits that Galdo did much of the

work by 1992. The City contends, however, that Galdo did not establish that he

continued to do lawn maintenance across the entire Galdo Parcel after 1997. The

City observes that, despite the fact that Galdo testified that he began maintaining the

entire Galdo Parcel after 1997, the Trial Court only found that Galdo maintained part

of the Galdo Parcel through 1997. Thus, the City contends that Galdo did not

maintain the lawn for the entirety of the 21-year adverse possession period.

The City next argues that the record only reflects that Galdo hosted parties on

the Galdo Parcel for a fraction of the 21-year adverse possession period. The City

notes that the Trial Court only found that Galdo hosted parties in 1992, and that

Galdo testified that he hosted parties again in 1997. Thus, similar to the lawn

maintenance, the City takes the position that the inconsistent usage of the Galdo

Parcel for hosting parties is insufficient to support a claim of adverse possession.

21

Furthermore, the City observes that Galdo’s testimony largely limited the activity of

hosting parties to the two concrete slabs, not the entire Galdo Parcel.

Regarding parking and use of a driveway, the City observes that Galdo parked

his cars on the concrete slabs and not elsewhere on the Galdo Parcel. While the City

admits that Galdo claimed to drive across different parts of the Galdo Parcel to reach

the concrete slabs, the City alleges that Galdo did not delineate the alleged area to

establish that it was a physical improvement lasting the entire 21-year adverse

possession period. While the City concedes that if Galdo had used the same

grass-covered area for ingress and egress of his vehicles that it would likely support

a finding of adverse possession, it argues that the Trial Court never made a specific

finding concerning Galdo’s use of the driveway prior to 1993. The City observes,

rather, that the Trial Court only found that a driveway was built in 1997, not that

Galdo used the Galdo Parcel as a driveway in areas outside the concrete slabs.

Finally, the City argues that, as it concerns the stipulated facts, it only

stipulated that Galdo had actual possession of the Galdo Parcel as of the

commencement of the ejectment action—i.e., April 24, 2014. The City contends that

it never stipulated, and the Trial Court did not find, that Galdo was in actual

possession of the Galdo Parcel for the entire 21-year statutory period.

Thus, in sum, the City claims that the various temporary activities Galdo

engaged in at the Galdo Parcel—i.e., lawn maintenance, hosting parties, and using

the Galdo Parcel to park his cars—were insufficient to establish adverse possession

for the entire 21-year time period. While the City concedes that the Trial Court

concluded that “Galdo testified that since 1990 he uses and continues to use the

[Galdo Parcel] every single day and nothing was presented to dispute that fact,” it

contends that the Trial Court was within its discretion to change its mind and hold

22

otherwise. City’s Br. at 29 (quoting Trial Court Op. at 6). Accordingly, the City asks

that we affirm the Trial Court’s grant of its motion for post-trial relief.

In his reply brief, Galdo contends that the Trial Court’s Post-Trial Order is

both unsupported by the record and “flies in the face of the findings of fact in its

own . . . [o]pinion.” Galdo’s Reply Br. at 9. Galdo notes that while the Trial Court

was free to change its mind regarding the extent of Galdo’s use of the Galdo Parcel,

the Order did not state that it was doing so, and it provided no analysis to support

the change in its decision.

Galdo further claims that the City reduces his use of the Galdo Parcel prior to

1993 to lawn maintenance, party hosting, and car parking, while ignoring other uses,

which included “clearing the Galdo Parcel of weeds and trash, grading the Galdo

Parcel, discarding debris . . . from the remodeling of [Galdo’s] home, actively

chasing people off the Galdo Parcel, . . . maintain[ing] the lawn, storing materials,

installing a fire[ pit,] and using it every day for various reasons.” Id. at 18 (citing

Trial Court Op. at 3, 6, 8). Nonetheless, Galdo proceeds in his reply brief to address

the City’s claims concerning lawn maintenance, party hosting, and parking and

driveway usage. More specifically, Galdo highlights the following: (1) the Trial

Court concluded that he engaged in lawn maintenance at least from 1990 through

1997, and the Trial Court never concluded that Galdo’s lawn maintenance ceased

thereafter; (2) the Trial Court concluded, and Galdo’s testimony supports the fact,

that he hosted parties every weekend from 1990 through 1997 and that the use of the

Galdo Parcel for hosting parties extended beyond the concrete slabs; and (3) the Trial

Court found that he used the Galdo Parcel to park his vehicles every day and the

usage continued from 1990 through at least 1997 at which time Galdo built a

driveway. Galdo further contends that there is no requirement that the same specific

23

use must be established for the entire statutory period, as the City asserts, and that

he used the Galdo Parcel in a variety of ways consistently throughout the 21 years.

Lastly, Galdo contends that paragraphs 14 and 15 of the stipulated facts

specifically use the defined term “Galdo Parcel,” not “the Parcel,” and the Trial

Court cited to paragraphs 14 and 15 of the stipulated facts and held that actual

possession was not in dispute in the matter, and that it was clear that he was in actual

possession of the Galdo Parcel since 1990. Thus, Galdo alleges that the Trial Court’s

Post-Trial Order is unsupported by the record, as all of its findings make clear that

he adversely possessed the entire Galdo Parcel and not just the two concrete slabs.

We begin our analysis by reciting our “rigorous” standard of review:

A [trial court’s] findings of fact will not be disturbed

absent an abuse of discretion, a capricious disbelief of the

evidence, or a lack of evidentiary support on the record for

the findings. A [trial court’s] conclusions of law are

subject to stricter scrutiny. Unless the rules of law relied

on are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable, however, a

grant of . . . relief will not be reversed on appeal.

Lilly v. Markvan, 763 A.2d 370, 372 (Pa. 2000) (quoting Masloff v. Port Auth. of

Allegheny Cnty., 613 A.2d 1186, 1188 (Pa. 1992)). An appellate court will not

hesitate to reverse, however, where a decision is based on “findings which are

without [factual] support in the record.” Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 559 (Pa. 1999)

(quoting Rusiki v. Pribonic, 515 A.2d 507, 510 (Pa. 1986)).

In an adverse possession claim, the burden lies with the claimant to prove

actual, continuous, exclusive, open and notorious, and hostile possession of the land

in question for a period of 21 years. Parks v. Pa. R.R. Co., 152 A. 682, 684

(Pa. 1930). “It is a serious matter indeed to take away another’s property[,] [which]

is why the law imposes such strict requirements of proof on one who claims title by

adverse possession.” Edmondson v. Dolinich, 453 A.2d 611, 614 (Pa. Super. 1982).

24

Sporadic use of a property is insufficient to establish title to the property, “no matter

how often repeated.” Parks, 152 A. at 684.

It is true that residence is not necessary to make an adverse

possession [claim] within the statute of limitation[s]; the

possession may be adverse by inclosing and cultivating the

land[,] but nothing short of an actual possession,

permanently continued, will take away from the owner the

possession which the law attaches to the legal title[.]

[T]emporary acts on the land, without an intention to seat

and occupy it for residence and cultivation or other

permanent use consistent with the nature of the property,

are not the actual possession required. Such occupation

must be exclusive, and of such a character as compels the

real owner to take notice of the possession of the disseisor.

Id. (citations omitted); see also Flickinger v. Huston, 435 A.2d 190, 193

(Pa. Super. 1981) (“temporary acts on the land, without an intention to seat and

occupy it for permanent use . . . consistent with the nature of the property” is

insufficient to establish adverse possession). “Only acts signifying permanent

occupation of the land and done continuously for a [21-]year period will confer

adverse possession.” Smith v. Peterman, 397 A.2d 793, 796 (Pa. Super. 1978). While

actual possession generally means dominion over the land, it has no precise

definition and is dependent upon the facts of each case. Moore v. Duran, 687 A.2d

822, 827 (Pa. Super. 1996). “Actual possession of property may be established in

connection with the maintenance of a residence, by cultivation of the land, by

[e]nclosure of the land, or by making improvements to the land and paying property

taxes.” Id. at 828.

After careful review of the entire record in this matter, as well as the Trial

Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion and Post-Trial Order and the voluminous briefs

submitted by the parties, we agree with Galdo that the Trial Court erred in granting

25

the City’s motion for post-trial relief and narrowing its holding to limit Galdo’s

claim of adverse possession to the two concrete slabs.

At the outset, we observe that the Trial Court’s use of terminology in the

January 23, 2020 opinion confuses this matter, in that the Trial Court

interchangeably used the terms “parcel,” “property,” “Property,” and “the Parcel”

while referring to various areas of the Property or the Property itself. Nevertheless,

we agree with Galdo that the Trial Court’s January 23, 2020 opinion is most logically

read, through a number of examples, to define “the Parcel” as what this Court and

the parties have referred to as the Galdo Parcel, and not just the two concrete slabs:

The property at issue in this case is a rectangular lot of

undeveloped land located at 1101-1119 N. Front Street in

Philadelphia (hereinafter “[t]he Parcel”). . . .

. . . In early 1990, Galdo cleared the Parcel of weeds and

trash, poured a concrete slab, and parked his vehicles

there. Galdo also used the Parcel to discard debris from the

remodeling of his home. During this time, someone other

than [Galdo] was seen dumping materials onto [t]he

Parcel. By 1992, Galdo poured another concrete slab on

the Parcel for storing materials and enclosed that area with

a fence. Galdo installed on the Parcel a fire pit and a picnic

table affixed to the ground. In 1997, a nearby factory

burned down and Galdo created a driveway on the Parcel

with materials collected from the remains of the factory.

Galdo also planted two maple trees and built a carport with

metal poles, which was later replaced with a wooden

pavilion. Additionally, in 1997, Galdo converted the fire

pit on the Parcel into a brick barbecue, installed two

oversized trailers to store gardening tools and the like, and

installed a volleyball court and horseshoe pit. Between

1998 and 2001, Galdo planted grass seed on a portion of

the Parcel . . . and planted a willow tree in 2010. . . .

....

26

. . . The parties agree that [Galdo] is in possession of [t]he

Parcel, but not the remainder of the Property. . . .

....

. . . Further, the parties stipulated that sometime in early

1990 Galdo poured a concrete slab on the Parcel to park

[his] vehicles. . . . By chasing others off the property,

maintaining the property, and using it every day for

various reasons[,] this court finds the possession of [t]he

Parcel to be exclusive from . . . Galdo from 1990 to

present.

....

As previously discussed, the parties stipulated that

sometime in early 1990 Galdo poured a concrete slab on

the Parcel to park [his] vehicles. . . . Galdo also performed

various activities and continued to improve the property

by laying a concrete slab and park[ing] his vehicles every

day. . . .

....

The evidence indicates that sometime in early 1990, Galdo

poured a 20’ x 16’ concrete slab on [t]he Parcel on which

to park his car. By 1992, Galdo poured an additional 16’ x

16’ concrete slab, put up a fence to store materials, cleaned

away debris . . . and weeds, and began grading a portion

of the lot. . . .

. . . Over the next few years[,] two (2) storage containers

were added to [t]he Parcel. In 2008, Galdo built a wooden

pavilion. From 2010-2014[,] Galdo buil[t] a treehouse on

[t]he Parcel. . . .

Trial Court Op. at 2-9 (internal citations omitted).

The foregoing makes clear that, throughout the Trial Court’s January 23, 2020

opinion, when it referenced “the Parcel,” it was discussing the entire Galdo Parcel

and not just the two concrete slabs. Indeed, the Trial Court identified a number of

activities Galdo engaged in on “the Parcel,” most notably the actual pouring of the

concrete slabs “on the Parcel,” which could not have occurred on the concrete slabs

27

themselves. Nonetheless, in the Trial Court’s Post-Trial Order, it stated that “when

this [Trial] [C]ourt refer[red] to ‘[t]he Parcel’ in the discussion section of its opinion,

it is specifically detailing the two (2) concrete slabs [Galdo] poured prior to 1993.”

R.R. at 1451a. This statement provided the basis for the Trial Court to limit its

finding of adverse possession to the two concrete slabs. The Trial Court, however,

failed to provide any reasoning to support its change of heart, despite the fact that its

Post-Trial Order directly contradicted the findings of fact it made in its

January 23, 2020 opinion.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Trial Court’s Post-Trial Order

finding that Galdo only adversely possessed the two concrete slabs, is unsupported

by the record. It is clear to this Court that the Trial Court’s findings—i.e., those made

in the January 23, 2020 opinion concerning Galdo’s activities on the Galdo Parcel

beyond the concrete slabs and prior to April 24, 1993—have ample support in the

record and should not have been modified without adequate explanation.

Significantly, the Trial Court found that

[t]he evidence indicates that sometime in early 1990,

Galdo poured a 20’ x 16’ concrete slab on [t]he Parcel on

which to park his car. By 1992, Galdo poured an additional

16’ x 16’ concrete slab, put up a fence to store materials,

cleaned away debris . . . and weeds, and began grading a

portion of the lot. Additionally, Galdo parked his vehicles

on [t]he Parcel every day and hosted parties on the

weekends. The City has stipulated that visual

improvements to the Galdo Parcel can be seen in

photographs taken by the Delaware Valley Regional

Planning Commission as early as 1990.

Trial Court Op. at 8 (internal citation omitted). These facts were stipulated to by the

parties, are otherwise supported by Galdo’s testimony, and are not in dispute. R.R. at

908a-10a, Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 24-27, 37; R.R. at 582a; see also City’s Br. at 21

28

(“[The City] . . . accept[s] as true the factual conclusions that the Trial Court drew

in the January 23, 2020 opinion.”). Thus, it is clear that the record supports a finding

that Galdo engaged in activities on the Galdo Parcel that extended beyond the two

concrete slabs prior to April 24, 1993, sufficient to establish actual possession.

Furthermore, while the City concedes that Galdo engaged in a number of

activities prior to April 24, 1993, that could be sufficient to establish adverse

possession, it contends that these activities were various and temporary in nature

and, therefore, inoperative as a matter of law to establish adverse possession.

Although we agree with the City that “temporary acts on the land, without an

intention to seat and occupy it for . . . permanent use consistent with the nature of

the property” are insufficient to establish adverse possession, the cases the City cites

in support of its contention concerned temporally spread-out and isolated activities

that the claimants attempted to string together to support their claims. See, e.g.,

Parks, 152 A. at 684-85 (partial cultivation and sand and gravel extraction of some

portions of the land was insufficient to establish adverse possession); Flickinger, 435

A.2d at 192-93 (isolated activities over 21 years of clearing 2 stream banks, draining

a swampy area, planting some trees, picnicking and erecting a fence in vague and

inconclusive area considered temporary and insufficient for adverse possession

claim); Edmondson, 453 A.2d at 613-14 (sporadic, non-exclusive, temporary use of

an alley was insufficient to establish adverse possession); Smith, 397 A.2d at 795-

97 (rejecting claim that temporary acts strung together over 21-year period was

sufficient for adverse possession). Significantly, none of those cases considered a

factual scenario involving consistent, daily, or weekly use of a property, as the Trial

Court found here with Galdo’s use of the Galdo Parcel as it relates to parking,

hosting parties, conducting general maintenance, and making improvements thereon

29

from 1990 through 2014. Trial Court Op. at 5, 7-8. Further absent from those cases

is an “intention to seat and occupy [the property] for residence and cultivation or

other permanent use consistent with the nature of the property,” Parks, 152 A. at

684, which is similarly contrary to the facts of the present case. The stipulated facts,

including those continuing up through 2014, clearly portray that Galdo treated the

Galdo Parcel in a manner consistent with its nature and with an intent to occupy it

permanently. See R.R. at 909a-10a, Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 28-36.

We similarly find no requirement in the case law that, where an individual

initiates an activity, that activity must be maintained for the entire 21-year time

period, despite the fact that the property was consistently being used for a variety of

other activities during the same time. In other words, we do not interpret the case

law to mean that Galdo’s claim for adverse possession must necessarily fail because

the record is unclear whether he engaged in lawn maintenance after 1997, but where

evidence of other consistent uses were present at that time. Rather, the foregoing

cases concern consistent and notorious use of property as opposed to temporary,

sporadic use, and the stipulated facts here clearly establish that Galdo engaged in

consistent use of the Galdo Parcel through 2014. Thus, we similarly reject the City’s

claim in this regard.

In sum, based on the evidence of record, and in particular the Trial Court’s

factual findings in its January 23, 2020 opinion, we conclude that the Trial Court’s

Post-Trial Order limiting its finding of adverse possession in favor of Galdo to the

two concrete slabs is unsupported by the record, and, thus, the Trial Court erred in

granting the City’s post-trial motion. Bortz, 729 A.2d at 559. Rather, the evidence

of record clearly establishes that Galdo had actual possession of the Property that

encompassed the entire Galdo Parcel and that his use was consistent through the

30

adverse possession period. Based on this evidence, the Trial Court initially

concluded that Galdo had adversely possessed the entire Galdo Parcel for the

required 21-year period. Without providing an explanation, the Trial Court

subsequently attempted to limit its holding to only the concrete slabs. The Trial

Court’s Post-Trial Order, however, is inconsistent with its own analysis and

explanation as set forth in its January 23, 2020 opinion. Indeed, it is revealing that

the Trial Court expressly concluded that “[a]ctual possession in the case at hand is

of no issue. . . . Based on the facts and stipulations made by the parties[,] it is clear

that [Galdo] is in actual possession of the property.” Trial Court Op. at 5; see also

R.R. at 907a, Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 14-15.

V. Conclusion

For these reasons, we conclude that the Trial Court erred in entering the Post-

Trial Order and granting the City’s motion for post-trial relief. Accordingly, we

reverse the Post-Trial Order. In addition, we remand this matter to the Trial Court,

with instructions that it enter judgment in favor of Galdo, in a manner that is

consistent with this opinion.

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

31

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Philadelphia :

:

v. : Nos. 532 & 537 C.D. 2020

:

Francis Galdo, et al., :

Appellant :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 13th day of December, 2021, it is hereby ORDERED that the

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County’s (Trial Court) order, dated

February 28, 2020, is REVERSED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is

REMANDED to the Trial Court, with instructions that it enter judgment in favor of

Appellant Francis Galdo, in a manner that is consistent with the foregoing opinion.

Jurisdiction relinquished.

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge