In The Matter of the Nomination Papers of M. Mlinarich Appeal of: S. Butler

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the Matter of the Nomination :

Papers of Mark Mlinarich, :

Independent Candidate for :

Magisterial District Judge : No. 949 C.D. 2021

05-3-04 : Argued: September 13, 2021

:

Appeal of: Scott Butler :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: September 17, 2021

Scott Butler (Objector) appeals from the August 18, 2021 Order of the Court

of Common Pleas of Allegheny County (trial court) that denied Objector’s Petition

to Set Aside the Nomination Papers (Petition) of Mark Mlinarich (Candidate), who

is seeking to appear on the November 2, 2021 General Election ballot as an

Independent candidate for Allegheny County Magisterial District Judge District 05-

3-04 (District Judge). At issue are whether Sections 951.1 and 951(e)(6) of the

Pennsylvania Election Code (Election Code),1 25 P.S. §§ 2911.1, 2911(e)(6), require

Candidate’s removal from the ballot. Section 951.1 provides that

[a]ny person who is a registered and enrolled member of a party during

any period of time beginning with thirty (30) days before the primary

and extending through the general or municipal election of that same

year shall be ineligible to be the candidate of a political body in a

general or municipal election held in that same year . . . .

1

Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. §§ 2911(e)(6), 2911.1. Section 951.1

was added by Section 3 of the Act of July 12, 1980, P.L. 649, No. 134 (Act 134). Section 2 of Act

134 amended Section 951(e) to add Subsection (e)(6).

25 P.S. § 2911.1 (30-day requirement). Section 951(e)(6) requires that, appended to

each nomination paper, shall be an affidavit swearing that the candidate “was not a

registered and enrolled member of a party thirty (30) days before the primary held

prior to the general or municipal election in that same year.” 25 P.S. § 2911(e)(6).

In denying the Petition, the trial court found these provisions to be inapplicable to

Candidate, who was not a “sore loser” because he had not been a candidate during

the May 18, 2021 Primary Election, and Candidate had detrimentally relied on the

statements of the Ballots & Returns Manager (Manager) of the Allegheny County

Elections Division (Elections Division), who told him incorrectly that the Act of

October 31, 2019, P.L. 552, No. 77 (Act 77), changed the 30-day requirement to 15

days.

On appeal, Objector argues that, because Candidate was a registered member

of a party until 20 days before the primary, Candidate did not meet the 30-day

requirement set forth in Section 951.1, and is, therefore, “ineligible to be the

candidate of a political body,” 25 P.S. § 2911.1, and Candidate cannot rely on the

misinformation from the Elections Division to overcome this ineligibility. Objector

also argues that Candidate’s Affidavit contains a material falsehood in that

Candidate swore that he was not a registered member of a party 30 days before the

primary and is eligible for the office, neither of which are true, which makes the

Affidavit invalid and void and nullifies Candidate’s Nomination Papers.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

The facts of this matter are not in dispute. On August 9, 2021, Objector filed

the Petition. (Original Record (O.R.) Item 1.) In the Petition, Objector stated that

Candidate filed Nomination Papers as an Independent candidate for District Judge

2

with the Allegheny County Board of Elections (Board) and filed a signed Political

Body Candidate’s Affidavit (Affidavit) with the Board on July 27, 2021 (Petition ¶¶

4, 5; Exhibit (Ex). 2.) Candidate’s Affidavit stated, in relevant part: “[I]f I am a

candidate for election at a general or municipal election[,] I shall not be a registered

and enrolled member of a political party at any time during the period of [30]

days prior to the primary . . . .” (Id. ¶ 6 (quoting Ex. 2) (emphasis added).)

Objector asserted that Candidate “was a registered and duly enrolled member of a

political party . . . within [30] days of the May 18, 2021 primary election.” (Id. ¶ 9.)

Objector submitted that Candidate did not change his voter registration until April

28, 2021. (Id. ¶ 10.) Objector asserted that 30 days before the May 18, 2021 primary

was April 18, 2021, a Sunday, making Candidate’s last day to disaffiliate from a

political party Monday, April 19, 2021. (Id. ¶ 11 (citing In re Nomination Papers of

Lahr, 842 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. 2004)).) Accordingly, Objector contended that

Candidate is ineligible to be a political body candidate in the November 2, 2021

General Election. (Id. ¶ 12.) Objector also alleged that Candidate’s Affidavit

materially misrepresented that Candidate was eligible for the office sought and had

not been “a registered and enrolled member of a political party at any time during

the period of [30] days prior to the primary,” which rendered the Affidavit invalid.

(Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) For these reasons, Objector requested the trial court sustain the

objections and strike Candidate’s Nomination Papers.

The trial court held a hearing on August 16, 2021, where Candidate appeared

pro se and Objector was represented by counsel. (See Hearing Transcript (H.T.) at

3.) Candidate testified that he had spoken to Manager of the Elections Division

regarding the procedures and protocols for disaffiliating and that Manager had stated

that Candidate “was able to disaffiliate by May 3rd,” or 15 days prior to the May 18,

3

2021 primary election, “from a political party and act as a candidate for nomination

in the upcoming election[.]” (Id. at 11.) Citing the recent statutory changes to the

deadline for receipt of voter registration applications from 30 days to not later than

15 days before the election under Section 1231 of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 3071,

added by Section 4 of Act 77,2 Candidate further believed that “there’s a reasonable

expectation from a registered voter that the 30-day window [to disaffiliate] has been

replaced by a 15-day window before the primary” such that “a voter can register 15

days prior to the primary and a registered voter can disaffiliate or change parties

within 15 days of a primary as per Act 77.” (Id. at 12.) Candidate did not dispute

the accuracy of the dates that Candidate was supposed to disaffiliate and actually did

disaffiliate. (Id. at 13.) Again, citing to Section 1231(b)(1), Candidate asserted:

“Subsection B and Citation 1 basically says [sic] that the ballot voter registration

application is received by the appropriate commission not later than 15 days before

the election.” (Id. at 15-16.) Candidate maintained that the General Assembly “is

holding a political candidate body [sic] at a higher standard and a higher burden to

disaffiliate from a political party of 30 days before a primary election, instead of the

outlined legislation of 15 days for a non[-]candidate[.]” (Id. at 16.) However,

Candidate acknowledged that “all of the documentation that was given to” Candidate

“seems to be reverting back to the old legislation where a voter or a candidate to

disaffiliate from a political party had 30 days.” (Id. at 11-12.) Conversely,

Candidate introduced the 2021 Election Calendar and argued that it stated that May

3, 2021, was “the last day to register before the primary election and . . . the last day

to change party enrollment for a non[-]partisan enrollment before the primary . . . .”

2

Act 77 repealed former Section 1326 of the Voter Registration Act, former 25 Pa.C.S.

§ 1326, which set forth the previous 30-day deadline for voter registration. Section 1231 was

amended by Section 7 of the Act of March 27, 2020, P.L. 41.

4

(Id. at 17.) Candidate, therefore, submitted that he should have had the ability to

change party enrollment by May 3, 2021, which was 15 days prior to the primary.

(Id.)

Manager agreed that she spoke with Candidate and exchanged emails with

Candidate regarding when he had to change his registration in order to run as a

political body candidate, which she believed was by May 3, 2021. (Id. at 24-25, 27.)

On cross-examination, Objector asked Manager about the time frame of these

conversations with Candidate, and Manager replied that an oral conversation took

place on April 22, 2021, and the email exchange occurred on April 23, 2021. (Id. at

25-26.)

Candidate asserted that he also signed the Affidavit in reliance on Manager’s

erroneous advice. (Id. at 28-29.) Candidate further stated that, at “the time

[Candidate] had signed the [A]ffidavit,” Candidate “did not knowingly or willfully

try to misrepresent any” fact but relied on Manager’s advice. (Id. at 11-12, 29.) The

trial court on the record stated that the trial court did not believe Candidate tried to

misrepresent any fact knowingly or willfully in the Affidavit. (Id. at 29.)

The trial court denied Objector’s Petition in its August 18, 2021 Order. (O.R.

Item 2.) The trial court first determined that Objector’s reliance on In re Guzzardi,

99 A.3d 381, 386 (Pa. 2014), for the proposition that Pennsylvania courts may not

mitigate statutory provisions through equity, was misplaced because that matter

concerned a provision of the Public Official and Employee Ethics Act (Ethics Act),3

not the Election Code. The trial court further distinguished In re Guzzardi because

the Ethics Act provision at issue included language stating that the failure of a

candidate to file a statement of financial interest was a fatal defect, and Section 951.1

3

Act of October 15, 1998, P.L. 729, as amended, 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 1101–1113.

5

does not contain similar language. The trial court also determined that Candidate’s

reliance on the advice from Manager was reasonable, non-negligent, and supported

the Petition’s denial. (O.R. Item 2 (citing Appeal of Fairview Assocs., Inc., 433 A.2d

929, 930 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), and In re Nomination Papers of Kim D. Williams (Pa.

Cmwlth., No. 412 C.D. 2019, filed April 17, 2019)).)

Objector filed a Motion for Reconsideration and brief in support, which the

trial court denied. (O.R. Items 3-5.) Objector then appealed to this Court. Upon

Objector’s appeal, this Court, on August 30, 2021, directed the trial court to issue an

opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a) (Rule 1925(a) Opinion).

B. Trial Court’s Rule 1925(a) Opinion

The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, explaining its decision. First,

the trial court explained that Act 77’s changes, while not dispositive, were “relevant

to context of the facts of this case, and that its specific provisions led to an

understandable mistake by [Manager] . . . .” (Rule 1925(a) Opinion (Op.) at 4.)

Moreover, the trial court explained that while Objector “appear[ed]” to violate

Section 951.1’s 30-day requirement, “that subsection was never intended to apply in

the first place.” (Id.) Specifically, the trial court stated: “Section [951]’s clear intent

was to force a political candidate to choose between the primary route and the

nomination route to the general election ballot and to prevent a losing primary

candidate from filing nomination papers.” (Id. at 5 (citing Baronett v. Tucker, 365

A.2d 179, 181 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1976)).) Quoting our Supreme Court’s decision in In

re Nomination Papers of Scroggin, 237 A.3d 1006, 1018-19 (Pa. 2020), the trial

court determined that “[t]he purpose of this provision as applied to nomination

papers is to identify and disqualify so-called ‘sore-loser’ candidacies, i.e., those

6

individuals who unsuccessfully attempted to secure the nomination of a political

party before filing nomination papers as a candidate of a political body.” (Id.

(emphasis omitted).) Thus, the trial court concluded, Section 951 does not apply

because Candidate was not a candidate in a prior primary and was, therefore, not a

“sore loser.” (Id. at 5-6.) This conclusion, the trial court reasoned, was supported

given “that [Section 951](e)(5)4 and (6) . . . inherently prohibit[ed] a candidate from

being a ‘sore loser’” and that “[e]very single case dealing with Section [951]

involve[d] . . . a ‘sore loser’ candidate attempting to run twice.” (Id. at 6.)

From this, the trial court reasoned that the word “candidates” in the title of

Section 951.1, “Limitation on eligibility of candidates,” indicated that this section

applied only to “those people who have already been candidates in the primary. Thus

[Section 951].1 establishes a 30-day pre-primary disaffiliation choice deadline for

only those people who have been primary candidates if they wish to proceed as an

independent versus a political party candidate.” (Id. (emphasis omitted).) The trial

court held that its “reading of the statute is consistent with the affidavit requirements

found in [Section 951](e)(5) and (6), which inherently prohibits a candidate from

being a ‘sore loser.’” (Id.) As such, the trial court concluded that the legislative

intent of Section 951.1, and the use of the words “limitations” and “candidates” in

the title, “was to expressly codify the pre-primary disaffiliation affidavit

requirements inherently established in [Section 951](e)(5) and (6) for ‘sore[ ]losers’,

and not for candidates like [Candidate].” (Id.)

4

Section 951(e)(5) requires that a candidate attest in the affidavit that “his name has not

been presented as a candidate by nomination petitions for any public office to be voted for at the

ensuing primary election, nor has he been nominated by any other nomination papers filed for such

office[.]” 25 P.S. § 2911(e)(5).

7

The trial court cited In re Cohen for Office of Philadelphia City Council-at-

Large, 225 A.3d 1083 (Pa. 2020), as an example of a situation where our Supreme

Court has held that a candidate is not a “sore loser” and can “run as an independent[]”

despite having campaigned and circulated nominating petitions if the candidate

voluntarily withdraws from the primary, either as of right or via judicial approval.

(Id. at 7.) Having concluded that Section 951.1 did not apply, the trial court

analogized Candidate’s situation to that of the special election candidate in In re

Nomination Papers of Smith, 431 A.2d 1096 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981), rev’d, 430 A.2d

1156 (Pa. 1981), who had changed his registration after circulating nomination

papers as an independent candidate. In In re Smith, the trial court explained, this

Court removed the candidate from the ballot holding that the candidate was not a

“candidate” for purposes of a third-party nomination until the change of registration

and, therefore, any signatures received prior to that change could not be counted,

which left the candidate without enough signatures. (Id. at 8.) Extrapolating from

the holding in In re Smith, the trial court held that Candidate “simply had to

disaffiliate prior to circulating his nomination papers to run as an independent[,]”

and, having done so, Candidate could remain on the ballot. (Id.)

The trial court next concluded that its decision to deny the Petition was

supported by Candidate’s reasonable and non-negligent reliance on the advice from

Manager. (Id. at 9 (citing Appeal of Fairview Assocs., Inc., 433 A.2d at 930, and In

re Williams, slip op. at 8-10).) Because “the ‘sore loser’ provisions simply d[id] not

apply to the facts of this case,” the trial court determined that there was “no equity

issue” and that the holdings of In re Guzzardi and In re Scroggin, which preclude a

court from using its equitable powers to deviate from the plain language of the

Election Code, did not prevent the trial court from acting here. (Id.) Finally, the

8

trial court noted that it had found Candidate truthful in regard to Candidate believing

that the boilerplate language of the Affidavit had not been changed to reflect

Candidate’s perceived change to the 30-day requirement. (Id. at 10.) Therefore, the

trial court held that Objector’s assertion that Candidate had committed a crime in

attesting to false information, as raised in Objector’s Motion for Reconsideration,

was frivolous. (Id. at 10.)

II. Parties’ Arguments

A. Objector’s Arguments

On appeal, Objector contends that, pursuant to express mandates of Sections

951.1 and 951(e)(6), Candidate is ineligible to be a political body candidate for

District Judge because Candidate was “a registered and enrolled member of a party

during any period of time beginning with thirty (30) days before the [P]rimary.” 25

P.S. § 2911.1. Objector asserts that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the

Election Code by relying on: (1) Section 951(e)(5) rather than Section 951(e)(6);

and (2) cases that did not involve Section 951.1 and 951(e)(6), namely Baronett, 365

A.2d at 180 (decided before those sections were added to the Election Code); Cohen,

225 A.3d at 1084, 1085 n.1 (case did not involve “a general election political body

candidate’s failure to disaffiliate at least 30 days prior to the primary”); and In re

Smith, 431 A.2d at 1097 (case concerned “a political body candidate’s eligibility for

special election, rather than the general election[.]”). (Objector’s Brief (Br.) at 30-

32.)

Objector also argues that Act 77 did not make any relevant changes to the

Election Code. Objector maintains that while Act 77 “changed the Commonwealth’s

mail-in voting system and vastly expanded the option for Pennsylvanians to vote by

mail[,] [i]t did not change the relevant provisions o[f] the statute related to the

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nomination of political body candidates[,] [] the affidavit requirements for those

candidates[,] or the [] disaffiliation deadline for political body candidates[.]” (Id. at

17.) At oral argument, Objector emphasized that Section 951.1’s express 30-day

requirement is unambiguous and, as such, the Court should ascertain the legislative

intent by the plain language rather than looking to the statute’s purpose.

Objector therefore asserts that, given the plain and unambiguous language of

Section 951.1, Candidate cannot legally or factually rely on the incorrect information

received from Manager to overcome those mandates. Factually, Objector argues

that Candidate’s reliance on the incorrect information did not cause Candidate to

miss the deadline because the evidence of record establishes that Candidate did not

seek advice about the 30-day requirement until April 22, 2019, two days after the

start of the 30-day period. Thus, Objector contends, Candidate cannot rely on that

after-the-fact communication to justify that he was a member of a party 30 days

before the primary. (Id. at 29-30.)

Legally, Objector maintains that, contrary to the trial court’s determination,

“erroneous guidance from . . . the county board of elections cannot nullify the

express provisions of the Election Code.” (Id. at 22-23 (quoting In re Scroggin, 237

A.3d at 1021) (emphasis omitted).) Because the requirements of Section 951.1 are

express provisions, Objector argues, the trial court erred in concluding that In re

Guzzardi and Section 951.1 were inapplicable. Objector posits that our Supreme

Court in In re Scroggin “made clear that [In re] Guzzardi is not limited to the Ethics

[Act] and . . . applies to the Election Code” by applying In re Guzzardi to a challenge

under the Election Code. (Id. at 25.) Objector further argues that the trial court’s

reliance on Appeal of Fairview Associates, Inc. was also in error, as that case “did

not involve an ‘express provision’ of the Election Code,” while Section 951.1 is an

10

express provision that sets forth a requirement for a candidate’s eligibility, through

the use of “shall,” with which the failure to comply “should not be remedied by

equitable principles.” (Id. at 25-26.) Objector asserts that the trial court’s reliance

on In re Williams is similarly erroneous because the Court there considered a

provision that contained uncertainty, since the Election Code did not expressly state

at what county office a statement of financial interest should be filed for a multi-

municipality magisterial district justice, and the challenged candidate “did

everything reasonably possible to determine the correct filing location.” (Id. at 27-

28 (quoting In re Williams, slip op. at 8).) Here, Objector argues, Candidate did not

do everything reasonably possible to determine the deadline before which Candidate

had to disaffiliate from the political party, and which was clear from the express

provision of the statute and the written guidance he had from the Elections

Department. Objector maintains that any erroneous advice Candidate received

cannot operate to nullify that express provision, particularly where Candidate did

not start to even inquire about those requirements until after the date had passed. (Id.

at 23-24 (citing 25 P.S. § 2911.1).)

Objector additionally argues that the trial court’s Order should be reversed,

and Candidate should be removed from the ballot, because Candidate falsely swore

that he was eligible to be a candidate for office and not a registered member of any

party 30 days preceding the primary, thereby making the Affidavit invalid and void.

Under In re Nomination Petition of Keith M. Cianfrani, 359 A.2d 383, 384 (Pa.

1976), and In re Nomination Petition of John R. Pippy, 711 A.2d 1048, 1054 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1998), Objector argues, “an affidavit that includes sworn facts that were

not true when the affidavit was executed renders the nomination [papers] materially

defective and void, such that the nomination [papers] may be set aside.” (Objector’s

11

Br. at 11.) Objector posits that “sworn affidavits are to [e]nsure the legitimacy of

information crucial to the election process” and “a false affidavit ‘must be at least

equated with the failure to execute an affidavit.’” (Id. at 11-12 (quoting Petition of

Cianfrani, 359 A.2d at 384).) Therefore, Objector argues, “[f]alsely swearing to be

eligible for an office for which one is running is a material defect that renders the

nomination [papers] null and void[,]” the Affidavit is void and the Nomination

Papers are fatally defective. (Id. at 12 (citing In re Nomination Petition of Kathleen

J. Prendergast, 673 A.2d 324 (Pa. 1996)).)

B. Candidate’s Arguments

Candidate agrees with the trial court’s conclusion that his “failure to

disaffiliate from [a party] as prescribed by the Pennsylvania Election Code[] was not

fatal to [his] potential candidacy because [he] was neither a ‘candidate’ nor a ‘sore

loser’ and such non-negligent failure, as in this case[,] is simply not a fatal action.”

(Candidate’s Br. at 7 (footnote omitted).) Candidate cites In re Scroggin, 237 A.3d

at 1018-19, to define a “sore loser” as “individuals who unsuccessfully attempted to

secure the nomination of a political party before filing nomination papers as a

candidate of a political body.” (Candidate’s Br. at 8.) Because Candidate was never

a candidate for a primary election and did not lose a primary election, Candidate’s

“efforts to get on the ballot of the general election was not a second run at being

elected.” (Id. at 7.) Candidate argues that precedent supports that the “sore loser”

provisions only apply where an individual seeks a “second bite of the proverbial

election apple.” (Id. at 8 (citing In re Scroggin, 237 A.3d at 1006; In re Smith, 431

A.2d at 1100-01; Baronett, 365 A.2d 179).)

Candidate also cites In re Cohen, in which the candidate, after campaigning

as a candidate in the primary, voluntarily withdrew before the primary occurred.

12

Although Candidate incorrectly states that the withdrawal was “after the time for

disassociation had passed[]”,5 our Supreme Court did permit the candidate’s name

to be placed on the general election ballot. Candidate explains it was because the

candidate was not a “sore loser” because the candidate “willfully r[an] for the party’s

nomination,” which is the same situation as here. (Id. at 9.) Candidate further argues

that he is more similarly situated to the candidate in Cohen, distinguishing the case

sub judice from that in Lachina v. Berks County Board of Elections, 884 A.2d 867

(Pa. 2005), where the candidate was involuntarily removed from the primary ballot

and the Court held that the candidate still qualified as a primary candidate because

he intended to be on the primary election ballot and thus could not run in the general

election. (Id.)

Candidate argues that In re Guzzardi is inapplicable to the present case

because, unlike here, the Ethics Act “attached specific consequences for the failure

of a potential candidate to conform to its requirements regarding the filing of

financial disclosure statements[.]” (Id. at 10.) In contrast, Candidate argues, Section

951.1 contains no such stated consequences, and given that the Court in In re

Guzzardi limited the “fatal[-]defect rule” to circumstances involving a statutorily-

imposed consequence to the noncompliance, “there is no legislative basis for

applying the ‘fatal[-] defect rule’” to Candidate’s 10-day deviation from the 30-day

requirement. (Id. at 10.) Moreover, pursuant to In re Smith, 431 A.3d at 1098,

Candidate argues that an individual does not become a “candidate” for the purpose

of being disqualified under Section 951.1 unless and until he files nomination

petitions as a candidate for a political party. Because Candidate never filed such

5

We note that our Supreme Court in In re Cohen explained that “[b]ecause [the candidate]

was not a registered member of a party thirty days before the May 21, 2019 primary, Section 951.1

[wa]s not implicated in th[at] matter.” 224 A.3d at 1085 n.1.

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petitions to become a candidate for a party, Candidate was not a disqualified

“candidate” under Section 951.1. Candidate maintains that “one cannot be a

candidate for a political party if one does not intend to be.” (Id. at 12 (citing Packrall

v. Quail, 192 A.2d 704, 706 (Pa. 1963)).) Accordingly, Candidate claims that

because he never sought or intended to become the candidate for a party during the

primary, he was not a “sore loser” in this matter and Section 951.1 is inapplicable.

Candidate next argues that the trial court correctly held that Candidate’s

reliance on the inaccurate information from the Elections Division was reasonable,

non-negligent, and not disqualifying. (Id. at 14-15.) Candidate explains that Act 77

“muddied the water of election law” and confused Candidate with respect to the 30-

day requirement for disaffiliation by candidates and the 15-day requirement for

disaffiliation by voters. (Id.) Given those “conflicting” dates, Candidate sought

advice from the Elections Division, and Manager advised him, incorrectly, that he

was eligible to be the candidate of a political body in the General Election if he

disaffiliated 15 days before the primary. (Id. at 15.) Under Appeal of Fairview

Associates, Inc., 433 A.2d at 931, Candidate argues that “when a potential candidate

relies on inaccurate information provided by the Board of Elections, that reliance is

reasonable and the potential candidate should not be punished for [such] reliance.”

(Id. at 16.)

Finally, Candidate asserts that the trial court properly held that Candidate was

not disqualified by signing the inaccurate Affidavit. (Id. at 18.) Candidate maintains

that the “ten (10)-day tardiness . . . [wa]s not crucial to the election process” and that

“[n]o one has been adversely impacted by [Candidate’s] error.” (Id.) Pursuant to In

re Nomination Petition of Driscoll, 847 A.2d 44, 51 (Pa. 2004), Candidate posits

that “the affidavit cannot be found to be invalid[] when a candidate believed he or

14

she was being truthful,” but requires “‘evidence that the candidate knowingly

falsified the affidavit with an intent to deceive the electorate.’” (Id. at 19.)

Candidate contends that Candidate “believed that the boilerplate form he was

signing had not been updated to reflect” the changes to the Election Code that

Candidate alleges to have occurred in Act 77 and there is no evidence that Candidate

“knowingly falsified [the A]ffidavit or intended to deceive anyone.” (Id.) Candidate

argues that “a potential candidate’s erroneous affidavit should only be found to be

disqualifying when[] the affidavit is ‘materially false.’” (Id. at 19 (quoting In re

Hacker, 728 A.2d 1033, 1034 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999)).) Because Candidate’s “actions

were not made to deceive the electorate, nor w[ere they] materially false[,]”

Candidate maintains that the inaccurate affidavit is not grounds for his removal from

the ballot. (Id. at 19-20.)

III. Discussion6

A. Legal Principles

When analyzing cases under the Election Code, the “longstanding and

overriding policy in this Commonwealth [is] to protect the elective franchise.”

Shambach v. Bickhart, 845 A.2d 793, 798 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Petition of Cioppa,

626 A.2d 146, 148 (Pa. 1993)). Our Supreme Court has cautioned that while “the

language of the Election Code . . . requires a liberal construction in order to protect

a candidate’s right to run for office and the voters’ rights to elect the candidate of

their choice[,]” In re Nomination of Paulmier, 937 A.2d 364, 371 (Pa. 2007), this

Court “cannot ignore the clear mandates of the Election Code,” In re Canvass of

6

“In reviewing an order adjudicating challenges to [] nomination [papers], our standard of

review permits reversal only when the findings of fact are unsupported by substantial evidence,

where there was an abuse of discretion, or where an error of law was committed.” In re Nomination

Petition of Beyer, 115 A.3d 835, 838 (Pa. 2015).

15

Absentee Ballots of November 4, 2003 General Election (Appeal of Pierce), 843

A.2d 1223, 1231 (Pa. 2004). Further, where the Election Code provision at issue is

clear and express, the Court cannot use equitable principles to deviate from that plain

language. In re Guzzardi, 99 A.3d at 388; In re Scroggin, 237 A.3d at 1021.

In interpreting the Election Code, we apply the provisions of the Statutory

Construction Act of 1972 (SCA), 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991. “[T]he polestar of

statutory construction is to determine the intent of the General Assembly.” Appeal

of Pierce, 843 A.2d at 1230 (citing Section 1921(a) of the SCA, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a)

(stating that the courts’ objective in construing or interpreting a statute is to

“ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly”), and Hannaberry

HVAC v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Snyder Jr.), 834 A.2d 524, 531 (Pa. 2003)).

It is a well-settled principle that “the best indication of legislative intent is the plain

language of a statute.” Commonwealth v. Gilmour Mfg. Co., 822 A.2d 676, 679 (Pa.

2003). The General Assembly has directed that “[w]hen the words of a statute are

clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the

pretext of pursuing its spirit.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Further, “[w]ords and phrases

shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and

approved usage[.]” Section 1903 of the SCA, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903.

Our Supreme Court has explained that,

[u]nder Section 1921(c)[ of the SCA], it is only when the words of a

statute “are not explicit” that a court may resort to other considerations,

such as the statute’s perceived “purpose,” in order to ascertain

legislative intent. Consistently with the [SCA], [our Supreme] Court

has repeatedly recognized that rules of construction, such as

consideration of a statute’s perceived “object” or “purpose,” are to be

resorted to only when there is an ambiguity.

16

Appeal of Pierce, 843 A.2d at 1230 (citations omitted). Statutory language must be

read in context with, “together[,] and in conjunction” with the remaining statutory

language. Commonwealth v. Off. of Open Records, 103 A.3d 1276, 1285 (Pa. 2014).

However, it is not the court’s role to “judicially usurp the legislative function and

rewrite [unambiguous provisions in a manner that] the General Assembly clearly did

not desire,” “‘no matter how well-intentioned’” those efforts may be.

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247, 262 (Pa. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth

v. Kirkner, 805 A.2d 514, 516-17 (Pa. 2002)). Further, “court[s] may not amend [a]

statute but instead must examine the statute as drafted by the legislature.” Holland

v. Marcy, 883 A.2d 449, 456-57 (Pa. 2005).

B. The plain language of Sections 951.1 and 951(e)(6)

With these rules of statutory construction in mind, we begin our analysis with

the text of the Election Code. Section 951.1, titled “Limitations on eligibility of

candidates,” states:

Any person who is a registered and enrolled member of a party

during any period of time beginning with thirty (30) days before

the primary and extending through the general or municipal election

of that same year shall be ineligible to be the candidate of a political

body in a general or municipal election held in that same year nor

shall any person who is a registered and enrolled member of a party be

eligible to be the candidate of a political body for a special election.

25 P.S. § 2911.1 (emphasis added). Section 951, “Nominations by political bodies”

provides for nominations of candidates by nomination papers, who are not

nominated by a party primary. Subsection (e) sets forth the requirements of the

candidate’s affidavit, which must be appended to the nomination paper when it is

filed. Consistent with the eligibility requirement in 951.1, Subsection (e)(6) requires

17

a candidate who “is a candidate for election at a general or municipal election,” to

state in the affidavit that “he was not a registered and enrolled member of a party

thirty (30) days before the primary held prior to the general or municipal election

in that same year.” 25 P.S. § 2911(e)(6) (emphasis added).

We address first whether this provision applies to Candidate. The plain

language of Section 951.1 addresses who is eligible “to be the candidate of a

political body in a general or municipal election held in that same year.” 25 P.S.

§ 2911.1 (emphasis added). By its plain terms, this provision applies to “[a]ny

person” who wants to be such a candidate. Id. (emphasis added). Candidate is “[a]

person” who wants “to be the candidate of a political body in [the] . . . municipal

election held in” 2021. Id. As such, Section 951.1, and the corresponding affidavit

requirement of Section 951(e)(6), apply to him. Thus, the trial court’s conclusion

that it would only apply to a “sore loser” candidate, i.e., one who was unsuccessful

in the primary, is not supported by the plain language of Section 951.1.7

Having concluded Section 951.1 applies to Candidate, we examine that

provision’s language to determine what is required thereby. The plain language of

Section 951.1 unambiguously and explicitly states that a registered member of a

party “during any period of time beginning with [30] days before the primary

. . . shall be ineligible to be a candidate of a political body in a general . . . election.”

25 P.S. § 2911.1. This provision has three relevant considerations. The first is party

registration status, and whether the person is a registered or enrolled member of a

7

Further, the trial court’s reliance on the fact that no case had applied these provisions to

someone who had not participated in a primary to support its narrow interpretation of Section

951.1 is misplaced. While Section 951.1 may not have previously been applied to a candidate that

had not run in a primary, this does not limit its applicability to individuals who fall within its ambit.

18

party.8 The second is timing, specifically, the applicable and relevant time frame as

to when a person’s party registration status affects their eligibility to be a political

body candidate, which is “during any period of time beginning with [30] days

before the primary . . . .” Id. The third is the consequence if the person is a registered

member of a party during the 30-day period, which is that the person “shall be

ineligible to be the candidate of a political body in a general or municipal election

in that same year.” Id. Here, the parties do not dispute that a candidate cannot be a

registered member of a party and be a political body candidate, and Candidate here

did change his party registration. The parties do dispute, however, the applicable

and relevant time period in this case, and how to interpret, and whether to apply, the

consequence to Candidate. Given that “the best indication of legislative intent is the

plain language of a statute[,]” Gilmour Manufacturing Co., 822 A.2d at 679, we look

more closely at the text.

1. Applicable time period

In describing the time period, the statute not only includes a specific number,

30, for the period of days, but amplifies that the applicable time frame is “during

any period of time beginning with [30] days before the primary. . . .” 25 P.S.

§ 2911.1. Not being a registered and enrolled member of a party during this

limitation period is a substantive requirement that must be met in order for a person

to be eligible to be a candidate for a political body. The General Assembly repeated

and amplified this requirement by including it in Section 951(e)(6) as one of the

matters to which a candidate for a political body must attest. Thus, to appear on the

8

Generally, the Election Code’s definition of what constitutes a “political party” is tied to

the percentage of votes an entity’s (political party or political body) candidates receive in the

general or municipal election preceding the primary. Section 801 of the Election Code, 25 P.S.

§ 2831.

19

ballot, a candidate for a political body must attest that “he was not a registered and

enrolled member of a party [30] days before the primary[,]” which is,

essentially, that they have complied with the requirements of Section 951.1. 25 P.S.

§§ 2911.1, 2911(e)(6)

Candidate argues that there is confusion regarding the ongoing applicability

of the 30-day time period because, in Act 77, the General Assembly recently changed

the deadline for receipt of valid voter registration applications before the primary

from 30 days to 15 days. See Section 1231(b) of the Election Code, 25 P.S.

§ 3071(b). Thus, persons who want to change their voter registration status for the

primary election can now do so up to 15 days before the primary, whereas before

Act 77, the change had to be made 30 days before the primary. This Court

acknowledges that, prior to Act 77, there was consistency between the two deadlines

as they were both 30 days, and as Candidate has contended, both deadlines implicate

a person’s registration status before a primary election. Such consistency could

suggest that the General Assembly intended both time periods to be the same, as

Manager apparently believed. However, had the General Assembly intended these

timeframes to be the same, it could have stated that the time frame in Section 951.1

be “the deadline for receipt of voter registration applications.” Such language would

undeniably link the two deadlines, but the General Assembly did not provide that

link.

There is no question that, through Act 77, the General Assembly made

numerous changes to the Election Code, including the change in the deadline as to

when voter registration applications must be received (from 30 days to 15 days).

However, in engaging in statutory construction, it is important to consider both what

the General Assembly says and does not say. Pilchesky v. Lackawanna County, 88

20

A.3d 954, 965 (Pa. 2014). Considering this principle, we are mindful that when the

General Assembly changed the time period in Section 1231(b) to 15 days, it did not

similarly change the 30-day time period in Sections 951.1 and 951(e)(6), and that it

could have done so. The Court may not amend statutory language but must read it

as written by the General Assembly. Holland, 883 A.2d at 456-57.

Thus, were we to interpret Section 951.1 as containing the same 15-day time

period as Section 1231(b), we would have to ignore the plain language and our rules

of statutory construction, which provide that “it is only when the words of a statute

are not explicit that a court may resort to other considerations, such as the statute’s

perceived purpose, in order to ascertain legislative intent.” Appeal of Pierce, 843

A.2d at 1230 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). Further, doing so would

require the Court to replace the 30-day requirement in Section 951.1, with either “the

deadline for receipt of voter registration application” or “15 days.” Such an

interpretation effectively rewrites the unambiguous language of Sections 951.1 and

951(e)(6), replacing it with language that the General Assembly did not enact. Quite

simply, this Court is not permitted “to judicially usurp the legislative function and

rewrite” or modify the unambiguous 30-day requirement or to disregard the clear

language of Section 951.1 that establishes an express limitation on candidate

eligibility. Hopkins, 117 A.3d at 262; see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903; Holland, 883 A.2d

at 456-57. Thus, we cannot alter the plain language of Section 951.1 and 951(e)(6)

to be something less than the 30-day requirement expressly set forth by the General

Assembly.

2. Consequence

Candidate argues that the Court is not precluded from concluding that a person

who changes their registration 20 days before the primary election is nonetheless

21

eligible under Section 951.1. Candidate’s argument is two-fold. First, he argues

that In re Guzzardi is inapplicable because Section 951.1 does not contain the

express “fatal-defect” language that the General Assembly had attached to a

candidate’s noncompliance with the Ethics Act. Second, he argues that given the

recent enactment of Act 77, he reasonably and non-negligently relied on the

information provided by Manager and should not be punished for doing so.

Candidate first argues that the limitations on judicial review of the Election

Code expressed by our Supreme Court in In re Guzzardi are inapplicable here. This

is because, Candidate asserts, Section 951.1 does not impose the “fatal-defect”

consequences for noncompliance with its provisions that was used by the General

Assembly in the Ethics Act for noncompliance with that act’s requirements for the

proper filing of statements of financial interests.

It is true that, in Section 951.1, the General Assembly did not use the phrase

“shall . . . be a fatal defect to a petition to appear on the ballot,” 65 Pa.C.S.

§ 1104(b)(3); instead, it used the phrase “shall be ineligible to be the candidate . . .

in a primary or general election . . . [,]” 25 P.S. § 2911.1. A “defect” is “[a]n

imperfection or shortcoming[.]” Black’s Law Dictionary 527 (11th ed. 2019).

“Fatal” means “[p]roviding grounds for legal or logical invalidity[.]” Id. at 750.

Black’s Law Dictionary also defines “fatal defect” as “[a] serious defect capable of

nullifying a contract.” Id. at 527. Therefore, a “fatal defect” would be a serious

imperfection or shortcoming capable of providing grounds for legal invalidity of a

petition to appear on the ballot. “Ineligible” is defined as “legally disqualified to

serve in office.” Id. at 928. Accordingly, here, “ineligible” means legally

disqualified from appearing on the ballot as a candidate. Thus, the legislatively

prescribed outcomes are the same – that the person shall not appear on a ballot.

22

Accordingly, that the legislature used different terminology to describe the same

outcome is not a reason for finding that In re Guzzardi does not apply here.

Pursuant to In re Guzzardi, “courts are not free to disregard . . . explicit

legislative direction based on equitable considerations.” 99 A.3d at 385 (emphasis

added). As our Supreme Court observed in In re Guzzardi, “[e]lections are

appropriately regulated by the political branch precisely because they are inherently

political” and, therefore, “the judiciary should act with restraint, in the election

arena, subordinate to express statutory directives.” Id. at 385-86. Thus, “where the

legislature has attached specific consequences to particular actions or omissions,

Pennsylvania courts may not mitigate the legislatively prescribed outcome through

recourse to equity.” Id. at 386.

Second, in light of the General Assembly’s “explicit legislative direction” and

expressly imposed consequences in Section 951.1, which we cannot disregard by

applying equitable principles, In re Guzzardi, 99 A.3d at 388, the Court cannot

accept Candidate’s argument that he should not be punished for his reliance on the

erroneous advice from Manager. While we acknowledge that Act 77’s change to the

voter registration deadline may have caused confusion as to whether the 30-day

requirement applicable to a person who wants to be a political body candidate was

also amended, Candidate asks this Court to exercise its equitable powers to mitigate

the harsh consequences and allow him to remain on the ballot. However, pursuant

to In re Guzzardi, we may not do so in light of the express language used by the

General Assembly. Further, our Supreme Court has clearly indicated that reliance

on official interpretations does not excuse a failure to comply with express

provisions of the Election Code. See, e.g., In re Scroggin, 237 A.3d at 1021 (stating

that our Supreme Court “repeatedly has cautioned[ that] even erroneous guidance

23

from the Department [of State] or county boards of elections cannot nullify the

express provisions of the Election Code”); In re Guzzardi, 99 A.3d at 388

(explaining that “even if there was some miscommunication at the Department of

State . . . , this does not offset the underlying, self-acknowledged mistake” of the

candidate “in failing to apprehend, from the outset, the express statutory requirement

to file a statement of financial interests with the Ethics Commission.”); Appeal of

Pierce, 843 A.2d at 1225 (holding that “[n]o [] ‘recognized exception’ exists that

would permit a court to employ a jurisprudential doctrine to defeat a substantive

provision of the Election Code[]” and, therefore, that reliance on incorrect

information from a board of elections will not overcome such provision).9

Accordingly, the Court cannot, as Candidate asks, apply equitable principles to allow

Candidate to remain on the ballot where he was a registered and enrolled member of

a political party 20 days before the primary election in derivation of the express

provisions of Sections 951.1 and 951(e)(6).

C. The Candidate’s Affidavit

Finally, Objector argues that Candidate’s Affidavit is false and contains

material falsehoods and, accordingly, is invalid and voids Candidate’s Nomination

Papers. Candidate maintains that his Affidavit does not require disqualification

because he did not intend to deceive the electors and honestly believed that the

Affidavit stated the incorrect deadline.

9

Although Candidate points to In re Nomination Papers of Kim D. Williams and Appeal

of Fairview Associates, Inc. as situations in which the Court has applied equitable principles, we

note that the statutory provisions with which, respectively, the candidate and electors did not

comply contained ambiguities regarding where a statement of financial interest should be filed and

how many signatures were needed for a ballot initiative. Here, in contrast, Section 951.1’s

requirements and consequences are clear and unambiguous. Thus, neither of these cases require a

different result.

24

As set forth above, Section 951(e)(6) requires a candidate to append to their

nomination paper an affidavit attesting that the candidate was not a registered and

enrolled member of party 30 days before the primary election. 25 P.S. § 2911(e)(6).

Section 976(a) of the Election Code, 25 P.S. § 2936(a), provides that “[n]o

nomination petition, nomination paper[,] or nomination certificate shall be permitted

to be filed if . . . it contains material errors or defects apparent on the face thereof[.]”

Our Supreme Court has explained that the requirement that candidates sign and file

such affidavits is “[o]ne of the Election Code’s critical anti-fraud mechanisms[.]” In

re Scroggin, 237 A.3d at 1018. The Court has further stated:

[T]he provisions of the election laws relating to the form of nominating

[papers] and the accompanying affidavits are not mere technicalities

but are necessary measures to prevent fraud and to preserve the

integrity of the election process. . . . The requirements of sworn

affidavits are to insure the legitimacy of information crucial to the

election process.

Petition of Cianfrani, 359 A.2d at 384 (internal citations omitted). Thus, “it has long

been the case that a candidate’s failure to present and file an affidavit of candidacy

with his or her nomination paper is a fatal defect necessitating its rejection.” In re

Scroggin, 237 A.3d at 1019 (citing Brown v. Finnegan, 133 A.2d 809, 813 (Pa.

1957)); In re Street, 516 A.2d 791, 793 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1986) (explaining that “a false

candidate’s affidavit is a fatal defect that cannot be amended and would require the

setting aside of the nomination [paper]”).

In Petition of Cianfrani, the candidate executed an affidavit attesting that he

was a registered and enrolled member of a party, despite having not been registered

and enrolled with that party until the day after the affidavit’s execution. 359 A.2d

at 384. Our Supreme Court held that “a false affidavit must be [a]t least equated

with the failure to execute an affidavit[]” and “[s]uch a defect cannot be cured by

25

subsequent conduct and the [candidate’s nomination] petition was therefore void and

invalid.” Id. As such, the Court concluded that the false affidavit could not be cured

and the candidate’s petition was void and invalid. Id.

Candidate compares the case sub judice to In re Hacker, 728 A.2d at 1034,

arguing that a candidate’s affidavit is only disqualifying where it is “materially false”

and signed knowing that it was untruthful with an intent to deceive the electors. In

In re Hacker, the candidate listed his residence as Kutztown, Pennsylvania, despite

actually residing in Fleetwood, Pennsylvania. However, the candidate asserted that

he had purchased the Kutztown home with the intent to refurbish it and listed the

Fleetwood home for sale. Further, the candidate’s voter registration and vehicle

registration card listed the Kutztown residence. Nonetheless, this Court determined

that the candidate’s residence was in Fleetwood for the purpose of the Election Code,

but did not find this defect to be disqualifying because the candidate truly believed

his residence was in Kutztown. Id.

Following In re Hacker, this Court addressed the issue of a false affidavit in

In re Nomination Petitions of McIntyre, 778 A.2d 746 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2001). There,

the candidate listed his residence as Upper St. Clair, Pennsylvania, on his nomination

petitions but attested to living in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on the candidate’s

affidavits. This Court held that the candidate’s attestation to living in Pittsburgh was

false and required the setting aside of the petitions. Id. at 747. On appeal, our

Supreme Court remanded for this Court to “make specific findings concerning [the

candidate’s] intentions or other factors that would bear upon the determination of

whether [the candidate] should be included on the primary ballot.” In re McIntyre,

770 A.2d 315, 316 (Pa. 2001). On remand, this Court found that the candidate’s

testimony regarding his residence in Pittsburgh was not credible and demonstrated

26

an intent to deceive the electorate. In re McIntyre, 778 A.2d at 753-54. The Court

compared the circumstances to those in Hacker and, concluding the candidate filed

the affidavits with “an intent to deceive” the electorate, held that the error constituted

a material defect that could not be cured and, as such, the petitions had to be set

aside. Id. Our Supreme Court affirmed. See In re McIntyre, 770 A.2d 326 (Pa.

2001).

In In re Nomination Petition of Driscoll, 847 A.2d at 50-54, our Supreme

Court examined its decisions in Petition of Cianfrani, In re Hacker and In re

McIntyre. There, the candidate listed his residence as Allentown, Pennsylvania, in

the nomination petition and filed an affidavit attesting to the same. The objector

asserted that the affidavit was false because the candidate actually resided in

Haverford, Pennsylvania, which is outside of the district for which the candidate was

seeking nomination for a congressional seat. After examining this line of cases in

light of its holding in Petition of Cianfrani, our Supreme Court held that “before an

affidavit may be declared void and invalid because it contains false information,

there must be evidence that the candidate knowingly falsified the affidavit with

an intent to deceive the electorate.” In re Nomination Petition of Driscoll, 847

A.2d at 51 (emphasis added). Because the candidate there was not actually legally

required to live in that congressional district and because, unlike the candidate in In

re McIntyre or Petition of Cianfrani, the candidate did not “intentionally falsify his

affidavit to deceive the electorate[,]” our Supreme Court held that the false affidavit

was not disqualifying in that instance. Id. at 53. Thus, falsity in an affidavit alone

is insufficient to disqualify a candidate; there must also be a showing that the

candidate’s attestation to the false information exhibited an intent to deceive the

electors.

27

In the present case, the trial court found Candidate credible that he did not

have an intent to deceive with regard to the Affidavit. This Court is bound by the

trial court’s credibility findings. See Interest of N.B.-A., 224 A.3d 661, 668 (Pa.

2020) (explaining that appellate courts “are required to accept the findings of fact

and credibility determinations of the trial court[] if they are supported by the

record”). Here, the record supports the trial court’s determination that the Candidate

did not attest to the incorrect information in the Affidavit with an intent to deceive

the electorate but was based on Candidate’s understandable confusion regarding the

changes from Act 77 and the erroneous advice received from the Elections Division.

Therefore, we are bound by that determination. Id. Thus, the present facts are

distinguishable from those in In re McIntyre or Petition of Cianfrani and akin to

those in In re Driscoll, as Candidate’s attesting to the Affidavit was not done with

the intent to deceive but was based on a reasonable, albeit incorrect, belief that the

Affidavit stated the wrong deadline. Accordingly, Candidate is not to be disqualified

based on the Affidavit.

IV. Conclusion

Election cases are often difficult, and this is no exception. Candidate is to be

commended for his desire to serve the public by running for public office and for

expending his time and efforts pursuing this honorable goal. The road to the ballot,

which is governed by the statutory requirements set forth by the General Assembly,

can be complicated. Unfortunately, in this case, for Candidate to be eligible to

remain on the ballot, the Court would be required to disregard the clear and

unambiguous requirements set by the General Assembly. This we cannot do. See 1

Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). While recognizing that the Election Code should be liberally

construed, this Court nonetheless “cannot ignore the clear mandates of the Election

28

Code[,]” Appeal of Pierce, 843 A.2d at 1231, and cannot use equitable principles to

deviate from that plain language, In re Guzzardi, 99 A.3d at 388; In re Scroggin, 237

A.3d at 1021. It is not the role of the courts to rewrite clear deadlines which the

General Assembly has enacted. Should the General Assembly desire to change the

30-day requirement, it may do so.

In sum, although the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion, based on its

credibility determinations, in holding that the falsity in Candidate’s Affidavit did not

require his removal from the ballot, it did err in holding that Section 951.1 of the

Election Code does not apply to Candidate and that Candidate’s reliance on

misinformation he received excused the untimeliness of Candidate’s disaffiliation.

This is because the 30-day requirement is an express, unambiguous provision that

applies to more than just “sore loser” primary candidates and cannot be abrogated

by equitable principles. Therefore, Candidate’s failure to comply with Sections

951(e)(6) and 951.1 renders him ineligible to be a candidate of a political body in

the upcoming general election. Accordingly, the trial court’s Order is, regretfully,

reversed.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

29

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In the Matter of the Nomination :

Papers of Mark Mlinarich, :

Independent Candidate for :

Magisterial District Judge : No. 949 C.D. 2021

05-3-04 :

:

Appeal of: Scott Butler :

ORDER

NOW, September 17, 2021, the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County is REVERSED. The Allegheny County Board of Elections is

directed to remove the name of Mark Mlinarich from the General Election ballot as

an Independent Candidate for the Office of Magisterial District Judge for Magisterial

District 05-3-04. The Prothonotary is directed to send a copy of this order to the

Allegheny County Board of Elections.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge