Opinion

BST Holdings, L.L.C. v. OSHA

  • 17 F.4th 604
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Nov 12, 2021
Status
Published
Nature of suit
Agency
Cited by
52 cases
Authority
More cited than 78.8%

concluding that OSHA lacked authority to impose a vaccine mandate where “OSHA issued it under an emergency provision addressing workplace ‘substances,’ ‘agents,’ or ‘hazards’ that it has used only ten times in the last 50 years and never to mandate vaccines”

How later courts described this case

  • concluding that OSHA lacked authority to impose a vaccine mandate where “OSHA issued it under an emergency provision addressing workplace ‘substances,’ ‘agents,’ or ‘hazards’ that it has used only ten times in the last 50 years and never to mandate vaccines”
  • holding that a federal Covid vaccine mandate “threatens to substantially burden the liberty interests of reluctant individual recipients put to a choice between their job(s) and their jab(s)” (footnote omitted)
  • observing that the irreparable injury requirement automatically follows from such a showing because “the loss of constitutional freedoms for even minimal periods of time unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury” (cleaned up)
  • finding irreparable harm where ‘reluctant individual recipients [were] put to a choice between their job(s) and their jab(s)’

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Case: 21-60845 Document: 00516091902 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/12/2021

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 12, 2021

No. 21-60845 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

BST Holdings, L.L.C.; RV Trosclair, L.L.C.; Trosclair

Airline, L.L.C.; Trosclair Almonaster, L.L.C.;

Trosclair and Sons, L.L.C.; Trosclair ; Trosclair,

Incorporated; Trosclair Carrollton, L.L.C.; Trosclair

Claiborne, L.L.C.; Trosclair Donaldsonville, L.L.C.;

Trosclair Houma, L.L.C.; Trosclair Judge Perez, L.L.C.;

Trosclair Lake Forest, L.L.C.; Trosclair Morrison,

L.L.C.; Trosclair Paris, L.L.C.; Trosclair Terry, L.L.C.;

Trosclair Williams, L.L.C.; Ryan Dailey; Jasand

Gamble; Christopher L. Jones; David John Loschen;

Samuel Albert Reyna; Kip Stovall; Answers in Genesis,

Incorporated; American Family Association,

Incorporated; Burnett Specialists; Choice Staffing,

L.L.C.; Staff Force, Incorporated; Leadingedge

Personnel, Limited; State of Texas; HT Staffing,

Limited; doing business as HT Group; The State of

Louisiana; Cox Operating, L.L.C.; Dis-Tran Steel,

L.L.C.; Dis-Tran Packaged Substations, L.L.C.; Beta

Engineering, L.L.C. Optimal Field Services, L.L.C.; The

State of Mississippi; Gulf Coast Restaurant Group,

Incorporated; The State of South Carolina; The State

of Utah; Word of God Fellowship, Incorporated, doing

busines as Daystar Television Network,

Petitioners,

versus

Occupational Safety and Health Administration,

United States Department of Labor; United States

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Department of Labor; Martin J. Walsh, Secretary, U.S.

Department of Labor; Douglas Parker, in his Official

Capacity as Assistant Secretary of Labor for

Occupational Safety and Health,

Respondents.

Petition for Review of

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Emergency Temporary Standard

Before Jones, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Kurt D. Engelhardt, Circuit Judge:

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

“reasonably determined” in June 2020 that an emergency temporary

standard (ETS) was “not necessary” to “protect working people from

occupational exposure to infectious disease, including COVID-19.” In re

AFL-CIO, 2020 WL 3125324, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 11, 2020). This was not

the first time OSHA had done this; it has refused several times to issue ETSs

despite legal action urging it do so. See, e.g., In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union,

830 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). In fact, in its fifty-year history,

OSHA has issued just ten ETSs. 1 Six were challenged in court; only one

survived. 2 The reason for the rarity of this form of emergency action is

1

Cong. Rsch. Serv., Occupational Safety and Health

Administration (OSHA): Emergency Temporary Standards (ETS)

and COVID-19, at 34 tbl. A-1 (Nov. 10, 2021), available at

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46288.

2

It bears noting at the outset that most of the few ETSs issued by OSHA were

immediately stayed pending merits review. See Asbestos Info. Ass’n/N. Am. v. OSHA, 727

F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1984); Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 968

(D.C. Cir. 1977); Taylor Diving Salvage Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 537 F.2d 819, 820–21 (5th

2

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simple: courts and the Agency have agreed for generations that

“[e]xtraordinary power is delivered to [OSHA] under the emergency

provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act,” so “[t]hat power

should be delicately exercised, and only in those emergency situations which

require it.” Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 489 F.2d 120, 129–

30 (5th Cir. 1974).

This case concerns OSHA’s most recent ETS—the Agency’s

November 5, 2021 Emergency Temporary Standard (the “Mandate”)

requiring employees of covered employers to undergo COVID-19

vaccination or take weekly COVID-19 tests and wear a mask. 3 An array of

petitioners seeks a stay barring OSHA from enforcing the Mandate during

the pendency of judicial review. On November 6, 2021, we agreed to stay the

Mandate pending briefing and expedited judicial review. Having conducted

that expedited review, we reaffirm our initial stay.

I.

OSHA promulgated its much anticipated 4 vaccine mandate on

November 5, 2021. Framed as an ETS, the Mandate requires all employers

of 100 or more employees to “develop, implement, and enforce a mandatory

COVID-19 vaccination policy” and require any workers who remain

Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Fla. Peach Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 489 F.2d 120, 126

(5th Cir. 1974).

3

See COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86

Fed. Reg. 61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918,

1926, and 1928).

4

Debates over the Biden Administration’s forthcoming vaccine mandate roiled the

country throughout much of the Fall. For obvious reasons, the Mandate affects every

person in America in one way or another.

3

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unvaccinated to “undergo [weekly] COVID-19 testing and wear a face

covering at work in lieu of vaccination.” 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402, 61,402.

On the afternoon of the Mandate’s publication, a diverse group of

petitioners (including covered employers, States, religious groups, and

individual citizens) moved to stay and permanently enjoin the mandate in

federal courts of appeals across the nation. Finding “cause to believe there

are grave statutory and constitutional issues with the Mandate,” we

intervened and imposed a temporary stay on OSHA’s enforcement of the

Mandate. For ease of judicial review, and in light of the pressing need to act

immediately, we consolidated our court’s petitions under the case number

captioned above.

Many of the petitioners are covered private employers within the

geographical boundaries of this circuit. 5 Their standing 6 to sue is obvious—

the Mandate imposes a financial burden upon them by deputizing their

participation in OSHA’s regulatory scheme, exposes them to severe financial

risk if they refuse or fail to comply, and threatens to decimate their

workforces (and business prospects) by forcing unwilling employees to take

their shots, take their tests, or hit the road.

5

Because these petitioners are the targets of the Mandate and bear the brunt of

OSHA’s regulatory power, we principally analyze the petitions from their perspective.

This is not to say that the claims of other petitioners such as States or individual citizens

would be any less successful on a thorough analysis.

6

“Only one of the petitioners needs to have standing to permit us to consider the

petition for review.” Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).

4

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The petitioners seek a stay—and ultimately a permanent injunction—

of the Mandate’s enforcement pending full judicial review of the Mandate.

We address their request for a stay today. 7

II.

The “traditional stay factors . . . govern a request for a stay pending

judicial review.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 426 (2009). Under the

traditional stay standard, a court considers four factors: “(1) whether the stay

applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits;

(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay; (3)

whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties

interested in the proceeding; and (4) where the public interest lies.” Hilton

v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987).

Each of these factors favors a stay here.

A.

We first consider whether the petitioners’ challenges to the Mandate

are likely to succeed on the merits. For a multitude of reasons, they are.

7

Our November 6, 2021 stay order preserved the status quo during the pendency

of briefing. The unusual procedural posture of this case makes for an unusual process.

Ordinarily, a federal plaintiff aggrieved by an adversary’s threatened course of action must

go to a district court to seek injunctive relief at the outset. In this ordinary scenario, a

preliminary injunction precedes a permanent injunction, and trial-court review precedes

appellate review. But this is not a typical case. Here, the statute giving OSHA the power to

issue emergency temporary standards like the Mandate also provides for direct and

immediate judicial review in “the United States court of appeals for the circuit wherein”

“[a]ny person who may be adversely affected by” an ETS “resides or has his principal

place of business.” See 29 U.S.C. § 655(f). Satisfied of our jurisdiction to proceed under

that provision, but mindful of our unusual procedural posture, we apply the traditional

factors for a stay pending judicial review and draw factual support from the attachments to

the pleadings, uncontested facts, and judicial notice.

5

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We begin by stating the obvious. The Occupational Safety and Health

Act, which created OSHA, was enacted by Congress to assure Americans

“safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve our human

resources.” See 29 U.S.C. § 651 (statement of findings and declaration of

purpose and policy). It was not—and likely could not be, under the

Commerce Clause and nondelegation doctrine 8—intended to authorize a

workplace safety administration in the deep recesses of the federal

bureaucracy to make sweeping pronouncements on matters of public health

affecting every member of society in the profoundest of ways. Cf. Ala. Ass’n

of Realtors v. HHS, 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2488–90 (2021) (per curiam).

On the dubious assumption that the Mandate does pass constitutional

muster—which we need not decide today 9—it is nonetheless fatally flawed

on its own terms. Indeed, the Mandate’s strained prescriptions combine to

make it the rare government pronouncement that is both overinclusive

(applying to employers and employees in virtually all industries and

workplaces in America, with little attempt to account for the obvious

differences between the risks facing, say, a security guard on a lonely night

shift, and a meatpacker working shoulder to shoulder in a cramped

warehouse) and underinclusive (purporting to save employees with 99 or

more coworkers from a “grave danger” in the workplace, while making no

attempt to shield employees with 98 or fewer coworkers from the very same

8

The nondelegation doctrine constrains Congress’s ability to delegate its

legislative authority to executive agencies. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,

371–72 (1989) (“The Constitution provides that ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted

shall be vested in a Congress of the United States’ . . . and we have long insisted that ‘the

integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordered by the Constitution’

mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another Branch.”

(first quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 1; then quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692

(1892))).

9

But see infra subsection II.A.2.f.

6

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threat). The Mandate’s stated impetus—a purported “emergency” that the

entire globe has now endured for nearly two years, 10 and which OSHA itself

spent nearly two months responding to 11—is unavailing as well. And its

promulgation grossly exceeds OSHA’s statutory authority.

1.

After the President voiced his displeasure with the country’s

vaccination rate in September, 12 the Administration pored over the U.S.

Code in search of authority, or a “work-around,” 13 for imposing a national

10

As Justice Gorsuch recently observed, society’s interest in slowing the spread of

COVID-19 “cannot qualify as [compelling] forever,” for “[i]f human nature and history

teach anything, it is that civil liberties face grave risks when governments proclaim

indefinite states of emergency.” Does 1–3 v. Mills, --- S. Ct. ---, 2021 WL 5027177, at *3

(Oct. 29, 2021) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see also Fla. Peach Growers, 489 F.2d at 131

(situation ongoing for “last several years . . . fail[ed] to qualify for [OSHA] emergency

measures”).

11

The President announced his intention to impose a national vaccine mandate on

September 9, 2021. See, e.g., Kevin Liptak & Kaitlan Collins, Biden Announces New Vaccine

Mandates that Could Cover 100 Million Americans, CNN (Sept. 9, 2021),

https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/09/politics/joe-biden-covid-speech/index.html

(“‘We’ve been patient, but our patience is wearing thin, and your refusal has cost all of us,’

Biden said, his tone hardening toward Americans who still refuse to receive a vaccine

despite ample evidence of their safety and full approval of one . . . .”). OSHA issued the

Mandate nearly two months later, on November 5, 2021, and the Mandate itself

prominently features yet another two-month delay. One could query how an “emergency”

could prompt such a “deliberate” response. In similar cases, we’ve held that OSHA’s

failure to act promptly “does not conclusively establish that a situation is not an

emergency,” but “may be evidence that a situation is not a true emergency.” Asbestos Info.,

727 F.2d at 423 (emphasis added).

12

See supra note 11.

13

On September 9, 2021, White House Chief of Staff Ron Klain retweeted MSNBC

anchor Stephanie Ruhle’s tweet that stated, “OSHA doing this vaxx mandate as an

emergency workplace safety rule is the ultimate work-around for the Federal govt to require

vaccinations.” See, e.g., Pet’rs Burnett Specialists, Choice Staffing, LLC, and Staff Force

Inc.’s Reply Brief at 4 (emphasis added).

7

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vaccine mandate. The vehicle it landed on was an OSHA ETS. The statute

empowering OSHA allows OSHA to bypass typical notice-and-comment

proceedings for six months by providing “for an emergency temporary

standard to take immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register”

if it “determines (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from

exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful

or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to

protect employees from such danger.” 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1).

As the name suggests, emergency temporary standards “are an

‘unusual response’ to ‘exceptional circumstances.’” Int’l Chem. Workers,

830 F.2d at 371 (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Rsch. Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d

1150, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). Thus, courts have uniformly observed that

OSHA’s authority to establish emergency temporary standards under

§ 655(c) “is an ‘extraordinary power’ that is to be ‘delicately exercised’ in

only certain ‘limited situations.’” Id. at 370 (quoting Pub. Citizen, 702 F.2d

at 1155). 14

But the Mandate at issue here is anything but a “delicate[] exercise[]”

of this “extraordinary power.” Cf. Pub. Citizen, 702 F.2d at 1155. Quite the

opposite, rather than a delicately handled scalpel, the Mandate is a one-size-

fits-all sledgehammer that makes hardly any attempt to account for

differences in workplaces (and workers) that have more than a little bearing

on workers’ varying degrees of susceptibility to the supposedly “grave

danger” the Mandate purports to address.

14

The Agency has thus conceded in the past that “[t]he OSH Act does not

authorize OSHA to issue sweeping health standards to address entire classes of known and

unknown infectious diseases on an emergency basis without notice and comment.” See

Department of Labor’s Resp. to the Emergency Pet. for a Writ of Mandamus at 33–34, In

re AFL-CIO, No. 20-1158 (D.C. Cir. May 29, 2020) [hereinafter OSHA D.C. Circuit Brief].

8

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2.

Thus, as § 655(c)(1) plainly provides, to be lawfully enacted, an ETS

must: (1) address “substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically

harmful”—or “new hazards”—in the workplace; (2) show that workers are

exposed to such “substances,” “agents,” or “new hazards” in the

workplace; (3) show that said exposure places workers in “grave danger”;

and (4) be “necessary” to alleviate employees’ exposure to gravely

dangerous hazards in the workplace. As we have noted in the past, the

precision of this standard makes it a difficult one to meet. See Fla. Peach

Growers, 489 F.2d at 130 (observing that OSHA’s ETS authority “requires

determination of danger from exposure to harmful substances, not just a

danger of exposure; and, not exposure to just a danger, but to a grave danger;

and, not the necessity of just a temporary standard, but that an emergency

[temporary] standard is necessary”). 15

(a)

In its brief, Texas makes a compelling argument that § 655(c)(1)’s

neighboring phrases “substances or agents” and “toxic or physically

harmful” place an airborne virus beyond the purview of an OSHA ETS in the

first place. To avoid “giving unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress,”

courts “rely on the principle of noscitur a sociis—a word is known by the

company it keeps.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015) (cleaned

up). Here, OSHA’s attempt to shoehorn an airborne virus that is both widely

present in society (and thus not particular to any workplace) and non-life-

15

In prior litigation, OSHA acknowledged that many “workplaces” covered by a

COVID-19 ETS “are not merely workplaces,” but are also “stores, restaurants, and other

places occupied by workers and the general public alike, in which the measures called for

require a broader lens—and at times a broader mandate—than available to OSHA.” See

OSHA D.C. Circuit Brief at 20.

9

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threatening to a vast majority of employees into a neighboring phrase

connoting toxicity and poisonousness is yet another transparent stretch. Other

cases involving OSHA (though not ETSs per se) shed further light on the

intended meaning of these terms. See, e.g., UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310,

1314 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See generally Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am.

Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980). Any argument OSHA may make that

COVID-19 is a “new hazard[]” would directly contradict OSHA’s prior

representation to the D.C. Circuit that “[t]here can be no dispute that

COVID-19 is a recognized hazard.” See OSHA D.C. Circuit Brief at 25

(emphasis added).

(b)

A natural first step in enacting a lawful ETS is to show that employees

covered by the ETS are in fact exposed to the dangerous substances, agents,

or hazards at issue—here, COVID-19. See, e.g., Int’l Chem. Workers, 830 F.2d

at 371 (noting OSHA’s stated view “that a finding of ‘grave danger’ to

support an ETS be based upon exposure in actual levels found in the

workplace”). As it pertains to the vast majority of private employees covered

by the Mandate, however, OSHA fails to meet this threshold burden. In

defending the Mandate before this court, the Government credits OSHA

with “describ[ing] myriad studies showing workplace [COVID-19] ‘clusters’

and ‘outbreaks’ and other significant ‘evidence of workplace transmission’

and ‘exposure.’” See Resp’ts’ Opp’n to Emergency Stay Mot. at 8. But this

misses the mark, as OSHA is required to make findings of exposure—or at

least the presence of COVID-19—in all covered workplaces.

Of course, OSHA cannot possibly show that every workplace covered

by the Mandate currently has COVID-positive employees, or that every

industry covered by the Mandate has had or will have “outbreaks.” As

10

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discussed below, this kind of overbreadth plagues the Mandate generally. See

infra subsection II.A.2.d.

(c)

Equally problematic, however, is that it remains unclear that COVID-

19—however tragic and devastating the pandemic has been—poses the kind

of grave danger § 655(c)(1) contemplates. See, e.g., Int’l Chem. Workers, 830

F.2d at 371 (noting that OSHA itself once concluded “that to be a ‘grave

danger,’ it is not sufficient that a chemical, such as cadmium, can cause cancer

or kidney damage at a high level of exposure” (emphasis added)). For starters,

the Mandate itself concedes that the effects of COVID-19 may range from

“mild” to “critical.” As important, however, the status of the spread of the

virus has varied since the President announced the general parameters of the

Mandate in September. (And of course, this all assumes that COVID-19

poses any significant danger to workers to begin with; for the more than

seventy-eight percent 16 of Americans aged 12 and older either fully or partially

inoculated against it, the virus poses—the Administration assures us—little

risk at all.) See, e.g., 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402, 61,402–03 (“COVID-19 vaccines

authorized or approved by the [FDA] effectively protect vaccinated

individuals against severe illness and death from COVID-19.”).

The Administration’s prior statements in this regard further belie the

notion that COVID-19 poses the kind of emergency that allows OSHA to take

the extreme measure of an ETS. In reviewing agency pronouncements,

courts need not turn a blind eye to the statements of those issuing such

pronouncements. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502,

515 (2009). In fact, courts have an affirmative duty not to do so. It is thus

16

See CDC, Covid Data Tracker, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-

tracker/#datatracker-home.

11

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critical to note that the Mandate makes no serious attempt to explain why

OSHA and the President himself 17 were against vaccine mandates before they

were for one here. See, e.g., Occupational Exposure to Bloodborne Pathogens,

54 Fed. Reg. 23,042, 23,045 (May 30, 1989) (“Health in general is an

intensely personal matter. . . . OSHA prefers to encourage rather than try to

force by governmental coercion, employee cooperation in [a] vaccination

program.”); Letter from Loren Sweatt, Principal Deputy Assistant Sec’y,

OSHA, to Richard L. Trumka, President, AFL-CIO at 3 (May 29, 2020)

[hereinafter Sweatt Letter] (acknowledging as a general matter that it “would

not be necessary for OSHA to issue an ETS to protect workers from

infectious diseases” because “OSHA lacks evidence to conclude that all

infectious diseases to which employees may be exposed at a workplace

constitute a ‘grave danger’ for which an ETS is an appropriate remedy”).

Because it is generally “arbitrary or capricious” to “depart from a prior

policy sub silentio,” agencies must typically provide a “detailed explanation”

for contradicting a prior policy, particularly when the “prior policy has

engendered serious reliance interests.” FCC v. Fox, 556 U.S. at 515. OSHA’s

reversal here strains credulity, as does its pretextual basis.18 Such

shortcomings are all hallmarks of unlawful agency actions.

To be sure, “OSHA’s assessment of . . . scientifically complex [facts]

and its balancing of the competing policies that underlie the decision whether

to issue an ETS . . . are entitled to great deference,” but this is not a case

17

In December of 2020, the President was quoted as saying, “No I don’t think

[vaccines] should be mandatory.” See, e.g., Jacob Jarvis, Fact Check: Did Joe Biden Reject

Idea of Mandatory Vaccines in December 2020, Newsweek (Sept. 10, 2021),

https://www.newsweek.com/fact-check-joe-biden-no-vaccines-mandatory-december-

2020-1627774.

18

See supra note 13 (Klain endorsement of the term “work-around”).

12

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where any amount of deference would make a bit of difference. Int’l Chem.

Workers, 830 F.2d at 371.

(d)

We next consider the necessity of the Mandate. The Mandate is

staggeringly overbroad. Applying to 2 out of 3 private-sector employees in

America, in workplaces as diverse as the country itself, the Mandate fails to

consider what is perhaps the most salient fact of all: the ongoing threat of

COVID-19 is more dangerous to some employees than to other employees. All

else equal, a 28 year-old trucker spending the bulk of his workday in the

solitude of his cab is simply less vulnerable to COVID-19 than a 62 year-old

prison janitor. Likewise, a naturally immune unvaccinated worker is

presumably at less risk than an unvaccinated worker who has never had the

virus. The list goes on, but one constant remains—the Mandate fails almost

completely to address, or even respond to, much of this reality and common

sense.

Moreover, earlier in the pandemic, the Agency recognized the

practical impossibility of tailoring an effective ETS in response to COVID-

19. See OSHA D.C. Circuit Brief at 16, 17, 21, 26 (“Based on substantial

evidence, OSHA determined that an ETS is not necessary both because there

are existing OSHA and non-OSHA standards that address COVID-19 and

because an ETS would actually be counterproductive. . . . To address all

employers and to do so with the requisite dispatch, an ETS would at best be

an enshrinement of these general and universally known measures that are

already enforceable through existing OSHA tools that require employers to

assess and address extant hazards. OSHA’s time and resources are better

spent issuing industry-specific guidance that adds real substance and permits

flexibility as we learn more about this virus. Given that we learn more about

COVID-19 every day, setting rules in stone through an ETS (and later a

13

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permanent rule) may undermine worker protection by permanently

mandating precautions that later prove to be inefficacious. . . . [A]n ETS

could only enshrine broad legal standards that are already in place or direct

employers to develop COVID-19 response plans specific to their businesses,

something employers are already doing. Such a step would be superfluous at

best and could be counterproductive to ongoing state, local, and private

efforts. . . . Additionally, employers may choose any effective method to

abate a recognized hazard under the general duty clause. Contrary to AFL-

CIO’s argument, this flexibility is likely to improve worker safety, because

employers must choose a means of abatement that eliminates the hazard or

materially reduces it to the extent feasible.”). OSHA itself admitted that “an

ETS once issued could very well become ineffective or counterproductive, as

it may be informed by incomplete or ultimately inaccurate information.” Id.

at 30, 32–33 (acknowledging further that “[a]dequate safeguards for workers

could differ substantially based on geographic location, as the pandemic has

had dramatically different impacts on different parts of the country. State and

local requirements and guidance on COVID-19 are thus critical to employers

in determining how to best protect workers, and OSHA must retain flexibility

to adapt its advice regarding incorporation of such local guidance, where

appropriate. . . . [A]n ETS meant to broadly cover all workers with potential

exposure to COVID-19—effectively all workers across the country—would

have to be written at such a general level that it would risk providing very

little assistance at all”).

In light of this immense complexity, one might naturally ask the

Agency—is this situation truly amenable to a one-size-fits-all Mandate? The

likely answer may be why OSHA has in the past “determined that the best

approach for responding to the pandemic is to enforce the existing OSH Act

requirements that address infectious disease hazards, while also issuing

detailed, industry-specific guidance,” which is generally “more effective

14

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than promulgating a rigid set of requirements for all employers in all

industries based on limited information.” See Sweatt Letter at 2. In sum, as

OSHA itself has previously acknowledged, an ETS appears to be a “poorly-

suited approach for protecting workers against [COVID-19] because no

standard that covers all of the Nation’s workers would protect all those

workers equally.” See id. at 9.

At the same time, the Mandate is also underinclusive. The most

vulnerable worker in America draws no protection from the Mandate if his

company employs 99 workers or fewer. The reason why? Because, as even

OSHA admits, companies of 100 or more employers will be better able to

administer (and sustain) the Mandate. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402, 61,403

(“OSHA seeks information about the ability of employers with fewer than

100 employees to implement COVID-19 vaccination and/or testing

programs.”). That may be true. But this kind of thinking belies the premise

that any of this is truly an emergency. Indeed, underinclusiveness of this sort

is often regarded as a telltale sign that the government’s interest in enacting

a liberty-restraining pronouncement is not in fact “compelling.” Cf. Church

of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542–46 (1993)

(city’s ban on religious animal sacrifice but corresponding allowance of other

activities similarly endangering public health belied its purportedly

“compelling” interest in safe animal disposal practices). The underinclusive

nature of the Mandate implies that the Mandate’s true purpose is not to

enhance workplace safety, but instead to ramp up vaccine uptake by any

means necessary. 19

19

The Mandate is also underinclusive in the solutions it proposes. Indeed, even in

its fullest force, the Mandate cannot prevent vaccinated employees from spreading the

virus in the workplace, or prevent unvaccinated employees from spreading the virus in

between weekly tests.

15

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(e)

If the deficiencies we’ve already covered aren’t enough, other

miscellaneous considerations seal the Mandate’s fate. For one, “[t]he

Agency cannot use its ETS powers as a stop-gap measure,” Asbestos Info., 727

F.2d at 422, but concedes that that is precisely what the Mandate is intended

to do here. See 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402, 61,434–35 (admitting that “[c]rafting a

multi-layered standard that is comprehensive and feasible for all covered

work settings, including mixed settings of vaccinated and unvaccinated

workers, is an extraordinarily challenging and complicated undertaking, yet

the grave danger that COVID-19 poses to unvaccinated workers obliges the

agency to act as quickly as possible”). For another, courts have consistently

recognized that the “protection afforded to workers [by an ETS] should

outweigh the economic consequences to the regulated industry,” Asbestos

Info., 727 F.2d at 423, but for all the reasons we’ve previously noted, the

Mandate flunks a cost-benefit analysis here.

(f)

It lastly bears noting that the Mandate raises serious constitutional

concerns that either make it more likely that the petitioners will succeed on

the merits, or at least counsel against adopting OSHA’s broad reading of

§ 655(c) as a matter of statutory interpretation.

First, the Mandate likely exceeds the federal government’s authority

under the Commerce Clause because it regulates noneconomic inactivity that

falls squarely within the States’ police power. A person’s choice to remain

unvaccinated and forgo regular testing is noneconomic inactivity. Cf. NFIB

v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 522 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); see also id. at

652–53 (Scalia, J., dissenting). And to mandate that a person receive a vaccine

or undergo testing falls squarely within the States’ police power. Zucht v.

King, 260 U.S. 174, 176 (1922) (noting that precedent had long “settled that

16

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No. 21-60845

it is within the police power of a state to provide for compulsory

vaccination”); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25–26 (1905) (similar).

The Mandate, however, commandeers U.S. employers to compel millions of

employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine or bear the burden of weekly

testing. 86 Fed. Reg. 61,402, 61,407, 61,437, 61,552. The Commerce Clause

power may be expansive, but it does not grant Congress the power to regulate

noneconomic inactivity traditionally within the States’ police power. See

Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 554 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“People, for reasons of

their own, often fail to do things that would be good for them or good for

society. Those failures—joined with the similar failures of others—can

readily have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Under the

Government’s logic, that authorizes Congress to use its commerce power to

compel citizens to act as the Government would have them act.”); see also

Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 854 (2014) (“The States have broad

authority to enact legislation for the public good—what we have often called

a ‘police power.’ . . . The Federal Government, by contrast, has no such

authority. . . .” (citations omitted)). Indeed, the courts “always have rejected

readings of the Commerce Clause . . . that would permit Congress to exercise

a police power.” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas,

J., concurring). In sum, the Mandate would far exceed current constitutional

authority.

Second, concerns over separation of powers principles cast doubt over

the Mandate’s assertion of virtually unlimited power to control individual

conduct under the guise of a workplace regulation. As Judge Duncan points

out, the major questions doctrine confirms that the Mandate exceeds the

bounds of OSHA’s statutory authority. Congress must “speak clearly if it

wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast economic and political

significance.” Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014) (cleaned

up). The Mandate derives its authority from an old statute employed in a

17

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novel manner, 20 imposes nearly $3 billion in compliance costs, involves broad

medical considerations that lie outside of OSHA’s core competencies, and

purports to definitively resolve one of today’s most hotly debated political

issues. Cf. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994)

(declining to hold that the FCC could eliminate telecommunications rate-

filing requirements); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.

120, 159–60 (2000) (declining to hold that the FDA could regulate

cigarettes); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 262 (2006) (declining to allow

DOJ to ban physician-assisted suicide). There is no clear expression of

congressional intent in § 655(c) to convey OSHA such broad authority, and

this court will not infer one. Nor can the Article II executive breathe new

power into OSHA’s authority—no matter how thin patience wears.

At the very least, even if the statutory language were susceptible to

OSHA’s broad reading—which it is not—these serious constitutional

concerns would counsel this court’s rejection of that reading. Jennings v.

Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018).

* * *

Accordingly, the petitioners’ challenges to the Mandate show a great

likelihood of success on the merits, and this fact weighs critically in favor of

a stay.

B.

It is clear that a denial of the petitioners’ proposed stay would do them

irreparable harm. For one, the Mandate threatens to substantially burden the

20

Here, it is simply unlikely that Congress assigned authority over such a

monumental policy decision to OSHA—hard hats and safety goggles, this is not.

18

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liberty interests 21 of reluctant individual recipients put to a choice between

their job(s) and their jab(s). For the individual petitioners, the loss of

constitutional freedoms “for even minimal periods of

time . . . unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.” Elrod v. Burns, 427

U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even

minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”).

Likewise, the companies seeking a stay in this case will also be

irreparably harmed in the absence of a stay, whether by the business and

financial effects of a lost or suspended employee, compliance and monitoring

costs associated with the Mandate, the diversion of resources necessitated by

the Mandate, or by OSHA’s plan to impose stiff financial penalties on

companies that refuse to punish or test unwilling employees. The Mandate

places an immediate and irreversible imprint on all covered employers in

America, and “complying with a regulation later held invalid almost always

produces the irreparable harm of nonrecoverable compliance costs.” See

Texas v. EPA, 829 F.3d 405, 433 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Thunder Basin Coal

Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 220–21 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and

in the judgment)).

The States, too, have an interest in seeing their constitutionally

reserved police power over public health policy defended from federal

overreach.

C.

In contrast, a stay will do OSHA no harm whatsoever. Any interest

OSHA may claim in enforcing an unlawful (and likely unconstitutional) ETS

is illegitimate. Moreover, any abstract “harm” a stay might cause the Agency

21

Not to mention the free religious exercise of certain employees. See U.S.

Const. amend. I; cf. Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361 (2015).

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pales in comparison and importance to the harms the absence of a stay

threatens to cause countless individuals and companies.

D.

For similar reasons, a stay is firmly in the public interest. From

economic uncertainty to workplace strife, the mere specter of the Mandate

has contributed to untold economic upheaval in recent months. Of course,

the principles at stake when it comes to the Mandate are not reducible to

dollars and cents. The public interest is also served by maintaining our

constitutional structure and maintaining the liberty of individuals to make

intensely personal decisions according to their own convictions—even, or

perhaps particularly, when those decisions frustrate government officials.

* * *

The Constitution vests a limited legislative power in Congress. For

more than a century, Congress has routinely used this power to delegate

policymaking specifics and technical details to executive agencies charged

with effectuating policy principles Congress lays down. In the mine run of

cases—a transportation department regulating trucking on an interstate

highway, or an aviation agency regulating an airplane lavatory—this is

generally well and good. But health agencies do not make housing policy, and

occupational safety administrations do not make health policy. Cf. Ala. Ass’n

of Realtors, 141 S. Ct. at 2488–90. In seeking to do so here, OSHA runs afoul

of the statute from which it draws its power and, likely, violates the

constitutional structure that safeguards our collective liberty.

For these reasons, the petitioners’ motion for a stay pending review is

GRANTED. Enforcement of the Occupational Safety and Health

Administration’s “COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency

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Temporary Standard” 22 remains STAYED pending adequate judicial review

of the petitioners’ underlying motions for a permanent injunction. 23

In addition, IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that OSHA take no

steps to implement or enforce the Mandate until further court order.

22

86 Fed. Reg. 61,402 (Nov. 5, 2021) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915,

1917, 1918, 1926, and 1928).

23

The Clerk of Court shall ensure that this order applies with equal force to all

related motions consolidated into this case in accordance with the court’s November 6,

2021 order.

21

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Stuart Kyle Duncan, Circuit Judge, concurring:

In addition to the many reasons ably identified by Judge Engelhardt’s

opinion, I underscore one reason why these challenges to OSHA’s

unprecedented mandate are virtually certain to succeed.

Courts “expect Congress to speak clearly when authorizing an agency

to exercise powers of ‘vast economic and political significance.’” Ala. Ass’n

of Realtors v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 141 S. Ct. 2485, 2489 (2021)

(quoting Utility Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014)). OSHA’s

rule reaches “two-thirds of all private-sector workers in the nation.”86 Fed.

Reg. 61,402, 61,403 (Nov. 5, 2021). It compels covered employers to (1) make

employees get vaccinated or get weekly tests at their expense and wear

masks; (2) “remove” non-complying employees; (3) pay per-violation fines;

and (4) keep records of employee vaccination or testing status. 86 Fed. Reg.

at 61,402–03, 61,551–54; 29 U.S.C. § 666. OHSA invokes no statute

expressly authorizing the rule. Instead, OSHA issued it under an emergency

provision addressing workplace “substances,” “agents,” or “hazards” that

it has used only ten times in the last 50 years and never to mandate vaccines.

86 Fed. Reg. at 61,403; see 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1).

Whether Congress could enact such a sweeping mandate under its

interstate commerce power would pose a hard question. See NFIB v. Sebelius,

567 U.S. 519, 549–61 (2012). Whether OSHA can do so does not.

I concur in granting a stay.

22

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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