concluding that grooming as a phenomenon exists, that a law enforcement official with a significant amount of experience with child sex abuse cases may be qualified to talk about it, and that it involves matters beyond the understanding of the jury and therefore is useful to the jury
How later courts described this case
- concluding that grooming as a phenomenon exists, that a law enforcement official with a significant amount of experience with child sex abuse cases may be qualified to talk about it, and that it involves matters beyond the understanding of the jury and therefore is useful to the jury
- holding that the phenomenon of grooming children for sexual molestation is an appropriate topic for expert testimony and noting that 10 *605 circuits and 38 states have addressed grooming, with most reaching the same conclusion
- invoking Volosen and Rhodes in support of the proposition that, having prevailed both in the trial court and in the court of appeals, the State may ask this Court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact for the first time in its reply brief on the appellant's petition for discretionary review
- noting that “grooming” phenomenon is “not rocket science” and does not depend on either scientific, technical, or psychological principles or methodology, or educational expertise, calculable rate of error, learned treatises, peer review, or other esoteric skill
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MEYERS, J.,
dissenting in which PRICE and WOMACK, JJ., joined.
The court of appeals said that under the record in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony regarding Appellant’s “grooming” of the victim. Appellant contends that the court of appeals based this determination on the purported expert’s experience, rather than whether “grooming” is a legitimate field of scientific examination. The majority disagrees and takes judicial notice that “grooming” is sufficiently established as a subject of expert testimony. Judge Cochran concurs that “grooming” is a legitimate issue for expert testimony, but says that this type of expertise is experiential and is not related to scientific reliability.
Irrespective of whether the study of “grooming” behavior is a legitimate field of expertise, I do not think Hullum was qualified to be an expert on this issue. He had no degree in any field of study involving human behavior, no specialized training in “grooming” behavior, and he did not show that the training and experience he did have enabled him to distinguish such behavior. His testimony that he believed Appellant engaged in “grooming” behaviors expressed to the jury his opinion as to Appellant’s guilt. Allowing him to testify was error and, although we did not grant Appellant’s ground for review regarding *675 harm, I would say that the error was harmful. I respectfully dissent.