holding that relevant inquiry is whether factfinder could reasonably form firm belief or conviction that termination of parental rights was in child’s best interest “even if the agency is unable to identify with precision the child’s future home 16 environment,” because court did not want best-interest determinations reversed on sole ground that adoptive family had not yet been located
How later courts described this case
- holding that relevant inquiry is whether factfinder could reasonably form firm belief or conviction that termination of parental rights was in child’s best interest “even if the agency is unable to identify with precision the child’s future home 16 environment,” because court did not want best-interest determinations reversed on sole ground that adoptive family had not yet been located
- holding the evidence was sufficient to support termination under *573 subsection (N) when, after release from prison, the defendant was advised of visitation but only visited with his children twice and made no further efforts to be involved with them, and a case worker testified that all reasonable efforts were made to return the children to the parents
- holding the evidence was sufficient to support termination under subsection (N) when, after release from prison, the defendant was advised of visitation but only visited with his children twice and made no further efforts to be involved with them, and a case worker testified that all reasonable efforts were made to return the children to the parents
- finding undisputed evidence established not only that father was unable to care for child from prison but that he also exhibited pattern of conduct inimical to child rearing, including lack of emotional or financial assistance to child after his birth, extensive criminal history, and no concrete plan to provide emotional or physical care for child
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice HECHT,
concurring.
I join fully in the Court’s opinion and add only this brief note.
Respondent argues that appellate review of the evidence for terminating the parental relationship must not only be conducted in light of the requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence but must also be de novo — that is, with very limited deference to the finder of fact — as the United States Constitution requires in defamation cases 1 and for punitive damages awards. 2 Absent a definitive word from the United States Supreme Court on whether the Constitution requires this independent appellate review, 3 it might become necessary for this Court to address the issue. We have not done so here because it may make no difference; whether the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment in this case may not turn on what deference is paid the jury’s findings. We should have the court of appeals’ analysis of the evidence in light of the burden of proof before we take on the difficult constitutional issue.
Also, after reading the evidence set out in our opinion one might wonder why the State, far from failing to meet its burden of proof, should not be held to have established conclusively grounds for terminating Robert G.’s parental relationship with C.H. The State has not made this argument.
.Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685-686 , 109 S.Ct. 2678 , 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 510-511 , 104 S.Ct. 1949 , 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984).
. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 , 121 S.Ct. 1678 , 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001).
. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).