Opinion

Industrial Foundation of the South v. Texas Industrial Accident Board

  • 19 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 417
  • 540 S.W.2d 668
  • 1976 Tex. LEXIS 234
Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Jul 21, 1976
Status
Published
Author
Daniel
On the bench
Daniel, Denton, Doughty, Johnson, Opinions, Pope, Reavley, Reayley, Steakley
Cited by
218 cases

holding that right of privacy FN17. See also Michael Hoefges et al., Pri- acknowledged in Billings v. Atkinson was “the type of vacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure Policy: information which the Legislature intended to exempt The “Uses and Effects” Double Standard in from mandatory disclosure” under the PIA provision Access to Personally–Identifiable Infor- excepting matters confidential by judicial decision

How later courts described this case

  • holding that right of privacy FN17. See also Michael Hoefges et al., Pri- acknowledged in Billings v. Atkinson was “the type of vacy Rights Versus FOIA Disclosure Policy: information which the Legislature intended to exempt The “Uses and Effects” Double Standard in from mandatory disclosure” under the PIA provision Access to Personally–Identifiable Infor- excepting matters confidential by judicial decision
  • holding that right of privacy acknowledged in Billings v. Atkinson was “the type of information which the Legislature intended to exempt from mandatory disclosure” under the PIA provision excepting matters confidential by judicial decision
  • holding that there is a common law right to privacy that protects against PIA disclosure in some circumstances
  • holding that requested workers’ compensation information, including “the claimant, the nature of his injuries, his employer and his attorney,” did not fall within any recognized zone of privacy and therefore must be disclosed

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

DANIEL, Justice

(concurring).

It is my opinion that, with respect to the individual claim files of the Industrial Accident Board, the Legislature did not intend Article 6252-17a to be as broad as it was written. In this respect, I agree with some of the reasoning set forth in Justice Johnson’s concurring opinion. On the other hand, as pointed out in the majority opinion, it is our duty to interpret and apply the statute as written. If this interpretation is broader or narrower than intended, the Legislature will soon have an opportunity to amend and clarify the statute. I concur with the majority opinion.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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