stating, “[it] is well-established that three elements are necessary to plead a cause of action for breach of contract: (1) - 13 - J-A06008-26 the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of the contract; and, (3) resultant damages”
How later courts described this case
- stating, “[it] is well-established that three elements are necessary to plead a cause of action for breach of contract: (1) - 13 - J-A06008-26 the existence of a contract, including its essential terms, (2) a breach of the contract; and, (3) resultant damages”
- stating she would “expressly permit Meyer Darragh to file a nunc pro tunc cross[-]petition for allowance of appeal” and “refer to the Appellate Rules Committee the question of amendments to our appellate rules which account for the impact of Lebanon Valley in the procedural context of this case”
- clarifying that Meyer Darragh was not required to file a protective cross-appeal where it prevailed below on its quantum meruit claim, and citing Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 107, 113 (Pa. 2013) for proposition that “a successful litigant need not file a protective cross-appeal on pain of waiver”
- stating that a quantum meruit action “sounds in quasi-contract or contract implied in law," and seeks restitution from those “unjustly enriched by the services of another”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice TODD,
concurring.
I join the Majority Opinion except for the following point. The majority does not address the dilemma, but I fully agree with the expressions of Chief Justice Say-lor regarding the predicament in which Meyer Darragh finds itself concerning the quantum meruit issue. See Concurring Opinion (Saylor, C.J.) at 1259-60. Therefore, having prevailed below, and given our admonitions in- Lebanon Valley Farmers Bank v. Commonwealth, 623 Pa. 455 , 83 A.3d 107, 113 (2013), against successful litigants filing protective cross appeals, I would expressly permit Meyer Darragh to file a nunc pro, tunc cross petition for allowance of .appeal within 30 days of our decision herein. Further, I would refer to the Appellate Rules Committee the question of amendments to our appellate rules which account for the impact of Lebanon Valley in the procedural context of this case.