stating that Implied Consent Law also “serves the important purpose of notifying the driving community that motorists noncompliant with the proper administration of our chemical testing laws will be removed from our roadways swiftly through the civil penalty of license suspension”
How later courts described this case
- stating that Implied Consent Law also “serves the important purpose of notifying the driving community that motorists noncompliant with the proper administration of our chemical testing laws will be removed from our roadways swiftly through the civil penalty of license suspension”
- stating that “officers explained [licensee’s] implied consent rights and obligations before requesting that he submit to a chemical test of blood,” and repeatedly noting that an “official request for testing” is a precondition to refusal
- holding that a motorist’s statement to officers that he was “not refusing” was immaterial where his persistent denial demonstrated an “intractable unwillingness to consent”
- holding that a motorist had no right to request an alternative test to the arresting officer’s preferred test
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Chief Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion save to the extent it may be construed to suggest, in dicta, that, if a motorist were given a choice from a number of specified chemical tests, this would negate the concept of implied consent. See Majority . Opinion, at 745-46 (indicating that allowing the motorist to select among reasonably practicable chemical tests would fail to effectuate the implied consent scheme and ultimately render it “meaningless”).
As the majority notes, the statute does not reflect a preference or hierarchy concerning which test a motorist should be required to take. See id. at 745. Accordingly, while there may be good reasons to commit the selection process to the discretion of the police officer, I see no basis to conclude the statutory scheme would become ineffectual if such a choice were given to the motorist. In this respect, I note that at least one jurisdiction has enacted such a framework for its implied consent law. See Cal. Veh. Code § 23612 (a)(2)(A) (“If the person is lawfully arrested for driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, the person has the choice of whether the test shall be of his or her blood or breath and the officer shall advise the person that he or she has that choice.”). I do agree with the majority, however, that a similar ability to choose is not mandated by our own implied consent law.
Justice TODD joins this concurring opinion.