finding exhaustion doctrine inapplicable where party presented “purely legal challenge to an agency’s jurisdiction, not a factual one” as was case in Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh
How later courts described this case
- finding exhaustion doctrine inapplicable where party presented “purely legal challenge to an agency’s jurisdiction, not a factual one” as was case in Mercy Hospital of Pittsburgh
- explaining that SEPTA operates "in over 100 municipalities across southeastern Pennsylvania.”
- noting that the court is not aware of “any statute remotely suggesting the [PFPO] is viable outside of Philadelphia”
- exhaustion of remedies before agency was not required for challenge to agency's jurisdiction in seven administrative proceedings against plaintiff that were pending before the agency at the time action was filed
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
dissenting.
I differ with the majority’s approach of remanding to the Commonwealth Court to ascertain legislative intent because, as I read the intermediate court’s decision, it already undertook that task. Accord Concurring and Dissenting Opinion at 95 (Castille, C.J.); see, e.g., SEPTA v. City of Phila., 20 A.3d 558, 561-62 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2011) (concluding that, under SEPTA’s enabling legislation, SEPTA is a state agency and that, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission was intended to have exclusive jurisdiction over state agencies like SEPTA). As to substance, I am aligned with Mr. Chief Justice Cas-tille’s position — and that of the Commonwealth Court majority — that the General Assembly did not intend for SEPTA to be subject to suit by the local human relations commissions of the municipalities in which it conducts operations. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.