explaining that to satisfy excited utterance hearsay exception it must first be shown that declarant had witnessed event sufficiently startling and so close in point of time as to render declarant’s reflective thought processes inoperable and, second, that his declarations were spontaneous reaction to that startling event
How later courts described this case
- explaining that to satisfy excited utterance hearsay exception it must first be shown that declarant had witnessed event sufficiently startling and so close in point of time as to render declarant’s reflective thought processes inoperable and, second, that his declarations were spontaneous reaction to that startling event
- holding that the defendant waived his claim regarding attorney-client privilege by failing to raise it in the trial court and stating “that preservation of the specific argument in support of the ground for reversal is required for appellate review” (citation omitted)
- concluding that a victim’s statement “they’re going to kill me” was an excited utterance -6- J-S57012-15 in part because, “[a] threat upon one’s life is certainly a startling event[]’”
- describing an excited utterance as a “spontaneous declaration by a person whose mind has been suddenly made subject to an overpowering emotion caused by some unexpected and shocking occurrence, which that person has just participated in or closely witnessed, and made in reference to some phase of that occurrence which he[, or she,] perceived, and this declaration must be made so near the occurrence both in time and place as to exclude the likelihood of its having emanated in whole or in part from his[, or her,] reflective faculties”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
concurring.
I join the majority. I write separately merely to reiterate that stating that capital cases are “subjected to the closest scrutiny,” Majority Op., at 168, should not be construed as affording a more complete level of scrutiny to capital cases. As I have previously expressed, relaxing requirements of proof for capital defendants or affording these cases greater scrutiny than is given others does not afford those others the equal protection of the laws. See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 576 Pa. 332 , 839 A.2d 245, 255 (2003) (Eakin, J, concurring) (“[T]he constitution does not afford some lesser right to effective counsel on those charged with noncapital crimes. The right to counsel inures to the capital defendant, the felon, and the misdemean-ant alike.”). Defendants not convicted of capital murder do not get scrutiny that is less close, nor do they deserve “less exacting review” than capital defendants.