stating that the PCRA places time limitations on claims, and in doing so, “strikes a reasonable ____________________________________________ 3 The record reflects that Appellant was represented at trial by Chandra V. Bliece, Esq. - 11 - J-S29034-21 balance between society’s need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person’s need to demonstrate that there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his conviction”
How later courts described this case
- stating that the PCRA places time limitations on claims, and in doing so, “strikes a reasonable ____________________________________________ 3 The record reflects that Appellant was represented at trial by Chandra V. Bliece, Esq. - 11 - J-S29034-21 balance between society’s need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person’s need to demonstrate that there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his conviction”
- holding that “[b]ecause individuals who are not serving a state sentence have no liberty interest in and therefore no due process right to collateral review of that sentence, the [PCRA’s] statutory limitation of collateral review to individuals serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation, or parole is consistent with the due process prerequisite of a protected liberty interest.”
- stating that the PCRA places time limitations on claims, and in doing so, “strikes a reasonable balance between society’s need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person’s need to demonstrate that there has been an error in the proceedings that resulted in his conviction”
- holding that “in the context of the jurisdictional timeliness restrictions on the right to bring a PCRA petition . . . the constitutional nature of a collateral claim does not overcome the legislature’s restrictions on collateral review” (cleaned up)
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Commonwealth v. Delgros, E., Aplt., 183 A.3d 352 (2018)
He argues that Turner is distinguishable because it did not involve a defendant's attempt to raise ineffectiveness claims in post-sentence motions, as occurred here.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
dissenting.
In Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726 (2002), this Court expressed a strong preference for deferral of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to post-conviction review. See id. at 67-68 , 813 A.2d at 738 . In the interceding years, the Court obviously has been divided concerning whether, and to what degree, flexibility should attend the Grant rule. Compare, e.g., Commonwealth v. Liston, 602 Pa. 10, 17-20 , 977 A.2d 1089, 1093-95 (2009), with id. at 20-30 , 977 A.2d at 1095-1101 (Castille, C.J., concurring, joined by Saylor and Eakin, J.J.), with id. at 30-33 , 977 A.2d at 1101-03 (Baer, J.). Given the palpable uncertainty in this regard, I fail to see how a postconviction petitioner should be penalized for adhering to the Court’s stated (and, for post-Growi cases, potentially inflexible) preference.
I also incorporate here, by reference, the thoughts concerning short-sentence scenarios expressed in my concurrence in Commonwealth v. Holmes, — Pa. —, 79 A.3d 562, 585-86 (Oct.2013). Although the majority correctly observes that Ap-pellee has not set forth a claim under Article V, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, I find that the due process and right-to-counsel concerns that she has asserted overlap with the concern that she should be permitted at least one opportunity to present her constitutional challenges to her judgment of sentence.