holding that appellant’s challenge to her conviction for aggravated assault graded as a second-degree felony on the basis that she was charged only with aggravated assault graded as a first-degree felony was not a non- waivable illegality-of-sentencing claim
How later courts described this case
- holding that appellant’s challenge to her conviction for aggravated assault graded as a second-degree felony on the basis that she was charged only with aggravated assault graded as a first-degree felony was not a non- waivable illegality-of-sentencing claim
- holding that, because the defendant’s challenge to the grading of her offense involved her underlying conviction at trial and not the sentence imposed, the claim did not implicate the legality of her sentence and, thus, it was subject to waiver
- finding appellant’s claim did not implicate non- waivable illegal sentencing issue where evaluation of Appellant’s underlying claim depended upon what offenses were charged and pursued, rather than a fatal problem with the sentence imposed
- explaining that "F1s" are first-degree felonies and "F2s" are second-degree felonies
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion for the most part, although I differ with the notion that the legality of a sentence is wholly independent of the legality of the underlying conviction. See Majority Opinion at 461-62. Since a conviction is the essential supporting infrastructure for a sentence, I suggest that “illegality” with respect to the former extends to the latter as well. Cf. Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 228-29 , 121 S.Ct. 712, 714 , 148 L.Ed.2d 629 (2001) (per curiam) (holding that a conviction for conduct which was not prohibited by a statute, as properly interpreted by a subsequent decision, violates due process, despite previous litigation of claim on direct appeal). The alternative is for courts to accept as legal a sentence which is grounded upon an illegal conviction.
From my point of view, the difficulty in this line of inquiry lies in establishing an appropriate understanding of the use of the term “illegality,” for the relevant purposes. See generally Commonwealth v. Foster, 609 Pa. 502, 539-41 , 17 A.3d 332, 355-57 (2011) (Saylor, J., concurring) (favoring a return to the concept of “per se ” illegality as the appropriate litmus). Certainly, I support the majority’s explanation that routine claims of trial-court error and fact-bound challenges cannot qualify; otherwise, the public interest in the finality of judgments of sentence would be wholly undermined. Accord id. Furthermore, in the present case, I am in agreement with the majority that Appellee’s grievance as vindicated by the Superior Court is of a type which is fairly subordinated to ordinary rules of issue preservation.