holding prosecutor’s remarks that “this closing speech [has] become, for me, sort of a benediction for all the evil that we have been confronted with in this case” did not have unavoidable effect of prejudicing the jurors and rendering them incapable of weighing evidence and rendering a true verdict
How later courts described this case
- holding prosecutor’s remarks that “this closing speech [has] become, for me, sort of a benediction for all the evil that we have been confronted with in this case” did not have unavoidable effect of prejudicing the jurors and rendering them incapable of weighing evidence and rendering a true verdict
- stating, to prevail on a claim of most recent counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to raise an -6- J-S18041-17 allegation of earlier counsel’s ineffectiveness, a PCRA petitioner must present a layered claim that shows ineffectiveness at each layer of allegedly ineffective representation
- noting that a jury is presumed to have followed instructions provided by the trial court
- holding that a petitioner waived his ineffective assistance of counsel claims because it was not included in his PCRA Petition and the PCRA court did not give him permission to amend his PCRA petition
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EAKIN,
concurring.
I join the majority; however, I write separately to reiterate my disfavor of a rule evaluating counsel’s performance which applies only to capital defendants. See Commonwealth v. Brooks, 576 Pa. 332 , 839 A.2d 245, 255-56 (2003) (Eakin, J., concurring). This case, and future failure-to-meet cases, may be properly analyzed under the long-standing framework announced in Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153 , 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (1987); therefore, it is unnecessary to afford capital defendants — based solely on their status as a capital defendant — the ability to bypass the requirement of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Brooks, at 255 (Eakin, J., concurring) (“[T]he constitution does not afford some lesser right to effective counsel on those charged with noncap-ital crimes. The right to counsel inures to the capital defendant, the felon, and the misdemeanant alike.”). Thus, I agree with the majority that appellee failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to meet with him face-to-face prior to trial. However, to the extent the majority would “save for another day the issue of whether, in a post-Brooks case, a new trial would be warranted [in a similar factual scenario,]” Majority Op. at 431 n.6,1 would analyze that case based solely on the defendant’s ability to demonstrate actual prejudice under Pierce and its progeny.