concluding that the PCRA court did not have to address the merits of two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that defendant raised for the first time in his response to the Rule 907 notice where the defendant did not also request leave to amend his PCRA petition
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the PCRA court did not have to address the merits of two claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that defendant raised for the first time in his response to the Rule 907 notice where the defendant did not also request leave to amend his PCRA petition
- concluding that claims raised for the first time in response to the court’s Rule 907 notice are not preserved for review unless petitioner seeks, and the PCRA court grants, permission to file an amended petition
- stating, “[a] claim that the PCRA court erred as a matter of law in permitting counsel to withdraw, although necessarily discussing PCRA counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness, is not an ineffectiveness claim[]”
- explaining that if PCRA counsel is permitted to withdraw pursuant to Turner/Finley, new counsel shall not be appointed, and the appellant must look to his own resources for future proceedings
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION BY
COLVILLE, J.:
I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the PCRA court and PCRA counsel complied with the Tumer/Finley requirements. Regarding Appellant’s claims that PCRA counsel rendered ineffective assis *1193 tance of counsel, I would find that he preserved these claims for appellate review by presenting them in his response to the PCRA court’s notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without holding an evidentiary hearing. Commonwealth v. Pitts, 603 Pa. 1 , 981 A.2d 875 , 880 n. 4 (2009). I concur with the Majority’s conclusion that these claims, as well as Appellant’s claims regarding trial counsel’s stewardship, do not entitle him to relief. Thus, I, too, would affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition.