holding that defendant had failed to prove that there was any “exculpatory or impeaching evidence that the Commonwealth had an obligation to disclose under Brady” where PCRA court found the Commonwealth’s evidence was more credible on the issue of whether the alleged Brady material—a cooperation agreement with the Commonwealth’s key witness—existed
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant had failed to prove that there was any “exculpatory or impeaching evidence that the Commonwealth had an obligation to disclose under Brady” where PCRA court found the Commonwealth’s evidence was more credible on the issue of whether the alleged Brady material—a cooperation agreement with the Commonwealth’s key witness—existed
- holding that a witness’s testimony that another individual told him and the defendant that the victim had robbed the individual was not hearsay when it was not offered to show that the robbery occurred but to show only that the statement had been made to the defendant and motivated the defendant to act
- stating “reversible error arises from a prosecutor’s comments only where their unavoidable effect is to prejudice the jurors, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a fair verdict”
- stating, “[w]hile evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible to prove the character of a person in order to show conduct in conformity therewith, evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible when offered to prove some other relevant fact, such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring and dissenting.
I agree with Appellant’s position that: the trial court erred by overruling the defense objection to Commonwealth rebuttal evidence of a remark by Appellant that he contemplated assassinating attendees (presumably, the victim’s family and friends) at the funeral for the victim; the inflammatory effect of such evidence substantially outweighed its probative value, particularly in light of the Commonwealth’s otherwise very substantial case of guilt; and appellate counsel lacked any reasonable basis for failing to advance the salient claim of trial court error. I support the majority’s holding affirming the order of the post-conviction court as to the guilt phase based on an evaluation of the prejudice criterion of the ineffective inquiry, again, in view of the strong evidence of guilt. However, given the significant possibility of spillover prejudice which may have affected the penalty determination, I would vacate the death verdict and remand for a new sentencing hearing.