Opinion

Fagan v. Smith

  • 615 Pa. 87
  • 41 A.3d 816
  • 2012 Pa. LEXIS 453
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Feb 29, 2012
Status
Published
Author
Eakin
On the bench
Eakin, Files, Melvin, Saylor
Cited by
18 cases

explaining mandamus relief is available “to compel the performance of official duties whose scope is defined as a result of the mandamus action litigation. Thus, . . . ‘mandamus will lie to compel action by an official where his refusal to act in the requested way stems from his erroneous interpretation of the law’”

How later courts described this case

  • explaining mandamus relief is available “to compel the performance of official duties whose scope is defined as a result of the mandamus action litigation. Thus, . . . ‘mandamus will lie to compel action by an official where his refusal to act in the requested way stems from his erroneous interpretation of the law’”
  • assuming King’s Bench jurisdiction over electors’ petition for mandamus and ordering the Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives to issue writs of election for special elections to fill vacancies in enumerated legislative districts

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice EAKIN,

dissenting.

I join the dissenting statement of Justice Saylor.

The majority suggests § 2778a must yield to the Constitution, and indeed all statutes must. However, there has been no constitutional challenge to this statute. This is a mandamus request, suggesting the Constitution impliedly requires immediate action by the Speaker.

The act of setting elections is not discretionary — I agree with the majority on this point — but that does not equate to holding there is no discretion in when the act must be accomplished. The Constitution is silent on the matter of when the act must be accomplished — in the absence of a requirement of immediate action, it requires action within a reasonable time. What is reasonable of course depends on the specific situation, and here, the situation is not one the framers were likely to have considered.

The statute recognizes that when districts are realigned, timetables are necessarily changed; when an anticipated realignment is successfully challenged in court, the timetable is even further askew. I find the statute to be a reasonable, and not unconstitutional, effort to address an unfortunate situation.

As Justice Saylor notes, we are not presented with a properly framed constitutional challenge to a statute. We are asked for mandamus relief. As the statute vests discretion in the Speaker under the present circumstances, mandamus is inappropriate. Hence, I dissent.

Justice ORIE MELVIN joins this Dissenting Statement.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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