finding no violation of public policy that would void the unambiguous “regular use” UIM exclusion in plaintiff’s insurance policy where plaintiff had not demonstrated that he could not have purchased a supplemental rider waiving that exclusion from defendant
How later courts described this case
- finding no violation of public policy that would void the unambiguous “regular use” UIM exclusion in plaintiff’s insurance policy where plaintiff had not demonstrated that he could not have purchased a supplemental rider waiving that exclusion from defendant
- holding that a police officer injured while in the scope of his employment was precluded from recovering underinsured motorist benefits under his personal auto policy based on the “regular use” exclusion
- stating that “the overall policies of the MVFRL” include “cost containment and the correlation between the scope of coverage and the reasonable premiums collected.” (citation omitted)
- holding that out of respect for the parties’ freedom of contract, this Court has expressed great reluctance to disrupt an otherwise valid agreement on public policy grounds
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority’s holding and much of its reasoning. My modest differences are as follows.
First, I agree with the majority that there is a strong public policy favoring the protection of first responders. See Majority Opinion, op. at 1202-03. Even so, I agree with Appellee that such policy is not so overarching as to override rational contractual limitations on coverage provided by commercial insurers in the absence of specific legislative or regulatory guidance. See Brief for Appellee at 1. In this regard, I fully support the majority’s explanation that the critical issue in addressing geographic policy limitations lies in determining to what extent the General Assembly envisioned that coverage must be portable (or follow the insured outside the vehicle or vehicles listed on the policy). See Majority Opinion, op. at 1204-05. While I dissented in Burstein based on the belief *1210 that the Insurance Department should exercise its rulemaking responsibilities to reassume an active role in determining the appropriate limits on portability, see Burstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 570 Pa. 177, 220 , 809 A.2d 204, 230 (2002) (Saylor, J., dissenting), I have seen little movement in that direction since that time. Cf. Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Schneider, 599 Pa. 131 , 145 n. 8, 960 A.2d 442 , 450 n. 8 (2008). Given that there are mixed policy concerns in play, and the Legislature and the regulators have not spoken clearly on this issue, it appears to me that, rightly or wrongly, much latitude has been left to the insurance companies in determining the appropriate degree of portability. 1
I would also once and for all abandon the rubric that cost containment was the overarching policy concern of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, since the act clearly retained the core remedial objectives of the prior regulatory scheme. See id. at 145-46 & n. 8, 960 A.2d at 450 -51 & n. 8.
. As I explained in my responsive opinion in Burstein , the observation that the offer of UM/ UIM coverage is mandatory does not answer the question of how far beyond insured vehicles the Legislature intended for the coverage to apply. See Burstein, 570 Pa. at 188 , 809 A.2d at 210 (Saylor, J., dissenting).