holding that the plaintiff presented enough evidence at trial of each of the required factors to support the jury’s conclusion that the factors had been met
How later courts described this case
- holding that the plaintiff presented enough evidence at trial of each of the required factors to support the jury’s conclusion that the factors had been met
- “[T]he only stated mandatory requirements of the product-line exception in Pennsylvania [are] the three Ray factors[.]”
- judgment notwithstanding the verdict denied on same product line element to defendant successor corporation that produced “fire wagons” with alterations as compared to the injury causing fire truck
- bystanders who witnessed relatives killed and/or injured by [a] defective [fire hose] allowed to recover under [Second Restatement] Section 402A for emotional distress even though they suffered no physical injuries
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Concurring and Dissenting OPINION BY
ORIE MELVIN, J.:
¶ 11 concur in the Majority’s disposition of each of Appellants’ claims on appeal save one: the award of damages for emotional distress.
¶ 2 Although I recognize the gravity of the situation witnessed by Appellees in this case, the Majority as well as the parties acknowledge that no appellate court in Pennsylvania has addressed the issue of whether a party may recover damages for emotional distress in a strict product liability action. 8 Nevertheless, I believe that the precise language of Section 402A of the Restatement, which our Supreme Court adopted in 1966 in Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424 , 220 A.2d 853 (1966), is controlling:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id. at 427 , 220 A.2d at 854 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Touts § 402A (1965)) (emphasis added). Further, I conclude that the trial court’s rebanee on negligence principles in permitting the issue to be determined by the jury was in error. See, e.g., Bugosh v. Allen Refractories Co., 932 A.2d 901, 911 (Pa.Super.2007) (stating that, “negligence concepts have no place in *522 a case based on strict liability.”) (citations omitted).
¶ 3 Hence, I would vacate the judgment and remand solely for the purpose of permitting the trial court to mold the verdict accordingly. For this reason, I respectfully dissent from the Majority’s disposition of this single issue.
. The claim against Appellants proceeded solely on the basis of strict product liability. See, e.g., Appellees' brief at 46 ("the underlying claim sounds in strict liability rather than negligence”); id. at 40, 42-43; N.T. Trial, 9/5-7/06, at 7, 119-20; N.T. Trial, 9/8-11/06, at 745-749; N.T. Trial, 9/12-14/06, at 1194-95, 1252-58, 1307-08.