The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority disposition of this appeal, because I believe that it effectuates a plain-meaning application of Section 301(c)(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 411(2). I write only to note that Employer’s substantive due process *892 argument gives me pause, since the plain-meaning interpretation of Section 301(c)(2) eliminates (or at least severely restricts) the conventional workers’ compensation concept of employer-specific work relatedness in the occupational disease setting. I believe, however, that any developed discussion of substantive due process relative to workers’ compensation would need to encompass a discussion of the trilogy of decisions in which the United States Supreme Court, in very general terms, approved the basic loss-spreading scheme inherent in the general workers’ compensation concept as consistent with constitutional due process norms. See New York Central R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 , 37 S.Ct. 247 , 61 L.Ed. 667 (1917); Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 , 37 S.Ct. 255 , 61 L.Ed. 678 (1917); Mountain Timber Co. v. State, 243 U.S. 219 , 37 S.Ct. 260 , 61 L.Ed. 685 (1917). Since Employer has not included such a discussion in its brief, or referenced any other substantive due process decision, I find its argument on this point to be insufficiently developed to warrant further consideration in this case.
Justice BALDWIN joins this concurring statement.