explaining that the veterans’ preference policy outlined in the Commission’s management directive “reflect[s] the will of the legislature that veterans be given mandatory preference in appointment when their names appear together with those of non-veterans on a list of eligibles”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that the veterans’ preference policy outlined in the Commission’s management directive “reflect[s] the will of the legislature that veterans be given mandatory preference in appointment when their names appear together with those of non-veterans on a list of eligibles”
- holding that “in determining legislative intent, all sections of a statute must be read together and in conjunction with each other, and construed with reference to the entire statute”
- analyzing statute more similar to former RCW 41.04.010 than the general veterans’ preference statute, increasing exam points for veterans and specifically requiring “mandatory appointment preference”
- ‘‘[T]he [veterans preference provisions of the Military Affairs Act] clearly require[ ] that mandatory veterans preference be afforded to any veteran who is applying for a civil service position and who is on an Eligible List due to his performance on the civil service examination[;] [t]he appointing authority may not impose additional threshold requirements on a veteran under the guise that it is setting forth the requisite qualifications[.]''
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SAYLOR, Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority’s opinion save for its discussion of standing in Section I. In my view, an assessment of the Commission’s ability to enforce the veteran’s preference provisions of the Military Affairs Act does not implicate principles of standing, but merely the authority of the Commission under its enabling legislation, the Civil Service Act.